Statistics & Training Considerations
When we look at the number of officers killed last year felonious assaults, we can deem some information from the known statistics about the encounter. I derived this information from LEOKA and have focused only on the highest informational aspects since the information provided is quite detailed. There were 48 officers killed in felonious assaults that vary from traffic stops, domestic disturbances, and search warrants, etc.. The individual numbers provided may not equal the total number since some officers may have been in multiple categories, and I only looked at the most prevalent based on the circumstance of their death. I wanted to focus on a few of the details as a trainer with the first being that 30 of the officers killed were in a patrol capacity at the time of the encounter, with the average age being forty with thirteen years' experience. You’ll also notice the average age of the assailant was nine years younger than the average age of the officer killed. There are no details given in the amount of training provided to each of the officers killed or the existence of continual training they received, which could be vital information for any studies conducted.
I know that age and physical conditioning can influence reaction time and physical ability depending on how often you take part in physical activity related to what you may experience in the field. I’m 46 years old at the time of this article and I often challenge myself in martial arts against individuals that are half my age, and I personally can feel the difference in stamina compared to someone in their twenties. I still seem to have enough comparable strength to compete with them, but other areas like flexibility and stamina seem to fade with time. I also realize this is not even across the board since some older competitors seem to last longer than others. The area where officers were assigned at the time of their death would also suggest to me that most training hours would need to focus on the patrol officer, not saying that training across the board is not important for professional development. We notice that six of the officers were conducting traffic violation stops at the time of the incident. Most of the officers killed during a traffic stop were on the driver side approach at the time of the encounter which is less safe than the passenger side approach, because of the offender expectation of approach and the officer maneuverability once the encounter turns deadly.
The other statistic that struck me was the number of officers that were attempting to restrain the offender at the time of their death. We don’t know each circumstance as it relates to each officer, but we can see that the close contact and control during an arrest is vital. We must also be cognizant of body language before we close that distance that may indicate a weapon is present. We may want to focus on eye movement and hesitation when we ask the offender about weapons they may have concealed on their body. I noticed several times over the years that offenders would touch the area or hesitate when answering the question, which would be a clear sign of a weapon or contraband being present. The detailing of that information would be critical as well when an officer was articulating grabbing an offender in a circumstance where the body camera didn’t capture body language recognized by the officer. I’m sure most of us have seen the signs beforehand of a suspect that was about to run prior to the pursuit. These signals are often not developed in an academy setting because they base much of the training on passing a state exam and have a limited amount of time for other categories. It doesn't help that each state seems to add more to the curriculums when groups lobby for other specific training to be provided.
We can accomplish this body language recognition training through scenario-based training where the role player exhibits behaviors the officer would need to recognize and articulate. The officer could use the body behaviors learned during training scenarios to justify why they grabbed the offender or drew their weapon prior to no apparent action being taken by the suspect. This cognitive recognition would allow the officer to decrease their decision time based upon the actions of the offender who is also considering their options when observing the officer. The criminal can recognize an officer that is confident and aware of their circumstances compared to the officer that ignores the signs of an impending attack. The experienced criminal can recognize the inexperienced officer and will often make this known by asking them if they are new. This is also where the suspect will often attempt phycological intimidation to see how the new officer will respond.
The other noteworthy statistic would be the distance between the assailant and the officer at the time of the encounter, and we notice this really hasn’t changed over the years. We see that 14 of the officers killed were within five feet or fewer from the offender. I taught for years in the academy setting and noticed many of the recruit officers would draw their weapon in a close contact scenario and use the Weaver stance as they punched the firearm out from their body. I seldom would see an officer fire from the hip even though I know they taught it during range week. You would see some move offline, but the majority would keep their stance and not move. This failure to move showed me that line based training on a range is not indicative of a gunfight, but conducive to getting as many people as possible through training at one time. I noticed as well that many would move straight backward, and a few even fell over their own feet instead of moving at an angle forward towards cover. This movement backward away from the threat is a natural reaction but can be reduced with enough conditioned training focused on forward angling.
The next set of data that was alarming was the officers that were not wearing their body armor during the encounter. I’m sure there are some officers that have gained or lost weight to where their vest no longer fits, and the agency should immediately resolve the situation under those circumstances. We should be responsible for wearing the equipment that could save our lives, but as well we should hold each other accountable when we see our partner making the choice to not wear their vest. I’ve heard officers make the statements that them not wearing their vest doesn’t affect me, which I would disagree with since they could be my backup officer on scene. The officer not wearing their vest could take rounds that could keep them from being able to assist in the gunfight and cause the initial officer to risk their own life trying to save their fallen partner. The patrol shift supervisors should do safety checks as well to verify officers are wearing their vest and other equipment is present and in working order.
I realize no matter how much training or equipment we provide that officers will lose their lives in this profession, but we should always examine ways that we can lower those possibilities. We should look at ourselves and our own training to see if there are areas where we can reduce the chances of creating another statistic. I know we’re all going through tough times right now and things won't get easier with reduced budgets in the upcoming year, but let us have conversations about how we can reduce cost and provide great training to our officers. I will always be available to assist with questions that my fellow officers have, even if you attend none of our programs. Be safe and watch your six!
Victim profile
The average age of the officers killed in 2019 was 40 years old.
The slain officers’ average length of law enforcement service was 13 years.
Of the officers who died in 2019, 45 were male and 3 were female.
By race, 40 of the victim officers were White, 7 were African American, and 1 was Asian
7 officers were attempting to restrain/control/handcuff offenders during arrest situations.
5 Disturbance calls.
14 investigative enforcement with 6 being traffic stops.
3 involved vehicular pursuits.
10 tactical situations serving search warrants etc…
3 assisting another officer
2 officers ambushed (entrapment/premeditation).
Assignments
30 officers were on assigned vehicle patrol when the felonious incidents occurred.
4 officers were on special assignments.
3 officers were assigned to investigative/detective duties.
5 slain officers were off duty (but acting in official capacities) at the time of the incidents.
26 on-duty officers who died in 2019 were assisted at the times of the attacks.
17 on-duty officers were alone and unassisted at the times of the attacks.
Weapons
44 were killed with firearms. Of these, 34 were killed with handguns.
No officers’ weapons were stolen during the incidents.
10 officers fired their weapons; 6 officers attempted to fire their weapons.
14 officers were slain with firearms when they were less than 5 feet from the offender.
Body armor
30 of the officers feloniously killed were wearing body armor at the time of the incidents.
Profile of alleged known assailants
49 offenders of those offenders, the following characteristics we know:
The average age of the alleged offenders was 31 years old.
The average height was 5 feet 10 inches tall, and the average weight was 181 pounds.
48 alleged offenders were male.
28 were White, and 15 were African American.
12 under judicial supervision at the time of the incidents.
9 were under the influence of alcohol and/or a controlled substance.
36 prior criminal arrests.
Author: Ray Beshirs
Blue Shield Tactical Systems LLC