Striking similarities between the Wagner Group, and the SS of Nazi Germany. Ten points for dealing with Wagner group presented, and other comments
quote
Wagner Roadmap: Ten Recommendations to Fight the Group
1. The sanctions discussion needs to be expanded, as such designations should aim to shame Wagner’s state partners.?
2. Sanctions lists should expand to include actors in third-party countries, such as Broker Expert LLC, a Russian-owned company widely reported to be shipping heavy machinery to support Wagner Group forestry activities in CAR, and First Industrial Company, a business owned by Wagner operator Dimitri Sytyi which concocts cheap “Russian” alcohol in Cameroon and sells it in CAR.
3. Perhaps one of the more important lessons for countering Wagner and other Russian PMCs is the importance of multilateralism.
4. NATO must also continue to consider proactive tools to counter Russian and other PMCs.?
5. NATO should work to amplify efforts to push the adoption of the 2008 Montreux Document—an international agreement designed to reaffirm the legal obligations of states where PMCs originate and for those who hire them.
6. The Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs require consideration within a larger great power discussion, particularly as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has firmly aligned Europe and the US against Russia.
7. US?senior leaders should demonstrate a greater diplomatic commitment to African allies and put pressure on other African leaders considering, or currently contracting, the Wagner Group and other Russian PMC operations.
8. International bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and the East African Community (EAC) should reevaluate their approaches to peacekeeping and instability.
9. Exploiting the friction between Wagner’s financier and the MoD should also be considered a worthwhile policy option.
10. Last, NATO members must formalize methods of blocking contact with the Wagner Group through their international activities.?
?
The Wagner Group is both the tip of the Russian spear in Ukraine and the state’s backroom dealer in Africa. A mercenary outfit originally designed as an expeditionary foreign policy tool offering Russia the guise of plausible deniability, Wagner ascended as a leading force in the Kremlin’s campaign to wage war in Ukraine as evidenced by its scorched earth assault in Bakhmut
end of quote
In essence it is time to call it as it is. Wagner group activities are one and the same with the Waffen SS of Hitler's Germany
quote
TAGS
Believing that Germany would be victorious in war, SS chief?Heinrich Himmler ?intended to strengthen the position of the SS relative to the established German elites after?the war. To this end, Himmler persuaded?Adolf Hitler ?in late 1939 to permit the establishment of an armed SS force known as the?Waffen-SS.
Although initially restricted to four divisions, the Waffen-SS eventually fielded more than 20 divisions. This created an armed force of about half a million men and established a command and operations structure to rival the German army.
end of quote
Very similar to the Wagner Group. Damn similar. But there is more:
In Germany the Waffen SS after May 1945 helped organized an armed resistance to the occupation of Germany. In the American sector of German occupation , in three years US authorities hanged captured Werwolves which broke the back of them.
quote
Werwolf?(pronounced?[?ve???v?lf] ,?German ?for "werewolf ") was a?Nazi ?plan which began development in 1944,[2] ?to create a?resistance ?force which would operate behind enemy lines as the?Allies ?advanced through?Germany , in parallel with the?Wehrmacht ?fighting in front of the lines. It is widely misconstrued as having been intended to be a?guerrilla ?force to harass Allied forces after the defeat of Germany, a misconception created by?Joseph Goebbels ?through propaganda disseminated in the waning weeks of the war through his "Radio Werwolf,” which was not actually connected in any way with the military unit.
end of quote
These Werwolves when caught were summarily killed, and eventually by about 1950 most of the resistance stopped. But it was materially aided by the Waffen SS
We should treat the Wagner group much the same way as how we treated the Waffen SS and their lineal descendants
quote
Perry Biddiscombe ?has offered a somewhat different view. In his books?Werwolf!: The History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Movement, 1944–1946?(1998)[10] ?and?The Last Nazis: SS Werwolf Guerrilla Resistance in Europe, 1944–1947?(2000), Biddiscombe asserts that after retreating to the?Black Forest ?and the?Harz mountains , the Werwolf continued resisting the occupation until at least 1947, possibly until 1949–50. However, he characterizes German post-surrender resistance as "minor",[34] ?and calls the post-war Werwolfs "desperadoes"[35] ?and "fanatics living in forest huts".
end of quote
Minor or not they had to go. And we should treat internationally Wagner fighters the same way the SS and Werwolves. Finish them off
quote
The Wagner Group’s Expanding Global Footprint
Wagner Roadmap: Ten Recommendations to Fight the Group
1. The sanctions discussion needs to be expanded, as such designations should aim to shame Wagner’s state partners.?
2. Sanctions lists should expand to include actors in third-party countries, such as Broker Expert LLC, a Russian-owned company widely reported to be shipping heavy machinery to support Wagner Group forestry activities in CAR, and First Industrial Company, a business owned by Wagner operator Dimitri Sytyi which concocts cheap “Russian” alcohol in Cameroon and sells it in CAR.
3. Perhaps one of the more important lessons for countering Wagner and other Russian PMCs is the importance of multilateralism.
