Should we expect more militant extreme religious activity in Ethiopia?

I recently read a piece by Muktar Ismail wherein he argues that Abiy Ahmed has opened the doors for Al-Shabaab and ‘ISIL’ in the Somali region of Ethiopia. I believe he may be correct, but I do not think his analysis goes deep enough into how deeply rooted the problem may now be.

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Ismail's main point, as I understood it, was that Al-Shabaab has been embedding itself in Ethiopia and has carried out attacks in anticipation of the new offensive by the Somali National Army and the AMISOM forces. This is in order to effectively and preemptively retaliate against Ethiopia. According to Ismail, Abiy has created an opening through the restructuring of Ethiopia's armed military and paramilitary forces, to bring them under the firm control of the central Addis Ababa Government.

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The process of dismantling units such as the Liyu paramilitary police has been far from peaceful. There have been armed clashes between 'militias', federal troops, and other armed combatants, in the Somali region and other regions of Ethiopia, including the capital area. Above all, Ismail points to a weakened intelligence service in Ethiopia. Despite using ostensibly draconian methods, they were known as one of the strongest in the region, capable of largely subduing peaceful and militant opposition to the governing regimes and keeping armed insurrectionist groups like Al-Shabaab as fringe concerns.

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Emerging Threats: The Potential for Further Violence

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There are, however, several things that have occurred since Abiy assumed power, which gives me cause to think that the situation in Ethiopia might be ripe for the growth of further violent extremist movements in Ethiopia itself.

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Abiy came into power riding a wave of popular protests, driven especially by the youth. It, however, did not take long for the prime minister to become an oppressor himself. Whether this is due to necessity – such as protesters demanding what the state can't afford or a perceived need to establish – or to re-establish the state as the holder of the monopoly of violence and cement his own grasp of power, in the wake of the brutal – and in many ways still ongoing Tigrayan war, may vary. But a liberator turned oppressor is, as history so often shows, a recipe for unrest and violence.

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From a social contract point of view, Abiy can be said to have signed in to be the voice of the people. To a certain extent, he may be perceived to have voided that contract. What the actual will of the many different people and ethnic groups in Ethiopia is notoriously hard to know, but it does not appear far-fetched to assume that discontent is brewing rapidly.

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We would be remiss to not admit that this appears to be happening. There are frequent reports of protestors – religious and secular – taking to the streets and being killed. Reports of ethnic and religious schism have surfaced – see for example the divide in the Ethiopian church earlier this year – holy places being torn down, continued brutal ethnic conflict and cleansing, and of course, attacks by militias, although the exact truth of who did what can be hard to know.

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The discontent, food insecurity, and unemployment that follow the global economic slump and food infrastructure problems, significant levels of corruption, and a prime minister who appears to want to dissolve at least partial ethnic self-determination in the federal system all contribute to a volatile situation. The kettle does appear ready to boil over, especially for the many young men with little hope for their future, disillusioned with the political system, such as it is, and perhaps even those who fought in the recent brutal war, gaining little for themselves, except traumas.

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I believe it is likely that a new generation of religiously motivated militants could emerge in Ethiopia, beyond the Somali region. Especially the Oromo youth - who must have had such high hopes for the future when their man, the relatively young Muslim Oromo Abiy Ahmed ascended to the post of prime minister – appears as a likely source of recruits.

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The opposition, armed and otherwise, is likely to take many forms – as it already is - but as the secular insurrection of the OLA was so recently beaten down, it appears to me to indicate that there is a significant chance that it will be violent extremist religious groups that will emerge in the foreseeable future. Perhaps they will be aligned with groups such as Al-Shabaab and ‘ISIL’, or perhaps more homegrown and idiosyncratic.

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This could also be the case with Christian movements, but here I must admit that I am both less well-read on the literature, the internal issues of the region, and on the potential sponsors of such extreme militarism. Depending on the direction of the current government of Ethiopia, and the developments in the competition between world powers, this remains an open question. Certainly, various forms of religiosity have been a significant part of militant movements throughout history.

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No matter the creed it is not far-fetched to imagine that there are plenty of potential angry young men who will fuel instability if they continue to feel disenfranchised by Ethiopia and the uncaring mechanisms of international capitalism and conflict. And with a security apparatus in varying degrees of turmoil or transition, these may grow in danger and influence, especially if given support.