Shi’ism and Iran’s Foreign Policy

The Muslim World, Washington DC: Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 94, Issue 4, October 2004, pp. 555-563.

(The author apologises for not having included the footnotes. For some reason they could not be imported)

To Talk of Shi’ism and its impact upon Iran’s foreign policy is, in a sense, to define the role of Shi’ite clerical establishment in the socio-political developments of the country. That will be done in two fundamental ways. Firstly the impact of Shi’ism upon the political culture of Iranians will be considered. And secondly, the impact of Shi’ism as an institution will be studied. Although each of these require a study greater in length than this paper, an attempt shall be made to briefly review the two ways of the impact, as outlined above, with regard to three main aspects of foreign policy in Iran: sources, means and goals. Throughout the debate reference will be made to the modern history of Iran.

It ought to be noted at the outset that there is now sufficient evidence that clearly establish the link between domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, accounting for the impact of Shi’ism on Iran’s foreign policy involves inevitably a review of its impact on domestic politics in Iran. Also what constitutes foreign policy (what separates it from domestic policy) is also a matter of concern here. On many an occasion what is thought to be a foreign policy is actually conducted for domestic consumption, and at times domestic policy is directed for a foreign audience. For our purpose, however, policies that address issues that embody a strong foreign element are considered as part of foreign policy; the target of the policy may or may not be outside the borders of the state. In reality, though, there is at times very little that separates the two categories of domestic and foreign policy.

How political is Shi’ism? The very establishment of the sect relates to a political development after the death of the Prophet. Upon his death, Abubakr, his father-in-law was selected by a council of close confidants of the Prophet to rule Muslims. After Abubakr, Omar and Othman ruled respectively. Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, was chosen as Khalifa only after those three had served and passed away. Sunnis, the majority sect amongst Muslims, revere all the successors of the Prophet. The Shi’ites, however, believe that Ali should have been the immediate successor of the Prophet and that the three Khalifs in between, in effect, usurped power. Therefore the essential difference between the Sunnis and Shi’ites is about the question of governorship of Muslims in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet’s death. This issue has had important ramifications for Shi’a Iran, as rulers have always had to enjoy blessing from religious authorities in the country – they had to be viewed as the legitimate governor of Shi’a Muslims. Failure to heed to this point could have proven costly to rulers, e.g. the Late Shah of Iran.

However, the institutional politicization of Shi’ism in Iran can be traced back to1501, when it was adopted as the official religion of the state by Shah Esmail I, the founder of the Safavid dynasty. This was most significant in the light of the Ottoman empire, which defended Sunnism as true Islam. The religious difference, itself reinforced by political rivalries, provided the context for Iran’s most important foreign policy issue at the time: relations with the Ottomans. The political and military rivalry, leading to war between the two empires, was in part inspired by the religious divisions between them. The degree of sectarian enmity that prevailed in the two countries and the consequent bitterness between them was particularly significant in terms of the new rising West. The Ottomans’ preoccupation with the Persians allowed the West a breathing space, without which at least the military history of the region could have been different. The role of Shi’ism, therefore, in this important development should not go unheeded.

More particularly, however, there are four traits of Shi’ism including developments within the sect that allow and in fact promote its politicization. They are: the triumph of Usooliyoon over Akhbariyoon, Ijtehad, Taqlid and last but not least the important direct and regular contact of the Shi’ite clergy with the laity through religious sermons and the religious tax called Khoms. Although Zakat or alms-giving is common to all Muslims, Khoms is peculiar to Shi’ites. Each of these traits is explained below. It is important to bear in mind that the collective impact of these traits on the faith in terms of its politicization is an important factor in explaining the effect Shi’ism has had on Iran’s domestic and foreign policy.

Usooliyoon (the term denoting the importance of adhering to principles) and Akhbariyoon (the term denoting the importance of adhering only to the Quran and Hadith) are two competing philosophies in Islamic jurisprudence. Whereas the former believe that one should adhere to Islamic principles by the application of reason and training, which obviously includes the Quran and Hadith, the latter maintain that the Quran and the Hadith are both sufficient and clear enough to guide the believers and that there is no need for any new inclusion by the way of reason. This fundamental difference allowed the Shi’ite cleric to interpret religion in the light of the circumstances Muslims were in. In policy making terms, formulation of policy became a distinct possibility in Shi’ism with the triumph of Usooliyoon. As we shall see later, the Tobacco Movement was a clear illustration of that point.