4. NATO must also continue to consider proactive tools to counter Russian and other PMCs.?
5. NATO should work to amplify efforts to push the adoption of the 2008 Montreux Document—an international agreement designed to reaffirm the legal obligations of states where PMCs originate and for those who hire them.
6. The Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs require consideration within a larger great power discussion, particularly as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has firmly aligned Europe and the US against Russia.
7. US?senior leaders should demonstrate a greater diplomatic commitment to African allies and put pressure on other African leaders considering, or currently contracting, the Wagner Group and other Russian PMC operations.
8. International bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and the East African Community (EAC) should reevaluate their approaches to peacekeeping and instability.
9. Exploiting the friction between Wagner’s financier and the MoD should also be considered a worthwhile policy option.
10. Last, NATO members must formalize methods of blocking contact with the Wagner Group through their international activities.?
?
The Wagner Group is both the tip of the Russian spear in Ukraine and the state’s backroom dealer in Africa. A mercenary outfit originally designed as an expeditionary foreign policy tool offering Russia the guise of plausible deniability, Wagner ascended as a leading force in the Kremlin’s campaign to wage war in Ukraine as evidenced by its scorched earth assault in Bakhmut. Meanwhile, its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, cuts deals with African junta leaders promising counterterror assistance for access to resources while he feuds with the Russian military brass over Ukraine. But Wagner is not the first Russian private military company (PMC), and it will not be the last. Throughout the tenure of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the use of semi-state security forces like PMCs has accelerated.
Russia’s current use of PMCs reads like a classic case of “coup[1] -proofing” and simultaneously enables Moscow to use proxy forces as part of its broader irregular warfare strategy to enhance Russia’s reach abroad and achieve its geopolitical goals. Wagner trades its services—counterterror assistance and personal protection—for lucrative resource extraction deals[2] , undermining Western political-military relationships[3] ?with African states at the same time.
Concurrently, the West must consider the context in which Wagner has become a viable policy choice for governments. Insecurity wrought by the growth of Islamist insurgencies in the Sahel region of Africa has crippled already fragile security forces. Coupled with a surge in civil-military crises over the past several years, Europe’s patchwork[4] ?counterterrorism efforts and the United States’ “behind the wire”[5] ?approach are insufficient in the eyes of the military regimes that seized power in Mali and Burkina Faso. Though such Western efforts were well-intentioned, they led to unintended consequences, which allowed a group like Wagner to fill a growing security gap. Addressing sustained insecurity in the Sahel will take more than lip service. With France having exhausted its relations with Bamako and Ouagadougou, Washington must think creatively about how best to counter terrorist threats that are gaining traction in the wake of Wagner’s arrival.
A man wearing a camouflage uniform walks out of PMC Wagner Centre, which is a project implemented by the businessman and founder of the Wagner private military group Yevgeny Prigozhin, during the official opening of the office block in Saint Petersburg, Russia, November 4, 2022. REUTERS/Igor Russak
?
Losses in Europe, Gains in Africa
Recently, much has been written about the Wagner Group. These articles may lead to some confusion because the Wagner Group is constantly evolving, eschewing classifications, evading sanctions, and frustrating Western generals and politicians alike. The group’s battlefield behavior in Ukraine and recruitment tactics have changed, and rumblings of new frontiers in Burkina Faso, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) could provide alternate paths for economic and political gain. Indeed, if the Russian General Staff shuts Wagner Group out of the Ukraine conflict, it could return to a place of relative success when it resumes missions in Africa.
In the past few months, Wagner has assumed center stage with its involvement in the months-long battle around Bakhmut. The battle, a 21st-century[6] ?Verdun, has seen Wagner locked in a war of attrition with Ukrainian armed forces for a city with little strategic value[7] . Like Verdun, Bakhmut has become a symbol, as both sides see victory there as key to the war effort. The Wagner Group has mimicked World War I-style tactics, using human waves[8] ?to storm positions while taking massive casualties among the group’s newly recruited prisoner cadres[9] . Although estimates vary, UK sources put Wagner’s prisoner recruit casualties at approximately 50 percent[10] , while US sources gauge that Wagner suffered north of 30,000 casualties[11] .
Funeral of Wagner group fighter Dmitry Menshikov, who died during a special military operation in Ukraine, at the military section of the Beloostrovskoe cemetery. 24.12.2022 Russia, St. Petersburg Photo credit: Alexander Koriakov/Kommersant/Sipa USA(Sipa via AP Images)
Many wonder what might be next for these prisoners[12] . Some may turn to organized crime after the war. Others may continue with Wagner in other operations. Either way, Wagner’s new recruits could have cascading effects[13] ?on African instability. Indeed, the next shoe to fall may be Burkina Faso, host to persistent jihadist threats, spillover violence, and instability from Mali. Burkina Faso’s government, like Mali’s junta, came to power via a coup and has flirted with Wagner cooperation in recent months. In January, Ouagadougou demanded[14] ?France end its counterinsurgency operations there, saying it would take on the mission of defending itself. France[15] ?subsequently honored that request. Given the country’s inability to defeat jihadist insurgents, a new security partner appears[16] ?essential.
