Security Assessment of Indonesia 2022

Overview

Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world, located in a strategic position at the crossroads of the Indian & Pacific oceans. This location both imposes an obligation to protect vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) & presents an opportunity to utilise the abundant marine resources at Indonesia's disposal. In recent years, Indonesia has re-conceptualised its identity as a maritime nation whose livelihood both derives from & depends upon the sea, evidenced by President Joko Widodo's Global Maritime Fulcrum & Sea Policy proposals.

It is a developing country in Southeast Asia with a poverty rate of approximately 10.14% in March 2021, which is higher than the 9.2% in September 2019. The Central Bureau of Statistics reported in March 2018 that Indonesia’s 4 richest people own as much wealth as its poorest 100 million citizens, while its poorest 10% live on as little as 0.76 cents a day. Although an estimated 88% of the population is Muslim, Indonesia is not an Islamic country ruled by Islamic law. Most Indonesian Muslims can in fact be labelled 'moderate Muslims', meaning that the majority approves of a secular democracy & a pluralist society.

Indonesia has no conventional external threat to its security although China has subjected Indonesia to maritime grey zone tactics in the South China Sea (SCS), attempting to change the strategic equation at sea & beyond without provoking a direct conflict.

National security priorities therefore tend to focus on the many internal & transnational security challenges that the country faces. From the perspective of Indonesian policymakers, the foremost internal threat to national security is corruption. The Indonesian government has a reputation for corruption & has stepped up its anti-corruption efforts focusing on provincial governments, the police & the private sector. However, these efforts have a long way to go.

Security problems & corruption have been significant drags on foreign investment in Indonesia for a long time.?

External Threats

In Indonesia’s view, the most serious regional problem involves overlapping claims of sovereignty in the SCS its partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) & those of China. An increasingly assertive China looms as the region's most worrisome future threat. At the heart of the SCS dispute is the “nine-dash line”, Beijing’s claim that encircles as much as 90% of the contested waters. The line runs as far as 2,000km from the Chinese mainland to within a few hundred kilometres of the Philippines, Malaysia & Vietnam. Beijing maintains it owns any land or features contained within the line, which confers vaguely defined “historical maritime rights”. Parts of?China's nine-dash line?overlap Indonesia's 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a concept set out in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), overlaps with the southernmost reaches of China’s expansive “nine-dash line” maritime claim. Chinese incursions into the North Natuna Sea have increased but Indonesia has not pushed back which has emboldened China’s salami-slicing tactics in the North Natuna Sea, from IUU fishing to challenging Indonesia’s hydrocarbon rights. Indonesia also faces incursions into its waters by Vietnamese fishing boats as a result of an unresolved overlapping EEZ dispute with Hanoi.

(Maps of China's Nine Dash Line & Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone)

In the North Natuna Sea where Indonesia’s EEZ overlaps with China's nine dash line, China has mobilized its fishing vessels accompanied by its coast guard & maritime militia - vessels ostensibly engaged in commercial activity, but which in fact conducts operations in concert with Chinese law enforcement & military institutions to help the party-state achieve its military & political aims in the SCS’s disputed waters. The most public incidents in the area with Indonesian authorities occurred between December 2019 to January 2020, when nearly 60 vessels crossed into Indonesia’s EEZ. Indonesia has been subjected to China’s maritime grey zone tactics not so different from Vietnam, Malaysia or the Philippines. In June 2020, Indonesia’s Defence Ministry authorized the Maritime Security Agency?- Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia?(Bakamla) to procure weapons & its ships were fitted with 30mm remote-controlled Stabilized Naval Gun Systems. This move sought to deter Chinese incursions while preserving important areas of cooperation between Jakarta & Beijing. The arming of Bakamla vessels with heavier weapons may enhance deterrence but Indonesia will still find it challenging to respond robustly to Chinese &/or Vietnamese transgressions in the North Natuna Sea. Bakamla vessels would have to rely on the larger ships of the Indonesian Navy for backup. It is more plausible for a Navy-Bakamla tie-up to act as a bulwark against Chinese & Vietnamese transgressions.

Susanto of Airlangga University views China’s attitude towards Indonesia as ambiguous, wanting to maintain the country as a “non-claimant” in the SCS dispute yet testing its commitment to defending its sovereignty in the Natuna waters.

