STRICT LIABILITY TO ABSOLUTE LIABILITY -- FAILURES TO PROTECT LIVES SO FAR........ "

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发布日期: 2020年5月7日

Hazardous substances pervade modern industrialized societies. Indian industry generates, uses, and discards toxic substances. Day by day the increasing use of technology to the make human life easy has an equal and opposite reaction in form of claiming lives in case of mis-handling of those hazardous substances. Industrial hazards are threats to people and life-support systems that arise from the mass production of goods and services. When these threats exceed human coping capabilities or the absorptive capacities of environmental systems they give rise to industrial disasters. Industrial hazards can occur at any stage in the production process, including extraction, processing, manufacture, transportation, storage, use, and disposal. Losses generally involve the release of damaging substances (e.g. chemicals, radioactivity, genetic materials) or damaging levels of energy from industrial facilities or equipment into surrounding environments. This usually occurs in the form of explosions, ?res, spills, leaks, or wastes.

Bhopal Gas Tragedy:

was a deadly disaster which took place in Bhopal, India leaving behind thousands dead and thousands other maimed for life. This is considered as one of the most horrific and lethal industrial disasters.

SUCH incident posed a grave threat and impression for people / human generations including environmental damage irreparable and uncountable led to arising of numerous questions. Many researches are conducted by scholars worldwide including India regarding a common question that "how for Such kind of activities, in the present world or upcoming questions, is carried on by the corporations / industries / chemical plants can be regulated and checked and to what extent the liability of such bodies should be fixed".

The Main Important Question and task be based for the "PROTECTION OF LIVES" Protection of Human Lives -- How Lives of Commoners Be Saved.

INDIA too has been witness to such an unfortunate event of an industrial accident in the Year of 1984 (December 2/3, 1984), a mass disaster when in Bhopal a toxic gas Methyl Isocyanate escaped from the chemical plant of Union Carbide in Bhopal. During the night of 2–3 December 1984, water entered a side pipe that was missing its slip-blind plate and entered Tank E610 which contained 42 tons of MIC.

A runaway reaction started, which was accelerated by contaminants, high temperatures and other factors. The reaction was sped up by the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines. The resulting exothermic reaction increased the temperature inside the tank to over 200 °C (392 °F) and raised the pressure. This forced the emergency venting of pressure from the MIC holding tank, releasing a large volume of toxic gases. About 30 metric tons of methyl Isocyanate (MIC) escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 45 to 60 minutes. The gases were blown in southeastern direction over Bhopal. The initial e?ects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and a feeling of su?ocation, burning in the respiratory tract, blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. People awakened by these symptoms ?ed away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations. Thousands of people had died by the following morning. Primary causes of deaths were choking, re?exogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotizing enteritis. The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by around 200%.

The event led to the death of more than 3500 people and serious injuries to a very large number of other (estimated to be over 6 lakhs), permanently affecting their eyes, respiratory system, and causing scores of other complications, including damage to the fetuses of the pregnant women, years after that accident it is believed that the death toll was as close to 8000. The peculiar problem regarding the claim of compensation was involved because of such a large number of victims, most of those belonging to the lower strata.

The question that arose with this incident was regarding the liability of the Union Carbide and at the same time regarding the adverse environmental impact that similar industries handling the hazardous substances posed on human life and earth.

Another Incident witnessed on 4th and 6th December, 1985:

The leakage of Oleum gas from one of the units of Shriram Foods and Fertilizers Industries, in the city of Delhi, belonging to Delhi Cloth Mills Ltd. as a consequence of this leakage, it was alleged that one advocate practising in the Tis Hazari Court, Delhi had died and several others were affected by the same. The action was brought through a writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution by way of public interest litigation.

The Bhopal Gas leakage case led to the manifold developments in the Indian legal system. The transition from the rule of strict liability to that of the absolute liability in the Shri Ram Gas leakage case at the time when the Bhopal Case was pending was the consequence of the immense loss of life that occurred in the incident of 1984.

UCIL was the Indian subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC). Indian Government controlled banks and the Indian public held 49.1 percent ownership share. In 1994, the Supreme Court of India allowed UCC to sell its 50.9 percent share. The Bhopal plant was sold to McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. UCC was purchased by Dow Chemical Company in 2001. Following the accident there started a long unending journey quest for justice to the victims of the incident. However, the grave questions that arose from this unfortunate incident were two fold. Firstly the question was related to the quantification of the liability of the corporations handling the hazardous substances in view of the absence of any established principle. Another much grave question was related to the impact of such hazardous substances on the environment and the issue of prevention of such damages in the future by the installation of proper safety devices and mechanisms.