The second trait emanates from the first. The status of Ijtihad, the most elevated state of learning in Shi’ism, whereby one is thought to be learned and trained sufficiently to interpret religion, allows the jurisprudent to wield much power in the way of providing or withdrawing legitimacy. Both policy makers and policy executors, therefore, need to heed to the opinion of Ulema in order to enjoy, or not to be deprived from, religious blessing that has traditionally carried public sentiments. This takes us into the third characteristic.

The third trait, that of Taqlid, whereby every individual is duty-bound to follow the rulings and edicts of any one Marja’ Taqlid on any given matter is perhaps the most influential arm of Shi’ism. This most empowering characteristic of Shi’ism was developed during the Safavid dynasty, though some claim that it existed in one form or another even before their rise to power. To illustrate the significance and importance of this trait, one can refer to the opinion of Molla Khorasani in early Nineteenth Century to the effect that if any Shi’ite refuses to engage in Taqlid, their good deeds and prayers throughout their life will have amounted to nothing in the eyes of the Almighty. Therefore, according to the teachings of Shi’ism, every Shi’a Muslim must choose a Source of Emulation and abide by his edicts.

Khoms, or the religious tax, is unique to Shi’ism. Shi’as are expected to dispense with one fifth of their net profit annually. This money is given to the Source of Emulation chosen by the individual, to be spent in whichever way the senior cleric sees fit. Although there is no accountability as such as to how the money is spent, it is believed that the funds are to maintain the religious seminaries and their staff, as well as a host of religious networks in the country and abroad. This financial exchange has a number of important political ramifications, which in terms of foreign policy are also significant. First and foremost, it brings the clergy and the laity into direct contact. This contact allows also a regular exchange of views and preferences on any issue of the day. The traditional market and traders in Iran – the bazaar and the bazaris – have always used this channel of contact to increase their influence in the politics of the country by gaining legitimacy from the clergy. Secondly, this financial dependence on the laity by the clergy has somewhat constrained Shi’ism in the form of a populist doctrine. In other words, the Ulema were always skeptical about issuing edicts that could have perceivably gone against the public mood. A conservatism of a sort, therefore, came to prevail over Shi’ism that was in part the result of this financial dependence. Thirdly, and emanating from the previous point, is the traditional independence of the clerical establishment from the political power structure. This, in the last one hundred fifty years or so, allowed the institution of Shi’ism an independence of opinion from government, which was significant at times of political crisis. The clerical support for the Constitutional Movement of 1906 is but one instance of such independence.

The above factors have indeed impressed the political culture of Iranians, as they have also contributed to the establishment of the Shi’ite institution in the country. The development of the concepts of Niabat and Velayat in Shi’a jurisprudence, further entrenched the influence of the clerics in all aspects of the community. Each of these concepts, concerned the delegation of power to the religious jurists, and in turn made Shi’ism a more politicized sect in Islam. It is no accident that radical political figures in Sunni Islamic countries have mainly come from the laity. Whereas Abdu in Egypt and Wahhab in Saudi Arabia, for instance, were both non-clerical figures, many nationalist and political figures in Iran came from the ranks of the clergy; Ayatollah Mirza ye Shirazi (the Tobacco Movement), Ayatollah Naiani (the Constitutional Revolution), Ayatollah Kashani (the Oil Nationalisation), Ayatollah Noori (the Constitutional Revolution) and Ayatollah Khomeini (the Islamic Revolution) are but a few examples. This is also in contrast to the Western experience where religion was perceived to stand in the way of nationalist movements, e.g. the French Revolution was essentially anti-religious.

Shi’ism as an institution, is also a matter of concern to this paper. What is an institution? Keohane states that institution may refer to “a general pattern or categorization of activity or to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized, that persists over time”. Young has a similar view. He defines institutions as “recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles coupled with collections of rules or conventions governing relations among occupants of these roles”. Therefore what is meant by the institution of Shi’ism, in very general terms, is an established hierarchy of roles amongst the Shi’ite clergy and the accompanying structures of seminaries, mosques and religious centres, all defining and supporting a network of relations amongst themselves and with the general public.

