Strategic Narrative Design

Pamela Williamson LL.B, MCTS

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Please refer to Pamela for permissions.

https://www.dhirubhai.net/posts/activity-6692935352841334784-GLoB

“We shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape us”: Marshall McLuhan

Note: this paper is excerpted (with some amendments) from my Master of Conflict and Terrorism Studies Dissertation submitted to the University of Auckland in October 2018. My supervisor was Dr. Stephen Noakes. I have added 6 Appendices. Unfortunately, viewing them on an IPhone seems to collapse my careful structure. LinkedIn's word count seems to be rejecting my References so I have provided a link HERE.

A.   Narrative Theory                                                                     

i.        The Meaning of Narrative

“If it is taken for granted that ideology is a function of domination, then it is assumed uncritically that ideology is an essentially negative phenomenon.” - Paul Ricoeur

Narrative (the meaning-full stories we tell ourselves that structure our perception, shape our cognition and unconscious minds) shapes who we are and how we see our place in the world. The philosopher Ricour (1991) postulated narrative as central to thinking and identity using the metaphor of navigating the seas to explain the process. Seminal cognitive linguists Lakoff & Johnson (1980) identified metaphor as inherent to our cognition and action:

“[M]etaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.” 

Jamet (2010) has continued the sea metaphor to reflect the way the internet and its users reciprocally influence each other in their use of metaphor to describe the internet:

“……if Internet metaphors have largely been motivated by the perception of Internet users, there is also a reciprocal influence because Internet metaphors also structure our very perception of it, which is in keeping with the mutual relationship between language and thought”

Gay notes that Ricoeur saw in semiotics an unresolvable tension between the “struggle for ideology and the battle for myth”. Where there are interpretation issues, he sees the inherent tension resolved in the metaphorical synthesis of both ideology and myth:

“ideology critique can utilize a metaphorical approach that provides perceptual, rather than strictly factual, criteria for assessing linguistic distortions.”

An example offered by Gay is the phrase “window of vulnerability” used in US propaganda against the Soviets for a home audience, a metaphor that plays with both perception and ideology.

To summarise: Gay’s breakdown of this simple metaphor used in a strategic context is as follows: 1) metaphor; 2) ideological; 3) creative and 4) distortive.

Playing with perception and ideology is at the heart of strategic narrative.

The power of narrative to frame audience responses was pioneered by Robert Entman. In respect of audience autonomy, Entman referred to the “dominant meaning” being the narrative that will capture a mostly susceptible audience most successfully (Zaller (1992, Kahneman and Tversky (1984, and Iyengar (1991), although he did acknowledge the tendency of some to reframe narratives they receive according to their own lights under certain conditions (Gamson 1992).

Ajit Maan, in her ground-breaking work Narrative Warfare, has applied these cognitive theories to irregular influence warfare. She has emphasised the difference between ‘storytelling’ (a familiar cosier concept) and ‘narrative’ which has several dimensions: cognition, meaning and identity.

“This form of warfare is all about influence. But this is not information warfare; this is warfare over the meaning of the information. Information consists of facts—raw data. Narratives do not tell the facts. Narratives tell the meaning of the facts.” 

The proactive targeting of the collective cognition and unconscious minds of specific adversary populations, by means of structured offensive narratives and counter-narratives, has weaponised narrative in the service of political-military goals.

The refinements possible today in the field of Strategic Narratives, that are a quantum leap beyond traditional propaganda, have come about through the sophisticated insights of neuroscience, psychology, psychotherapy, and modern marketing and communications theory. The subtle art of hypnotic communication (pioneered by eminent psychiatrist Milton Erickson MD) which embeds suggestion via therapeutic metaphor without formal trance induction ‘orients the subject towards’ (Jeffrey Zeig Ph.D) the required changes of thought processes and direction. It is a relatively unexplored goldmine in terms of the cross-disciplinary potential and imperatives of Strategic Narrative. 

ii. Structure, Analysis and Research

“we are able to see different and sometimes contradictory layers of meaning, to bring them into useful dialogue with each other, and to understand more about individual and social change.” – Squire et al.

Murray considers it important to locate narrative themes within an analysis of structure or framework that includes plotline. He describes the linguistic deconstruction of the “core narrative” as having the following stages: firstly, the breakdown into clauses followed by abstract and orientation; next is the central “complicating action”; finally, an evaluation and afterword. For any material to be included in the core it must have some material relevance to the complicating action. This systematic approach allows an analyst to “grasp the interpretive orientation” as well as the main action. Tellingly, it is both the issues that are included or left out that are important to the meaning of the narrative.

 Frye (1957) classified narrative into 4 genres -comedy, romance, tragedy and satire. Plummer (1995) described basic plots as 1) taking a journey; 2) engaging in a contest; 3) enduring suffering; 4) pursuing consummation; and 5) establishing a home.Gee (1991) added rhythmic poetic structure to these narrative tools.

Squire et al. (2013) highlight the historical contradictions in the 2 main post-war narrative traditions, “the antecedents to contemporary narrative social research”:

“……commonly located in two parallel academic moves (Andrews et al., 2004; Rustin, 2000).1 The first is the post-war rise of humanist approaches within western sociology and psychology. These approaches posed holistic, personcentred approaches, often including attention to individual case studies, biographies and life histories, against positivist empiricism (Bertaux, 1981; Bruner, 1990; Polkinghorne, 1988; Sarbin, 1986). The second academic antecedent to contemporary narrative social research is Russian structuralist and, later, French poststructuralist (Barthes, 1977; Culler, 2002; Genette, 1979; Todorov, 1990), postmodern (Foucault, 1972; Lyotard, 1984), psychoanalytic (Lacan, 1977) and deconstructionist (Derrida, 1977) approaches to narrative within the humanities.”

 The authors emphasise the latter movement towards the influence of social context, power relations and “narrative fluidity and contradiction, with unconscious as well as conscious meanings (Parker, 2003; Tamboukou, this volume). In this tradition, the storyteller does not tell the story, so much as she/he is told by it.”