In Ukraine, Wagner’s fortunes seem to have taken a turn for the worse, although this may benefit the group in the long run. Unsurprisingly, Wagner’s heavy losses discouraged further recruitment among prisoners, leading Wagner to completely halt[37] ?prisoner recruitment. Meanwhile, Prigozhin, a loud critic of the Russian military’s strategy in Ukraine, has accused top military officials of treason[38] ?for their failure to supply Wagner with ammunition and air transport. Taken together, these developments suggest that Prigozhin and Wagner are losing[39] ?their campaign to compete directly with the Russian defense establishment. Yet, paradoxically, this ‘demotion’ in Ukraine may save the Wagner Group. Given the high attrition[40] ?rates near Bakhmut, it is unclear how long the group would endure if it maintains its current front-line assault role in the conflict. Instead, a recommitment to Africa would allow Wagner to resume its core mission—acting as an expeditionary force in unstable environments, while pursuing valuable resource extraction contracts and building Russian military-to-military relations with African countries.
An interior view shows PMC Wagner Centre, which is a project implemented by the businessman and founder of the Wagner private military group Yevgeny Prigozhin, during the official opening of the office block in Saint Petersburg, Russia, November 4, 2022. REUTERS/Igor Russak
Mercenary Evolution
While the Wagner Group has emerged as Russia’s premier PMC, Moscow’s use of semi-state[41] ?security forces is far from novel. From Cossacks in the early 20th century to Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov’s “Kadyrovites,” Russia has relied on various paramilitary-style forces both within and outside its territorial boundaries for decades. Under Putin, this trend has expanded[42] . The traditional notion of the state as the primary guarantor of security has gradually eroded during his tenure—morphing into a complex landscape of traditional and irregular armed forces.
Mercenary-esque outfits have been a key feature of the Kremlin’s foreign policy toolkit for much of the past decade. While Wagner first appeared on the battlefield in eastern Ukraine circa 2014 and has ascended to the pinnacle of the Russian PMC hierarchy, other groups such as Anti-Terror Orel, the Moran Security Group[43] , and Wagner’s immediate predecessor, the Slavonic Corps, were already operating[44] ?in places like Nigeria and Syria well before Wagner fired its first shot. Many of Russia’s modern PMCs have close, if not direct, links to the Russian Ministry of Defense and Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU.
But Wagner is not your ordinary PMC. In fact, the degree to which Wagner is truly a “private” and independent entity is questionable. Instead, the defining feature[45] ?of Wagner is that it blends private corporate interests with Russian state interests. Wagner itself is best viewed as the military component of an extensive network[46] ?of business entities owned, operated, or financed by Prigozhin. The group does not operate without the Kremlin’s approval like a genuinely independent private military contractor might. While the organization may wield some autonomy at the tactical and operational levels, Moscow maintains a tight grip to ensure Wagner is in alignment with the government’s broader foreign policy. This grip may have loosened over the summer of 2022 as Wagner’s footprint in Ukraine expanded, but the Kremlin has made a recent, concerted effort to shorten Wagner’s leash and streamline its activities.
Taken together, the PMC landscape in Russia is on a concerning trajectory and has been for years. Even if the ongoing tensions between Prigozhin and the Russian General Staff ultimately lead to Wagner’s demise, it will not signal the collapse of the Russian PMC industry. The model itself—using mercenaries in the battle to maintain plausible deniability while advancing Russian foreign policy interests at minimal costs—is here to stay. Eventually, one of the existing Russian PMCs, or perhaps new ones currently in development, will supplant Wagner, just as the end of the US PMC Blackwater was not the end of American private security firms. Like Blackwater, which became Xe Services and later Academi, PMCs can simply rebrand and reorganize under new names. Moscow will undoubtedly work to retain direct control and oversight in this space. However, emboldened actors like Prigozhin may have inspired the next generation of Russian PMCs. And with the influx of war veterans produced by the current conflict, there will be no shortage[55] ?of personnel to stack the PMC rank-and-file.
Limited Responses
The potential growth and proliferation of Russian PMCs should concern Western decision-makers. The Biden administration, to say nothing of the broader US government, cannot agree on a strategy to most effectively counter the Wagner Group[56] . In late January, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated[57] ?the Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organization (TCO). The TCO designation makes it harder for Wagner to operate but also has its limitations. Beyond its symbolism, which is significant, OFAC’s designation of Wagner as a TCO is intended to warn states of the consequences of doing business with the mercenary outfit. But the states where Wagner maintains connections—Libya, Sudan, Syria, Mali, and CAR, to name a few—are unlikely to be persuaded[58] ?by policies crafted in Washington. These governments already know what they are getting into when they invite Wagner to their countries—a security-for-resources agreement with no strings attached[59] , including no lectures over human rights abuses. In a speech delivered at the end of February, French President Emmanuel Macron[60] ?called the Wagner Group “life insurance of failing regimes in Africa.” Even China has not been deterred from dealing with Wagner. The US recently levied sanctions against Changsha Tianyi Space Science and Technology Research Institute for supplying Wagner fighters with satellite imagery. Known as “Spacety China,” it was one of sixteen entities recently sanctioned[61] ?by the Treasury Department.
