Stability in Northern Nigeria; The Iranian System Has Got Some Answers

Nigeria presents a near-perfect example of a meeting place between the downward movement of Islam from North Africa and the upward movement of Christianity from the Gulf of Guinea. The most populous African country gives a clearer geographical dichotomy to the two main religions within its borders—North and South.

"Banditry, abductions, clashes between nomadic groups and farmers, inter-sectarian clashes and more notoriously, extremism, continue to plague the region"

The North, since independence has experienced some major challenges including abject poverty, hunger crisis and epidemics. The last decade and a half have been overshadowed by developments in the area that leave much to hope for. Banditry, abductions, clashes between nomadic groups and farmers, inter-sectarian clashes and more notoriously, extremism, continue to plague the region. All these have led to loss of lives—the death toll continues to rise.

The situation hurts the local economy and renders the growing youthful population hopeless. The security volatility implicitly suggests that private investment in that part of the country is lacking. Both local, national and international investors are scarcely attracted to the inimical economic environment. The chaos further affects national and sub-regional security. Thus, threats posed by multiple actors and events in Northern Nigeria has cross-border ramifications on neighboring states.

There have been many reasons mentioned to be behind the crises faced by the Muslim dominated area. Many experts and academics have mostly looked at the economic and religious factors that act together to elicit a range of vices that bedevils the local people. The focus is mostly on issues concerning low resource endowment to religious fundamentalism. Some have just dismissed the area as being too conservative for the necessary changes that bring about tranquillity. ?

What is interesting, however, is the seeming neglect of the dysfunctional governance system of the area in these discourses. Even when it is discussed, the solutions proffered are not so direct. However, much of the problem of the North is a political problem that has to do with political structure and the functions thereof. Interestingly, it appears the solution to this debacle may be with a meticulous modification of the Iranian system and applying it in Northern Nigeria. Yes, modifying and adopting the Iranian system to fit into state-level governance.

Obviously, the mention of Iran set eyes rolling, and brings doubts about the viability of any such solution.

A Century of Old Order, and The Coming of The British

Well, Northern Nigeria is not only dominated by Muslims, but more importantly, the people are significantly religious. This consequently makes the society a conservative one. The mode by which Islam spread across the geography was initially not radical. However, a notable development and events in the 1800s monumentally changed adherence to the religion.

During the period, a self-declared Jihadist; Usman Dan Fodio, embarked on an aggressive puritanical campaign to change the version of Islam that was practiced in the region. In the process he had politicized the leadership of the religion and established a caliphate in present-day Northern Nigeria. The Sokoto caliphate, therefore became the regulator of both religious and political activities of the territories under its control.

The politico-religious entity had a well-established government structure that involved the emirs who served as provincial heads under the caliph. They in turn controlled territories with a structured local government system of their own and collected taxes. They paid tributes to the paramountcy. An important office in the structure was that of the Vizier. A position equivalent to a modern-day Turkish, French or Russian Prime Minister. The occupant was in charge of the day-to-day running of the Caliphate from its headquarters. He was the Chief administrator of the realm.

At its height, the Caliphate comprised much of modern-day Northern Nigeria, Northern and parts of Central Cameroon and the Southern fringes of Republic of Niger. The independence of the Caliphate lasted for a century: from 1801 to 1903 when the British conquered and declared the territory of the Islamic Caliphate a British protectorate.

Symptomatic of British colonial administration in West Africa and elsewhere in Asia, indirect rule was used in controlling Northern Nigeria. To symbolically show who was in charge, the British abolished the Caliphate and pacified the dynasty with a Sultanate that still controlled religion and a significant aspect social life. Traditionally, therefore, the emirs of the various territories in the North still held allegiance to what became the Sultanate of Sokoto, and supervised the application of customary law. Inter-tribal conflicts, ethnic tensions, and local security were effectively resolved and ensured by the Sultan and his emirs. Very important was the fact that colonialism could not do much to change the religion of Northern Nigeria—the people remained predominantly Islamic.

In the South, however, the limitations on traditional authorities as incrementally instituted by the colonial administration happened concurrently with the methodical conversion of the population into Christianity. This significantly stripped the spiritual leadership of local authorities in the South. The Sultan and the emirs, however, continued to be spiritual leaders even under colonization, and were notably, adherents of mainly a specific school of Islam. They were loyalists of Qadiriyya Sufi, which is part of the larger Sunni sect of Islam. Dan Fodio had spread it through his Jihad.

For over a century, therefore, Northern Nigeria had a strong government that oversaw all aspects of society before being subdued by the British. During that same period and earlier, the British and other Europeans had de-facto authority in the South, especially in the Coastal Areas where trading activities flourished.

The Sokoto caliphate and its nature were not so different from other caliphates that had been established in other parts of the world. Those established in North Africa, Western Asia and South Asia, all had leaders assuming both political and religious control. Like it, most Caliphates had a dominating Islamic school or sectarian allegiance guiding its subjects. In the early twentieth century in Arabia, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud had conquered and unified the various tribes and created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. With him was the cleric Abd al-Wahhab—the spiritual leader of the conquest who concurrently spread what they believed to be a “puritanical” version of Islam. That has been the source of the dominant version of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia till today—Wahabism.