 They identify the challenges of undertaking research on narratives given that not only is the definition still disputed but, by contrast with content and theme analyses and structure, there is little in the way of guidance as to how to analyse the data itself:

“…..unlike other qualitative research perspectives, narrative research offers no overall rules about suitable materials or modes of investigation, or the best level at which to study stories. It does not tell us whether to look for stories in recorded everyday speech, interviews, diaries, photographs, tv programmes, newspaper articles or the patterned activities of people’s everyday lives; whether to aim for objectivity or researcher and participant involvement; whether to analyse stories’ particularity or generality; or what epistemological or ontological significance to attach to narratives.”

 Their rationale for continuing to attempt such analysis is not just to investigate the “how” of structure and ‘mechanics’ but the “who” and “what” of sources and methods of production, their transportation to audiences, the privileging of one narrative over another and their ultimate impact. They conclude that narrative gives expression to the ever-evolving internal maps of both events and experience. However, there is, according to the authors, a third form of narrative research: “co-constructed narratives” which are dialogues rather than simply event-based or internal experience. The Foucauldian basis of their research emphasises not only the interactive relationship between internal and social sources of narrative but the reciprocal impact and effect of language/cognitive representations aka narrative on the socio-cultural context.

 Narrative warfare therefore deals with effects and not just with structure and themes. Construction gives way to effectiveness and influence.

iii.  Thematic analysis

 Braun & Clarke (2006) argued that thematic analysis in psychology that searches for themes and patterns “offers an accessible and theoretically-flexible approach to analysing qualitative data.” The pitfalls of the method are summarised as: 1) failure to actually conduct analysis but simply regurgitating strings of narrative without making sense of them; 2) failure to locate thematic patterns in addition to identifying a series of themes; and 3) ‘anecdotalism’. They conclude that most problems encountered are due to poorly conducted research which can be mitigated by a rigorous matchup between theory and method:

“rigour lies in devising a systematic method whose assumptions are congruent with the way one conceptualises the subject matter” (Reicher & Taylor, 2005: 549).”

 This form of analysis is just as relevant to the analysis of disinformation narratives and counter narratives.

iv.   Content Analysis

Entman emphasised that it is the “salience” of the frames or “clusters of messages” in a text that is vital to consider when doing a content analysis. Otherwise, a more mechanical analysis of the text (that makes facts equivalent in weight), will fail to identify the dominant slant that the audience receives. He also advocated that the biases inherent in framing, priming and agenda-setting should be identified as “tools of power” in a content analysis:

“informed by explicit theory linking patterns of framing in the media text to predictable priming and agenda‐setting effects on audiences. When unmoored by such underlying theory, measures and conclusions of media bias are suspect.”

Failure to do so means losing control of the narrative.

 Smith (2000) asserted that content analysis of both verbal and written material can be done and can include the study of propaganda and psycholinguistics. He identified the field of communications research as the one in which content analysis is used most citing the research summaries of Berelson (1954), Holsti (1969) and Krippendorff (1980) into propaganda techniques and

“f. the intentions and psychological states of persons and groups; and

g. the attitudes, interests, and values of media audiences”.

 He categorised the analysis of communications into 3 parts –

a) “substantive or formal characteristics”;

 b) “inferences about the characteristics and intentions of communicators”; and

 c) inferences about content and its effect on, or the characteristics of its recipients”.

 He describes the step by step process of content analysis (see Appendix 2).

v.        Counter Narrative Design/Building:

A repeated refrain of researchers is that more studies are needed to develop effective alternative and counter-narrative models. A meta-model model of both alternative and counter-narratives may need to be investigated for its efficacy to streamline and expedite such studies. ‘Reinventing the wheel’ each time is inefficient and global responses are currently being ‘back-footed’ by Russian troll farms who have developed effective and flexible narrative models that can be tailor-made for individuals. A meta-model is provided as a starting point only at Appendix I.

Examples: United States: Narrative Builders; Europe: Radical Awareness Network (RAN).

 The key arguments utilised in the 2015 RAN Issue Paper are directed at counter-narratives for terrorists. However, they are, arguably, equally applicable for Russian Disinformation counter narratives for the same reasons:

•         “Large gap between the volume and quality of counter- and alternative narrative campaigns and the propaganda machine of ISIL and other extremist groups.”
•         The primary obstacle to producing more and better-quality counter- and alternative narratives is the lack of government, civil society and industry partnerships that are productive, sustained and long-term – with proportionate levels of resource.
•          One of the solutions is to create innovative funding models and structures that combine government resources with support and expertise from tech, social media, and advertising companies to support civil society practitioners and grassroots networks in a manner that is sustained and long-term, with creative freedom and rigorous measurement.
•         Governments have the resources and motivation to fund counter-narrative campaigns. They can encourage partnerships between civil society and industries, such as tech and social media. Existing funding mechanisms at EU and national level should be leveraged to a maximum to support such partnership initiatives. Here, the EU RAN CoE could provide an important platform for innovative solutions between government, industry and CVE practitioners.”

E.        ‘Weaponised’ Narratives

The ‘weaponisation’ of the internet and social media offers both opportunities and significant challenges in the information war. Getting academic access to campaigns at the military/governmental level for study outside of military universities may be difficult depending on level of security clearance. But the West must respond to these opportunities and challenges as Russia makes use of and exploits them very effectively via the following strategies: manipulation, misleading, distraction and confusion of public opinion. Russian trolls are very well-prepared specialists in internet communication; these utilise high quality cheap techniques and engage in a wide spectrum of activities using cyber, social media, bots and trolls and the internet. Facing this hostile and organised Russian propaganda, the West has to respond and consistently increase the resources it currently applies in order to strengthen its own strategic communication potential and effectiveness which is lagging. “Fighting fire with fire” and increasing the usage of mechanised bots is typical counsel of military-based narrative strategists.