Bipartisan pressure has been building in Congress for the Biden administration to label Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism (SST)[62] ?and, through the reintroduction[63] ?of the Holding Russian Mercenaries Accountable (HARM) Act[64] , to designate Wagner as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). An SST designation would place dual-export restrictions on the types of materials flowing to the Russian war machine. An official FTO designation under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act would go beyond existing sanctions against Wagner to bring into effect the US material support to terrorism statutes, which limits financial and business ties, hitting African leaders and Wagner with harsh economic penalties[65] ?for cooperation. In April 2020, the US designated[66] ?the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM), a far-right group with white supremacist ties, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity. RIM members are fighting in Ukraine and maintain ties to Wagner and Task Force Rusich. In early March, US Attorney General Merrick Garland said he would “not object”?[67] to labeling Wagner as an FTO, referring to Prigozhin as a “war criminal.”
Demonstrators hold photographs of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian flags during a sit-in to protest against the visit of the French President Emmanuel Macron and France’s perceived support for neighbouring Rwanda, which Congo accuses of supporting M23 rebels in the east, in front of the French embassy in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, March 1, 2023. REUTERS/Justin Makangara
Wagner Roadmap: A Multisector Approach to Fight the Group
While the US, the European Union, ECOWAS, and a variety of other states and international organizations have tried to respond to Wagner, these attempts have been reactive, struggling to limit the group’s expansion or its numerous human rights abuses. This paper provides ten potential responses, avenues, or ways of thinking about Wagner Group and other Russian-backed PMCs that can be turned into a roadmap to effectively combat the group.
The sanctions discussion needs to be expanded, as such designations should aim to shame Wagner’s state partners. Potential Wagner partners should be informed of the outcomes of associating with the group—long-term instability and greater distrust in governance. Immediate examples include Burkina Faso, Liberia, DRC, and Sierra Leone.
Further, the Wagner Group has become very shrewd in sanctions-proofing its activities, as can be seen through its economic pipeline from Douala to Bangui. Third-party states should be warned against allowing Wagner Group arms, industrial equipment, or other elements from transiting across their borders. Wagner’s TCO designation may have helped deter some states in this regard, but more work is needed. Sanctions lists should expand to include actors in third-party countries, such as Broker Expert LLC[71] , a Russian-owned company widely reported to be shipping heavy machinery to support Wagner Group forestry activities in CAR, and First Industrial Company[72] , a business owned by Wagner operator Dimitri Sytyi which concocts cheap “Russian” alcohol in Cameroon and sells it in CAR. Governments must stay vigilant, updating sanctions lists routinely to account for shell corporations, new business ventures, and other avenues that the Wagner Group and other Russian entities use to evade sanctions.
Perhaps one of the more important lessons for countering Wagner and other Russian PMCs is the importance of multilateralism. Given Wagner’s ability to entice clients into partnerships via coalescence of false promises and disinformation, efforts to counter the group’s activity demand a strong coalition.?
NATO must also continue to consider proactive tools to counter Russian and other PMCs. Moscow’s use of gray-zone tactics via the employment of mercenary outfits like Wagner has frustrated the alliance, and finding effective responses to nontraditional tactics has always been difficult. Given that such hybrid warfare tactics are increasingly the norm, NATO must consider non-kinetic tools that can pack a punch in slowing Wagner’s, and future Russian PMCs’, metastasization.
Though appearing mundane, NATO should work to amplify efforts to push the adoption of the 2008 Montreux Document[79] —an international agreement designed to reaffirm the legal obligations of states where PMCs originate and for those who hire them. The Montreux Document currently has the support[80] ?of 58 states, including nearly all NATO members. NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have also invoked their support for the document. While the likelihood of convincing a state like Russia to commit to an agreement that seriously hampers their ability to use PMCs to operate in legal limbo and avail them of accountability, NATO and its members have an opportunity to push for its global acceptance[81] ?which would seriously restrict the list of potential Wagner clients. In other words, the more states committed to enhancing rules-based norms about PMCs, the more difficult it will be for Wagner and other Russian PMCs to find business and operate with impunity.
The Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs require consideration within a larger great power discussion, particularly as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has firmly aligned Europe and the US against Russia. Indeed, the war in Ukraine is a cautionary tale but also a welcome precedent. Countries across the globe and particularly in Africa need help building defense and civil society responses to pro-authoritarian, particularly Russian, actors. On the kinetic side, the war in Ukraine demonstrates that the West has the means to provide massive military assistance, including arms, equipment, and training to partners in need. At the same time, these tools must not be used haphazardly, leaving a Cold War-like residue of authoritarianism. The West needs to continue corruption-proofing and authoritarian-proofing its “soft” tools in helping to build strong civil societies alongside militaries capable of maintaining a just rule of law.