In March 1985, the government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act to ensure the dealing of claims arising after the incident speedily and equitably. This made the government as the only representative of the victims in the legal processes in and outside the country. The settlement was made by Supreme Court of India with UCC in which UCC agreed to take the moral responsibility and paid a claim of $470 million to the government which was negligible compared to a multi-billion dollar lawsuit which was filed by an American lawyer in a U.S court. This amount of $470 million was based on the disputed claim that only 3,000 people died and 1,02,000 suffered permanent disabilities. According to Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, by the end of October 2003, compensation was awarded to 5,54,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. After this settlement, the matter was placed entirely under Indian jurisdiction. The government was blamed for not having appropriate laws for environmental safety and for settlement of claims through the establishment of liability. If this kind of proper laws would have prevailed then the victims of the incident would have got better compensation and it would have been difficult for UCC to get off the matter.

As after the breathtaking tragedy, the Indian government passed and implemented The Environment Protection Act (E.P.A) of 1986 under Article 253 of the Indian constitution. Its purpose was to implement the decisions of the UN Conference on the Human Environment of 1972 to provide protection to an improvement of environment and prevention of hazards for humans, plants, other living creatures. This act strengthens the regulations on pollution control and environment protection by hazardous industries.

The act provides the Centre with a lot of power to take all necessary actions required for the protection of the environment. It enables the executive wing to issue notifications and orders which becomes guidelines for the administrative agencies. Basically, it provides the Centre with the power to make rules for environment protection. The act has 7 schedules specifically laying down the rules for emission or discharge of pollutants from industries, prescribing emission of smoke, etc. from vehicles, provides a list of authorities to be approached in case of any discharge outside the prescribed levels and standards.

Under the provision of Section 25 of EPA, 1986 another set of rules was passed “Hazardous Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989”. It includes the management of 18 categories of waste basically all toxic chemicals which could be stored in industries and used for different purposes. Some categories of waste which are included in this are-metal finishing waste, waste containing water-soluble compounds of lead, copper, zinc, etc. It issues the notification that the one generating this type of wastes or the one operating the facility which generates this type of wastes is responsible for the proper management and handling of the waste.

The Environmental Impact Assessment Notification of 1994 includes almost all kinds of activities which could harm the environment in any way. Through this notification, an impact assessment of any project became mandatory. The Central Government is required to carry out an environmental impact assessment on a large scale before passing any project listed under the notification. It also established a “Right to Know”, that is, public hearing through which the common man who would get affected by the project is given the chance to speak out and is made aware of the project. Basically, a lot of transparency was included in the system for the validation of any developmental project.

The journey begins of legal principle cannot be easily understood through a case study of a very landmark case M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India.

The principle of “Absolute Liability” was established by Supreme Court after one more gas leak (though not a major one like Bhopal Gas Tragedy) in Shriram Fertilizer Factory in New Delhi on 4th Dec 1985, where the oleum gas was leaked from the bursting of the tank containing oleum gas which was caused by human and mechanical errors and not by any third party. This concept is of utmost importance today.

Bhopal Gas Tragedy was an incident which opened the eyes of the legislature and made their attention available to the environment and its protection. Even before this tragedy, laws such as Water Act of 1974 and Air Act of 1981 existed but EPA provides an umbrella to the Central Government for the coordination of various state and central authorities established under these previous laws. Therefore it would not be wrong to state that had the proper legislative framework would have existed then either this tragedy would not have occurred or the sufferings of the people could have been made less. The CEO of the accused UCC has died and the lawsuit against him has been shut down forever. Lack of proper and sufficient laws resulted in the loss of life of thousands of people and leaving behind many to suffer and live in pain of the after-effects of the tragedy.

Principle of Strict Liability

This principle was to develop from a well-known case of Ryland vs. Fletcher (1868 LR 3 HL 330). This case was decided by Lord Chancellor, Lord Cranworth and Lord Cairns.

Ryland was the plaintiff and Fletcher was the defendant in the case. Plaintiff was the occupier of the mine and defendant owes a mill in neighbour to the mine and they propose to make a reservoir to store water for the purpose to use in a mill and another adjacent land near to it. Defendant took the help of agents to construct the reservoir while making it. They did not take reasonable care and precaution and due to the heavy weight of water, the shaft broke and the water passed into the mine of the plaintiff which cause damage to the plaintiff. While giving the final decision Lord Cairns distinguished between the natural and non-natural use of land. Under Ryland case, the court declares it’s as Principle of “Strict Liability” rule. The Supreme Court got the chance to make this principle when a petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India emerged into the form of PIL (Public Interest Litigation).