F.        Resilience Narratives

Psychologists such as Lewandowsky et al. have identified resilience narratives as highly effective strategies.

G.        The Deconstruction of Weaponised and Resilience Narratives:

Using the Lewandowsky model applied to both weaponised and resilience-building narratives:

“in deconstructing and testing such narratives, there are several parts that interlock with variables such as”:

1.     Target audience: targeting hostile actors or community-building?

2.     Context: terrorist or subversive?

3.     Structure and style: semiotics and magical realism provide quantum leaps to and from reality and fantasy making these tools flexible for creative narratives that can address an inter-cultural and inter-ethnic space; learnable and non-learnable writing skill-sets;

4.     Themes and memes: weaponised or resilience-building?

5.     Content that stimulates and engages;

6.     Affect and tone:

7.     Weaponised: sarcasm, aggressive tone and put-downs etc.;

Resilience-building: empathy, subversive humour, irony, positive messaging and affirmations;

8.     Visual messaging: visual propaganda;

9.     Effectiveness: analysis of the effectiveness of sample narratives from various sources.

RAN GAMMA+ Model

Utilising the (Goal, Audience, Message, Messenger, Media, Action plus Monitoring and Evaluation). Key findings are as follows: See Appendix 3 for expanded form.

1.     Do no harm; don’t spread propaganda;

2.     Backfire effect/ Quantity of messages;

3.     Do no harm; don’t spread propaganda;

4.     Beliefs and identity;

5.     Moral reframing;

6.     Identity and values;

7.     Narrative persuasion and transport;

8.     Theory of change;

9.     Delivering new narratives;

10. Target audience, disruption and quantity of alternative narratives and counter-narratives;

11. Uncertainty and authoritarian attitudes;

G.        YARNS (Yeasty Affirmative Resilience Narratives)

Compelling and engaging narratives with particular structural elements that stimulate readers have been found to be most effective (see Appendix 5).

This approach might suffer from a perception or bias against its “positivity”. It might be seen as an ineffective soft option. Further testing is required to assess whether that is in fact the case. It should not be too difficult to gain access to samples from the mid-level of civil society and public awareness campaigns. The sampling and analysis techniques undertaken by marketing experts may be invaluable.

Finally, the problems identified by Reed, Ingram and Whittaker, that of scope, ambiguity and variety of audiences, contexts and messages, may be overcome with the formulation of a meta-model that applies to all contexts. I have developed one based on solid well-regarded models but it (and they) need rigorous testing: see Appendices 1-6 for the STRATNAR Meta-Model tm (Appendix 1) and the models which fed it.

Conclusion:

“talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice”: Carl von Clausewitz

1.     There is a need for strategic narratives as an effective tool for defence against Information and Narrative Warfare;

2.     Their re-prioritisation as an effective tool is urgent;

3.     How they can best be crafted for what purpose and contexts is not well understood so further experimental research is needed;

4.     Research into counter-narratives for terrorism may be a guide for structuring Russian disinformation counter narratives as their structures are similar in certain ways with key differences;

5.     Interdisciplinary research and active collaboration is required;

6.     An inter-country action plan and hub is needed to coordinate strategic communications within the bounds of country security concerns.

It might be cynically suggested that narratives are mere propaganda or some other derisive description that serve only to manipulate people towards particular political agendas. If utilised unethically they are certainly capable of being so. What has been lacking until recently is a Code of Ethics for online platforms for countering online disinformation. This has just been rectified by the European Commission with the release of a self-regulated Code of Practice.

There has been wide advocacy in the literature for not only the “cross-pollination” of research but also for increased investment in studies that deconstruct narrative effectiveness, identify what is a complete narrative strategy and connect it with advanced cyber warfare and AI initiatives to counteract the mechanisation of Information Warfare and Influence Operations by adversaries. It is a natural evolution of theory-building in this relatively new field to examine whether a meta-model would be helpful in synthesising various alternative and counter-narrative models developed in parallel. Two of the 3 elements of Elegant Theory, simplicity and importance (but not predictive accuracy), are addressed. Karl Popper’s ‘falsifiability’ and predictive accuracy will need to wait until empirical research is completed.

A.       Theoretical Value

(a)       An examination of the theories of structural, thematic, and content analysis and the semiotics of narrative has been attempted.

(b)      A proposal for the content analysis of the deconstructed components of both terrorist and Russian disinformation counter narratives has been advanced.

 [Important Note: since this paper was completed in October 2018 a study has been released in June 2019. The article presents a content analysis of the Russian mass media regarding coverage of events in the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, identifies main methods, models of propaganda, provides examples of disinformation based on analytical and search services. Monitoring and content analysis has been carried out on the basis of ten Russian Internet Sources on the beginning of 2019.

I am publishing the conclusion in full:

“During the study of Russian propaganda on events in the East of Ukraine and Crimea, we come to the following conclusions: propaganda and disinformation is global in scope and is spread across two levels: 1) between Ukrainians and Russians to incite hostility between them. This is confirmed by the leading false idea on the Russian new media that Ukrainians are oppressing the Russian-speaking population, all-Ukrainianization is taking place, and the authorities have been seized by the nationalists who have brought the country to poverty. Instead, Novorossiya needs help from Putin and people want to join Russia; 2) impact on the international audience, which does not always have a definite point of view on this issue. For example, the television network RT, formerly known as Russia Today, has information internet portals in six languages (Russian, English, German, French, Arabic, Spanish) and offers biased (with a single point of view), inequitable information about Ukraine and others post-Soviet countries. The publication in the Russian version has an appropriate heading (Former USSR). The Internet publication spreads to the international audience the relevant provocative contexts propagating the idea of Russophobia and Ukrainian nationalism, radicalism. Further research on Russian propaganda is needed to counteract and counter-propaganda of a "hybrid" war that continues in the information area as well as in the Eastern regions of Ukraine. Moreover, only the joint efforts of politicians, journalists and scientists in exposing the facts of disinformation by Russia will be able to demonstrate the real situation for the international community.”