Zachary Abuza, a professor of Southeast Asia Studies at the National War College in Washington does not view the arming of Bakamla as a hardening of Jakarta’s position on China, but as more of a deterrent move to prevent the escalation of tensions. Indonesia hoped that arming Bakamla‘s vessels would deter foreign fishing vessels from entering Indonesian waters & prevent a repeat of the March 2016 incident when Chinese coastguard vessels entered Indonesian waters to rescue an impounded Chinese fishing vessel & crew. During this incident, Indonesian maritime officials detained a Chinese fishing boat within Indonesia’s 200-mile EEZ off the Natuna Islands. As the ship was being towed to a nearby Indonesian naval base, a Chinese coastguard vessel rammed the fishing boat in an attempt to compel the Indonesian authorities to release it.

(A Bakamla vessel)

(Indonesian Navy Parchim-class corvette - KRI Tjiptadi)

In June 2021, the Noble Clyde Boudreaux (a semi-submersible rig), arrived & begin drilling 2 appraisal wells in Indonesia’s Tuna block, located approximately 140 nautical miles north of Natuna Besar. China responded by sending a vessel to patrol close to the rig. Indonesia then promptly sent a Bakamla patrol ship, KN Pulau Dana, the first of a number of Bakamla & Indonesian navy ships that has tailed Chinese vessels around the area in the months since.

(The semi-submersible rig - Noble Clyde Boudreaux)

In recent years, Vietnam, Malaysia & the Philippines have all come under Chinese pressure to end energy development projects operating in areas of the SCS claimed by Beijing, but this is the first time it has done so in the case of Indonesia.

Indonesia however, continues to compartmentalize this problem by separating its bilateral ties with China from the North Natuna Sea issue, the SCS disputes & great power politics. This approach seems reasonable given the complexity of each & that China is the most domestically polarizing foreign policy issue today. So far Jokowi’s administration has managed relatively to keep its flourishing economic ties with China fairly isolated from the periodic stand-offs & tensions offshore. How much longer it can sustain the balancing act in the face of intensifying Chinese pressure remains to be seen.

Amid China's growing assertiveness in the SCS, Indonesia intends to convene a meeting with the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei & Singapore. Beijing may not dial down its activities in the disputed areas but the point would have been made that Indonesia is prepared to take the lead in galvanizing ASEAN on SCS matters. Malaysia, the Philippines & Vietnam occupy a number of atolls in the disputed Spratly Islands. Brunei has never formally claimed 2 features which lie inside its EEZ, but China’s nine-dash line skirts uncomfortably close to the country’s coastline. Singapore is not a claimant but was invited because as a major transshipment hub, it has a vested interest in stability in the SCS & free flow of maritime trade.

Internal Threats

Indonesia's major internal security problems have involved separatist groups in the country. The separation of the Indonesian police from the military in the early 2000s was supposed to establish a line between internal security & external defence. However, the distinction between these roles is still blurred & the military is still very much preoccupied with internal security. The military’s preoccupation with internal security is not a recent phenomenon as it was crystallised in the early days of the country. The military’s historical legacy & Indonesia’s evolving internal security dynamics have preserved its involvement in safeguarding domestic security. The need to overcome internal security threats more effectively has long been used to justify & prolong their involvement.

The Indonesian military (TNI) has been involved in the Tinombala operation in the Central Sulawesi city of Poso since 2016 & increasing military operations in Papua since 2019. The Indonesian National Police (POLRI) & military launched the Tinombala operation - later called the Madoga Raya operation to?curb terrorist groups.

In April 2021, Mahfud MD, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Political, Law & Security Affairs changed the official label for armed separatist groups from ‘criminal groups’ to ‘separatist-terrorist groups’. This renaming has enlarged the military’s stake in internal security operations, as countering separatism & terrorism fall under the military’s ‘other than war’ mandate.

Crime in Indonesia

Typical crimes in Indonesia include local thugs extorting protection money in markets & hiring out their services to corrupt businessmen; armed men robbing cars in the way to the airports; taxi drivers robbing their passengers; & poor people raiding shrimp farms & rice fields. Armed car-jacking, theft of vehicles & residential break-ins do occur in Indonesia.?Personal and "snatch-and-grab" robberies?are the most common type of crime and have occurred regularly to expatriates. Other more serious crimes would be theft, fraud, financial crimes, cyber crimes, transportation security, religious violence, separatist violence, elections, religious terrorism, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, bribery & extortion. Kidnappings pose a moderate threat in Indonesia & locals & residents most often targeted. Kidnappings were typically financially motivated & the perpetrators were familiar with the victim's family. There is also some evidence to suggest that corruption among police & the military have created links between kidnap gangs & the authorities. It should be noted that weapons & explosives are not difficult to obtain.

