South Africa’s Landmark Elections

As South Africa concludes a set of historic national elections, questions remain on how its democracy will fare in response to a new set of challenges.

By Michelle Gavin - June 3, 2024

The results of the South African elections are in, and the African National Congress’ (ANC) showing was even worse than expected—the party barely garnered 40 percent of the vote. But while the storied party’s fall from grace dominates the headlines, it is not truly surprising.? Polls show that the vast majority—over 80 percent—of South Africans believe their country is headed in the wrong direction. Change votes were to be expected.

In that sense, the election results suggest that South Africa’s democracy is still working; it has responded to popular dissatisfaction by punishing underperforming leadership and rewarding new ideas. There are no indications that the exercise was anything but free and fair, and the leader of the ANC and President of the country Cyril Ramaphosa has accepted the results. Rather than abandoning democratic principles in a quest for change in government, as has occurred in several African states recently, South Africans used the democratic process to signal their discontent, retaining the connective tissue between voters and leaders.

But there are real signs of trouble. More eligible voters stayed home than in any election since the end of apartheid. For a country just a few decades out from such a long and costly struggle for liberation and genuine democracy, the trendline is discouraging.

The strong showing of the uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) party, which explicitly opposes the country’s constitution, is another worrying sign. MK won fifty-eight seats in the National Assembly—a remarkably successful debut that exceeded the expectations of pollsters. But former President Jacob Zuma and his supporters are also contesting the integrity of the elections themselves—a strategy familiar to Americans, and one designed to undermine citizens’ faith in democratic institutions. The threatening language Zuma used to argue against the announcement of election results, which included warning the electoral commission not to “start trouble” is characteristic, but also alarming.

The most interesting drama is yet to unfold. The ANC will now have to form a coalition with political opponents to govern the country, and the potential partners run the gamut from the business-friendly Democratic Alliance to the radical, quasi-Marxist Economic Freedom Fighters. The maneuvering will test the rifts between ANC factions—the same fault lines that have made Ramaphosa so tentative in decision-making. The inevitable recriminations within the ANC in the wake of its electoral setbacks could create more dysfunction, as ambitious contenders for leadership smell blood in the water. But too much inward focus on party dynamics would be a mistake. Citizens want to see results from their government. Making security, competence, and integrity in public services the lodestar of coalition government is the only way to convince South Africans that their voices were heard.

Similarly, it will take time for the broader regional implications of the ANC’s humbling to become apparent. Southern Africa is rife with dominant political parties that have been trading on their historic role in achieving independence for decades. South Africa’s election results provide incontrovertible proof that such historic associations are not enough, at least when elections are free and fair. Those powerful parties could respond by stepping up their game, improving service delivery and transparency. Or they could conclude that genuine political competition is to be avoided at all costs, ushering in even more blatant repression.

South Africa’s Landmark Elections | Council on Foreign Relations ( cfr.org )

+++++++++++++

An Alternative Civilian Entity to Administer the Gaza Strip—Urgently Needed

There is no time. The fighting against Hamas’s military wing—however qualitative it may be—will not eliminate the terrorist organization in Gaza. Instead, more terrorists who will join its ranks. Only by formulating a plan for the “day after,” which includes a solution for civilian rule in the Gaza Strip along with a deal to return all the hostages, will Israel succeed in achieving the desired victory.

INSS Insight No. 1862, June 4, 2024

By Tamir Hayman

In spite of the severe damage it has sustained, Hamas is expected to recruit more terrorists to replenish its ranks. The Israeli leadership is still debating whether to make a decision—the decision that will effectively determine the fate of the war, after some eight months. But against this background, critical questions are already emerging: What are the advantages and disadvantages of an Israeli military administration in Gaza? What are the implications of this scenario for the capabilities of the IDF? And what is the significance of the Gulf States’ proposal for the “day after” the war?

