Sixth generation combat air systems: the issue of European fragmentation

I recently wrote a short article for Affarinternazionali in which I aimed to illustrate the conundrum now facing Europe's principal defence industrial players with regard to future combat air system programmes. This is a summary of that Italian-language piece.

The process of European integration in the context of defence industry has, among its main objectives, that of gradually eliminating the extensive, harmful duplication in terms of the procurement and development of weapon systems, military equipment and new technologies among European armed forces.

The development and future acquisition of sixth generation combat systems is a priority for Europe's most advanced air forces. Yet the exorbitant price tag attached to the technologies required in order to achieve this capability mean that experts, practitioners and policymakers alike seem to agree that only a multinational effort can produce a competitive and cost-effective programme.

However, Europe is now stage to two competing programmes: Tempest, led by the UK and involving Italy and Sweden, and Future Combat Air System (FCAS), led by France and involving Germany and Spain. Recent news suggest that the latter is struggling to take off due to internal work-share disputes between France's Dassault (acting as programme leader) and Airbus' German branch.

Frictions between Berlin and Paris are perhaps unsurprising given that the programme was not born out of an agreement between the respective industrial players, but rather as a result of a political initiative started by Macron and Merkel in 2017. This was very much intended as a way to signal of unity among Europe's dominant players in the face of Brexit.

Chancellor Scholz's announcement of a €100b special defence fund and the stated intention of increasing the defence budget to 2% of GDP, has given Germany and its industry the critical mass necessary to demand a more favourable work-share arrangement vis-a-vis France should Berlin wish to do so. Furthermore, the existence of a competing programme in Tempest could play as a useful bargaining tool in order to force Paris' hand. A further element in an already complex algorithm is Germany's decision to procure F-35 joint strike fighters in order to replace its ageing Tornado fleet, a most unwelcome turn of events from France's perspective.

According to Dassault's managing director Eric Trappier, the current disagreements could delay FCAS' entry into service to after 2050 (instead of 2040, as foreseen by the original plans). Meanwhile, at least judging by press releases and official declarations, Tempest is proceeding much more smoothly, with the UK's Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) pushing for an "aggressive" schedule which would see the new aircraft enter into service as early as 2035.

Moreover, recent news have revealed that Japan has entered the fray, though the nature and extent of its involvement are still unclear. Whatever role Tokyo is set to play, this may further complicate the path to a future convergence of the Tempest and FCAS programmes, an outcome that some stakeholders in Rome and Berlin see as desirable or even inevitable as the only way to make development costs sustainable.

While, as external observers, we can't draw any conclusions as to whether the two European programmes are destined to merge eventually, we can hypothesise that this eventuality is tied first and foremost to the willingness of Paris and London to give up some of the work-share they have hitherto negotiated as part of Tempest and FCAS. Even then, the more the two programmes progress their own separate ways, the more convergence becomes an increasingly complex proposition.