Civil unrest occurs frequently & often takes the form of politically motivated demonstrations that can be disruptive & affect the operating environment for businesses. Demonstrations are common in cities such as Surabaya & Medan & occur on a near daily basis in Jakarta. Most protests are peaceful, but demonstrations can attract large crowds & there are potential for clashes with security forces.

Crime always increases before the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan due to the pressure of providing gifts for family members & obtaining money to return to their villages for Eid Al-Fitri, which is extremely important to the majority of Indonesians.

There are a wide spectrum of criminal networks involved in various forms of organized crime in Indonesia. For the most part, these criminal networks are involved in drug trafficking in the major cities, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, Yogyakarta & Medan, as well as in tourist destinations such as Bali. In the Global Organized Crime Index 2021, the latest operative information available, suggests that there are 83 criminal networks engaged in drug trafficking in Indonesia. Human trafficking networks are believed to exist primarily in rural areas, especially in eastern Indonesia. Terror-like operations are reportedly carried out by large criminal networks adhering to religious interests, but terrorist networks operate in Indonesia as well.

Criminal networks are thought to significantly influence the democratic process in Indonesia, often through maintaining state-embedded connections, participating in political campaigns & buying votes. Corruption is rampant in the country at state & regional levels & state-embedded actors facilitate a range of organized crime operations. It is likely that state-embedded actors also exert control over criminal markets in the country & take an active part in them. Prison & border control officers, as well as the Badan Narkotika Nasional?(BNN), aid drug trafficking. There is anecdotal evidence of foreign involvement in certain criminal markets, such as human & drug trafficking, but foreign groups mostly collaborate with local organizations.

There are no specialized anti-organized crime units within the judiciary & corruption is also pervasive in the judicial system. As a result, the judiciary’s ability to pass effective sentences in cases involving organized crime is compromised. The prison system is also plagued by issues & does not meet minimum international standards. Overcrowding & a lack of proper facilities are common, which has allowed criminal networks to organize & engage in crime, notably drug trafficking, within Indonesia’s penal institutions, again collaborating with prison officers.

Transnational crime organizations are drawn to operate in Indonesia because of the perception that the police are corrupt & inept. Transnational crime is more a symptom of weak governmental institutions & corruption, rather than an externally imposed threat. POLRI is tasked with countering organized crime, although a lack of training limits its anti-organized crime capacities. Indonesia both shares & receives intelligence from its partners, but corruption & political influence has reduced trust among its partners & discouraged the practice.

(Korps?Brigade?Mobil - Brimob. This is POLRI's special operations, paramilitary & tactical unit. Its duties include CT, CRC, SAR, IEDD & hostage rescue.)

Transnational crime organizations involved in weapons, narcotics & human trafficking also most likely to be involved in the illegal wildlife trade. Criminal activities can supply funds to terrorist organizations. The illegal wildlife trade is attractive to organized criminal groups because of their synergistic links with trafficking of other contrabands, particularly narcotics. Other types of transnational crime such as human trafficking & environmental crimes like illegal fishing, illegal logging & illegal wildlife trade are less frequently viewed from a security standpoint. The Indonesian Forestry Ministry estimated that the government suffers an annual loss in revenue of about US$3 billion from illegal logging activities. Corruption & collusion by local elites with illegal logging have been exacerbated by the political decentralization the occurred after the resignation of the Suharto administration & this has created an environment where domestic & transnational environmental criminals operate with impunity. Some provincial governments have emphasized development over conservation & in some cases have urged people to settle & open businesses in protected areas, simply ignoring national laws.

(Indonesian Police officers)

Police officers routinely supplement their salaries by accepting payments from motorists who violate traffic laws. Police sometimes charge victims to investigate crimes or to return recovered stolen property. This makes solving complex crimes challenging. When police do take appropriate steps to address crime, they face significant hindrances. Police have limited capabilities in responding to criminal acts & other emergencies. They lack sufficient patrol vehicles to respond quickly on a consistent basis.