In the information and media space, Russian-backed sources of disinformation have been on the offensive, with cartoons and other media messaging tools used to sow discord against the West and glamorize the Wagner Group’s interventions in Africa. Western responses must not stoop to this level. Such cartoons are deeply infantilizing[82] ?to target populations, demonstrating how disconnected Russia’s misinformation warriors are from Africans. Western responses should be a stark reminder of the sobering reality—Wagner is a farce and bad for African security and stability. Its high rate of civilian killings in the places it operates, its failure in Mozambique[83] ?and subsequent exit, and its contribution to weak governance across Africa are all areas that should be directly and iteratively communicated to would-be Wagner clients. Such responses, in turn, can act as a deterrent against future Russian PMC operations.
?
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.
[1] ?Catrina Doxsee, “Putin’s Proxies: Examining Russia’s Use of Private Military Companies,” Congressional Testimony, House Oversight and Reform National Security Subcommittee, September 15, 2022,?https://www.csis.org/analysis/putins-proxies-examining-russias-use-private-military-companies .
[2] ?Raphael Parens, “The Wagner Group’s Playbook in Africa: Mali,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 18, 2022,?https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/the-wagner-groups-playbook-in-africa-mali/ .
[3] ?Christopher Faulkner, “Undermining Democracy and Exploiting Clients: The Wagner Group’s Nefarious Activities in Africa ,”?CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Vol. 15, Issue 6, June 2022,?https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/CTC-SENTINEL-062022.pdf .
[4] ?Silvia D’Amato, “Patchwork of Counterterrorism: Analyzing European Types of Cooperation in Sahel,”?International Studies Review, Volume 23, Issue 4, December 2021,?https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/23/4/1518/6295091?login=false .
[5] ?Brian Finucane, “Still at War: The United States in the Sahel,”?Just Security, April 7, 2022,?https://www.justsecurity.org/81028/still-at-war-the-united-states-in-the-sahel/ .
[6] ?Robert Zaretsky, “Ukraine’s Verdun,”?Quillette, February 17, 2023,?https://quillette.com/2023/02/17/ukraines-verdun/ .
[7] ?Sinéad Baker, “Russia has spent 9 months bleeding troops to try to capture a city with limited strategic value, experts say,”?Business Insider, February 14, 2023,?https://www.businessinsider.com/bakhmut-russia-grinds-for-9-months-city-limited-strategic-importance-2023-2 .
[8] ?Mia Jankowicz, “Wagner Group can only afford to throw soldiers into Bakhmut’s ‘meat grinder’ for another 2 months before it runs out of men, Ukrainian commander says,”?Business Insider, April 12, 2023,?https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-group-2-months-human-wave-troops-left-bakhmut-ukraine-2023-4 .
[9] ?Christiaan Triebert, “Video Reveals How Russian Mercenaries Recruit Inmates for Ukraine War,”?New York Times, September 16, 2022,?https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/16/world/europe/russia-wagner-ukraine-video.html .
[10] ?Jack Dutton, “Wagner Group’s Convict Recruits Suffer 50% Casualties in Ukraine War: U.K.,”?Newsweek, February 17, 2023,?https://www.newsweek.com/wagner-group-convict-recruits-casualties-ukraine-1781929 .
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[11] ?Niha Masih, “Over 30,000 Wagner fighters killed or injured in Ukraine, U.S. says,”?Washington Post, February 18, 2023,?https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/18/wagner-group-ukraine-war-casualties/ .
[12] ?Colin P. Clarke, “What Will Become of Russia’s Convict-Soldiers?”?Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2023,?https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-will-become-of-russias-convict-soldiers-wagner-group-kremlin-criminal-organized-crime-ukraine-war-invasion-vladimir-putin-2c9e2f3b .
[13] ?Raphael Parens, “Mercenary Shocks: What the War in Ukraine Will Eventually Mean for Africa,”?War on the Rocks, February 17, 2023,?https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/mercenary-shocks-what-the-war-in-ukraine-will-eventually-mean-for-africa/ .
[14] ?Thiam Ndiaga, “Burkina Faso ends French military accord, says it will defend itself,”?Reuters, January 23, 2023,?https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-confirms-end-military-accord-with-france-2023-01-23/ .
[15] ?“French army officially ends operations in Burkina Faso,”?France 24, February 20, 2023,?https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230220-french-army-officially-ends-operations-in-burkina-faso .
[16] ?Héni Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss, “Oil on the Jihadi Fire: The Repercussions of a Wagner Group Deployment to Burkina Faso,”?CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2023, Vol. 16, Issue 1,?https://ctc.westpoint.edu/oil-on-the-jihadi-fire-the-repercussions-of-a-wagner-group-deployment-to-burkina-faso/ .?