A very famous case above afore mentioned of M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India was filed in the Court of law as a PIL for the incident which took place on 4th December to 6th December 1985, where Oleum gas was leaked from one of the Units of Shriram Food and Fertilizers in the area of Delhi and become famous by the name of Oleum Gas Leakage Case. During this accident, one of the advocates of Tis Hazari Court died and many others were also affected by it at a large number. So, an environmental activist Mr M.C. Mehta approached Supreme Court of India and filed a PIL, so the court may take action on the matter and decide the liability and responsibility of the person for the incident. During that period, the court was going across the most activist stage and denied to follow the ruling of Ryland vs. Fletcher case. Justice Bhagwati said that he cannot afford to evolve any type of guidance and any standard liability under constitutional norms. Law has been made to satisfy the needs of the rapid changing society and keep aside the development of the economy of the country. All the industries which are set up in the residential locality and engaged in a hazardous toxic chemical which will affect the health and safety of the people of locality owe an absolute responsibility for the community to ensure them no harm or damage will be caused to them. The industries are under obligation to use the highest standard amount of equipment and machines to avoid damages to a large number of the population residing nearby. They should use a filter to avoid pollution.

Certain guidelines are given under Environmental law which needs to be followed by every industry which is engaged with the toxic and hazardous substances to avoid pollution. If they do not follow the guideline then their licence will be cancelled by the inspection team.

So, now we can easily distinguish between both the principles of Strict liability and Absolute Liability. Strict liability is applicable to all the things which exist in a place but for absolute liability, things causing harm or damages and it must be in relation to Hazardous and toxic substance. So, on this note, the court has narrowed down the principle of strict liability.

But the more exciting and happening part of it is that the liability of the defendant become absolute in every manner. No matter what the damages will be caused due to the negligence on the part of the defendant, no matter how the hazardous item escaped, what the reason is but the consequences are to be faced by defendant only, once it is proved by the plaintiff side that the damage was caused by the defendant through hazardous item, no excuse will be applicable to it except the case of Act of God. Court laid down that measure will be taken to finalize the amount of compensation should be within the capacity of the enterprise.

The rule laid down under this case was approved by Court in Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480 where the court held that defendant has absolute liability for the act he cannot escape by saying that he took all the reasonable care on behalf of his part.

Yet in another case of Indian Council for Environmental Legal Action vs. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 1446 the court held that “Once the event is carried related to hazardous substance then is liable to take all the loss caused to another person irrespective of taking reasonable care while carrying out the activity.

Another Incident was of Chasnala Mining Disaster, 1975:

The Chasnala Mine Disaster occurred on the evening of 27 December 1975, and killed 372 miners in Dhanbad, India. On 27 December 1975, an explosion rocked the Chasnala Colliery in Dhanbad, India. The explosion was most likely caused by sparks from equipment igniting a pocket of ?ammable methane gas. Even a small spark can ignite the surges of gas that may suddenly ?ll a mine. Clouds of coal dust raised by the explosion and accompanying shock wave contribute to these sorts of mine explosions, making the ?ames self-sustaining.

The Chasnala Colliery explosion was so severe that the mine collapsed, and millions of gallons of water from a nearby reservoir rushed into the pits at a rate of seven million gallons per minute. Those miners who weren't killed in the blast now found themselves trapped under debris, or drowned as the water quickly ?lled the mine. Rescue workers continued their e?orts to dig out bodies and survivors until 19 January 1976. Sadly, there were no survivors, and most of the bodies were never recovered. The local workers' union claimed a total death toll of almost 700 people. The government's o?cial death toll, however, is 372. The Chasnala Colliery's records were poorly kept, and many bodies were never recovered, so there is no way of knowing how many miners actually perished in the Chasnala Mine Disaster. The Chasnala Disaster inspired the 1979 ?lm Kaala Patthar, directed by Yash Chopra. The Chasnala Disaster was one of the worst in Indian history. The nationalization of Indian mining since then has contributed to a signi?cant decrease in the incidence of mining accidents in that country.