The institution of Shi’ism in Iran was always closely linked with the politics of the country; in other words Shi’ism never accepted a distant role from politics. Throughout the Safavid period there was widespread and continuous cooperation between the clergy and the state. That meant that all religious preachers, however high or low ranking they may have had, included praise of the King in their sermon, symbolically an important legitimizing act in the Iranian society. In return the clergy received from the state what it needed to deepen its roots and widen its influence in the country. This mutual cooperation lasted well after the Safavids had been forced out. During the Qajar rule, however, Shi’ism for the first time competed with the state in the Tobacco Movement. The state, supposed to have no equal internally and no superior externally, found to its dismay that the Shi’ite institution was more than its equal in the country. The Concession for the Tobacco in Iran had been granted to Britain and Mirza Hassan Shirazi, the undisputed Source of Emulation at the time, issued an edict forbidding Shi’a Muslims in Iran from smoking tobacco. Under immense public pressure the government withdrew the concession effectively reversing an important policy.

Source, Means and Goals

The formulation and execution of foreign policy requires identifying the goals and the means by which the policy is to be implemented. Both goals and means, however, emanate from the source, from which the policy originates. In the West, or the liberal democracies, the source is usually thought to be the will of the people. Governments derive their mandate from the people they represent. Theoretically at least, each foreign policy, in one form or another, relates to the mandate of the government representing the wishes of the majority.

In Shi’ite Islam, however, the source of political behaviour is God. This difference with the West can be seen in the origins of the words politics and siasat. Whereas the former refers to preoccupation with keeping people happy, the latter strives to advance people, even if it means incurring the displeasure of people. Even though most Shi’a scholars may agree on this basic premise, there are wide gaps between various interpretations as regards the goals and means of policy. For the more radical interpretation (conservative), the will of the people, can not be allowed to stand in the way of executing the will of God, as interpreted by the religious jurist. . The nearest example is perhaps Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, though it should be stressed that the Iranian experience represents by and large the conservative Shi’a Islam. Goals are set and defined by ideology. Whilst the Western framework defines foreign policy objectives in terms of national interest, the conservative Shi’a Islam sets its foreign policy targets according to the terms of its doctrine, as understood and interpreted by the jurist. This may help explain the goal set by Shah Esmail I in trying to defeat the Ottomans; more contemporarily it may shed light on Iran’s attitude towards the Palestinian issue. There is little doubt that Iranian foreign policy goals as regards the Arab-Israeli conflict has largely been influenced by religious orientation.

There are other interpretations which, though still having God as the source of policy, also consider Ijma’, consensus of Muslim scholars and jurists, and allow a certain degree of public participation, as different from mass mobilization, in the political process. Today, we can see in Iran the government of President Khatami promoting the rule of the people within a framework he calls ‘religious democracy’. There is clearly a mismatch of a sort within the Iranian establishment, which stems from different interpretations of the faith. This difference extends to domestic and foreign policy as well. On the issues of civil society, resumption of ties with the United States, freedom of the press, etc., there are decisive gaps between the two groups. The ‘moderates’, it is believed, have the welfare of the people as the primary target of policy, believing that God’s will is for man to prosper on earth as well as salvation hereafter. The ‘conservatives’ have God and achieving the goals set by Him, as they understand them, as their policy goal. People’s satisfaction and welfare, in this interpretation, comes secondary to obedience to Almighty. Therefore, although God stays as the source of policy for all Shi’ites, the goal orientation of the policy, including foreign policy, vary according to different interpretations.

As for the means, tools by which policy is to be implemented, there is again a difference of some magnitude between Shi’a Islam and the West and within Shi’ism itself. Diplomacy, based on rationality is the most common tool in the implementation of foreign policy. Even revolutionary Soviet Union, in the aftermath of the October Revolution of 1917, gradually replaced its radical revolutionary approach with conventional diplomacy. In the conservative brand of Shi’ism, however, jurisprudence replaces rationality as the means of policy. Even though rationality will be utilized, the point of reference will remain with jurisprudence. The following analogy may illustrate the point. President Truman used atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nakasaki to achieve final victory in the WW II in perceivably the least costly way to the United States. His successors, however, did not use the same weaponry in the war with Vietnam, presumably because they were aware of the changed circumstances in the world and could not foresee victory even if the US used nuclear power. Rationality was clearly at work. Iran, however, in the war, which was imposed on it by Iraq, refused to utilize rationality to the maximum. It probably could have ended the war earlier than it did, without having incurred the human and financial loss it did. But the goal had been set by ideological orientation – which was the overthrow of Saddam – and religious law and fervour shaped and moblisied the country’s defences against the enemy. Rationality was at the service of ideology and jurisprudence, whereas in the case of the USA noted above, rationality was utilised for the perceived national interests.