[17] ?“Burkina Faso Under Influence,”?All Eyes on Wagner, February 2023,?https://alleyesonwagner.org/2023/02/05/burkina-faso-under-influence/ .
[18] ?All Eyes on Wagner, Twitter post, February 15, 2023, 11:28 a.m.,?https://twitter.com/alleyesonwagner/status/1625894782164733953?s=46&t=OqXNhgD6-nHHHwoYCEMl0Q .?
[19] ?“Burkina Faso denies favouring Russia’s Nordgold over gold mine permit,”?Reuters, February 6, 2023,?https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-denies-favouring-russias-nordgold-over-gold-mine-permit-2023-02-06/ .
[20] ?“Burkina Faso summons Ghana envoy over president’s claim on Wagner,”?Al Jazeera, December 16, 2022,?https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/16/burkina-faso-summons-ghanaian-ambassador-over-wagner-allegations/ .
[21] ?“Burkina Faso, Mali eye federation after expelling French soldiers,”?Africanews, February 2, 2023,?https://www.africanews.com/2023/02/02/burkina-faso-mali-eye-federation-after-expelling-french-soldiers/ .
[22] ?Erin Banco, “U.S. cable: Russian paramilitary group set to get cash infusion from expanded African mine,”?Politico, January 19, 2023,?https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/19/u-s-cable-russian-paramilitary-group-set-to-get-cash-infusion-from-expanded-african-mine-00078551 .?
[23] ?“Come follow the redwood trees – tracking Wagner’s forestry business in CAR,”?All Eyes on Wagner, July 26, 2022,?https://alleyesonwagner.org/2022/07/26/come-follow-the-redwood-trees-tracking-wagners-forestry-business-in-car/?s=09 .
[24] ?David Ehl, “More than mercenaries: Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa,”?DW, April 17, 2023,?https://www.dw.com/en/more-than-mercenaries-russias-wagner-group-in-africa/a-64822234 .
[25] ?Jane Flanagan, “Pro-Kremlin Wagner mercenaries expand into African coffee business,”?Times (London), January 27, 2023,?https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/pro-kremlin-wagner-mercenaries-expand-into-african-coffee-business-vkp0vt3qw .
[26] ?Mathieu Olivier, “CAR – Cameroon: An investigation into the Wagner Group’s African financial model,”?Africa Report, January 18, 2023,?https://www.theafricareport.com/275235/car-cameroon-an-investigation-into-the-wagner-groups-african-financial-model/ .?
[27] ?Zeinab Mohammed Salih and Jason Burke, “Wagner mercenaries sustain losses in fight for Central African Republic gold,”?Guardian, February 2, 2023,?https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/02/wagner-mercenaries-sustain-losses-in-fight-for-central-african-republic-gold .?
[28] ?Elian Peltier, “Wagner Group May Have Committed War Crimes in Mali, UN Experts Say,”?New York Times, January 31, 2023,?https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/31/world/africa/mali-wagner-civilian-killings.html .?
[29] ?Benoit Faucon, “U.S. Intelligence Points to Wagner Plot Against Key Western Ally in Africa,”? Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2023,?https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-intelligence-points-to-wagner-plot-against-key-western-ally-in-africa-29867547 .
[30] ?Simone Schlindwein, “Are white mercenaries fighting in the DRC conflict?”?DW, January 17, 2023 ,?https://www.dw.com/en/are-white-mercenaries-fighting-in-the-drc-conflict/a-64407711 .
[31] ?Fiston Mahamba Wa Biondi, Twitter post, January 2, 2023, 8:11 a.m., @FMLarousse,?https://twitter.com/FMLarousse/status/1609900066579550209?s=20
[32] ?“Kinshasa: Young Congolese protest upcoming visit of French leader,”?Africanews, March 1, 2023,?https://www.africanews.com/2023/03/01/kinshasa-young-congolese-march-against-upcoming-visit-of-french-leader/ .???
[33] ?Philip Obaji Jr., “How These Mali Coup Plotters Staged a False Flag Pro-Russia March,” Daily Beast, June 2, 2021,?https://ca.news.yahoo.com/pro-russia-demo-false-flag-085554255.html .
[34] ?Fran?ois Picard, Juliette Laurain, Imen Mellaz, and Charles Wente, “Coup after coup: After Mali, pro-Russia sentiment stoked in Burkina Faso,”?France 24, April 10, 2022,?https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/the-debate/20221004-coup-after-coup-after-mali-pro-russia-sentiment-stoked-in-burkina-faso .
[35] ?“Pro-Russia protesters rally in Central African Republic,”?Africanews, March 3, 2023,?https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/05/pro-russia-protesters-rally-in-central-african-republic/ .
[36] ? Raphael Parens, “Conflict in Eastern Congo: A Spark Away from a Regional Conflagration,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 8, 2022,?https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/09/conflict-in-eastern-congo-a-spark-away-from-a-regional-conflagration/ .