Another Incident was of Bombay Docks Explosion, 1944:

The Bombay Explosion (or Bombay Docks Explosion) occurred on 14 April 1944, in the Victoria Dock of Bombay (now Mumbai) when the freighter SS Fort Stikine carrying a mixed cargo of cotton bales, gold, and ammunition including around 1,400 tons of explosives, caught ?re and was destroyed in two giant blasts, scattering debris, sinking surrounding ships and setting ?re to the area killing around 800 people. The SS Fort Stikine was a 7,142 gross register ton freighter built in 1942 in Prince Rupert, British Columbia, under a lend-lease agreement, and was named aGer Fort Stikine, a former outpost of the Hudson's Bay Company. Sailing from Birkenhead on 24 February via Gibraltar, Port Said and Karachi, she arrived at Bombay on 12 April 1944. Her cargo included 1,395 tons of explosives including 238 tons of sensitive "A" explosives, torpedoes, mines, shells, munitions, Supermarine SpiVire ?ghter aircraft, raw cotton bales, barrels of oil, timber, scrap iron and approximately ￡890,000 of gold bullion in bars in 31 crates. The 87,000 bales of cotton and lubricating oil were loaded at Karachi and the ship's captain, Alexander James Naismith, recorded his protest about such a "mixture" of cargo. The transportation of cotton through sea route was inevitable for the merchants, as transporting cotton in rail from Punjab and Sindh to Bombay was banned at that time. The vessel had berthed and was still awaiting unloading on 14 April, aGer 48 hours of berthing. In the mid-afternoon around 14:00, the crew were alerted to a ?re onboard burning somewhere in the No. 2 hold. The crew, dockside ?re teams and ?reboats were unable to extinguish the con?agration, despite pumping over 900 tons of water into the ship, nor were they able to ?nd the source due to the dense smoke. The water was boiling all over the ship, due to heat generated by the ?re. At 15:50 the order to abandon ship was given, and sixteen minutes later there was a great explosion, cutting the ship in two and breaking windows over 12 km (7.5 mi) away. The two explosions were powerful enough to be recorded by seismographs at the Colaba Observatory in the city. Sensors recorded that the earth trembled at Shimla, a city located at a distance of over 1700 km. The shower of burning material set ?re to slums in the area. Around two square miles were set ablaze in an 800 m (870 yd) arc around the ship. Eleven neighbouring vessels had been sunk or were sinking, and the emergency personnel at the site su?ered heavy losses. Attempts to ?ght the ?re were dealt a further blow when a second explosion from the ship swept the area at 16:34. Burning cotton bales fell from the sky on docked ships, on the dock yard, and on slum areas outside the harbour. The sound of explosions was heard as far as 50 miles (80 km) away. Some of the most developed and economically important parts of Bombay were wiped out because of the blast and resulting ?re. The total number of lives lost in the explosion is estimated at more than 800, although some estimates put the ?gure around 1,300. The results of the explosion are summarized as follows:

= 231 people killed were attached to various dock services including ?re brigade and dock employees.

= Of the above ?gure, 66 ?remen were killed

= More than 500 civilians were killed

= Some estimates put total deaths up to 1300

= More than 2500 were injured, including civilians

= 13 ships were lost and some other ships heavily or partially damaged

= Out of above, three Royal Indian Navy ships lost

= 31 wooden crates, each containing four gold bars, each gold bar weighing 2 stones (actually 800 Troy ounces).

= More than 50,000 tonnes of shipping destroyed and another 50,000 tonnes of shipping damaged

= Loss of more than 50,000 tonnes of food grains, including rice, gave rise to black-marketing of food grains afterwards.

The inquiry into the explosion identi?ed the cotton bales as probably being the seat of the ?re. It was critical of several errors: storing the cotton below the munitions, not displaying the red ?ag required to indicate a dangerous cargo on board, delaying unloading the explosives, not using steam injectors to contain the ?re and a delay in alerting the local ?re brigade.

Another Incident was of Jaipur Oil Deport Fire, 2009.