Other caliphates and political systems (established earlier) that were based on the Islamic faith adopted schools of taught and specific sects that provided the guiding principles to their rule. The often-strict adherence and application of the doctrines of these sub-sects and schools make liberal approach to politics in such entities rare. That is significant to understanding the Northern Nigeria.

Post-independence Civilian and Military Control

The problem in Northern Nigeria began when the independence constitution sought to place the authority of elected politicians above established traditional authority and hierarchy. The post-independence politicians eagerly assumed the power bequeathed to them by the Europeans and all its additions without seriously considering a return to the old system whether fully or partially as circumstances allowed. For a territory like Northern Nigeria, such disposition by the elected class would prove dangerous later—it has. In fact, the local politicians like other jurisdictions, exerted more control on traditional authorities than the colonialists had done.

Admittedly, some persons with links to the caliphate had become part of the first generation of elected leaders of the region post-independence. However, the decision by Ahmadu Bello not to become the first Prime Minister of the federal government and rather elected to be the Premier of the North speaks volumes. As a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio, Bello had unsuccessfully made attempts at becoming the Sultan of Sokoto. His decision to remain Premier of the North could have meant a self-pacification for that ambition. The sultanate was an important position. If he could not have it, he was perhaps proving where power truly was by assuming the premiership of the North instead. He was the only premier of Northern Nigeria in its short history as a single political entity.

Even though the military that had shown interest in governance at an early stage in nationhood it had generally not cut down the already eroded powers of the Sultan and the emirs. The federal and gubernatorial governments still exercised political and legal control over them. The worst under a military regime was when General Ibrahim Babangida “appointed” his friend as Sultan in the 1980s. There was massive disenchantment in the North for that singular action. The dynasty as established by Usman dan Fodio, had not been interrupted until then. It took General Sani Abacha, another military head of state, to restore traditional succession in the early 1990s.

Before Nigeria decided to go democratic in 1999, not so much had been considered about the uniqueness of the northern side of the country. The federal constitution therefore presumed some level of uniformity for the whole country irrespective of the obvious differences. It took the strenuous effort by some local politicians of the north to justify and push the federal government to adopt Sharia law.

The Iranian System?

Why the Iranian system? Contrary to what many make of the regime in Iran, it appears to be the most workable among existing Islamic government structures of the world that can apply to the political characteristics of Northern Nigeria. Iran’s political system is comparatively more ‘democratic’ than many states in Islamic Middle East. It is by far favorable to the rights of the individual to make political choices than the absolute monarchies in the region. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan and Oman all have degrees of absolutism that limit individual political rights relative to the Iranian system.

The uniqueness about the political system of the Persian state is its blend of theocracy with some level of democracy. Admittedly, democracies in Lebanon and Iraq appear potentially more liberal than what Iran offers. However, the Iranian system, despite occasional agitations, seems to have stood the test of time. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has been in place. Comparatively, the current democratic systems of Lebanon and Iraq are evidently volatile and lasted not long enough. Some reasons account for this.

"The placing of the Ayatollah at the top of the hierarchy was in consonance with the society’s prioritization of religion"

While the position of Supreme Leader often sends a message of absolutism to political observers around the world, it was the solution to the conservative Shia society of Iran. Before the Shah fled Iran in 1979, he had made serious attempts at modernizing the Iranian society. Some have rather called it the ‘Westernisation’ of Iran by the monarch. This did not sit well with the largely conservative nation. The return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the institution of the current government structure was widely welcomed by the masses. Admittedly this was partly due to earlier interference by the West in Iran's internal politics. The placing of the Ayatollah at the top of the hierarchy was therefore, in consonance with the society’s prioritization of religion. This coupled with the country being the centre of Shia Islamic scholarship helped grant legitimacy to theocratic-cum-democratic leadership.

Interestingly, the Iranian system has a popularly elected President who is the head of government of the country. He mostly represents the face of the state in beyond its borders. He appoints his ministers and forms a government of like-minded people and directs day-to-day affairs of the state. The Islamic Republic elects members of its legislature by popular vote. Mayors and other political officials are also elected by the people.

Despite the absence of registered political parties in Iran, political analysts and observers outside the country are able to identify liberal groups and conservative ones before, during and after elections. This creates some level of political predictability that happens in advanced democracies.?For instance, before Hassan Rouhani became president, he was largely seen as a liberal. It turned out he was. He became a relatively pliable leader, and amenable to reaching a nuclear deal with the United States under President Obama. Yes, the current Ayatollah is largely seen to be pro-conservative, but so is the British Crown widely seen to be conservative.

There are also bodies and committees with special duties and responsibilities within the Iranian system that warrant some level of checks and balances within the system. For instance, there is the Assembly of Experts that chooses the next Supreme Leader. Unlike many of the leaders in the region, the position of Supreme Leader is not hereditary. This is significantly progressive than many of the states in the region that ran nepotistic governments based on absolutism.

