THE SECURITY PARADOX: WHY "IDIOTS AND LOAFERS" THRIVE AND PROFESSIONALS STRUGGLE (part two)

Security Global Ltd

The first part of this article explored the chaotic early days of private security, a period marked by rampant crime, hasty solutions, and a fundamental misunderstanding of what constitutes effective protection. We saw how the newly wealthy, often blinded by greed and a distorted sense of bravado, frequently prioritized "coolness" over competence, leading to the widespread hiring of unqualified personnel and the systematic undermining of professional security practices. This created a fertile ground for the "idiots and loafers" to thrive, while genuine professionals struggled to gain recognition and respect. But the story doesn't end there. The consequences of these early missteps continue to reverberate through the security industry today, shaping hiring practices, training standards, and ultimately, the safety and well-being of those who rely on protection services. In this second part, we delve deeper into the lasting impact of these initial failures, examining how they solidified the paradoxical situation where incompetence is often rewarded, and true professionalism is frequently overlooked. We will uncover the mechanisms that perpetuate this cycle, explore the long-term ramifications for both clients and security professionals, and begin to consider what steps might be taken to break free from this self-destructive pattern.

STAGE TWO: DEBRIEFING

When commercial entities finally realized the gravity of the situation, they were understandably alarmed. Money was vanishing, leaving behind a trail of casualties, explosions, and a severe lack of security. Clearly, something had to change.

The more progressive business leaders began to adopt a comprehensive approach to security. Security specialists from the Secret Service, Law Enforcement, and other agencies became highly sought-after, filling roles as security chiefs, instructors, and consultants. However, these individuals were in short supply worldwide, and their services commanded a premium. Consequently, many newly wealthy businessmen concluded that if someone wants you dead, they will succeed - in other words, no amount of security can help. They refused to acknowledge their own poor judgment in personnel matters, specifically their tendency to hire overly muscular "meatheads" instead of qualified security professionals. Therefore, the blame fell squarely on the bodyguards themselves. Individually. The system, of course, was beyond reproach, incapable of improvement. While the far-sighted established rudimentary training programs for their bodyguards, the majority gradually relegated them to the roles of secretaries, personal assistants, or worse, bouncers, errand boys, car washers, janitors, lawnmowers, and even dog walkers.

The more astute businessmen sought help from former law enforcement agents, who readily obliged with unrestrained enthusiasm. While we won't delve into the numerous cases where this enthusiasm resulted in businessmen losing everything, their companies falling prey to these "enthusiasts," it's crucial to remember that security and "protection" are distinct concepts, a nuance often overlooked, even by former law enforcement personnel themselves.

Instead, we'll focus on those who genuinely committed to building security structures and implementing ongoing training. At this stage, discerning businessmen aligned themselves with different security providers. Some opted for protection from former Secret Service agents, while others chose former police and law enforcement officers. Consequently, training systems varied considerably, each reflecting the established practices of the chosen provider.

This revealed another tragic flaw in the security industry, one that ultimately contributed to the perception of security personnel as incompetent: secret service agents, when thrust into bodyguard roles, also failed - at least, from their clients' perspective. Why? Because these professionals, regardless of their background, focused on ensuring reliability, while their clients often prioritized coolness. This elusive concept is essential, especially for the newly rich "tough guy" who recently "made some quick cash" and installed a steel door. Now, this same individual desperately needs protection.

Despite the specialists' efforts, they struggled to convince most clients of the necessity of a sufficiently large team of trained security personnel - not for the sake of numbers, but for adequacy, meaning at least four bodyguards per shift. Many clients balked at this suggestion: "If you're real professionals, you should be able to handle it! Even single-handedly! Isn't that what we hired you for?"

Indeed, that was what they were hired for. However, the reality often looked like this: a client walking with a briefcase containing, say, a million dollars (or perhaps some equally valuable, though less universally desirable, item) and a single bodyguard trailing behind. A young thief snatches the briefcase and takes off. What is the bodyguard to do? Chase the thief and leave the client unprotected? What if it's a diversion? The bodyguard goes after the thief, and a killer approaches the client and dispatches him with a kitchen knife. Stay with the client? Then say goodbye to the money (or the Pope's socks). Chase the money? Then risk the client's life. And the client is likely to be furious regardless.

What is the poor bodyguard to do? He can't be in two places at once. The client inevitably loses something, and then there's the inevitable screaming, stomping, and salary deductions (which wouldn't even cover a fraction of the loss). Or, conversely, the client is simply quiet and resigned, lying there riddled with bullets.        

While even a fraction of the lost amount could have prevented such scenarios by increasing the security detail, this logical conclusion often eluded these businessmen. Instead, they arrived at a different, firmly held belief: the bodyguard simply didn't want to work. After all, "any idiot can do it" with a large enough team. Therefore, any increase in security would come at the expense of these "idiots," who were cheaper to hire en masse. They would carry the briefcase, cater to the client's whims, and be easily replaced if they were killed.

Elementary greed prevailed. Instead of hiring one additional specialist, they hired a dozen "idiots" for the same price, perhaps for their own amusement and to feel superior. The expertise of the few professionals was diluted by the incompetence of the many. The client, knowing he was primarily guarded by "idiots," began to treat everyone the same, blurring the distinction between the professionals and the amateurs.

Another factor hindering former operatives and counterintelligence officers was the wariness of clients with less-than-legitimate businesses. These clients were understandably suspicious of former "agency" employees. They opted for a more familiar type of security: the police. The same police who, of course, had previously kept an eye on many of these "businessmen" and therefore felt like family.

However, the police lacked experience in personal protection. Police officers, no matter how valiant, simply didn't know how to do it. It wasn't their job. It often seems that anyone can do anything, regardless of qualifications.

In short, they began to live "happily ever after," like in a fairy tale. Except the fairy tale had a tragic and predictable ending.

The hastily assembled retraining system failed. Even the best versions, based on the personal protection protocols for top government officials, were designed for large teams, not lone bodyguards. Much had to be improvised, and much was simply discarded, not because it was unnecessary, but because there weren't enough people to fill all the roles in these elaborate plans. The result was significant knowledge gaps, even for the few who were selected for this rapid training, and they were now expected to do everything for everyone. They accepted this task only because they didn't fully understand what they were getting into.

Even in organizations staffed primarily by "ready-made" specialists, ongoing training was often nonexistent. "Why train them further? They're already 'pros'," employers would shrug. Consequently, bodyguards developed a "work callus," and sooner or later lost most of their essential skills.

The overall result was far from satisfactory. Even the most astute clients were often guarded by poorly trained or de-skilled employees, often working alone. Businessmen continued to be targeted, and the prestige of the bodyguard profession continued to decline.

Stay tuned for Part 3 of The Security Paradox, where we'll explore solutions and strategies for a safer future!

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