“SNOW-VERWHELMED”: The January 2022 Snowstorm that Shutdown I-95 in Virginia Offers Up Lessons in Risk Management

The new year had begun with near record-breaking high temperatures and rain in the mid-Atlantic states, but the weather was slated to change dramatically as a snowstorm was forecast to hit the area on January 3rd. Accordingly, several Virginia state agencies began preparing for the storm by activating the same readiness plans they had used and relied on in the past to successfully manage and respond to storm events. Yet this time, those plans didn’t work as expected, and despite their best efforts, the snowstorm overwhelmed the region, resulting in the closure of 48 miles of Interstate 95 in Virginia, stranding hundreds of motorists overnight on the roadway in frigid temperatures.

An after-action report (AAR) that was commissioned by State authorities looked into what happened, why it happened, and what could be done to reduce the likelihood of similar events in the future. The report pointed to a confluence of factors, cascading risks, and unexpected challenges that contributed to the severity of the risk event. The findings and recommendations in the AAR offer several important lessons that have relevance to and can be applied to any organization’s approach to risk management.

What Happened

·??????The winter storm began in the early morning hours of Monday, January 3, 2022 – first as rain, but then turning to sleet and finally snow. Forecasts had called for snowfall totals across Central Virginia between 4-6 inches.

·??????At 7:27 a.m. on Monday, a call was made to 911 of a tractor-trailer blocking a ramp off of I-95 in Stafford County, marking the start of string of calls that would be made throughout the morning describing growing problems in both directions of I-95 in the Fredericksburg and Stafford areas of Virginia.

·??????At 8:20 a.m., a tractor trailer jackknifed and blocked the northbound lanes of I-95, beginning a pattern of disabled vehicles that would block lanes. Initially, heavy-duty tow trucks were able to respond to clear the vehicles from the roadway and get traffic moving again, but as the conditions worsened, the calls overwhelmed the State Police and the blocked traffic and heavy snow prevented VDOT crews from keeping roadways clear.

·??????At 11 a.m., the Virginia Governor’s office emailed the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) asking to let them know when/if a state of emergency was needed so that it could be declared as early in the day as possible. VDEM responded that they would let the Governor’s office know, but the next communication to the governor’s office from VDEM wasn’t made until Tuesday morning. In a 3:30 p.m. Monday conference call VDEM held with state agencies, no one requested assistance from VDEM.

·??????By Monday afternoon, the snow was letting up and skies were clearing, but more than a foot of snow (double what forecasts predicted) had fallen in the area. At 1 p.m., noting that travel warnings had only advised “Snow. Proceed with Caution”, Sen. Tim Kaine left Richmond for Washington, D.C., not aware that I-95 was essentially blocked and impassable. He wouldn’t arrive in D.C. until 27 hours later, stuck on the interstate overnight with hundreds of other stranded motorists.

·??????The first call to Virginia’s transportation secretary about problems on I-95 didn’t come until 4:52 a.m. Tuesday morning, when she was told the interstate was impassable. Finally, at 5:15 a.m. Tuesday, state and local officials closed the interstate.

·??????It wasn’t until after 7 p.m. on Tuesday night, nearly 36 hours after trouble had begun on I-95, that the northbound and southbound lanes finally reopened.

LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES??

SITUATION 1: Planned mitigation strategies weren’t available or didn’t work and alternative strategies weren’t available or hadn’t been identified

-?????????The roads couldn’t be pre-treated because the storm started as rain, before turning to snow

-?????????Downed trees and power lines slowed the work of snowplow operators in keeping the roads clear and stymied emergency responders and tow trucks from reaching the impacted areas

-?????????Shelters were opened but there was no way to get stranded travelers to these shelters

-?????????Communication messages didn’t factor in the state of mind of the recipients. The warm temperatures in the days leading up to the storm, uncertainty about and changing snow accumulation predictions, and prior snow “non-events” likely desensitized travelers to the risks

-?????????As forecasts and travel conditions worsened, messaging was not authoritative or strong enough to change traveler behaviors

-?????????Transportation and safety officials assumed they could keep at least one lane of traffic open, and didn’t plan for shutting down the highway, so hadn’t thought through alternatives

IMPLICATIONS: Mitigations that had been relied on and used previously weren’t available, and alternative back up strategies had not been considered or identified, thereby increasing the likelihood and impact of a risk event manifesting from this storm.

LEARNING OPPORTUNITY: When identifying mitigations, consider developing back-up plans in case the planned mitigations are unavailable. If back-up mitigations are not available, then plan for heightened monitoring to detect if a risk is manifesting and engage with and notify stakeholders to increase their readiness to be engaged in risk response. Also, be prepared to adjust communications and tailor messaging that takes into consideration the frame of mind/state of mind of the intended audience.

SITUATION 2: Risk treatment plans didn’t take into account the impact of multiple risk events occurring at the same time

-?????????Heavy rain and warm temperatures before the storm weakened the ground. Trees and limbs weighted down with heavy snow fell, bringing power lines with them, resulting in calls to the same emergency crews and responders who were also dealing with the situation on I-95?

-?????????Related power outages knocked out traffic cameras, cell communications, and a key communications center

-?????????VDOT maintained detailed snow removal plans, but they did not have plans for handling widespread interstate closures, so they focused on keeping lanes open rather than considering closing the interstate, based on the assumption they could keep up with the snow

IMPLICATION: Risk response plans that may have been effective in addressing a single risk were not scaled to manage multiple risks at the same time, greatly diminishing the sufficiency of these plans in managing the risks.?

