Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Yaqoob’s Deadly Alliance with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the Growing Threat to U.S. Forces

For the final day of Haqqani Month, we’re about to reveal a truth no one else will. You've heard us talk about al-Qaeda fighters being trained in Libya and sent to Syria at the behest of Abu Mohammad al-Julani, but what you don’t know is how his group, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was granted entry into Afghanistan. This terrorist pipeline, with the blessing of Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Yaqoob, has deadly implications for U.S. forces today.

?As a quick background, Julani has long relied on the terrorists responsible for our 2012 Benghazi attacks, specifically al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi (AAS-B), to fuel his operations in Syria. Back in May, we shared our investigation’s biography of Abdul Azim Ali Musa Bin Ali ("Musa"), a 2012 Benghazi plotter and Haqqani family member who continues to operate with Julani. Musa coordinates with a number of key al-Qaeda senior leaders including Sayf al-Adel (al-Qaeda’s mastermind for its current U.S. Homeland plot), Abu Muhammad al-Masri (al-Qaeda’s head in Mali, recently injured with an ad-hoc leader in place), and Abu ‘Abd al-Karim al-Masri (al-Qaeda’s current lead for operations in Syria) to maintain historic terror pipelines from North Africa into Syria. This effort is supported by Julani’s feeder terrorist camp in Libya, south of Misrata, Libya.

?Now that you have that reference let’s move on. Musa and al-Qaeda writ-large expanded these facilitation routes in multiple directions emanating now from Afghanistan after the fall of Kabul in 2021. In November 2021, Musa brokered a critical meeting that allowed Julani to travel to Afghanistan, where he met with Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Yaqoob, the head of Taliban’s Military. Their goal? To formalize a terror facilitation route, allowing foreign fighters safe passage and training in Afghanistan under Taliban control. Before 2021, Afghanistan-Pakistan regional terrorists relied on smuggling routes to reach Syria to fight in the Syrian Civil War, but this meeting established a more organized pipeline and strategic alliance emanating from Afghanistan between HTS, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban.

The plan emerging from this meeting had three key components, all implemented:

1.???? Reviving the Shura Ittihad al-Mujahedeen (Allied Mujahedeen Council): Originally formed under Osama bin Laden, and Sirajuddin’s and Yaqoob’s fathers Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Mullah Omar, the council is now led by al-Qaeda commander Hamid Yusuf and based in Badakhshan Province. This council not only includes al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and HTS, but also the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), ensuring effective coordination across these groups.

2.???? Training HTS Brigades in Afghanistan: Two HTS brigades—the Omar bin al-Khattab Brigade and the Saad bin Abi Waqqas Brigade—are now training and operating inside Afghanistan with direct Taliban approval. Musa and Sirajuddin Haqqani play pivotal roles in this at the senior levels, while Hafiz Wafiqullah Ashna manages the ground fighter movements and logistics between the Haqqanis and Julani. These brigades, once primarily trained near At Al-Tanf, Syria, now have expanded operational capabilities due to a safehaven in Afghanistan. Currently, around 1,500 HTS trainees are active in Afghanistan, with fighters rotating in and out, so this number serves as a baseline.?

3.???? Establishing a Terrorist Pipeline: Safe routing through Afghanistan was a critical element of the plan, enabling al-Qaeda and HTS to support their operations in Syria by facilitating the movement of Afghan recruits and foreign fighters. This pipeline originates in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, and is sustained by three key terrorists: (1) HTS recruiter Maulvi Shamsuddin, based in Nangarhar; (2) Hafiz Bashir Haqqani, responsible for the security of HTS brigade fighters in Afghanistan; and (3) Hanzala al-Maghrebi, based in Panjshir Province, who manages al-Qaeda’s weapons depots and supplies arms to new recruits.

But what does this mean for U.S. forces? Julani’s ties to al-Qaeda, combined with the Taliban's cooperation, have already contributed to a surge in attacks on U.S. troops in the region including our base in at Al-Tanf. As of January 2024, the Pentagon reported 166 attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan just since October 17, 2023. How many of these attacks can be traced back to this deadly alliance?

Why haven’t we been told that some of these attacks on our troops are emanating from Afghanistan?