(c)       A structural comparison of both types of narrative has been made against a model of effective narrative, 1.) to see to what extent the elements of both types of counter narrative match the narrative model ie whether they contain the complete elements or have deficits; and 2.) to see whether a beneficial crossover between terrorist and disinformation counter narratives is possible so that a meta-model can be formulated.

(d)      Neither qualitative or quantitative research has been undertaken but the paper contains some preliminary background for such studies including the key steps in a structural and content analysis of various narratives. It relies instead on thick description of a range of narrative types and the different contexts to which each narrative type (or some combination) can connect. Existing theory (narrative, political, military, psycho-social and methodological) can illuminate the process which lends itself to a wide scope of interdisciplinary theory.

(e)       The concept of ‘non-material realism’ is offered as an attempt to formulate an extension of the (arguably) out-dated realist political theory as a possible basis for the political theoretical umbrella of counter narrative research.

(f)       The Strategic Narrative Meta-Model (see App.1) is advanced to serve as a conceptual unifier of these models (see Appendices 2-6) by extrapolating or “filtering” their common structural elements. The meta-model will enable the future compliance of other related relevant models. This is important for several reasons:

i.        speed, parsimony and ease of use: no need to ‘reinvent the wheel’;

ii.       the streamlining and synthesis of disparate but related research models developed in parallel and often without cross-reference to the other;

iii.      a type of ‘clearinghouse’ that brings together and simplifies different branches of research and discipline so that learning can be expedited.

B.    Practical Value: Present and Future Influence Operations

i.         Applicability:

It has not been until this year that there has been a scholarly research finding (Communications scholar Jamieson 2018) that Russia “probably” had an impact on the outcome. Her findings beg the questions, to what extent should media outlets be accountable to society by regulation? Do they have a major role and responsibility to post stories that warn of foreign influences? If Western democracies cannot afford to allow the weaponisation of media to progress unchallenged and unchecked, these questions require further study. It is timely and necessary to re-examine and clarify the role of the media in a democracy, to what extent has it been weakened, to what extent has its relentless search for profit weakened democracy, what part should media be required to play to strengthen it and how will that be achieved.

ii.        Future Influence Operations & AI:

In future innovative military personnel may be concentrating on and counting on automation to deal with the flood of disinformation. The emphasis of this paper however is on Intellectual Property and Information Technology and Artificial Intelligence. Neither IT or AI are autonomous (yet) and require a mindset to direct them that fully encompasses empathy, compassion, and comprehension of values, mission and the function of properly- targeted types of narrative.

C.        RAND Study (2017)

A recent US-commissioned RAND study has examined political warfare by both state and non-state adversaries today. The authors’ recommendation was there be changes in approach to all types of warfare to address threats short of conventional warfare ie asymmetric hybrid strategies.

The key arguments utilised in the 2015 RAN Issue Paper are directed at counter-narratives for terrorists. However, they are, arguably, equally applicable for Russian Disinformation counter narratives for the same reasons.

D.       The Tension between Military and Political Leaders

"A commander-in-chief need not be a learned historian nor a pundit, but he must be familiar with the higher affairs of state and its innate policies; he must know current issues, questions under consideration, the leading personalities, and be able to form sound judgments.." - Carl von Clausewitz

 Information Warfare (IW) and Information Operations (IO) strategies are not new. In 1993 a comprehensive strategy was released by the US Joint Chiefs of staff in a Memorandum of Policy:

“C2W was defined as containing these five pillars: Destruction ? Deception 15 ? Psychological Operations ? Operations Security ? Electronic Warfare”.

 US military theorists have been heralding the shift in the nature of both Information Warfare (IW) and Information Operations (IO) since IO commenced in 1996:

“IO is formally defined as "those actions taken to affect an adversary's information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."

 The findings and recommendations of the RAND study are increasingly of interest to the U.S. military, the U.S. State Department, those in the executive and legislative branches charged with national security policy responsibilities, allies and others tasking with improving US national security policy. The recent National Security Strategy (2017) and National Cyber Defence Strategy (2018) is opening an aperture for innovative counter-measures.

However, US national security policy is in flux and somewhat unpredictable due to the inconsistencies of the current President. There is a significant need for much greater investment in “soft power” strategies by Governments to match let alone exceed the resources applied by Russia. The obtaining of State resources for large-scale studies, training and deployment (‘on the ground’ and across social media) of those with the necessary expertise to “weaponise” narrative and build narrative resilience in the information battlefield and at home, as well as of those tasked with deradicalisation and reintegration, is an ongoing challenge. It is necessary to demonstrate the effectiveness of such “soft” strategies in order to persuade those with the power to (1) comprehensively apply significantly more resources to the narrative and counter-narrative tasks for a “complete narrative strategy” in Influence Operations, and 2, conduct further outcome studies. 

Maley analysed state communications in the context of terrorism and found that opinion leaders could create an “information cascade” that could lead to the internal collapse of a regime. Utilising both Churchill and Hitler as examples, he considers that such a cascade could be triggered by credible strategic communications and counter narratives targeted at adversaries. This insight could usefully inform both terrorism and disinformation counter narratives. The use of mechanised bots is one way to trigger such a cascade, and the Russians have already shown the way.

E.       Limitations and Strengths:

i.        Explosion of Data and Information

There is no shortage of datasets and information to conduct qualitative and quantitative research on the effectiveness of strategic narratives. The scope of this paper has been to identify, pull together, and synthesise existing models into a Strategic Narrative meta model that can be practically applied. Research into its effectiveness is still required. However, it assimilates common elements of various models that are operational already and which are already undergoing testing in many cases. Deploying a meta-model against all forms of extremism and propaganda is a stretch certainly. However, there are significant structural similarities in the types of counter-narratives already being utilised.

ii. Potential for Immediate Use

The Meta model needs to be tested against big propaganda datasets. How would that work?

