Some thoughts on the all too often ignored Horn of Africa

As the Gregorian calendar year gradually concludes its cycle, I, like many others, feel compelled to address some of the issues in this world that grip my heart, moving me to tears, prayers, and whatever little else I can do at this point in my life.

While the Ukrainian and Palestinian tragedies continue to unfold and draw the majority of the global media's attention, numerous other brutal and disastrous conflicts are occurring, with political machinations seemingly moving inexorably towards the abyss.

My heart particularly goes out to the Horn of Africa, although many other places and regions are in dire straits. Ethiopia especially concerns me, and drives me to distraught distraction.

The Sudans:

The brutal conflict in Sudan persists, with the notorious RSF having clearly gained the upper hand over the technologically superior Sudanese army. Better arms, drones, and planes do not guarantee victory compared to morale, experience, community support, and embeddedness. Looting, murder, ethnic cleansing, sexual violence, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the utter and lasting breakdown of governance and collapse of civil societies could be the reality of 2024, to the extent that it isn't already the case.

The situation in South Sudan is similarly grim, with rampant local and regional conflicts, division, widespread displacement, hunger, and abuses. The long-awaited reconciliation process and peace processes appear stalled and ineffectual. The US has even gone so far as to withdraw its support. Things aren't likely to improve much in the coming year, and with the looming spectre of increased regional conflict and mass displacements, things could well become far worse.

Somalia:

The lesson that better equipment does not equal victory should have been learned in Somalia, where the grand offensive against the jihadist group Al-Shabaab continues, though largely shrouded in the fog of war and disinformation. The countries are still suffering from recurring, renewed, and new clan conflicts at both local and regional scales, proving the fragility of the "states" and governance again and again.

The recent debacle in Puntland and the rise of the Khatuumo state certainly show that even the more stable north might be more fragile than most would hope. In this context, and with all appearances of a resumption of the withdrawal of the ATMIS forces, the federal government has pursued the UN to lift the arms embargo.

With all respect, I dare suggest that the failures of the federal army to defeat Al-Shabaab lie not with their hardware but with the composition and segmentation of the federal army, and the applied strategies and general distrust of the central government, especially amongst the rural population.

Add to this the fact that the government is arming clan militias fighting against Al-Shabaab. The Macaawiisley militias might well turn out to be as destructive in partial victory as they could be in defeat. Despite gains, the situation appears set for severe deterioration rather than improvement, but I pray that I am wrong.

Ethiopia and Eritrea:

It might be something as complexly simple as the founding spirit of empire that drives Ethiopian instability and the region towards utter disaster.

The nation was founded by conquest and ethnic supremacy, by the rule of force and harsh oppression. This specter, almost with the regularity of the generational cycles proposed so long ago by the scholar Ibn Khaldun, defined the modern history of Ethiopia. Simplified as this explanation is, it still cannot be ignored. Regimes move from support to oppression to decay and open conflict.

But then again, being composed of almost equal ethnic and religiously divided demographics, none socialized by prolonged peace and inclusive prosperity to fully submit to the supremacy or necessity of the central state or even the ethno-federal state, flawed and unequal as it was.

The real oddity of the current situation is the almost unbelievably erratic arrogance of the incumbent prime minister, Abiy Ahmed. I was truly shocked at his public statements during the critical months of the Tigray war, where he called on all Ethiopians to pick arms and water the nation with the blood of his enemies (on Social Media, which does leave open the possibility of fraudulent posts). He won, but the Fano militias he fought with, armed, and egged on have now turned against him.

Abiy's efforts to make peace and cement a centralized state seem to have brought mostly ceasefire and now violent and destructive conflict and insecurity.

While his nation is reeling from the exceedingly brutal and deadly Tigray war, a sinking economy, starvation, explosive crime rates, conflict, rebellion, and a continued presence of Eritrean troops in parts of the Tigray region, he spends billions on a new palace and other mega-projects around the capital. With new conflicts springing up and experts stating large parts of the primary regions have seen a collapse of governance, he threatens a war of conquest against his former ally, Afwerki of Eritrea.

While it remains as threats, implications, and rumors of mobilization (for now) and can be interpreted as nothing more than symbol politics to be an attempt to appease both the TPLF remnants and the Amhara elites behind the Fano militias, it nevertheless smells of arrogant madness. A new war could all too easily erupt, either as a war of conquest to remove Ethiopia's landlocked precarity or to expel the foreign troops and reassert territorial sovereignty. But the result would likely be disastrous and brutal, and might well break Ethiopia, which for all its major flaws for decades has been seen as the stabilizing power in the Horn.

Eritrea is supposedly enjoying their new image as the more reasonable party after years and years of being pariahs. But Afwerki could well be stoking the flames of conflicts, although more circumspectly than at earlier times, to prevent alienating the regained diplomatic relations within IGAD. Can the country afford another war? It is hard to know. I am certainly not aware of any major international sponsor such as Abiy has with the UAE, but with the rise of the middle powers, the prospect of a Red Sea client state might certainly seem appealing to some. Especially those already shunned by the former near-hegemonic western powers.

The legendary rivalry between Afwerki and the TPLF and dreams of expansion and victory could certainly be deciding factors to stoke the jingoistic flames on his side.

For these two countries as well as the rest of the region, it has become undeniably apparent that we have entered a multipolar world order. We might well expect disasters and proxy wars to be on the rise, as a multitude of nations, through military power, diplomatic cunning, and financial speculation, seeks to assert themselves. One could well speculate on the interference of non-state interference, especially from multinational conglomerates as the resources necessary for modern tech are scarce.

A final note on rain, climate, and disaster:

Although far less talked about, the conflicts of the Horn, especially during the height of the Tigray War, had far higher casualties, especially civilian, than any other, to the extent of my knowledge. The death toll from starvation, 'natural' and weaponized, and war is estimated to far exceed a million, and the amount of abuse and sexual violence is shocking, and the general indifference likewise so.

The rains might have come, but humanitarian aid is lacking and limited in large parts of the region. The vulnerable, IDPs, and refugees continuously suffer. They suffer harshly from the effects of global climate change. Resource scarcity too drives conflict and changes economies.

One fear I will leave you with, if you made it this far, is that there are great conditions for a new outbreak of desert locusts in the destabilized regions of Ethiopia, where conflict and Covid made it far too hard to effectively combat the grasshoppers and remove the eggs. With El-Nino, the rains are falling, causing not just floods but prime conditions for the grasshoppers to again swarm and ravage a ravaged region, where intervention might be impossible due to conflict.

I genuinely pray that I am just bleak in these darkest nights of the north, and that prosperity and peace will be the order of the day in 2024, but I fear that I am right, and that those agencies that could intervene again will be too reactive to do much good, as was the case with the highly predictable El Nino floodings in southern Somalia.

For those who are capable of sharing and helping a little, I will provide information on a small and local Somali NGO doing relief work in inaccessible areas of the flooded areas. A little can make a difference too. I will post the information on the NGO in the new year, but if you cannot wait, don't hesitate to write to me.

I do, of course, encourage informed discussion and will gladly accept correction and be pleased by perspectives from others, but do keep a civil tone, please.

I apologize for focusing so one sided on the negative aspects, and admitted this piece is as much to help myself by articulating concerns outside my ability to influence. Next your I promise to produce more constructive and share more positive news.

I wish you all a happy new year, if your new year starts tomorrow.