[37] ?Sophia Ankel, “Wagner Group stops recruiting prisoners as growing numbers refuse to be enlisted on suicide missions, reports say,”?Business Insider, February 9, 2023,?https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-stops-recruiting-prisoners-suicide-missions-russia-ukraine-2023-2 .
[38] ?Sophia Ankel, “Wagner Group stops recruiting prisoners as growing numbers refuse to be enlisted on suicide missions, reports say,”?Business Insider, February 9, 2023,?https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-stops-recruiting-prisoners-suicide-missions-russia-ukraine-2023-2 .
[39] ?Jamie Dettmer, “Russia’s military chiefs go to war … with each other,”?Politico, February 22, 2023,?https://www.politico.eu/article/yevgeny-prigozhins-ramzan-kadryov-feud-with-russia-top-brass-boils-over/ .
[40] ?Raphael Parens, “Wagner Group Redefined: Threats and Responses,”?Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 30, 2023,?https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/01/wagner-group-redefined-threats-and-responses/ .
[41] ?Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group,”?Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 35, Issue 3, 2019,?https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/1060586X.2019.1591142?scroll=top&role=tab&aria-labelledby=refs .
[42] ?Anna Borshchevskaya , “Russian Private Military Companies: Continuity and Evolution of the Model,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Russia Foreign Policy Papers, December 18, 2019,?https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/12/russian-private-military-companies-continuity-and-evolution-of-the-model/ .?
[43] ?Candace Rondeaux, “Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare,” New America, November 7, 2019,?https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/ .
[44] ?Candace Rondeaux, “Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare,” New America, November 7, 2019,?https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/ .
[45] ?“Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs) ,” Congressional Research Service, September 16, 2020,?https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11650.pdf .
[46] ?Tim Lister, Sebastian Shukla, and Clarissa Ward, “Putin’s private army is trying to increase Russia’s influence in Africa,”?CNN, August 2019,?https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/08/africa/putins-private-army-car-intl/ .?
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[48] ?Ariel Cohen, “The Coming Hurricane: Russian Energy-Giant Gazprom Is Creating An Army ,”?Forbes, February 22, 2023,?https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2023/02/22/the-coming-hurricane-russian-energy-giant-gazprom-is-creating-an-army/?sh=74c2a78242e9 .
[49] ?Sophia Ankel, “Chechen leader says he wants to ‘compete’ with Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin and create his own private military,”?Business Insider, February 20, 2023,?https://www.businessinsider.com/ramzan-kadyrov-private-military-group-wagner-chechen-leader-russia-putin-2023-2?international=true&r=US&IR=T .
[50] ?Caleb Davis and Guy Faulconbridge, “Chechnya’s Kadyrov: one day I plan my own mercenary group,”?Reuters, February 19, 2023,?https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-ally-kadyrov-one-day-i-plan-my-own-private-military-company-2023-02-19/ .
[51] ?Matteo Pugliese, @MatteoPugliese, Twitter Post, February 26, 2023, 9:13 a.m.,
[52] ?Tetiana Lozovenko, “Shoigu deploys his Private Military Company, which competes with Wagner Group, to war against Ukraine,”?Ukrainska Pravda, December 28, 2022,?https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/12/28/7382706/ .
[53] ?Tim Lister, “‘Like turkeys at a shooting range’: Mauling of Russian forces in Donetsk hotspot may signal problems to come,”?CNN, February 14, 2023,?https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/13/europe/russia-ukraine-vuhledar-donetsk-fiasco-intl/index.html .?
[54] ?“Wagner versus Patriot: Fighting for Mercenary Control,”?Russia Monitor, Warsaw Institute , July 12, 2018,?https://warsawinstitute.org/wagner-versus-patriot-fighting-mercenary-control/ .
[55] ?Raphael Parens, “Mercenary Shocks: What the War in Ukraine Will Eventually Mean for Africa,”?War on the Rocks, February 17, 2023,?https://warontherocks.com/2023/02/mercenary-shocks-what-the-war-in-ukraine-will-eventually-mean-for-africa/ .
[56] ?Neil Hauer, “Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries ,”?The Atlantic, August 27, 2018,?https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/russian-mercenaries-wagner-africa/568435/ .
[57] ?“Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization ,” US Department of the Treasury, January 26, 2023,?https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1220 .
[58] ?Christopher Faulkner and Marcel Plichta, “How to Beat the Wagner Group,”?Foreign Policy, February 13, 2023,?https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/13/russia-wagner-group-sanctions-ukraine-putin/ .
[59] ?Colin P. Clarke, “Russian Mercenaries Are Destabilizing Africa,”?New York Times, January 31, 2023,?https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/31/opinion/russian-mercenaries-africa-wagner.html .
[60] ?“France’s Macron calls Wagner Group ‘life insurance of failing regimes’ in Africa,”?Reuters , February 27, 2023,?https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-macron-calls-wagner-group-life-insurance-failing-regimes-africa-2023-02-27/ .
[61] ?Kelly Ng, “Ukraine: US sanctions Chinese firm helping Russia’s Wagner Group,”?BBC News, January 27, 2023,?https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64421915 .