As an example, the 2019 content analysis of the Russian mass media (regarding coverage of events in the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea), which identifies the main methods and models of propaganda, provides examples of disinformation based on analytical and search services. Monitoring and content analysis has been carried out on the basis of ten Russian Internet Sources on the beginning of 2019.

There is little point in not deploying the meta-model immediately in real time as counter-messaging is developed.

Effectiveness studies can come later.

iii.       Lack of security clearance

I do not have one so no access to secret programmes or intelligence has been available. Therefore, I don’t know what I don’t know. At the very least I have pulled together some of the key state of the art source materials as far as open source and published research goes. It may be in future that civilians can obtain temporary short-term clearances or the fast-tracking of the process may become faster.

 FINAL WORD:

“War is a fascinating trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason."  - Carl von Clausewitz

The placing of this type of qualitative investigation eventually within quantitative research projects would be the ideal but the difficulties are immense given the obfuscation and deception strategies involved and the multiplicity of data. A platform is required nevertheless to assess which are the most potent narratives and whether the right narrative in the right context is being used. The comparison of contexts and the different types of counternarrative strategies utilised within them (from offensive and defensive “weaponised” narratives to YARNS would be a step forward in closing the knowledge gap.

The great war philosopher Clausewitz (quoted throughout this paper) who helped defeat Napoleon (and, ironically, fought in the Russian army at one point), has highlighted the difficulties that arise during the “fog of war”. Nowhere is this clearer than the “fog” of disinformation, misinformation that has been skillfully woven by the Kremlin to make up for its military and economic shortcomings.

The era of “post-truth” is weakening the knowledge base and institutional knowledge of societies and creating a hall of mirrors-type confusion in populations. That has increased their susceptibility to the propaganda of hostile adversaries. The challenges appear to lie in comprehending what drives people to be susceptible to anti-democratic propaganda, what narratives appeal and mobilise behaviour in certain directions and what do not. The evidence chain linking narratives and action is poorly studied. There is considerable speculation but the qualitative research showing actual effectiveness is not yet fully available - with some genuine exceptions. Populations under threat still do not have available to them easily accessible material on which to judge truth from fake news, a fact from a lie, and a half-truth from a genuine account. Journalism and social media are infected with differing accounts of any news story. The bias of the media towards dramatisation and personalisation does not provide perspective and objectivity to people in search of balance in their news. Short attention spans are being encouraged by sound bites and “fast-food” news. Analytical thinking is not within the grasp of many, so those delegated with that task – journalists and academics - are still talking to the elites who already have some measure of critical thinking. If disinformation is to be countered effectively, there needs to be education on an unprecedented scale starting in schools with civics lessons, lessons on media bias and training in the identification of fake news. There needs to be an increased focus on mass education and awareness campaigns at both civil society and governmental level.

The building of community resilience and resistance to election interference, the undermining of faith in democratic institutions, other forms of misinformation and disinformation and the empowering of “values” resilience narratives or YARNS (arising from the grass-roots civil societies of democracies and disseminated by media technologies), may be the most sustainable and effective long-term strategy to counter Russian Influence Operations.

In addition, weaponised approaches should target Russia’s vulnerable “centre of gravity” (to use a Clausewitzian term) - its civil society, repressed population, elites and key oligarchs with different messaging.

A “complete narrative strategy” will have various options in the toolbox depending entirely on objectives and context. A preparedness to utilise innovative strategies and personnel may be the most effective approach to counter unpredictable non-traditional warfare strategies. eg YARNS that assert and affirm democratic values and norms in engaging ways could even be combined with strategic narrative strategies that can reach and influence the Russian people.

Passionate and committed “top-down/bottom up” whole-of-society resilience approaches, backed by coordinated and unequivocal messaging from world leaders, are likely to be effective in immunising populations from attacks on their identities and values, and the undermining of their faith in their own societies.

Defensive entanglement in opposition narratives is unlikely to neutralise either overt and covert aggressors as much as YARNS or positive counter-narratives. As in personal interaction defensiveness is a weak strategy. A proactive focus and targeting of an opponent’s weaknesses (and Russia has many) is more likely to succeed in undermining the regimes that are utilising asymmetric (or irregular) warfare to attack democracies.

?? A warning note about diving into high-tech transmission modalities like AI without commensurate investment in Strategic Narrative and effective strategies of Narrative Warfare.

The medium is NOT the message in this instance (McCluhan turn in your grave!). Because the message is the crucial component. A warship is useless without missiles. Narrative is the missile. It needs to be guided and directed, the right type, size and weight and pointed in the right direction. You don’t always wait for the enemy to fire then fire back. Going on the offensive with carefully-crafted narrative missiles that hit the brain of the target and activate emotion in the required direction is a proactive strategy that gives momentum and the edge.

It is likely that Clausewitz would approve of weaponised cognition/emotion targeted warfare given that his ultimate maxim is that war is a volatile mixture of “violent emotion, chance and rational calculation”.

APPENDIX 1: STRATEGIC NARRATIVE META-MODEL:

See graphic of STRATNAR Meta-Model tm of Effective Strategic Narratives:

https://www.dhirubhai.net/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6521940352914591744

      Information Warfare (IW)                                                   Influence Operations (IO)

      Hard Power                                                                            Soft Power

TERRORIST NARRATIVES                                                            RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA

                         GOVERNMENT-LEVEL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

                                                      Master Narrative

 Offensive Narratives                                                    Community Resilience              

*Counter-narratives=designed by military                   *Alternative Narratives=civil society

PSYOP                                                                          *YARNS

ELEMENTS OF NARRATIVE META-MODEL:

 Effective YARNS and Counter-Narratives

A hybrid amalgam of models[4]drawn from the fields of psychology, narrative theory, social science, political science research into terrorism alternative and counter-narratives, communications theory, and persuasion/propaganda models of disinformation counter-messaging.