Terrorism

The underlying reasons for a Muslim to radicalize can be a mixture of feelings of political exclusion, feelings that great injustice has been done towards the Muslim community, or feelings of western domination. Radical feelings can be nurtured when radical Muslims clump together & arouse each other's sentiments; either horizontally when adults meet to ventilate their feelings of resentment & watch IS videos, or, vertically when children are indoctrinated in radical Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). Meanwhile, isolation from pluralist society & from other viewpoints help to strengthen their radical sentiments although such isolation is not always a prerequisite to nurture radical sentiments.

Indonesia suffers from radicalization problems within its prisons. Researchers from the Brookings Institution found that prison dynamics allowed for the spread of extremism, with guards failing to closely monitor terrorists in jail. According to Brookings’ findings, terrorist convicts answer to no one except themselves, deciding on their own routines & complying with prison regulations & participating in so-called deradicalization workshops only when it suits them. Imprisoned Islamists are allowed to wear robes rather than prison uniforms & have regular access to outside personnel due to the fact that much of the prisoners’ food is supplied directly to prisoners by external sources. The freedom of communication open to these high-risk prisoners to pursue their extremist agendas with the external world & within the prisons is alarming. Discussions with Syria based jihadists, organization of their couriers (frequently their equally committed wives) & orchestration of recruitment, training & attacks must not be available to them. Islamic doctrines are openly preached throughout the prison system & in one case an inmate even converted a prison guard to radical Islam. Although the number of convicted terrorist prisoners is small within the national prison population their ability to influence those around them & to recruit radicals to their viewpoint is significant.

The researchers also noted that prison staff were untrained & unprepared for handling terrorist convicts. Influential extremists have also reportedly issued publications & fatwas from prison. In 2014, Abu Bakar Bashir was allowed to convene a meeting of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) linked splinter cell Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) & its leaders, & vocalize support for IS while in prison.

A report released by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in Sept 2020 noted that the Indonesian government also needs to improve its terrorist rehabilitation & deradicalization programs because 11.39% of terror convicts in the country become repeat offenders. The government needs to act urgently because as many as 100 people imprisoned for terrorism-related offenses are released each year, with the number set to rise to 150 in 2021. It had examined the cases of 94 repeat offenders among a total of 825 men & women convicted of terrorism and released between 2002 & May 2020. Most were re-arrested after committing a 2nd terrorist crime, including those who joined ISIS in Syria after their release plus a few others who might not fit a strict definition of recidivism but who clearly re-engaged with violent extremism. Among the main reasons freed terror convicts reoffend & that they are surrounded by a high level of radicalism in prison, in close contact with a militant family member after their release, or the lure of a powerful ideological movement.

The IPAC report also noted that freed terror convicts who were among the first to be drawn back to extremism included those who were involved in the first Bali bombings in 2002, which killed 202 people; the 2004 Australian embassy bombing & some early failed & foiled plots.

Furthermore, of the hundreds who were arrested & incarceration for participation in extremism, those with lesser non-violent offenses such as harboring fugitives, withholding of information or attending meetings received short sentences of 2-3 years. In 2005, Islamic cleric Abu Bakar Bashir - the accused spiritual leader of JI, received a 30-month sentence after being convicted of conspiracy related to the Bali bombings. He was released on good behavior after serving 25 months in prison. (Six months later, the Indonesian Supreme Court overturned his conviction based on witness testimony.) In April 2022, an Indonesian court sentenced Munarman, former secretary-general of the now-outlawed Islamic Defenders Front, a group responsible for inciting violence against religious minorities including Christians, to 3 years in prison for terrorism offenses. Munarman had close links with & helped terror organizations such as?JAD - responsible for various?bomb attacks on churches?including?a suicide bomb attack?on a Catholic cathedral in Makassar, South Sulawesi?province, on Palm Sunday in 2021.

This showed that prisons have become even more of a revolving door for convicted terrorists than they have been in the past, with individuals released after minimal in-prison counseling programs & with almost no government capacity for sustained post-release monitoring.

The most significant terrorist threat to Indonesia is JI. There are increasing signs that JI, whose members are estimated to number between 6,000 & 10,000 today, is learning from militant groups such as Hezbollah & the Hamas in Palestine by morphing into a similarly hybrid variant of Islamist extremism that will be hard to eradicate. Indonesian intelligence reports reveal how JI is entrenching itself in legitimate businesses & charities, &?dabbling in local politics, have set alarm bells ringing for global security experts.