1. Recently, there has been a renewed discussion on the question of the “day after.” This matter, despite being worn away by unending debate, remains unresolved and can no longer be postponed. The discussion was revived with full force after Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared that a decision must be made as soon as possible, warning that the absence of a decision will allow Hamas to return to power (implying an Israeli military defeat). This declaration was met with many negative responses, mostly political, but there were also some professional ones:
2. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is unlikely to return to power in Gaza, given claims that it is not essentially different from Hamas. Without weakening Hamas, no alternative entity has a chance of establishing itself—Hamas will drive it out as it did with the PA in 2007; therefore, Hamas must first be destroyed before any realistic discussion about an alternative can take place.

Why Must We Rush and Decide Now?

Arguments in favor of waiting for the “day after” ignore the way in which the Palestinian “system of resistance” (terror organizations) operate in Gaza and within the Palestinian system in general. Delaying the decision, as the Israeli government has been doing for the past eight months, will ensure a strategic Israeli defeat, failure to achieve the aims of the war, and the continuation of Hamas’s rule in the Strip.

Nonetheless, when considering the Gaza Strip of the “day after,” it is crucial to promote an alternative civilian government in parallel to the military activity for the following four reasons:

1. Losing control over the residents of Gaza is the nightmare of Hamas’s leader Yahya Sinwar and would signify a political defeat for both the terror organization and Qatar.
2. An alternative civilian entity would release Israel from the responsibility of dealing with the basic needs of two million Gaza residents. Although its establishment would not absolve Israel from legal responsibility, it would ease operational burdens.
3. Without a civilian entity in charge of the distribution of humanitarian aid, Hamas will retain this role, strengthening its status and authority among the Palestinian public and creating a narrative of an “absolute victory” over Israel.
4. Hamas is based on the “idea of resistance.” Hamas must be defeated and dismantled militarily, while support for its ideology must be weakened by creating an alternative civilian entity that proposes a different idea and undermines Hamas’s basis of popular support.

The Source of Hamas’s “Renewal”

The resistance system of the Palestinian terrorism in the Gaza Strip has two layers. The upper layer consists of the military wing of Hamas, with approximately 30,000 terrorists organized into five regiments and 24 battalions. The military wing derives its power from the civilian population—the lower layer—that serves as both its human shield and a source of new fighters. As long as young Palestinians are motivated to resist Israel, there will always be a supply of volunteers to replace every dead terrorist. In this context, it is important to note that Gaza’s population is predominantly young. Almost 40% of the Strip’s 2 million residents are under the age of 14, and another 30% are between the ages of 15–29—particularly high percentages (based on data from the CIA World Factbook). Let us assume, if only for the sake of discussion, that only half of them support Hamas. Even then, the organization would have no difficulty recruiting another 15,000 new terrorists over a six-month period—the erosion rate that the IDF has managed to create thus far.

The idea of resistance is the only idea prevailing in Gaza today, as evidenced by the latest public opinion polls conducted by the PSR Institute, led by Dr. Khalil Shikaki. These polls show wide support for Hamas and its violent struggle against Israel. This support forms the foundation of Hamas’s power and enables its survival.

The Second Intifada as a Test Case

A personal lesson: During the Second Intifada, the writer of these lines commanded a regional brigade in Judea and Samaria. The IDF had eliminated and arrested a massive number of terrorists. However, as long as Yasser Arafat was head of the PA and pushing the idea of resistance, the “well” of terrorists continued to flow and refill faster than the IDF could empty it. Sometimes it seemed a Sisyphean task, with a “bottomless barrel of terror.”

The turning point came after Arafat’s death and the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as head of the PA. Abbas presented an alternative to the idea of armed resistance: “non-violent resistance,” followed by the idea of “nation-building and institutional development”.” These ideas enabled many young Palestinians to realize their national pride and their struggle against Israel through other channels. Many young people enlisted in the PA security forces, others invested resources in building a Palestinian city, and some are even engaged in attempts to take control of Area C.

Thus, in a process that lasted two years, the trend was reversed, and the “barrel of terror” began to empty. The IDF’s erosion rate of terrorists, which continued to operate in full force, was higher than the rate at which the armed resistance organizations could recruit new fighters. This is exactly what is lacking in the Gaza Strip today.

