The significance of watertight doors aboard vessels
MS Express Samina (Case study 1)
I chose to write about the MS Express Samina because it is a modern tragedy which clearly reinforces, how a series of errors can contribute to the ultimate sinking of a ship. Despite lessons learned from the infamous RMS Titanic, and despite recommendations which were set in place after the examination and investigation of the more recent ship tragedies such as the MS Herold of Free Enterprise and the MS Estonia; the MS Express Samina still succumbed to a grave, though preventable tragedy.
The MS Express Samina was a three and a half decade old ro-ro passenger ferry which on the 26th of September, 2000 collided with rocks (known as the Portes or “the gates” of Paros) in the Aegean Sea resulting in 82 deaths and the loss of the vessel. The French built ro-ro ferry was 4,455 GRT, 115 meters in length with a draught of 4.36 meters, and consisted of 11 decks. Two Pielstick engines gave her a maximum speed of 21 knots capable of carrying as much as 1,500 passengers and 170 cars.
Why do ships sink? I think it would be fair to argue that flooding is the only reason vessels sink. If a vessel doesn’t flood, generally, that vessel should not sink. It hardly matters what causes the flood, once water ingresses beyond a vessel’s ability to maintain its buoyancy, it will eventually sink.
Reports stated that the MS Express Samina had sailed into gale force winds measuring 8 on the Beaufort scale. The crew extended the ship’s fin stabilizers to decrease its rolling motion, in an effort to make the sailing more comfortable for its passengers. Unbeknownst to the crew, only the starboard stabilizer had extended; which resulted in the vessel becoming imbalanced due to the unsteady flow of sea water surrounding it. As it sailed toward the port of Parikia, Paros on autopilot at 18 knots, with only one stabilizer extended, the ship drifted more to one direction rather than in a straight heading.
At this point, the OOW should have made corrections to the heading of the vessel; however it appears that the navigational instruments on the bridge were not being monitored at that given time. Right before the ship’s first contact with the rock, at about 2212 hrs, a bridge officer noticed the imminent danger and desperately tried to steer the vessel in the opposite direction but it was too late.
Upon striking the rock, the vessel suffered a 6 meter longitudinal gash, 1 meter in width and well above the waterline. So now the question is, what led to the sinking of this vessel? It was the vessel’s second contact with the reef (the Portes) that bent the stabilizer which was extended on the starboard side backwards, and ripped a 3 meter gash in the ship’s side. However, unlike the first gash which ripped into the ship’s hull moments before; the second gash was located below the waterline exactly beside the engine room. The main generators were knocked out and electricity was cut throughout the ship, shortly after the sea water entered the space. Even after this, the vessel could have still maintained its buoyancy had other specific conditions been met; because the hole was confined to just that 3 meter section.
Further analysis revealed that; the final detrimental clincher to this tragedy was that 9 of the 11 watertight doors were left open. These doors are designed to maintain vessel watertight integrity by confining sea water entering a vessel through a breeched hull in a particular section; resulting in the limitation of its spreading and potential subsequent sinking. Because there was no power aboard the vessel, the watertight doors couldn’t be closed remotely from the bridge. The final result was the ship flooding, losing all of its reserved buoyancy and ultimately sinking in 38 meters of water.
Sequence of Events:
At 2215 hrs: 3 minutes post collision, the vessel is listing 5 degrees to starboard
At 2225 hrs: 13 minutes post collision, the vessel is now listing 14 degrees to starboard exposing the 6 meter gash above the waterline to the sea. Following this, the sinking of the vessel was inevitable.
At 2229 hrs: 17 minutes post collision, the vessel is listing 23 degrees to starboard making it impossible to launch additional lifeboats. Of the 8 lifeboats on board the vessel, only 3 were launched.
At 2232 hrs: 20 minutes post collision, the vessel is listing 33 degrees to starboard.
At approximately 2250 hrs: the vessel turns completely on its starboard side.
2302 hrs: 12 minutes after the vessel turned completely on its side and 50 minutes after its first contact with the rock, the vessel sinks.
Many ship safety experts and investigators agreed that; had the watertight doors been closed, the scale of the disaster would have been far less; and the vessel may have maintained it’s buoyancy. The circumstances under which the hull was breeched, the series of seemingly inconsequential errors which thereafter followed the hull breech and the very design of the ro-ro itself sealed the vessel’s fate.
Editor: Michele Spaulding
References: Wikipedia and Mayday S03E11
Photo Credit: Eurodivers