On Nov 16 2021, Indonesian police arrested 3 JI members, including Farid Ahmad Okbah, a member of Jemaah Islamiyah's (JI's) consultative council & Chairman of Indonesia’s People Dakwah Party (Partai Dakwah Rakyat Indonesia/PDRI), reveals the existence of a newly established JI political front, an addition to its traditional fronts of dakwah (religious outreach) & armed jihad (military struggle). Also arrested was Ahmad Zain An-Najah, a member of the fatwa commission of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), or Indonesia Ulema Council, the nation's top Islamic clerical body.

JI’s leaders are opposed to AQ style bombings on Indonesian soil because they are counterproductive - attacks on Western targets have killed more Indonesians than infidels, provoking community outrage & led to mass arrests. Nonetheless, small but persistent domestic terrorist cells continue to attract global attention to Indonesia & the potential for renewal of international terrorist support cannot be dismissed.

Other lesser actors include Laskar Jihad, Hizbullah Front & Laskar Mujahidan. There are international connections with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines & the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham?(HTS) - Al-Qaeda (AQ)'s former Syrian offshoot, which was then known as the Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Sham).

In Sept 2021, it was reported in This Week in Asia, that the Indonesian authorities had arrested 123 JI members. In addition, it has detained dozens of JAD members across 10 provinces. These mass arrests were made as Indonesian security & intelligence officials stepped up preventive action against militant networks after the Taliban seized Kabul after the?US withdrawal of troops in Aug 2021.

Around this time, the Indonesian police also announced they had arrested 4 more JI members, including a convicted militant & former emir or leader named Abu Rusdan in Bekasi.

Abu Rusdan

Rusdan attended paramilitary training in Afghanistan in 1986. He has taught at the JI-affiliated Al-Muttaqien School in Jepara, where many persons linked to key AQ & JI figures have resided. Rusdan replaced Abu Bakar Bashir as the ‘emir’ or leader of JI after Bashir's arrest in Oct 2002. As ‘emir’, Rusdan chaired JI leadership meetings & organized the group's affairs.

A captured senior regional leader of JI admitted that in Feb 2004, Rusdan ordered him to establish ties with ASG. He in turn ordered his subordinate, Zulkifli Abdul Hir, to establish ties with Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani who was at that time a leader of ASG.

In Feb 2004, Rusdan was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison for sheltering Ali Ghufron, (a.k.a. Mukhlas), who was convicted & executed along with his brother Amrozi & fellow JI member Imam Samudra, for carrying out Indonesia’s worst?terror attack, the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people.

However, Rusdan was released prior to completing the sentence & immediately resumed supporting JI-activities regardless of the conditions attached to his release. He traveled throughout Indonesia giving speeches & fiery sermons that received tens of thousands of views on YouTube. In a recorded sermon, he praised as the “land of jihad” Afghanistan, the country where he had previously trained with other militant groups.

In Jan 2021, Indonesian police uncovered a compilation video allegedly showing an elite force of JI members engaged in weapons & physical training as well as kidnapping simulations between 2013 & 2018. The video was found on the laptop of a recently arrested JI member. According to the police, 96 operatives between 19-23 years old had received 7-months of training before being sent to fight in Syria. The terrorist training camps were run in 12 locations in Central Java & involved 7 different groups comprised of up to 15 recruits. About 66 of them eventually made their way to Syria, the majority of whom joined?the?HTS.

Initially, JI collaborated with several Syrian militant & rebel groups deemed able to provide its training needs. Besides the HTS, JI cadres have also trained briefly with the Free Syrian Army (FSA),?Ahrar al Sham, as well as IS. JI cadres’ longest training stints in Syria have been with the HTS, stretching up to 2 years or more.?Their training included bomb-making, operating a tank & artillery. JI ceased deploying cadres to Syria in 2018, after 5 of its members were deported from Turkey following their failed attempts to join HTS & its pro-AQ splinter?Huras ad-Din?(HaD).