LEARNING OPPORTUNITY: Use scenario-based planning to consider and map out the impacts of more than one risk event occurring at the same time. Consider risks that may be inter-related, for example, that could share a similar cause or result from common triggering events. Determine how risk response strategies and mitigations can be adjusted or improvised if such situations were to occur. Tabletop exercises are also a good way to test response plans, exercise the muscles for dealing with unexpected events, and prepare for instances when planned mitigations don’t work.

SITUATION 3: There were delays informing leadership because field supervisors considered the situation to be stable and under control and because they lacked situational awareness

-?????????As long as troopers and tow trucks were responding to calls for help, field supervisors felt that the situation was under control and did not alert leadership to the problems. It wasn’t until tow truck operators stopped responding that leadership was notified.

-?????????State agencies lacked situational awareness – due to the communication outages, they could only see what was happening around them and didn’t know what was happening up and down the interstate.

IMPLICATION: Because their awareness was limited to what was happening in their immediate area, and they weren’t able to see what was happening in areas around them, they didn’t have a complete picture, and, as a result, the scale of the storm, and its impact, were severely underestimated.

LEARNING OPPORTUNITY: Review the methods used to enable situational awareness if a risk event occurs in your organization. Are there additional methods, tools or steps that can be taken to extend and enhance the level of awareness to information real time. Are there other parties that could be asked to help with information and communications in the event your normal channels fail (e.g., other levels of government, media, private companies, etc.)? Review the procedures and practices related to elevating and escalating risks to leadership as the risks are emerging, especially for high-velocity type risks that could quickly turn from a risk to an issue to a crisis.

SITUATION 4: The area of Interstate 95 where the initial problems and closures occurred was known for being a “hot-spot” for traffic accidents and delays -- yet the emergency response and preparedness plans for preventing and responding to problems on the highway did not include anything additional or different for these “hot-spot” areas.

IMPLICATIONS: If a problem on I-95 in Virginia was going to manifest during the storm on January 3rd, there was a higher likelihood it would occur in this “hot-spot” area.?Additional monitoring, crews, or warnings stationed in and around this area may have helped get ahead of and be prepared to more quickly respond to problems as they began surfacing here.

LEARNING OPPORTUNITY: A one-size fits all approach may not be sufficient when developing risk treatment and mitigation plans – some adjustments or additions may be required to account for anomalies or unique factors, especially if there is already a history of known past problems or risk events occurring in certain locations. Organizations can also have “hot spots” where teams may be over-stressed by high turnover, poor morale, outdated processes, etc., making them more susceptible to unforced errors or a significant risk manifestation. While leaders work to address those vulnerabilities, more frequent monitoring and check-ins with those units can help get ahead of risks before they turn into problems.

SITUATION 5: The risk environment had changed, but risk assessments and risk response strategies hadn’t factored in those changes and their implications

-?????????Tractor trailer volumes on I-95 had increased by almost 30% since 2019 due to COVID-19 related impacts to the supply chain and shifts in regular commuter patterns

-?????????There were shortages of field staff due to COVID-19, which limited the availability of staff who would typically be involved in assessing and gauging what was happening and providing the data and information used by highway and safety officials to guide their actions?

-?????????Flight cancellations due to the storm and from crew shortages caused by COVID put more people in their cars that day, with traffic volumes 65% higher than on the same days in 2019.???

IMPLICATIONS: Any problems or delays on the roadways, were they to occur, would build and escalate much more quickly than existing plans factored in.?

LEARNING OPPORTUNITY: Have there been any significant changes in your organization’s internal or external environment that could increase the likelihood and/or impact of risk events were they to materialize? If so, risk assessments should be updated, and risk treatment strategies adjusted accordingly. (This will help address some of the changes that occurred more gradually (e.g., tractor trailer volumes), but for more immediate changes that are occurring (e.g., increase in passenger traffic due to flight cancellations), those changes should be factored real-time into overall situational awareness and monitoring activities.)

Organizations don’t usually know in advance when a risk event may occur, but they do often know of situations when risk events may be more likely to happen, such as when bad weather is forecast, or when a scheduled activity or event is slated to occur that has known risks (e.g., shifting to a new computer operating system, taking systems down for maintenance, changing a business process, etc.). In these situations, it is worthwhile to consider whether anything else is happening in the internal/external environment that could have an impact on the mitigation and risk response plans and whether any last-minute adjustments may therefore be warranted.

END NOTE: Virginia officials acknowledged immediately after the storm and traffic disruptions that things didn’t go as planned. They realized they needed to understand what went wrong and then take action to prevent similar risk events in the future. To their credit, they owned the problem and took concrete actions to identify root causes and implement corrective measures. As stated in the AAR, the review was not undertaken to lay blame or point fingers. It acknowledged that this incident was multi-faceted and multi-layered and that the circumstances and conditions the state agencies and personnel faced were fast moving, ever evolving, and complex. Any negative cascading effects that occurred during the response operations stemmed from multiple issues with plans, procedures, policies, and preparedness, not the actions of any one individual or agency. Accordingly, the intent of this case study is only to use the findings from the AAR as an opportunity for others to learn from what happened.

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Sources:

Hedgpeth, Dana; Lazo, Luz; Shaver, Katherine; Laris, Michael; “How the East Coast’s busiest highway unraveled: 36 hours of confusion and misery on I-95”, Washington Post, January 27, 2022

Virginia Interagency After Action Report, “January 3-4, 2022, Winter Weather Event and I-95 Incident”, CNA, March 2022

About the Author:

Tom Brandt?is a risk management practitioner in the federal government. With nearly three decades of federal service, he is currently the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and Director of Planning and Risk for the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board. He previously served as the CRO for the Internal Revenue Service. He is a past president of the Association for Federal Enterprise Risk Management and also?served as chair of the OECD Forum on Tax Administration’s ERM Community of Interest from 2018-2021.?