Standards Compliance: An Often Misleading Indicator in Research
Richard Palluzi
Pilot Plant and Laboratory Engineering, Safety, and Design Consultant at Richard P Palluzi LLC
Anyone who has read my articles knows that I am a big proponent of following codes, standards and recommended practices in the design and operation of pilot plants, laboratories, and research equipment. However, simply complying with a standard does not automatically make you as safe as you may think.
?The reasons for this are many.
?The individual reading or interpreting the standard may not really understand what the standard requires. Sadly ,many standards are complex compendiums which reference both themselves and other standards back and forth. Determining exactly what sections and attendant requirements do or do not apply in each situation is often very complicated and prone to error. Often the wording , intended to be in legally enforceable language, is often complex, occasionally convoluted, and (sadly) sometimes only borderline intelligible as to what the standard requires.
?Compounding the issue is that there are often competing standards, each of which may give slightly (or not so slightly) different requirements. A classic example is those from the International Code Council, namely the International Building Code (IBC) and the International Fire Code (IFC), which often have different requirements from many National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) ?standards. While most technical committees try very hard to keep the major standards aligned sometimes oversights are made or other committee members simply won’t agree. This often requires the person doing the interpretation to look at more than one code and try to determine which one is governing or most applicable. Sometimes that is easy, other times hard.
?If no code is governing, or even sometimes if one is, it is usually prudent to examine the relevant sections from both. Then it is sometimes necessary to determine which is the most stringent of the multiple requirements or, occasionally, how to best implement both sets of requirements. Sometimes this is easy. One code may require a separate high alarm the other code may simply require a high alarm; providing a separate high alarm therefore meets both codes. In other cases, it may be inherently difficult as where one code has a different limit on maximum allowable quantity of hazardous materials allowed in a specific type of area versus the other. Determining which code is paramount may, or may not, be easy.
?The best approach to this issue is always to make sure that the person interpretating the code is familiar enough with the code’s provisions to be able to interpret it properly. A cold eyes review of the interpretation is occasionally warranted. A particular problem I often encounter is where a design firm gives a laundry list of codes to be followed on their first drawing? without fully understanding them. As a result, they do not properly apply the same codes to the rest of the design. The poor owner is comfortable they are compliant with code X since it is listed on the first drawing only to find later that their laboratory does not have the mandated number of exits, required fire rating, or some other key issue the design firm did not recognize or understand. In many cases even a cursory review of these general notes can show that they can be riddled with errors in areas for which the design firm rarely works. The author has had numerous cases where reading a particular code reference has resulted in him questioning the need, the relevance, or even if it is the correct section. Citing a medical gas code requirement limited to 300 psig is not very relevant or useful for a 3,000 psig process gas system. The design firm in question had never designed such a high pressure system previously and failed to realize the cited code was irrelevant. Or worse, what code should have been relevant.
?Another problem is that the code may not have been developed to address the specific situation which the organization is trying to address. Applying the American Petroleum Institute API 500 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division 1 and Division 2 ?to a 10 gallon pilot plant storage tank leads to requirements that do not make a lot of sense on that small a research scale. The best way to address this concern is usually to read the preamble and introduction to try and determine what the code does or does not intend to cover and the purpose for which it was written. Reviewing the limits of the requirements can also give you a strong indication of where it does and does not make sense to apply a specific code. For example, when one sees that small is 5,000 gallons in NFPA 497 Recommended Practice for the Classification of Flammable Liquids, Gases, or Vapors and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas you could get a strong indication that its relevance to a pilot plant or laboratory unit handling less than 25 gallons is probably going to be highly suspect or at least not terribly useful.
?One can contact the code organization and try and find someone on the committee who will venture an opinion, which of course is only their personal view, as to the relevance of the code to your specific situation. This may help but has no legal relevance as it is only an opinion. One can also write directly to the code organization and request a formal written interpretation. This is often a time consuming and tedious task which, unfortunately, does not always produce a usable outcome. The technical committee, the group responsible for writing and maintaining the code, may decide not to answer the question, give a very general and not very useful explanation (a motherhood statement), ask you to present it formally at the next scheduled revision, or even be unable to reach a consensus among its membership to give you an official answer. An answer that says “your approach may be suitable depending on the specific circumstances” is usually not very useful. Other organizations have internal groups that will try and answer your question. They usually do a great job telling you section X requires Y but often struggle trying to interpret new, novel, or unique cases. Sadly, in these instances, their interpretation may not always be very relevant or even correct.
?Another concern is that often meeting all the specific provisions of a code does not inherently ensure you are completely safe. You may have a special situation that the code did not think to address. You may have evaluated something within your process as not being applicable when it should be covered. An organization may not realize that there is an issue with their proposed design or operation which the code never addressed because it is too unique, too novel, or too rare. Codes almost always lag practice and take some time to catch up with new equipment, approaches, or concerns. Less recognized is that the technical committees often cannot reach a consensus on a particularly contentious issue. This often leads to having to ignore the issue until a later date, when consensus can be reached, or trying to side step the issue by some vague generality (e.g. “may be possible with the use of good engineering judgment”).
?What about the case when an organization proposes a design or operation that they believe is at least as safe as the code mandated requirements and is more suitable to their specific situation but is not allowed by the current version of the code? Certainly, bringing this to the attention of the code’s technical committee at the next revision cycle is prudent. It can help get the code revised to include a new approach or address a developing issue. However, this takes time and effort. Worse a successful outcome is not guaranteed. The technical committee, or at least enough of the technical committee, may not agree that the proposed design or operation is as safe as the organization proposing the change. The technical committee may feel that the current restrictions remain necessary. They may see concerns, legitimate or not, with applying it to areas outside the requestor’s intent in other situations. Sadly, they may not even understand the concern and hence not see the need to try and address it at all.