There have also been several Indonesian militants who joined HTS, although their organizational affiliation in Indonesia remains unclear. In January 2019, a photo circulated on Twitter allegedly showing the corpse of Abu Mujahid, an Indonesian HTS fighter who had attacked Syrian government forces in the village of Atshan, in the Hama Governorate & was later killed. Later that year, a Twitter user circulated a photo of an Indonesian fighter, claiming he was a member of HTS’s elite?inghimasi?battalion. The concept of Inghimasi refers to a special-forces style suicide fighter who carries both small arms & explosives.?The Inghimasiun are essentially shock troops used to soften the defences of their military or civilian targets. These individuals are believed to possibly have links to JI or Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) back home. HTS has preferred to hand-pick new recruits, with such fighters mainly sourced from the transnational network of existing HTS fighters.?

The number of attacks & plots by violent extremist Islamic militant groups dipped during the past 2 years compared with before the outbreak of COVID-19. JAD’s relatively stagnant activities in 2020-2021 & the decline of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) terror activities in 2021 can be partly attributed to movement restrictions & higher costs associated with domestic travels due to the pandemic. In 2021, JAD was involved in at least 9 incidents, including 5 using explosive materials. Those included 2 suicide bomb attacks & a suicide bomb plot, compared with 11 incidents the previous year.

Since the Bali bombings in 2002 & 2005, Indonesia has sought to improve its legislative & law enforcement capabilities to dismantle major extremist networks operating in the country. The government has passed a series of domestic counterterrorism laws & established regional alliances to address extremism. The authorities have also prosecuted more than 800 suspected terrorists between 2002 & 2021 with a nearly 100% conviction rate. There have been at least 29 terrorist attacks & 25 foiled plots from 2019 to date, most of them involving small IS-inspired cells & lone militants.

Terrorism & Political Strife

Indonesia has long been vulnerable to Islamic extremist ideologies & movements. From the emergence of Darul Islam (DI) in 1942, terrorist groups have been a constant fixture in the Indonesian security landscape. Under the 32-year-long dictatorship of President Suharto, the Indonesian government suppressed extremist movements such as Darul Islam, a precursor to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). After Suharto’s sudden resignation in 1998, Indonesian Muslims who had traveled to join the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s returned to Indonesia & formed various militant groups. Despite a strong effort from the Indonesian government to curb them, the country has witnessed the regrouping & resurgence of terrorist groups. This is exacerbated with the prominence of Islamic State (IS) ideologies & the revamped spirit of jihadist with a new & robust ideology. More than 30 public servants have been nabbed for terrorism in the past decade.

Indonesia also has a number of provinces where separatist movements have resorted to violence. Strife between Muslims & Christians continue to occur in Maluku, Sulawesi & Kalimantan.

Extremist groups have launched multiple terrorist attacks in the country. JI has carried out the majority of terrorist acts in Indonesia. The group experienced a period of relative inactivity after an Indonesian government crackdown in the early-2000s. JI, a historically AQ aligned group, fractured further when co-founder & former leader?Abu Bakar Bashir, pledged allegiance to IS?in July 2014. IS has capitalized on Indonesia’s existing Islamist networks to boost its recruitment efforts & carry out attacks in the country. According to USAID, Indonesia leads Asian countries in the number of foreign fighters in Iraq & Syria.

(Detasemen Khusus 88 Antiteror police)

Detasemen Khusus 88 Antiteror (Densus 88) is a?POLRI counter-terrorism unit formed on 30 June 2003, after the?2002 Bali bombings. It is funded, equipped & trained by the US through the?Diplomatic Security Service's Antiterrorism Assistance Program &?Australia. The unit is training in Megamendung, 50?km south of Jakarta & the training is conducted by the?CIA, FBI, Secret Service & Australian Federal Police. Most of the instructors were ex-special forces personnel.?Densus 88 is capable of countering various terrorist threats, from bomb threats to hostage situations. This 1,300-personnel strong special force went fully operational in 2005. It consists of investigators, explosive experts & an attack unit that includes?snipers. This unit now operates in every province.

(Densus 88 police escorting radical cleric Aman Abdurrahman to his trial at a district court in Jakarta, Friday, May 25, 2018)

Adhi Priamarizki, a Research Analyst with the Indonesia Program, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University opined that Densus 88 has been doing a marvellous job in countering the terrorist threat in Indonesia. The detachment also played an integral part in penetrating the JI network in the Indonesian archipelago. Despite these achievements, some of the fundamentalist groups often accused the detachment’s effort in combating terrorists as un-Islamic or an attack on the religion.