The conclusion is clear: The IDF forces can return dozens of times to Jabalya, al-Zeitoun, and Shejaiya, conducting brave and professional military operations, each time killing hundreds of terrorists. But without an ideological alternative to “resistance,” the achievement will be temporary, and Israel will be “surprised” to discover that Hamas has replenished its military force. If the Israeli government decided to introduce an alternative civilian entity into the Strip, such as the PA—which would have to undergo structural reform under the sponsorship and control of moderate Arab countries, including the Gulf States—it would create a rival to Hamas’s idea of resistance.

Unfortunately, the Israeli government is failing to do so. The IDF continues to erode Hamas’s military layer, but Hamas is able to refill its ranks, time after time, from the civilian layer. True, the PA is corrupt and works against Israel, it is too weak to defeat Hamas, and it will never take military action against it. However, it must be presented as an alternative to Hamas’s rule in Gaza in a lengthy process that will take years. During this time, Israel must work against the entire system of Palestinian resistance and address its weaknesses and shortcomings.

At the same time, attention should be given to the hope offered to Israel by the Gulf States’ initiative, which aligns well with the American plan for the day after the war, relying on Arab and international cooperation.

The PA will undergo serious reforms in its leadership under the control of an Arab coalition consisting, among others, of the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain:

The reforms will be varied, from changing school curricula to appointing other professionals to leadership positions.

The incentive for change will involve conditioning financial aid for rehabilitating the Strip on implementing the reforms.

The PA will distribute the humanitarian aid in the Strip instead of Hamas, thus beginning to impose its authority, under the auspices of the Arab coalition that will provide funds and forces to maintain law and order (yes, including fighting Hamas through civil security companies).

Hamas will discover that parts of the Gaza Strip are no longer under its control and that it has lost its sovereignty—its source of pride in recent years.

The Gazan public will find alternative employment opportunities in the framework of rebuilding the Strip.

The IDF will continue to operate against senior members of Hamas’s military wing, partially coordinated with the reformed PA in Gaza—as it does regularly in Judea and Samaria.

And What About a Military Administration?

Those who claim that a military administration is a better solution than no decision and continuation of the current situation are right. A military administration will improve the ability to take action against Hamas’s military wing and provide a functional alternative for civilian population aspects. The problem is that a military administration will not offer an ideological alternative. Past experience proves that it is not possible to end a military administration without further military clashes, as happened in the First Intifada, or a political process to transfer authority to the reformed PA, as happened by agreement at the end of the Second Intifada.

Whatever happens, such a solution will require significant time and resources, limiting the ability of the IDF to operate in other arenas.

Israel could find itself trying to stretch a small blanket to cover Gaza, at the expense of other urgent security challenges and while its international isolation worsens. This is all in addition to the internal civilian, economic, and social costs that managing a military administration will exact from Israeli society, which must be taken into account.

Conclusion

There is no time. The Israeli government should have made the decision six months ago. We are dealing with a long and complex process that must start quickly. Without simultaneous action against the ideological foundation of Hamas at the civilian level, together with action against its military capability, Hamas will not be defeated, even if the war continues for several years.

A large-scale deal leading to the release of the hostages is critical and would fit well with promoting an alternative to Hamas. A comprehensive deal must be proposed—“everything for everything”— in one stage only. Ceasing combat in Gaza, to which Israel will commit, will accelerate the steps proposed for the civilian layer. Concurrently, for the military layer, Israel will transition from waging war to fighting terror through ongoing, intelligence-guided actions targeting the arrest or elimination of terrorists within the Palestinian territory.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.

About: Tamir Hayman

Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Hayman is the Executive Director of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Prior to joining INSS, Maj. Gen. (res.) Hayman was Chief of the IDF Intelligence Directorate from 2018-2021. During his 34 years of IDF service, Maj. Gen. (res.) Hayman held a wide range of command positions in the ground forces including operational combat experience in the security zone in Lebanon and in the Palestinian arena.

An Alternative Civilian Entity to Administer the Gaza Strip—Urgently Needed | INSS

The End++++++++