The Jaipur oil depot ?re broke out on 29 October 2009 at 7:30 PM (IST) at the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) oil depot's giant tank holding 8,000 kilolitres (280,000 cu G) of oil, in Sitapura Industrial Area on the outskirts of Jaipur, Rajasthan, killing 12 people and injuring over 200. The blaze continued to rage out of control for over a week aGer it started and during the period half a million people were evacuated from the area. The oil depot is about 16 kilometres (9.9 mi) south of the city of Jaipur. The incident occurred when petrol was being transferred from the Indian Oil Corporation's oil depot to a pipeline. There were at least 40 IOC employees at the terminal, situated close to the Jaipur International Airport) when it caught ?re with an explosion. The Met department recorded a tremor measuring 2.3 on the Richter scale around the time the ?rst explosion at 7:36 pm which resulted in shattering of glass windows nearly 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) from the accident site 150-injured-massive-rages-Indian-oil-depot.html The ?re was a major disaster in terms of deaths, injury, loss of business, property and man-days, displacement of people, environmental impact in Jaipur. As per eyewitnesses having factories and hotels around Indian Oil's Sitapura (Jaipur) Oil Terminal they felt presence of petrol vapour in the atmosphere around 4:00 p.m. on 29 October 2009. Within the next few hours the concentration of petrol vapour intensi?ed making it di?cult to breathe. The Ayush Hotel in the vicinity of the terminal asked all its guests to vacate the Hotel to avert any tragedy. Adjacent to the Terminal wall was the workshop of Morani Motors (P) Limited whereas per eyewitnesses the Cars parked on the roof top were thrown up in Air to about 10 feet and 35 new Hyundai brand cars were completely damaged. The police, civil administration and ?re emergency services were oblivious of the situation developing in Indian Oil Terminal. Around half past six the sta? in the terminal had contained the leak and ?ow of petrol panicked and reported the matter to nearby Sanganer Sadar Police Station. Within the next 30 minutes the local police chief and District Collector were on the spot along with Indian Oil general manager, but with no plan to deal with the situation. The nearby industries, which were running second shiGs, were cautioned to vacate the area. At 7:35 p.m. a huge ball of ?re with loud explosion broke out engul?ng the leaking petrol tank and other nearby petrol tanks with continuous ?re with ?ames rising 30–35 m (98–115 G) and visible from a 30 km (19 mi) radius. The tra?c on adjacent National Highway No. 12 was stopped leading to a 20 km (12 mi) long tra?c jam. The Jaipur International Airport is just 5 km (3.1 mi) away from the accident site. Both the Army and experts from Mumbai were employed on 30 October 2009 to contain the ?re, which started when an oil tanker caught ?re at the depot in the Sitapura Industrial Area. The district administration disconnected electricity and evacuated nearby areas to limit the damage. The ?re still raged on 31 October 2009, in the Indian Oil Corporation Depot, at Jaipur, after a defective pipe line leak that set ?re to 50,000 kilolitres (1,800,000 cu G) of diesel and petrol out of the storage tanks at the IOC Depot. By then, the accident had already claimed 11 lives and seriously injured more than 150. The District Administration and Indian Oil Corporation had no disaster management plan to deal with this kind of calamity. The local ?re o?cers were ill equipped to deal with ?re accidents of this magnitude. They remained onlookers and no e?orts were made to breach the terminal wall to get closer to kerosene and diesel tanks to cool them with water jets.

Another Incident was of Korba Chimney Collapse, 2009:

The 2009 Korba chimney collapse occurred in the town of Korba in the Indian state of Chhattisgarh on 23 September 2009. It was under construction were under contract for the Bharat Aluminium Co Ltd (BALCO). Construction had reached 240 m (790 G) when the chimney collapsed on top of more than 100 workers who had been taking shelter from a thunderstorm. At least 45 deaths were recorded. Plans specify a 275-metre (902 G) chimney for the construction of a thermal power plant by BALCO, which is owned by Vedanta Resources. The incident happened during extreme weather conditions involving lightning and torrential rainfall. Workers sought shelter from the rain in a nearby store room, and a lightning strike at approximately 16:00 brought the chimney down on top of them.

A rescue attempt was initiated following the collapse. Ongoing rain obstructed e?orts to retrieve the trapped workers. At least seven of the wounded were hospitalised.

An investigation is ongoing to determine the cause of the collapse. BALCO initially did not discussed the incident at length, stating only that "[t]here is an accident and some people are injured"; claiming to be too busy with the rescue e?ort to make a longer statement. The state government believes that BALCO had been "overlooking security aspects".

In November 2009, the project manager from GDCL was arrested, as well as three o?cials from Vedanta Resources which manages BALCO. Later the National Institute of Technology (NIT) Raipur observed that the materials were of substandard quality and technically faulty in design. NIT also concluded that there was improper water curing and that soil at the site was not up to code. Additionally, supervision and monitoring was found to be negligent.