TNI Joint Special Operations Command (Koopsusgab)

In 2015, TNI chief General Moeldoko launched a new counterterrorism unit called the TNI Joint Special Operations Command (Koopsusgab) which clearly illustrates Jakarta’s determination to eradicate the terrorism threat. The unit will be stationed in Sentul, West Java. It is an elite, inter-service team comprising 81 trained counter-terrorism personnel from the Army, the Navy’s special forces & the Air Force’s Bravo 90 special forces unit. This lean & capable force will also enable it to be deployed quickly to hotspots as they arise. President Jokowi emphasized that this special unit would be deployed only when the National Police's capacity was deemed inadequate to respond to an emergency.

(Elite Koopsusgab soldiers)

However, the new TNI chief, General Gatot Nurmantyo, quickly disbanded the group, because he was concerned about any political backlash regarding the TNI’s lack of a legal basis for counterterror operations. There are legitimate legal concerns about how the military’s involvement in counterterrorism will impact court cases & other investigations. The military is trained to deliver lethal force. While military leaders argue that they can be deployed rapidly, they are not trained to arrest, collect evidence & maintain chains of evidence & custody that will be admissible in courts.

There have also been several Indonesian militants who joined HTS, although their organizational affiliation in Indonesia remains unclear. In January 2019, a photo circulated on Twitter allegedly showing the corpse of Abu Mujahid, an Indonesian HTS fighter who had attacked Syrian government forces in the village of Atshan, in the Hama Governorate & was later killed. Later that year, a Twitter user circulated a photo of an Indonesian fighter, claiming he was a member of HTS’s elite?inghimasi?battalion. The concept of Inghimasi refers to a special-forces style suicide fighter who carries both small arms & explosives.?The Inghimasiun are essentially shock troops used to soften the defences of their military or civilian targets. These individuals are believed to possibly have links to JI or Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) back home. HTS has preferred to hand-pick new recruits, with such fighters mainly sourced from the transnational network of existing HTS fighters.?

Pesentren (Islamic Schools)

Pesantren have also served as sites of recruitment & radicalization. A pesantren established by JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir has produced jihadists who have gone to fight in either Syria or Iraq with IS or its rivals. According to Sydney Jones of the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, an estimated 40 pesantren have terrorist connections. USAID & the New York Times found that a small number of mosques have also become sites of radicalization & are particularly pro-IS.

(A pesantren or Islamic school)

(Abu Bakar Bashir)

In November 2018, the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (BIN) announced it had conducted a 4-month-long investigation into approximately 1,000 mosques in the country. BIN found that 41 of the mosques investigated permitted radicalizing propaganda & 17 clerics expressed support or sympathy for IS & encouraged followers to join the group abroad. BIN also found that government workers primarily attended the 41 mosques identified for spreading radicalism.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was formally founded on 1 January 1993, by JI leaders,?Abu Bakar Bashir & Abdullah Sungkar?while hiding in Malaysia from the persecution of the?Suharto?government.?After the resignation the?Suharto?regime in 1998, both men returned to Indonesia?where JI gained an edge when Abdullah Sungkar established contact with?the AQ?network.

JI is dedicated to the establishment of an?Islamic state in SE Asia. It is a transnational organization?with cells in Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia & the Philippines.?In addition to AQ, the group is also has links to the?Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. The group has been designated as a?terrorist group by UN, Australia, Canada, China, Japan, UK & US.

Bali Bombing (2002)

At 11:05pm on 12 October 2002, a JI suicide bomber inside the nightclub?Paddy's Pub?detonated a Improvised Explosive Device (IED) bomb in his backpack, causing many patrons, with or without injuries, to immediately flee into the street. 20 seconds later, a second & much more powerful?VBIED?hidden inside a white?Mitsubishi L300?van was detonated by another suicide bomber outside the?Sari Club, located opposite?Paddy's Pub. The attack killed 202 people - 88?Australians, 38?Indonesians, 23?Britons & people of more than 20 other nationalities.?A further 209 people were injured.