SMART Goals and Objectives: disrupt, compete or confront adversary; narratives generating alternative and counter-narrative effects in alignment with the master narrative.

YARNS (or alternative narratives) = compete obliquely; Counter-narratives = confront directly.

·        Audience, message, medium, context, messenger, messengers, media

·        Overall communication plan or meta-narrative: reflects major themes of messenger identity;

·        Audience: identify audience target; know the intentions and psychological states of persons and groups and the attitudes, interests, and values of media audiences; know identities, issues, socio-cultural status, roles, political and religious beliefs, emotions, preferences; attitudes and behaviour; know local political myths.

·        Create alternate, legitimate narratives: ethical; exploit multiple identity issues (national, political, personal, social); single master narrative; meaning not truth; call to action;

·        Principles of online navigation: “transparency of online news, media and information literacy; empower users and journalists to foster a positive engagement with fast-evolving information technologies; safeguard the diversity and sustainability of the news media ecosystem; promote continued research on the impact of disinformation”; increase flow of persuasive information;

·        Core narrative structure and style: formal characteristics; inferences about the characteristics and intentions of communicators; inferences about content and its effect on, or the characteristics of its recipients;

·        Content analysis: frame analysis, structures, forms and schemes that influence individuals’ interpretations of issues, facts, groups and ideas and ‘determine’ the choices people make; enables prediction of future actions; reconstruction of a country’s strategic and operational objectives;

·        Content creation: stimulating, engaging, relevant, credible messaging; unifying framework of explanations; clear, realistic and compelling mission purpose; themes and memes; target cultural norms and values as well as interests; have legitimacy; match cultural and public norms and values seen by relevant publics as justified; consistent presentation; visual messaging; learnable and non-learnable writing skill-sets;

·        Linguistic means: metaphors, idioms and labels to amplify images;

·        Affect and tone: simplicity, emotionally-satisfying appeal, authenticity; optimism; empathy, subversive humour, irony, positive messaging and affirmations;

·        Narrative hierarchy: why, how, offer, proof;

·        Rules of Intention: protect the targeted; motivate audience to take action; do not spread propaganda

·        Message alignment

·        Strength

·        Hybrid narratives (cross-cultural or internarrative[6]);

·        Digital: amplification; production budgets and schedules;

·        Manner of transmission: chain, high quantity; professional and sophisticated use of social media; bots; AI;

·        Monitoring and evaluation components: reliability and validity assessment; evaluate the measures taken by different actors and constantly adjust the necessary responses; qualitative and quantitative analysis;

FLOW CHART:

Strategic Narrative Meta-Model of 2 Divergent Narrative Contexts in Influence Operations

   S.M.A.R.T. NARRATIVE GOAL

Terrorism/PVE                                                                                        Disinformation                                                         Master Narrative: meaning

Compete/Confront                                                                                    Disrupt/Compete                            

                    Target Audience: context, roles, status, emotions, beliefs

Disaffected_________________________ *_______________________Democracies

Audience Identities                                         Audience Identities

Radicalised/PVE_________________*_______________Elites/NonE                                                                     

Narrative Type                                                                      Narrative Type

Counter-Narrative/ Resilience_________*_____________YARN/Counter-narrative

-  structure, means, content                                            -  structure, means, content

Medium                                                                                  Medium

Social Media______________________  *________________MSM

Information Technologies                                                         Information Technologies

Messenger Type                                                                                    Messenger Type

Monitoring                                                                                             Monitoring

Evaluation Method                                                                                  

Research Studies:

qualitative/ quantitative

APPENDIX 2

Model of Narrative Requirements:

A. Core Narrative:

·        breakdown into clauses

·         abstract

·        orientation

·        central “complicating action”

·        evaluation

·        afterword

·        “grasp the interpretive orientation”

·         issues that are included or left out (important to the meaning of the narrative)

·        4 genres: comedy, romance, tragedy and satire

·        basic plots:

1.taking a journey; 2. engaging in a contest; 3. enduring suffering; 4. pursuing consummation; and 5. establishing a home.

·        rhythmic poetic structure

B. Hybrid Narratives Across Cultures

C. Narrative Builders:

“a great narrative helps people connect to what you are saying emotionally and intellectually”

Common Elements of Narrative Warfare and Digital Marketing

1. Narrative Construction: stories differ from narratives; a structured master narrative is more efficient than many stories

2. Digital Amplification:

D. Narratives and Power- the 5 criteria

“A Narrative is an interconnected set of beliefs that influence how we interpret the meaning of things”

·        Presentation

·        Clarity

·        Resonance

·        Shareability

·        Organisation

E. The Narrative Hierarchy

1. Why: What is the big vision? Why does it matter?

2. How: philosophy, methodology or point of view;

3. Offer: What are you selling? What are you motivating them to do?

4. Proof: trust, credibility and corroboration

F. Marketing Experience Can Inform Methods

Marketers: use narratives

Terrorists and Russian trolls use toxic narratives (usually lies)

Terrorists and Russian trolls: “have the intention of sowing discord and amplifying tensions in society”

G. Mobilising Narrative: “GRU Information Ops look just like digital marketing”

·        Targeting: similar to “prospecting” for clients; Russian propagandists seek people with low cognition and low information who do not question information; political and media figures; those on the extremes with divisive views;

·        Align message: message aligning creates rapport and involves pacing people’s values, interests, vocabulary and imagery;

·        Strengthen: ROI of narrative strength assessment -see the 5 criteria;

·        Amplify: hiring trolls with fake identities and bot accounts; Hamilton 68 Dashboard which tracks bot activity on Twitter;

·        Chain:

H. Counter Measures

    1. Identify and block toxic campaigns;

    2. Inoculate population;

    3. Create alternate, legitimate narratives.

APPENDIX 3

A. Model for Terrorism Counter Narratives: RAN GAMMMA+

Comprises the following key elements: Goal, Audience, Message, Messenger, Media, Action plus Monitoring and Evaluation.

