Shifting Power Dynamics Drives the Taliban's Morality Legislation of Summer 2024- Part II

The Taliban’s New Morality Regulation: The Law of Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice, summer 2024

In a recent decree, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhondzada, introduced a new morality law called the ‘law on promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’, official gazette number 1452 of 31 July 2024 (henceforth referred to as ‘the PVPV Law’). The law provides the Taliban’s morality police with a powerful legal framework legitimising an incredibly broad mandate.

Domestic heated debates and international reactions

The law’s oppressive nature in general and its tough approach towards women in particular made it the subject of heated debates. Majority of the commentators labelled ‘the PVPV Law’ as ‘draconian’ and ‘a catastrophe for the rights and freedoms of Afghans’ (see here, and more in local languages here, here, here, here and here).?

United Nations Security Council members have gone further to issue statements voicing concerns and asking for an immediate reversal of the law (see here and here). Other multilateral and bilateral organisations and political figures also condemn the law and contend that its adoption serves as a stark reminder that the Taliban is not leading towards their promises of a moderate regime (see here, here, here, and here).

However, the Taliban authorities reject all criticisms arguing that the law is ‘firmly rooted in Islamic teachings’ and that people should not just understand but also respect it, see here, here, and here. Given this context, important complications emerge, necessitating a nuanced assessment of the legal, social, ethical, political, and human rights dimensions of the law. In this post, I will look into the contents and nature of ‘the PVPV Law’ in comparison to its predecessors.

The PVPV law of summer 2024

The PVPV Law was a successor to the 2001 PVPV bylaw and its annexes, effectively combining and upgrading them into a superior legal document. While a bylaw typically ranks below ordinary law, as in many other legal systems, this development highlights that PVPV continues to resonate deeply with Taliban leadership, serving as a key mechanism for control.

In terms of content, the PVPV Law is incredibly detailed and filled with references based on various interpretations of Sharia as footnotes. All footnotes are in Arabic, and their volume outnumber the actual provisions of the law. The most frequently used references are sources of Hanafi jurisprudence, including Al Mausu’ah Al Fiqhiyah Al Kuwaitiyah and scholars such as Mufti Mohammad Shafi Deobandi (see here).

The PVPV Law adopts a comparatively less severe approach than previous Taliban edicts, representing a significant shift in the group’s governance strategy. It arguably indicates that the Taliban are endeavouring to formalise their control over social aspects of Afghan life through legislative measures, rather than relying solely on arbitrary enforcement or traditional interpretations of Islamic law. This approach, while still restrictive, indicates a potential move towards a more structured and predictable system of governance.

However, the implementation of such a law raises questions about the extent of its reach and the Taliban’s true intentions because its substantive provisions still raise significant concerns regarding individual freedoms and rights.

The message of Article 13

Many commentators rightly point fingers to the stringent provisions of Article 13, mandating women not to leave home unless it is for essential needs, in which case they should observe a full hijab. It defines a full hijab to include covering the face and body (cloths shall not be thin, tight, or short) and remaining silent in public. Thus, pursuant to the already enforced limitations on women’s rights, this provision effectively attempts to exclude women as visible participants in social life.

A broad area beyond Article 13

Indeed, the limitations imposed by ‘the PVPV Law’ extend to nearly every aspect of social life, irrespective of factors such as gender, level of education, age, well-being, and social status of people subject to the law. For example, the law allows the morality police to investigate all areas of public life and enter people’s private lives when necessary (Art. 4); morality police are duty-bound to ensure traders, artisans, and farmers pray on time, pay taxes, avoid advertising with images, refrain from selling human body parts, and follow the Hanafi school of thought (Art. 18). It imposes similar conditions on sightseeing and recreational spots (Art. 19), transportation (Art. 20), and public facilities (Art. 21). The list also includes minorities, asylum seekers, children, and the mentally handicapped living under Taliban rule (Art. 23). ???

The law notably excludes the Taliban, presenting itself as a measure targeting only the public and, more specifically, women. This is because restrictions on women’s freedoms are not limited to the infamous ‘Article 13’: women are banned from parks and public entertainment, must always be accompanied by a male guardian when travelling, and taxi drivers are mandated to refuse service to women not in full hijab or without a male chaperone, even during emergencies.?

The law imposes strict restrictions on media and online content, allowing only broadcasts that align with Islamic law, avoiding disparaging Muslims and excluding images of animate objects (Art. 17). Additionally, it limits cultural practices, prohibiting celebrations such as the New Year, winter solstice (shab-e-yalda), and festivals involving fireworks (Art. 22).

Dreadful Law and Governance Strategy

In summary, adoption of the PVPV law hints at a possible shift towards a more organised and foreseeable system of rule. But, it also equips the Taliban’s religious police with a dreadful instrument of control aimed at suppressing dissent and mandating conformity with a particular value system (Art. 6). It affects all citizens regardless of gender and social status, but women are particularly vulnerable (Arts 13, 14, and 15). Although its wording permits 'limited punitive measures', the spirit and scope of the legislation extend authority to the religious police to implement actions as deemed necessary and employ force when they identify any deviations from the aforementioned categories (Art. 24 - 27).

As a result, ‘the PVPV Law’ stifles all individual expression and autonomy, surpassing mere religious enforcement and resulting not only in restricted public interactions, but also in significant moral and psychological burdens on those affected, particularly women. Therefore, the law appears to be a strategy to burden people with feelings of guilt and inadequacy before they can identify the weaknesses and incompetencies of the Taliban regime. Moreover, there seems to be a clear link between the law and shifting power dynamics within the Taliban, which will be explored in a follow-up piece.