[62] ?Aaron Pellish, “Senators put bipartisan pressure on Biden to designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorism,”?CNN?Politics, August 7, 2022,?https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/07/politics/biden-russia-state-sponsor-of-terrorism-cnntv/index.html .
[63] ?“U.S. Lawmakers Want Terrorist Designation for Russia’s Wagner Group,”?U.S. News & World Report, February 15, 2023,?https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-02-15/u-s-lawmakers-want-terrorist-designation-for-russias-wagner-group .
[64] ?Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act,?S.416, 118th Congress (2023–2024), https://library.bowdoin.edu/research/chicago-gov.pdf.?
[65] ?James Petrila and Phil Wasielewski, “The Case for Designating Wagner Group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Is Still Compelling,”?Lawfare, January 18, 2023,?https://www.lawfareblog.com/case-designating-wagner-group-foreign-terrorist-organization-still-compelling .?
[66] ?“IntelBrief: Russian Imperial Movement Labeled a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity,” The Soufan Center, April 7, 2020, ?https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-russian-imperial-movement-labeled-a-specially-designated-global-terrorist-entity/ .
[67] ?Masood Farivar, “US Attorney General Says He Would Not Object to Designating Wagner a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Voice of America, March 2, 2023,?https://www.voanews.com/a/us-attorney-general-says-he-would-not-object-to-designating-wagner-a-foreign-terrorist-organization-/6987153.html .
[68] ?Cyril Bensimon, “US engages in strategy to remove Wagner Group from Africa,”?Le Monde, February 20, 2023,?https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/02/20/us-seeks-to-strike-a-deal-in-strategy-to-remove-agner-group-from-africa_6016597_4.html .
[69] ?Erin Banco, Sarah Anne Aarup, and Anastasiia Carrier, “Inside the stunning growth of Russia’s Wagner Group,”? Politico, February 18, 2023,?https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/18/russia-wagner-group-ukraine-paramilitary-00083553 .
[70] ?Colin P. Clarke, “How Russia’s Wagner Group Is Fueling Terrorism in Africa,”?Foreign Policy, Janurary 25, 2023,?https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/25/russia-wagner-group-africa-terrorism-mali-sudan-central-african-republic-prigozhin/ .
[71] ?“Come follow the redwood trees – tracking Wagner’s forestry business in CAR ,”?All Eyes on Wagner, July 26, 2022,?https://alleyesonwagner.org/2022/07/26/come-follow-the-redwood-trees-tracking-wagners-forestry-business-in-car/ .
[72] ?Mathieu Olivier, “CAR – Cameroon: An investigation into the Wagner Group’s African financial model,”?Africa Report, January 18, 2023,?https://www.theafricareport.com/275235/car-cameroon-an-investigation-into-the-wagner-groups-african-financial-model/ .?
[73] ?Press Statement, “ECOWAS Action on Mali,” U.S. State Department, January 10, 2022,?https://www.state.gov/ecowas-action-on-mali/ .
[74] ?“Mali: Avoiding the Trap of Isolation,” Crisis Group, February 9, 2023,?https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/b185-mali-eviter-le-piege-de-lisolement .
[75] ?“Mali junta adopts 24-month transition to democratic rule from March,”?Reuters, June 7, 2022,?https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-africa-bloc-willing-accept-another-12-16-months-transition-mali-2022-03-25/ .
[76] ?Christian Akorlie and Tiemoko Diallo, “West African nations sever links with Mali over election delay,”?Reuters, January 10, 2022,?https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-eyes-elections-four-years-west-african-bloc-mulls-sanctions-2022-01-09/ .
[77] ?“Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali ,” ACLED, August 30, 2022,?https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/ .
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[79] ?The Montreux Document ,?https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html .
[80] ?Participating States of the Montreux Document ,?https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating-states.html .
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[95] ?Leahy Law Fact Sheet, US State Department,?https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/human-rights/leahy-law-fact-sheet/ .
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Also
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werwolf
quote
Werwolf
27 languages
For the mythological shapeshifter, see?Werewolf . For one of Hitler's military headquarters, see?Werwolf (Wehrmacht headquarters) . For the musician, see?Satanic Warmaster . For resistance against the Nazis, see?German resistance to Nazism .
Werwolf?pennant [1] ?with the?Wolfsangel ?symbol in horizontal form
Werwolf?(pronounced?[?ve???v?lf] ,?German ?for "werewolf ") was a?Nazi ?plan which began development in 1944,[2] ?to create a?resistance ?force which would operate behind enemy lines as the?Allies ?advanced through?Germany , in parallel with the?Wehrmacht ?fighting in front of the lines. It is widely misconstrued as having been intended to be a?guerrilla ?force to harass Allied forces after the defeat of Germany, a misconception created by?Joseph Goebbels ?through propaganda disseminated in the waning weeks of the war through his "Radio Werwolf,” which was not actually connected in any way with the military unit.
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Andrew Beckwith, PhD