SicuroIMS: Brief respite from Al Shabaab attacks and inter-security clashes in Mogadishu

On 11 February, an unspecified Somali officer was shot and killed by unknown gunmen at a junction between Yaqshid and Shibis districts of east Mogadishu. On the evening of the previous day, 10 February, unknown gunmen threw a grenade into the home of former Hawl Wadaag district commissioner and now NISA member, killing a child and his grandmother.

Attacks on security forces and national government figures in Mogadishu are common occurrences, typically through armed attacks in the streets and at the homes of victims, but also through IED attacks on vehicles traveling through the city. These are driven by two primary factors: al-Shabaab (AS) attacks and disputes between various security forces.

Al-Shabaab attacks and capabilities

In Mogadishu, AS have a continuous presence in the city and are well aware of obvious target locations, meaning they can attack when the time suits them. Operational flexibility allows the militants the ability to attack on short notice when opportunities arise, or quickly change targets depending on fluctuating security environments. In confirmed AS attacks, most often these utilize weapons such as pistols, AK-47s, PKM, grenades, and RPGs, which typically target SNAF, SNPF, and local political figures in transit, at checkpoints, or at a residence.

Weapons are obtained by AS in Mogadishu through sales from corrupt government individuals, sales from warlords and clans, captured AMISOM stock, and legacy stocks from other conflicts. Supply routes from elsewhere in Somalia also serve militants in the capital.

IEDs are a frequent mode of attack by AS. In Mogadishu these fall into three categories: person-borne, vehicle-borne, and standalone, all of which are detonated remotely, by the victim, or as a suicide attack. Given AS’ expertise, IEDs can be manufactured either by harvested explosives or as home-made devices. Suicide vests are often used in complex attacks when a suicide VBIED is used to penetrate a checkpoint or entrance to allow a team of fighters to assault using automatic weapons, grenades, and suicide vests. Under-vehicle IEDs target specific individuals, used as remotely detonated VBIEDs, or as suicide VBIEDs. Remote-controlled devices are often used on the industrial road area and more to the north of the Mogadishu, however it has been a commonly used initiation method across many parts of the city. 

Several incidents indicative of AS IED capabilities and targets thus far in 2018 include:

• 25 January – An AS remote-controlled IED targeted an SNAF convoy escorting an SNAF Colonel near the Tarabunka Junction in Hodan, which damaged a vehicle and injured four, including the Colonel.
• 24 January – An AS remote-controlled IED targeted an SNAF vehicle driving towards Ex-Control Balcad, some civilian casualties reported.
• 16 January – AS targeted an SNPF convoy escorting the Daynile Police Commander with an IED in Wardhigleey, wounding two civilians.

Current trends in February of violent incidents against national government and security forces exhibit a marked decrease from January 2018 (see trend graph below). This fits with the narrative of AS operational capabilities, which tend to come in waves. The insurgents escalate the frequency of their attacks, followed by a period of subdued activity for regrouping and stockpiling of their resources. Declining activity may also be attributable to attrition of AS leadership as a result of targeted airstrikes in regions near Banaadir and the country as a whole.

Comparatively lower attacks by AS may also be a result of their larger pivot and repositioning of resources, as suggested by some reports, which claim that the militants may be seeking to increase their attacks from Middle Shabelle and move away from more traditional bases in Lower Shabelle. Heightened AMISOM and SFG counterinsurgent operations in Lower Shabelle may be inducing a geographical shift by AS to attack Mogadishu through more northern areas like Heliwa, Karaan, and Daynile.

Finally, a recent security conference in Mogadishu from 07-10 February led to minimizations of movement in the city, leading most residents to travel on foot or remain at home. Insufficient cover and few transport options may have contributed to the decline in AS activity thus far in February.  

*All graphics generated on SicuroIMS web platform, www.sicuroplatform.com

Violence between security forces

Clashes or assassinations by security forces against one-another typically stem from miscommunications, tribal disputes, theft, political direction, and other personal concerns. Common themes include requests and refusals to disarm when entering through a given checkpoint, as well as refusals to permit movements or participants in convoys. Accounts of these disputes describe use of medium weaponry and grenades, several of which incur casualties. Specific participants in these disputes often go unreported, however 2017 witnessed armed disputes between SNA forces, NISA, Presidential Guards, Kenyan Military, and other unspecified Somali troops. Security forces are also known to act on behalf of specific political or tribal allegiances, at times raiding the homes of political or military figures. An example of this occurred on 30 December 2017, when masked men entered the home of Somali Senator Abdi Hassan Awale Qaybdiid, who is a former militia leader, chief of police, minister, and regional head; at the time of the raid he was heading the constitutional committee in Parliament and the upper house. Despite his clear authority across military and political lines, the raid was authorized by an unknown third party.