Annex 2 provides a tangible overview of the key findings for effective alternative and counter-narratives from recent relevant research.

RAN GAMMMA+ Essentials: Effective Communication Campaigns:

•  Goals that are clear, realistic and measurable;
•  Promoted messages are relevant and the target audience considers the messengers credible;
•  Campaign works with the target audience's preferred medium or online platforms and is also present when the audience communicates offline;
•  Narrative campaigns in the form of monologues are unlikely to meet the needs of an audience that wants to talk or is upset or outraged about a real or perceived injustice;
•  Campaigns should offer a call to action for those wishing to become involved in the issue at hand, which will facilitate monitoring and evaluation;
•  Campaigns aiming to change minds and behaviours offer opportunity for sustained dialogue (both online and offline) with those in their audience who wish to talk;
• Campaigns which ensure they have monitoring and evaluation components in place from the start can then adjust ongoing activities if needed, and once completed, can learn whether they had the desired impact;
• 
  

Campaigns that produce a constant stream of content for their target audience to interact with increase their chances of having an impact. Authenticity and quantity are more relevant than technical quality;

• Alternative narratives promote positive alternative perspectives, courses of action and role models, and foster critical thinking.
• Counter-narratives, which aim at debunking extremist propaganda, should only be directed at a well-researched and understood audience which is already engaged with extremist content.

B. RAN Guidelines for Effective Alternative and Counter-narrative campaigns (GAMMMA+), RAN Centre of Excellence, Issue Paper, 31/12/2017

•  Do no harm; don’t spread propaganda; Backfire effect/ Quantity of messages; Do no harm; don’t spread propaganda;
•  Beliefs and identity;
• Moral reframing;
• Identity and values
• Narrative persuasion and transport
•  Theory of change
•   Delivering new narratives
•   Target audience, disruption and quantity of alternative narratives and counter-narratives
•  Uncertainty and authoritarian attitudes

C. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Issues Paper of 1 October 2010:

•         identified the key elements of the effectiveness of Daesh/Is’ social media campaigns that rely on emotion to galvanise young people into radicalisation:

“The following questions are addressed: ·How do counter-narratives and alternative narratives1 play a role in prevention of radicalisation? ·What do successful counter-narrative and alternative narrative campaigns look like? ·What are the obstacles to designing and delivering effective campaigns from an industry, government and practitioner perspective and how can they be overcome? ·How can and should success be measured? ·What can stakeholders offer to boost counter-narrative and alternative narrative campaigns?

•         Exposure to extremist propaganda – both online and offline – is critical; popular extremist propaganda often includes: high production value, the use of fast-paced editing, music and a charismatic narrator, and a call to action. The professional and sophisticated use of social media by ISIL in particular has been a game-changer.”
•         Extremist narratives are effective because of their simplicity, their use of scapegoating, and their emotional appeals to fear, anger, shame and honour;
•         Messages are crafted to exploit identity issues that many young people may be experiencing;
•         Manner of transmission is equally vital.

                                                                                                                                                    APPENDIX 4: Model of Counter-Narrative Structure

“Know the intentions and psychological states of persons and groups and the attitudes, interests, and values of media audiences” - Charles P. Smith

    A. Analysis of Communications into 3 parts –

a) “substantive or formal characteristics”;

 b) “inferences about the characteristics and intentions of communicators”;

c) inferences about content and its effect on, or the characteristics of its recipients”.

B.            Steps in Content Analytic Research*

o   Deciding on type of material to be analysed (archival, naturally- occurring, elicited;

o   Sampling (material and sources): non-probability sample may be used if research is exploratory or involves theory development;

o   Sampling conventions for communications research: see Berelson (1954): publications or other sources, issues or dates, content within issues; take into account geographical location, frequency of publication, time of publication (morning or evening), target audience and size of circulation. See Holsti (1969 and Krippendorff (1980) for greater detail.

o   Cross-cultural research: see Kalin, Davis and McClelland (1966).

o   Projective methods pose complex issues.

o   Sample size: for qualitative research consider reliability and precision (see Patton, 1990).

o   Content analysis (coding systems): computerised quantification of qualitative material; develop manual

o   Information to be obtained;

o   Definition of units of material

o   Categories or dimensions of classification

o   Rules for applying system

o   Deciding on or devising coding systems

o   See Table 12.2 for examples of coding systems for social science research.

•         Intercoder agreement: reliability of coder as measuring instrument and frequency and scores derived for quantitative research.

•         Coder training: manual, ample practice materials and ability to consult experienced scorer about coding decisions.

•         Computer-assisted coding and statistical analysis: large amounts of material, large numbers of variables, contingencies, patterns, analysis of coding categories and context.

•         Reliability and validity assessment.

C.      Braddock and Horgan: “Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counter Narratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism” (2015)

Narrative =  “a simple unifying, easily-expressed story or explanation that organises people’s experience and provides a framework for understanding events” (Kilcullen, as cited by Schmid, 2014, p. 3);

•         deeply rooted in culture;
•  can in turn encourage specific types of personal action (Corman, 2011);
•          powerful because they hold the pieces of the story and “ring true” for members of the target audience (Goodall, 2010);
•          Schmid: one of the keys to understanding the ascendance of al-Qaeda’s ideology is understanding the extent to which it functions as a single narrative:

“[It is] a unifying framework of explanations that provides its followers with an emotionally satisfying portrayal of the world in which they live and their role in it, offering them a sense of identity and giving meaning to their lives (2014, p. 5).