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?In this case the organization desiring to use a different approach bears the burden of responsibility to prove that their approach meets all the code’s intentions and is at least as safe. Many codes have performance options as viable alternatives. They will explain exactly what needs to be done if an organization wants to try a different approach arguing their approach is equivalent in safety. Unfortunately, these performance based alternatives are often tedious and time consuming. They usually require the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) to agree with the analysis. This can prove to be very difficult, particularly in complex and technical situations, as the AHJ may not have the required level of technical expertise to make an assessment. Many AHJ's are also reluctant to approve such performance based alternatives because of the potential legal complications if the alternative proves unsafe and an accident occurs. Just as often, the requesting organization’s logic behind the position is poorly documented, inadequately explained, ?and fails to make a compelling case. Often the analysis is simplistic with no back up. (“We cannot conceive how this can be an issue.”); other times it is so convoluted and complex that almost no one really understands it.? To win agreement for an alternate approach, the documentation must be clear, concise, and easily understood. The AHJ must be able to understand the issues, appreciate the hazards, and be able to comprehend the analysis for why the alternative approach is safe. Having a cold eyes review your argument before submission and play devil’s advocate is prudent and often eliminates many of these problems. Taking the time and effort to develop an easily understood summary and arranging to present it in person to the AHJ is also usually a good approach. This allows the AHJ to ask questions, allows the organization to correct misinterpretations of their argument or clarify complex issues , and generally promotes agreement. At worst, it allows the organization to understand any remaining issues that they should revisit and address.
?In many other cases the code does not have a specifically documented performance based alternative option. Sometimes a specific AHJ, such as a local municipality, building department, or fire department, is not directly involved so there is no one to approve the proposed approach. ?In this case the organization can decide to use their alternative approach and assume the risk. Obviously a detailed hazard analysis and risk assessment should always be conducted addressing all elements of the proposed design or operation. Assuming this hazard analysis and risk assessment concurs with the organization's view that the proposed alternative is a safer approach, it is still necessary to exercise extreme care to make sure that the process, the hazard analysis and risk assessment, and the resultant decisions are clearly and carefully explained in detail. Finally, the organization should always be careful to call out where they are not meeting the code. “We comply with NFPA 45 Fire Protection for Laboratories Using Chemicals except that we allow? storing up to 5 gallons of flammable waste in a hood as our hazard analysis and risk assessment documented in X has indicated that does not incur any additional risk given mitigative measures A, B, and C which we require.” If carefully documented and scrupulously followed this can help ensure the organization is in a defensible position if the approach is called into question later.
?Once an alternative approach is decided upon, the organization must ensure that the alternative is scrupulously followed. Crafting a solid argument that X kg of Y is safe tends to fail when one finds 2X kg in many places. The organization must compel compliance, treating their alternative as if it were a code provision. This can be challenging over time. The original people involved may have moved on, other people may have subtly interpreted some provisions or requirements, slightly different conditions may have been interpreted as being “equivalent”. I have seen too many alternative approaches which were valid when conceived that have slowly drifted into unsafe practices through normalization of deviation.
?Often a code does not address a hazard that the organization has identified. Just because the code does not mention a identified potential hazard one cannot ignore the hazard arguing one is “code compliant”. Ignoring the issue is not a solution. Codes are guidance documents to address known, common hazards. They never pretend to address every possible concern that might arise. They never pretend to be all encompassing.? Many organizations stop their hazard analysis and risk assessment once they feel a relevant code has been met. This is very dangerous as often other, non-routine or novel conditions, situations, or equipment can create potential hazards the code did not address.
?Sometimes an organization believes it is safe as it is following a code. However, I sometimes find that the organization is not following the code either because the original analysis was incorrect, it has become subtly or blatantly changed over time, or the original or current interpretation was wrong. Organizations tend to enshrine old interpretations that meet their needs and cite the mas gospel. When questioned as to their logic, documentation is often incomplete or entirely missing.? Different individuals give their own understanding and interpretation of the logic behind the practice, often disagreeing with others. References are made to older codes long since significantly modified. Subtle, or blatant but unrecognized,? changes to a practice or procedure may render current practices suspect, incorrect, or unsafe. (One client decided to cut windows into each laboratory doorway to avoid the potential for collisions when opening a door into the corridor not recognizing they destroyed the doors required fire rating. Another client found a code section that allowed larger amounts of flammable materials inside their laboratory but failed to understand the increased amount was not allowed as their doors opened in instead of out as required for the larger quantities.) A periodic review of an organization’s practices versus current code requirements is almost always a prudent safety measure.
?Often an organization believes they are code compliant because their annual fire inspection did not cite them for any specific code violation. Fire inspectors are responsible for inspection numerous buildings and have a limited time for each. Often they may be less familiar with some applicable code requirements for less common code areas. They often do not know the specific codes for which the facility was originally permitted. Often the owner does not either. So, the best they can do is try to highlight common, clearly known issues like blocked sprinkles, out of inspection date fire extinguishers, or blocked exits. This often means they miss others such as maximum allowable quantities (MAQ) of hazardous materials, or proper ping.. An annual fire inspection is really designed to just ensure the basic elements of the fire protection system are functional. It is not a code compliance review. It was never meant to be. Assuming no issues are cited simply means nothing blatantly obvious is wrong. Just like a state mandated automobile inspection checks the lights, brakes and signals, it does not ensure your gas gauge is working or your engine is not short of oil or coolant.
?In summary, following codes and standards is an important part of a good safety program. It is not the only part. It is not always easy. The organization’s assessment may not always be correct. A periodic cold eyes review of your facility and operations may be prudent. For more information consider these references:
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