South Africa - The Need for a Strategic Crime Intelligence Capability (SCICAP) - Part 2

Introduction

I ended off Part 1 of this thesis with the following conclusion - South Africa does not yet have a joint, inter-agency concept of operations to achieve desired outcomes, based on a synergised, integrated (fluid) joint intelligence picture – in this case specifically for organised crime as it affects business.

As a result the country has not yet developed a joint, integrated, overarching crime combating doctrine and employment strategy for the full range of impacts which the PPP can, currently and over the long term, bring to bear against criminals across the whole ambit of 21st-century crime fighting. Business as usual just does not cut it anymore.

So the question begs - if business as usual doesn't cut it anymore - what does?

The Requirement

There is a need to fuse the intelligence information of businesses/-industries across the spectrum into a single picture that can assist all role-players with decision-making and planning to conduct effects-based operations. Such a strategic intelligence capability needs to operate in a specific performance environment. Although not exhaustive, the following schematic is an example of the component elements of such a performance environment - one may term it the SCICAP Performance Environment.

Strategic Intelligence and Capabilities

The primary capabilities required by SCICAP relate to those that can ensure that the necessary inputs are transformed into the correct outputs that may in turn again inform planning for national Effects-based Operations. The SCICAP process at the highest level to ensure this is the following:

Inputs enter the process on the left and are transformed into outputs on the right. Controls entering at the top indicate the rules, strategies and regulations that govern the process. The list as indicated above is probably not exhaustive. Mechanisms, at the bottom, are the “things” that convert the inputs into outputs. From a Capabilities-based Planning approach it is therefore important to note that the total system capabilities should be focused at the production of six primary output types:

• Crime strategies. Intelligence and strategy may be viewed as two sides of the same coin. The one cannot function without the other. Whilst SCICAP may not necessarily take the lead in developing counter-crime strategies, it should provide guidelines, and continually consider what new strategies criminals may embark upon.
• Crime scenarios. A scenario is a description of a plausible relevant environment against which the effectiveness of a strategy or plan may be tested during a planning process. Developing these alternative futures should be a primary output of a SCICAP. Related to this should be a capability to do “what-if” scenarios, i.e. modelling, simulation and wargaming.
• Risk assessments. The purpose of an Intelligence Risk Assessment is to bring an otherwise uncertain future, characterised by several security vulnerabilities, into sharper focus for the consumers of intelligence; and by assigning probabilities to different possibilities, thus prioritising topics of security concern, highlighting strategic alternatives and ensuring the effective allocation of scarce resources. It deals with two central concepts, namely probability and impact (Bernhardt).
• Threat assessments. The purpose of an Intelligence Threat Assessment is to take those risks with the highest probability of occurrence and adverse impact (as determined by an Intelligence Risk Assessment), as well as those already manifesting, and to define in micro-analytical detail the reasons as to why such issues are projected as actual threats to the relevant industry (Bernhardt).
• Management information. This refers to descriptive statistics that indicate trends and tendencies. By itself this is/should form a small part of the SCICAP output, but will often be integrated into the other outputs.
• Geographical pattern analyses (GPA). These are the general “hotspot” reports which may be used on a stand-alone basis or be integrated with other outputs. The use of GIS software forms an integral part of this output. This will primarily consist of Crime Risk Factor information. Not all Crime Risk Factors will be relevant to all industries; however, a partner should be able to link their industry to any one of the Crime Risk Factors and to allocate a weighting for their industry without impacting on the weighting of other industries. Crime Risk Factors can have different weightings at Province, Police Area, Town, Suburb, Institution, and business levels. These levels form a type of hierarchy.

Conclusion

The above should indicate that this is a highly complex and interactive process, requiring a high level of awareness, knowledge and maturity by all role-players to make it work. Again, as I said at the end of Part 1 - a new approach is required. To be continued....

References

Bernhardt, W. 2003. Bridging the uncertainty gap in intelligence analysis: a framework for systematic risk and threat assessment. ISSUP. Pretoria.

Davis, P. Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation. RAND Corporation. Santa Monica.

Janse van Vuuren, I. 2001. The SA Air Force Operations Support and Intelligence Strategic Direction Plan: A Force Design Strategy for the 21st Century. Defence Research Centre. Pretoria.

Janse van Vuuren, I. 2006. A Systems Approach for Targeting Crime – A Suggested Methodology to Strategise for Criminal Centres of Gravity. SABRIC. Midrand,

USJFCOM. AFEI. Net Centric Operations.