The Iranian system, comparative to other systems the world over and in respect of Islamic politico-religious governance, if modified, will be the most appropriate leadership model for northern Nigeria. For over a century and a half, northern Nigeria was greatly influenced and controlled by the Sokoto Caliphate/Sultanate. A century on its own terms, and half a century with the tacit approval of British colonialism.

Adoption and Application

With an adoption of an adapted version of the Iranian system, the Sultan and emirs are going to become an integral part of the political system of Northern Nigeria, who will not be subject to the impulses of governors. This will greatly restore the ‘indispensable’ institution to its proper place. With that, the institution can play its role as a stabilizing force in the political system of the region. Emirs will have the legal backing of becoming peace brokers of social and cultural tensions resulting from multifaceted factors that destabilize the region.

The current system gives governors and federal authorities control over who becomes emir and who is deposed. In March 2020, a progressive and outspoken emir, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi of Kano, was deposed by the Governor of the state because they had fallen out. Before the governor finally deposed him, he had created different emirates within the state in an effort to dilute the authority of the emir. This action in a conservative society may have deleterious effect in the stability of the area, nation and sub-region at large. In fact, as earlier mentioned, the people identify more with the traditional authorities than they do with elected ones. Thus, traditional authority is meant to provide the kind of political stability and continuity that European monarchs have rendered to Europe for over time.

An application of the Iranian system would mean; structurally putting the Sultans and the emirs above the governors and making such changes constitutional. With the people considering the religious monarchs as holding trust with their values, customs and virtues, such steps would be popular and potentially stabilizing. Admittedly, the problem of the North will not disappear overnight. However, the support of the people could be won towards that goal.

With such powers, disputes between and among nomadic groups and sedentary farmers; clashes between different sects of Islam; extremism that breed terrorism; and the inequalities that promotes banditry stand a better chance of being addressed in a socio-cultural manner.

As governors—like the Iranian president—play their role of day-to-day administrators in their respective states, the traditional authorities should be allowed to constitutionally become guardians and moral authorities of the people, and mediate and mitigate potential factional frictions without whimsical control from elected leaders. The mere fact that the security of tenure of the emirs is guaranteed by the constitution will enhance the faith the people put in their offices, and help stabilize the system.

''The constitutional fortification of existing traditional structures that potentially serve as checks on the authorities of traditional leaders may help limit the powers of traditional leaders while insulating the institution from the manipulation of elected politicians''

The application of the system in Northern Nigeria does not in any way grant the Sultans and emirs the absolute powers they wielded in the nineteenth century. Nigeria is currently a modern democratic state with a federal constitution that would not grant absolute powers to any other entity. The proposed system is, therefore, recommended as a product of the federal constitution of Nigeria. Worth noting, however, is the fact that the region must be treated as a special case relative to the South that has religion significantly detached from traditional authority.

Possible checks on the powers of the Sultan and the emirs, like the Iranian regime, should be instituted within the traditional set-up. The constitutional fortification of existing traditional structures that potentially serve as checks on the authorities of traditional leaders may help limit the powers of traditional leaders while insulating the institution from the manipulations and whims of elected politicians.

Anticipated Reactions

This will, however, not happen without challenges. The class of politicians who have benefited from the curtailment of the powers of traditional leaders are likely to push back against any reforms or restitution. They may anticipate a more eroded power relative to what their counterparts in the south would have. This does not in anyway cancel the fact that a constitutional restoration of the authority of the sultan and emirs will help bring stability to the north. There is no change without opposition. The benefits of the change will, however, outweigh it disadvantages.

Also, there is a possibility of the chiefs in the south to ask for similar restoration of their own powers should there leadership reforms in the north. That could be legitimate. But, as mentioned, the north presents a peculiar case of leadership of a popular religion being fused with traditional authority. In 1999, agitations for the adoption of Sharia law did not lead to a corresponding action in the south beyond the customary law already recognized by the legal system of the country. Thus, any change in the north must be premised on the condition that it is a special case.

"The conservative disposition, similar religious practice and politico-religious leadership, in both systems, will make such adoptions workable"

For security and stability in Northern Nigeria, Nigeria as a country, and the West African sub-region, the federal politicians and the people of Nigeria must consider some features of the Iranian system, modify them and adopt them in the administration of the northern states. The conservative disposition, similar religious practice and politico-religious leadership in both systems, will make such adoptions workable. Such restored authority would immensely enhance conflict resolution by traditional authorities as they attract the support of the masses.

By: Fidel Amakye Owusu emial: [email protected]

Images: (1) Map of Nigeria showing states where Sharia Law is implemented. Purple area covers northern states where Sharia is fully implemented. Yellow area covers nothern states where Sharia is partially implemented. Green area covers southern states. source:wikipedia (2) Citizens of Kebbi State of Northern Nigeria protesting insecurity in the region. source: Channel Television (3) Image of Usman dan Fodio, Founder of the Sokoto Caliphate. source: DW (4) Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. NDTV Gadgets 360 (5) Sanusi Lamido, Former emir of Kano.