Question here is whether, therefore, the Shi’ite doctrine is inherently incompatible with national interests; or whether or not there is way to reconcile the two. There are two ways to address this question: theoretical and pragmatic. At the theoretical level, there is no inherent conflict between national interests and Shi’ism. Looking after the interests of Shi’a Muslims, according to Shi’ism, could be viewed as serving the interests of Shi’ism itself. The adherents of this view at times cite a Quranic Verse to support their claim. However, the real question concerns the definition of national interests and rationality. Shi’ism, like Sunnism, believes in the greater human community and that artificial divisions of statehood should not set one group of humanity against another. By belonging to a particular nation, one should not discard the interests of all other groups. In simple words, the promotion of national interests in Shi’ism, and in Islam, cannot be conducted to the detriment of humanity. There are limits to the pursuit of rationality and national interests; limits imposed by Almighty and not by rationality (if it was the latter, it could be self-negating). Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin both thought themselves to be rational in what they did, as did Neville Chamberlain with his appeasement policy. Few (if any at all), however, would agree with them today. A simple and reasonable conclusion from the above examples tells us that rationality, though necessary, cannot be sufficient in guiding the affairs of man. Mankind requires, Islam contends, limits to the pursuit of his interests and rationality; limits that have to be unquestionable and therefore can only come from God.

In practical terms Shi’ism is pragmatic. Ali, himself, agreed to the governorship of the three intervening Khalifs after the death of the Prophet, even though, Shi’as believe, he knew it was his right to govern after the Prophet. He did this in the interest of the unity of Ummah (the Muslim community). This meant that he waited some twenty five years before assuming the governorship of Muslims. His diplomacy of patience was thus based on the rationality of serving the long term interests of the community he belonged to and was going to represent. In more contemporary history, Iran after the Revolution has at times displayed capability to conduct conventional diplomatic manoeuvres in the pursuit of its goals. One instance was Iran’s accepting the Iraqi air jets flying there during the first Persian Gulf war (the invasion of Kuwait) and keeping them.

Therefore it can be observed that in terms of source, means and goals of policy, there are differences of some magnitude between Shi’ism and the Western conventional framework. Whilst the latter adopts the will of the people, rationality and national interest for source, means and goals respectively, Shi’ism replaces them with the will of God, jurisprudence and ideology; rationality plays an important role, but only at their service. However, as noted, different interpretation of Shi’ism can conceivably place rationality and national interest as means and goals of foreign policy.

Conclusion

Shi’ism , a religious sect in Islam, is potentially political. It started on a dispute over the succession to the Prophet of Islam. As it became the official religion of the state of Iran in 1501, Shi’ism was more and more institutionalised. The sectarian difference between Iran and the Ottomans then contributed, at least partly, to the relative immunity of the West from an Ottoman attack, which was fearful of a Persians strike from the east. Only in that sense alone, Shi’ism has greatly impressed the course of Eurosian history.

Four traits of Shi’ism, Ijtehad, Taqlid, the triumph of Osooliyoon over Akhbariyoon and the Khoms (all explained above) have greatly increased the capacity of Shi’ism for political action. The extensive network of the Shi’ite clergy and their direct and regular contact with the laity – in particular with the traditional merchant class – has allowed the institution of Shi’ism room to manoeuvre in domestic and foreign policy. In 1890s, religion for the first time in Iran competed with the state in the Tobacco Movement; a move that led to the state retreating from its position. The enhanced power of the clergy was utilised in the Constitutional Movement of 1906, the Oil Nationalisation of 1953 (to a much lesser extent) and of course in the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

In terms of Source, means and goals of foreign policy, Shi’ism assumes the Will of God, jurisprudence and ideology respectively; national interests, however, are not necessarily excluded depending on which interpretation of the sect one refers to. The difference with the conventional Western wisdom of adopting the will of the people, rationality and national interests, as source, means and objectives of policy is quite clear. Rationality is utilised in Shi’ism but usually to the benefit of the doctrine.

Historical experience has shown that, like all other political actors, Shi’ism, believing it can best serve the cause for which it stands, places much importance on preserving power and as such much domestic and foreign policy is directed towards that goal.