Statutory Interpretation after Chevron

Statutory Interpretation after Chevron

The Supreme Court's landmark decision to overturn Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce marks a seismic shift in administrative law, with profound implications for the legal profession, regulatory landscape, and the balance of power between federal agencies and the judiciary.

Background and Historical Context

Chevron deference, established in 1984 by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., required courts to defer to a federal agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers. This doctrine was premised on the notion that agencies, with their specialized expertise, were better positioned than generalist judges to make policy decisions within their domains. However, the Chevron doctrine has long been controversial. Critics argued it ceded too much power to executive agencies at the expense of the judiciary's constitutional role, while supporters contended it allowed for regulatory flexibility and respected agency expertise. This tension reflects longstanding debates over the proper balance between judicial review and executive authority in the modern administrative state.

When a statute becomes the subject of a dispute in court, judges usually must interpret the law, ambiguous or not. As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in Marbury v. Madison: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Judicial pronouncements about statutes are generally the final word on statutory meaning and will determine how the law is carried out—at least, unless Congress acts to amend the law. In the realm of statutory interpretation, many members of the judiciary view their role in “say[ing] what the law is” as subordinate to Congress’s position as the law’s drafter. Indeed, the legitimacy of any particular exercise in statutory interpretation is often judged by how well it carries out Congress’s will.

The Court's Decision

On June 28, 2024, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron deference. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized that it is the judiciary's constitutional role to interpret the law, not government agencies. The Court cited the Administrative Procedure Act's mandate that courts "decide all relevant questions of law" and "interpret...statutory provisions" when reviewing agency action. The majority opinion outlined several key instructions for lower courts in adjudicating future cases involving statutory interpretation of laws administered by agencies, emphasizing the need for independent judgment, traditional tools of statutory construction, and a rigorous analysis of statutory ambiguity.

Implications for Legal Education

The shift away from Chevron deference will prompt adjustments in legal education. Law schools will revamp their curricula to emphasize judicial statutory interpretation rather than agency deference. This entails a greater focus on principles of statutory construction and legislative processes, alongside the study of emerging case law and pre-Chevron precedents on judicial review of agency action. Additionally, law students must enhance their training in statutory interpretation and legal argumentation skills to prepare for a legal environment where challenging agency interpretations become more common. Understanding the complexities of regulatory law in a post-Chevron landscape will be crucial for future lawyers.

Impact on Practicing Lawyers

For practicing lawyers, the end of Chevron deference presents both challenges and opportunities. Increased litigation is expected, with a surge in legal challenges to federal regulations and agency interpretations. Lawyers must now focus more on convincing judges through robust statutory interpretation rather than deferring to agency expertise. This shift necessitates honing skills in analyzing legislative text, history, and purpose to argue for particular statutory constructions.

The decision also introduces regulatory uncertainty, as greater variability in judicial decisions may lead to less stability in regulatory regimes. Lawyers will need to provide more nuanced compliance advice to clients and engage more proactively with agencies during rulemaking to advocate for clear statutory language that minimizes ambiguity and potential litigation. Legal strategies that previously relied on Chevron deference will need to be reevaluated, presenting new litigation opportunities to challenge existing regulations and agency interpretations that were previously protected.

Broader Implications for Administrative Law

The Court's decision has far-reaching consequences for the regulatory landscape. It shifts power dynamics by reducing agency discretion and increasing judicial oversight of administrative action, potentially reshaping the administrative state. This ruling may compel Congress to craft more precise and detailed statutes to avoid ambiguities that could lead to judicial reinterpretation. Agencies might adopt more conservative interpretations of their statutory authority and provide more robust justifications for their actions. While this could potentially reduce agency flexibility, it may lead to more consistent interpretations of statutes over time.

The decision reinforces the judiciary's role in checking executive power, realigning the balance between branches of government. This renewed emphasis on judicial review underscores the importance of expertise, democratic accountability, and the rule of law in the modern regulatory state.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision to overturn Chevron deference represents a fundamental shift in administrative law, with significant ramifications for legal education, practice, and governance. As the legal community navigates this new terrain, monitoring how these changes influence the interplay between legislative intent, regulatory action, and judicial oversight will be essential. The ruling underscores the ongoing evolution of administrative law and the delicate balance between expertise, democratic accountability, and the rule of law. It demands more precision in legislative drafting, rigorous judicial review of agency action, and adaptability from legal practitioners.

As courts, agencies, and lawyers adjust to this new paradigm, the full impact of overturning Chevron will unfold. This landmark decision opens a new chapter in the relationship between the judiciary and the administrative state, shaping the development of American law and governance for years to come.

Sources

1. https://ppl-ai-file-upload.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/595048/dcb08188-7bea-4910-a204-118513504997/22-451_7m58%20%281%29.pdf

2. https://www.jacksonlewis.com/insights/go-fish-us-supreme-court-overturns-chevron-deference-federal-agencies-what-it-means-employers

3. https://natlawreview.com/article/crisis-certainty-us-supreme-court-throws-out-chevron-deference-and-tcpaworld-will

4. https://www.gibsondunn.com/supreme-court-overrules-chevron-sharply-limiting-judicial-deference-to-agencies-statutory-interpretation/

5. https://www.bakerdonelson.com/what-the-supreme-courts-chevron-deference-ruling-could-mean-for-health-care-law

6. https://www.seyfarth.com/news-insights/chevron-is-dead-long-live-the-administrative-state.html

7. https://www.hrdive.com/news/scotus-overturns-chevron-doctrine/720034/

8. https://abc7.com/supreme-court-dumps-40-year-precedent-in-major-blow-to-federal-regu/15008923/

9. https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2024/06/supreme-court-overrules-chevron-deference

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https://www.lsac.org/blog/how-recent-supreme-court-decisions-affect-legal-education

See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”). Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 41, Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, No. 15-1439, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1912 (U.S. 2017) (statements of Justice Samuel Alito) (describing statutory provision as “gibberish” and asking whether there is “a certain point at which we say this [provision] means nothing, we can’t figure out what it means, and, therefore, it has no effect”). 19 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See also HART & SACKS, (“Adjudication in its normal operation is at once a process for settling disputes and a process for making, or declaring, or settling law.”).

See, e.g., MIKVA & LANE, (“All approaches to statutory interpretation are framed by the constitutional truism that the judicial will must bend to the legislative command.”). See generally Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 283 (1989) (defining and exploring the concept of legislative supremacy in the field of statutory interpretation).

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