Another Incident was of Mayapuri Radiological Incident, 2010:

In April 2010, the locality of Mayapuri was a?ected by a serious radiological accident. An AECL Gammacell 220 research irradiator owned by Delhi University since 1968, but unused since 1985, was sold at auction to a scrap metal dealer in Mayapuri on February 26, 2010. The orphan source arrived at a scrap yard in Mayapuri during March, where it was dismantled by workers unaware of the hazardous nature of the device. The cobalt-60 source was cut into eleven pieces. The smallest of the fragments was taken by Ajay Jain who kept it in his wallet, two fragments were moved to a nearby shop, while the remaining eight remained in the scrap yard. All of the sources were recovered by mid-April and transported to the Narora Atomic Power Station, where it was claimed that all radioactive material originally contained within the device was accounted for. The material remains in the custody of the Department of Atomic Energy. One of the main business at Mayapuri is the recycling of metal scraps and sale of salvage vehicle parts. It is, arguably, the biggest market for used automotive and industrial spare parts in India. Many traders from all over India come here to sell or purchase old auto parts. Many small workshops specialized in di?erent metals are active in the Mayapuri area. The safety of the scrap yards became a concern after the radiological accident which occurred in April 2010. The area is not equipped with radiation detectors or portics, despite being a common practice in steel recycling factories in the US and in most of the European countries. The presence of toxic heavy metals and of harmful chemicals in the waste generated by these activities presents a direct menace for the health of several ten thousands of people living in the area. Eight people were hospitalized as a result of radiation exposure, where one later died. Five patients su?ered from the haematological form of the acute radiation syndrome and local cutaneous radiation injury as well. While four patients exposed to doses between 0.6 and 2.8 Gy survived with intensive or supportive treatment, the patient with the highest exposure of 3.1 Gy died due to acute respiratory distress syndrome and multi-organ failure on Day 16 after hospitalization. The incident highlights the current gaps in the knowledge, infrastructure and legislation in handling radioactive materials. Medical institutions need to formulate individualized triage and management guidelines to immediately respond to future public radiological accidents.

Today ie., another Incident occurred in Vizg 07-05-2020:

Visakhapatnam (Vizag) Gas Leak At least 11 people died and 1,000-5,000 others were exposed to the gas leak (Styrene) at a chemical factory in Vishakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh on Thursday. The gas leaked from the LG Polymer plant at Gopalapatnam area of RR Venkatapuram village on the outskirts of Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh in the wee hours. The leakage was reported when workers were preparing for the reopening of the plant. Meanwhile, Chief Minister YS Jaganmohan Reddy has announced Rs 1 crore each as relief to kin of people killed in the tragedy. Addressing the media after visiting affected people at the King George Hospital here, Jagan said that the government will also offer cash assistance to injured. Meanwhile, Director General of National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) SN Pradhan said leakage from the factory is now minimal but the NDRF personnel will be at the spot till it is totally plugged. Pradhan said 500 people belonging to 200-250 families living in 3 km radius have been evacuated to the safer places.

In Conclusion, it is submitted that after aforementioned incidents, the principle of absolute liability is given more emphasis and the Indian Judicial system took an affirmative step by adopting this principle. But there is no stoppage of such incidents, in the author's view there are two factor approach: Firstly, the rule of absolute liability - is it conclusive to conclude after the accident that liability clause solves all the problem to save the Life and another view point is that it is not sufficient that liability clause solve the problem and there is duty of administration to crub to stop the occurrence of such Incidents involving Human Lives. There is a duty of Administration to monitor the functioning of such Plants/Industries/Corporations dealing in hazardous materials including gases and chemicals. Personal / Physical Verification of such places required in the reasonable time period. Pollution Control Board to work with the administration in this behalf. Labour Department have to play role along with administration and time to time guidelines and working needs to be operational mandatory. Think tanks, researchers, Technical Experts, Academicians, Engineers, all needs to work together without any pressure or gain so that a precious Human Life and Environment on this Planet be saved so that the Right To Life be extended to the Poor Masses of the Country.

Biblograpy:

Web links

- https://www.hrdp-idrm.in/e5783/e17327/e24075/e27316/

- https://indiatoday.intoday.in/gallery/bhopal-gas-tragedy-in- pics/1/3261.html

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhopal_disaster

- https://www.novamining.com/knowledgebase/mining-accidents- analysis/inundations/chasnalla-colliery-on-27-12-1975/

- https://en.atropedia.net/article:5b5017

- https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1224018/Five-killed-150- injured-massive-rages-Indian-oil-depot.html

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Jaipur_?re

- https://specialnewsonline.?les.wordpress.com/2009/09/chimney- collapse1.jpg

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Korba_chimney_collapse

- https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/radiation-response-team- recovers-16-cobalt-pencils-from-mayapuri/article422133.ece