On Strategy and Admiralty
Gil Vanden Broeck
Senior Managing Consultant @ Square Management Belgium | Practice Lead Regulatory & Compliance
Chester William Nimitz was an Admiral in the US Navy. He had a career as a submariner and held responsibilities as an engineer, a teacher in tactics and operations at the naval school, and a staff officer, which earned him the stars of rear admiral. He was promoted Admiral and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in December 1941 and Joint Commander-in-Chief for the Pacific in April 1942, the largest theater of operations during World War II.
Furthermore, he has the particularity of never having published official memoirs and of having contributed relatively little to the theoretical corpus of naval warfare or grand strategy. To my knowledge, only the book "Sea Power, a naval history" by E.B. Potter benefited from the Admiral's contributions during its writing. However, certain biographies, writings of other actors who collaborated with Nimitz and an important correspondence make it possible to draw certain lessons from his strategic thinking.
Among this vast collection, I have chosen to highlight five principles that guided Admiral Nimitz's strategy and conduct of operations. Several are found in many manuals and other management lessons, to which I have always preferred primary sources.
Nimitz alternated periods of crisis and periods of priorities. He first had to manage the consequences of the Japanese successes during the first months of the war, with an inferiority in equipment and means and a necessary management of priorities on a huge theater of operations; and this until the tipping point of Midway.
A battle which sees a combination of risk taking, better intelligence analysis, and an element of chance and friction specific to military operations, and from which he emerges victorious to the point to stop the Japanese expansion and to balance the opposing forces.
He will then have to manage an exponential abundance of means which will make it possible to combine operations, lead to certain errors by underestimating the adversary and betting too much on the material advantage, and define a strategy of attrition and circumvention of adversary's strengths, despite pressure from his own hierarchy and the political sphere to attempt more spectacular and purely symbolic advances.
We are witnessing here the implementation of two opposing strategies in two different contexts that could easily be found in large projects and large industrial strategies: first, from the weak to the strong by concentrating its resources at a critical point and by accepting the risk of betting most of its resources on a single operation.
Then, in a second period, by a strategy from strong to weak, avoiding points of resistance and opposing counter-offensives, by a strategy of circumvention and encirclement which will reduce the means of action and the strategic options of his opponent.
As part of his command, Nimitz had to manage some personnel conflicts, either in his direct line of command or with neighboring theaters of operations in the Pacific, having the same Japanese adversary, but different priorities and objectives.
On the level of his direct line, Nimitz always strived to find the right person in the right command, analyzing both experience and character in his decisions; he assumed the difficult transfer decisions by meeting the people involved and preferably opted for a lateral transfer to an equivalent position where he considered the person more suitable, or even to promotions often from operational positions to broader responsibilities in administrative sectors.
He was also careful to avoid external intervention in these decisions, or that the conflicts be taken up in the press and amplified in a war of press releases. The main rival in the war against Japan was General Douglas Mac Arthur, responsible for the theater of operations extending from Australia to the Philippines and Indonesia, whose political ambition, relations with a certain opinionated press, and differences over strategy and war aims; which created difficulties and difficult discussions for Nimitz throughout the conflict.
However, he always maintained constant communication, good professional relations with his self-proclaimed and more publicized rival defending his priorities and his overall strategy, but otherwise conceding on certain points, and ensuring the success of combined operations (often claimed by Mac Arthur such as his personal successes) by the transfer of certain assets to the neighboring theater of operations.
He never entered into conflicts through the media or by escalating them to the political level, despite the very good relations he had with the Roosevelt presidency, and this, while Mac Arthur was a designated political adversary.??
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A lesson in diplomacy and moderation, ensuring its success and its main objectives, while keeping its ally-adversary close to you and under relative control, by concessions on more secondary points.
Nimitz defined the overall strategy and the main lines of conduct of operations with his staff, ensuring in particular the allocation of manpower and resources for each operation and its components, and the appointments of senior officers in charge of them; but it interfered little with the conduct of operations in real time, and left a great autonomy of action and interpretation once the framework of operations was defined.
He was particularly careful to ensure regular rotations within his staff, transferring operations officers to positions in charge of training, intelligence or logistics; and vice versa, to bring a fresh perspective and ensure the transfer and sharing of knowledge in its teams; he mentioned that he had to gradually transform his staff from a disparate set of imposed people to a team that he had chosen and formed.
An application of cross-functional management, the mixing of ideas and experiences, the definition of a framework and clear objectives, the adequacy of the means to carry out the mission, the delegation of power (and its responsibilities) and operational autonomy.
One of Nimitz's first decisions was to have, as soon as he took office, an expert on his staff who would think for the enemy; if the admiral benefited from an excellent intelligence service, and for several months from the decryption of a large part of the opposing codes.
He also made sure to have contrary opinions and a presentation of the alternatives offered to his enemy, he was fed regularly by an officer who interpreted Japanese decisions and movements, trying to anticipate and understand not only the possible reactions to American strategy, but also the reasons for certain decisions.
This device did not prevent some tactical surprises and bad American decisions, but it benefited the whole of the staff and made it possible to reduce the spectrum of possibilities, and to anticipate, even to provoke, certain adverse actions.
This way of thinking about the competition or the alternative is an important element to integrate into any commercial decision, positioning or product launch in order to better understand its current market and its possible evolution.
While Nimitz applies a policy of delegation and autonomy, he often had to negotiate with his direct superior, Admiral King, in charge of all theaters of operations. King had a more global strategic vision, moreover having to manage the theaters and means of the US Navy allocated to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and the internal political conflicts between the various components of the American armed forces.
The latter was also more favorable to offensive actions, a risk-taking sometimes bordering on recklessness, a temperate opposite to the pragmatism and cautious approach of Nimitz, Admiral King thus had the tendency and the authority to interfere in the strategy of the Pacific theater, both at the level of operations and the allocation of resources (the priority being the defeat of Germany) or promotions and appointments, King having the final decision in this field.
Nimitz therefore had to manage throughout the four years of military operations, the interventions and proposals of his N+1, conceding at times, negotiating inch by inch for others, not yielding on the essential points of his strategy and explaining the reasons for one's choices and the consequences of other options.
Acknowledging mistakes and successes; and ultimately retaining his command until the end of his term. A demonstration of good management of communication and the decision-making process with an interventionist manager, for the benefits of both parties.