Ingredients of an effective narrative: Schmid (2014, p. 29)

“1. articulate a clear, realistic and compelling mission purpose without getting entangled in sub-goals and details, but keeping the focus on long-term, overarching goals that have to be related to cultural norms and values as well as interests;

2. have legitimacy in that it matches cultural and public norms and values and is seen by relevant publics as justified;

3. hold the prospect of success and provide a feeling of progress towards its goals;

4. presented in a consistent manner in order to be effective and withstand the attacks of counter-narratives that might cost it public support; and

 5. must fit within an overall communication plan that reflects major themes of our own identity.” (at p.59)”

Counter-messaging Analysis: Braddock and Horgan cite the “spectrum” analysis of Briggs and Feve (2013)

•         “government strategic communications, which essentially involve “getting the message out……raise awareness of what it is doing and to forge positive relationships with key constituencies;
•        alternative narratives, positive stories about “social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy (Briggs & Feve, 2013, p. 5).
•         Schmid (2014) maintains that alternative narratives should be able to bridge the “us” versus “them” divide that is fostered by extremists and bring together people from all sides; focus more on “what we are for” and less on “what we are against”.
•        Whereas strategic communication is the purview of government, alternative narratives may be issued both government and civil society activists and groups.
•          Finally, counter-messaging may be realized through counter-narratives. 2015, p.58.”

 D. Institute of Strategic Dialogue (ISD)

COUNTER NARRATIVE TOOLKIT: Resources to Create and Manage Campaigns to Counter Violent Extremist Narratives Online

Clear Goals and Objectives: audience, message, medium, messengers

Content Creation: Best Practice Guide

Identifying Content Creation Needs

Making Engaging Content

Production Budgets and Schedules

Testing Content

APPENDIX 5

A.       Model of Resilience Narrative Structure

Psychologists Lewandowsky et al. have identified resilience narratives as highly effective strategies. In deconstructing and testing such narratives, there are several parts that interlock with variables such as:

1.) Target audience; 2.) Context; 3.) Structure and style; 4.) Themes and memes; 5.) Content that stimulates and engages; 6.) Affect and tone: the use of empathy, subversive humour, irony, positive messaging and affirmations; learnable and non-learnable writing skill-sets; 6.) Visual messaging; 7.) Effectiveness: analysis of the effectiveness of sample narratives from various sources.

B.      Model of YARNS (Yeasty affirmative narrative strategies)

 Know HOW to talk to the unconscious mind.

 YARNS (“yeasty affirmative resilience narrative strategies”) incorporate the structural elements of effective narratives. They evoke the campfire, comfortable chats and non-threatening casual communication. They contain “yeast” – that magic ingredient that makes buns rise and elevates stories into compelling narratives with many layers of meaning. YARNS are metaphorical grassroots stories with layers of meaning - powerful yet oblique narrative devices that can speak to all the identities of an individual and provide an instant heuristic that has the inherent capacity to manage intrapsychic change without the need for direct confrontation. Written well they will engage, entertain, teach, motivate, train, inspire and delight. They can make us laugh. They can change us – our perceptions, mood, and behaviour. They can also defend democratic populations by boosting populations that have been deflated, undermined and confused by hostile, divisive and contradictory narratives. They may also serve to subvert illiberal democratic regimes.

1. Ethics: know ethical ‘story’ (yarn); fighting ‘facts’/ ‘truth’ unimportant; ethics is.

2. Identity: know your audience and what is meaningful for it; its psychological age and identities; its biases and prejudices;

3. Issues: know its ordinary everyday as well as ultimate issues: what it avoids, obsesses about, leans towards and what it likes and dislikes.

4. Status: know its socio-cultural status, roles;

5. Beliefs: know its political and religious beliefs;

6. Emotions: know its fears, what makes it angry or sad, laugh, cry, entertains or bores it;

7. Preferences: know what soothes or arouses it: relaxes or keeps it awake at night.

APPENDIX 6

A. Models of Russian Disinformation Structure and Response

i.    Paul and Matthews (2016) of RAND describe the Russian propaganda model as:

       1. high-volume and multichannel,

       2. Rapid, continuous, and repetitive

       3. Lacks commitment to objective reality

       4. Lacks commitment to consistency.

Counter-narrative Model:

•    a stepped-up approach
•    building resilience by “increasing the flow of information” in competition with Russia;
•   active hostilities when sources of propaganda are targeted.
• 5 suggestions utilising the metaphor of a “firehose”:

1.     Don’t expect to counter the firehose of falsehood with the squirt gun of truth.

2.     Find ways to help put raincoats on those at whom the firehose of falsehood is being directed.

3.     Don’t direct your flow of information directly back at the firehose of falsehood;

4.     Increase the flow of persuasive information and start to compete, seeking to generate effects that support U.S. and NATO objectives;

5.     Turn off (or turn down) the flow. [44]

ii.       Cobaugh, Paul: A Five-Point Strategy to Oppose Russian Narrative Warfare (US)

1.       Build resilience in US audiences that aids in recognizing and resisting influence.

2.       Apply CYBER tools proportionately, both offensively and defensively.

3.       Regularly disseminate effective alternate and counter-narratives.

4.       Message by all available and appropriate means, messaging in support of US narrative strategy.

 5.      Deterrence or rather: demonstrate by action that aggression will be firmly resisted.

B. Model of Disinformation Counter Narrative Structure

Principles of Response:

•        “enhance transparency of online news, involving an adequate and privacy-compliant sharing of data about the systems that enable their circulation online;
•         promote media and information literacy to counter disinformation and help users navigate the digital media environment;
• develop tools for empowering users and journalists to tackle disinformation and foster a positive engagement with fast-evolving information technologies;
•    safeguard the diversity and sustainability of the European news media ecosystem and promote continued research on the impact of disinformation in Europe to evaluate the measures taken by different actors and constantly adjust the necessary responses.”

C. Table 1 (RAN PVE Model): template for the key considerations of the Disinformation Model of YARNS, counter-narratives and government strategic communication.

Countering Russian Disinformation: key considerations of YARNS and counter-narratives:

What                              Why                     How                         Target                Initiator     

Alternative

narratives

(YARNS)

Counter-

Narratives

(CN)

Government

Strategic

Communications