The attack involved the detonation of 3 IEDS; a backpack-mounted device (PBIED) carried by a?suicide bomber, a large?VBIED carried in a Mitsubishi L300 van, both of which were detonated in or near popular nightclubs (Sari Club & Paddy's Bar) in Kuta & a 3rd much smaller device detonated outside the US Consulate in?Denpasar. An audio cassette containing a recorded voice message from AQ chief, Osama bin Laden, stated that the bombings were in direct retaliation for support of the US's War on Terror & Australia's role?in the?liberation of East Timur. JI's military leader, Hambali, subsequently?confessed that AQ had sent him USD$30,000 to fund the suicide bombings. He has been held in Guantanamo Bay for the past 20 years & remains one of a handful of high-value detainees at the US military prison still considered a high-risk threat to the US.

The?VBIED was made from?potassium chlorate, aluminium powder &?sulfur contained in 12 plastic filing cabinets. The cabinets containing the potassium chlorate, aluminum powder, sulfur mixture & a?TNT?booster, were connected by 150 metres of?PETN-filled detonating cord. 94?RDX electric detonators were fitted to the TNT. The total weight of the VBIED was estimated to be 2,250 pounds (1,020?kg).The large, high-temperature blast damage produced by this mixture was similar to a thermobaric explosion & left a 1 metre deep crater.

Bali Bombing (2005)

On 1 October 2005, at approximately 7.30 pm (Bali time) 3 suicide bombers attacked separate locations in Kuta & Jimbaran Bay in Bali in quick succession, killing 20 people & injuring more than 100. One explosion occurred in a restaurant at Kuta Square & 2 other explosions occurred at restaurants in Jimbaran Bay.?

One of the blasts struck Raja's Restaurant at the Kuta Square shopping mall while the other 2 IEDS exploded at?warungs?along Jimbaran?beach. These areas are generally popular with Western tourists.?Police later said they had found three unexploded bombs in Jimbaran. They had apparently failed to go off after the security forces hastily shut down the island's mobile telephone network following the first blasts. These attacks were carried out by at least 3 suicide bombers?in a similar fashion to the 2002 bombings. The remnants of backpacks & excessively mutilated bodies of the suicide bombers were later recovered.

(Para Wijayanto)

On June 29, 2019, Indonesian counterterrorism police arrested JI leader Para Wijayanto on the outskirts of Jakarta. He reportedly attended a jihadist training camp in the Philippines in 2000 & was involved in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people. Wijayanto is believed to have become the leader of JI in 2007 & was known to have recruited & trained members to join extremist groups in Syria. During their investigations into Wijayanto, the police discovered that JI was using two oil palm farms in Sumatra & Kalimantan to generate income - a new development in the group’s terror financing efforts. In March 2020, Wijayanto was sentenced to just 7 years in prison on the charge of inciting others to commit an act of terrorism. According to the Jakarta Post, at the time of Wijayanto’s arrest in June 2019, there were approximately 6,000 JI members.

(Zulkanaen)

On December 10, 2020, Densus 88 arrested?Aris Sumarsono (a.k.a. Zulkarnaen), during a raid on a house in East Lampung district on the island of Sumatra. He was guarded by a security team.? Zulkanaen is considered by Indonesian police to be JI’s military commander & had evaded arrest for more than 18 years. He has been on the UN Security Council’s AQ sanctions list since May 2005 for his ties to the global terrorist network, as well as association with Osama bin Laden & the Taliban. The US State Department’s “Rewards for Justice” program offered $5 million for Zulkarnaen’s arrest.

His arrest is very significant because he is one of the last first-generation leaders of JI, one of the few with direct ties to AQ’s leadership & someone with years of operational experience. Indeed, he was one of the first Indonesian militants to receive military training in Afghanistan during the 1980s & had spent a decade running a militant training camp in the southern Philippines. In Indonesia, Zulkarnaen allegedly masterminded several deadly terrorist plots in the early 2000s & built explosives for other attacks, including those used in the 2002 Bali bombings & the 2003 attack on the JW Marriott in Jakarta. In January 2022, Zulkarnaen was sentenced to 15 years in prison after he was found guilty of withholding information on jihadist networks & sheltering other extremist suspects. Though the authorities have accused him of playing a role in the Bali bombings, the 3-judge panel abstained from issuing a charge related to the attacks because the statute of limitations had expired.

Between late February & early March 2021, Densus 88 arrested 22 suspected JI members across East Java province. The suspects were believed to have conducted military-style training & were plotting to attack the police. Police uncovered a bunker for weapons & bombmaking as well as jihadist books. Among the suspects was convicted terrorist Usman bin Sef, (a.k.a. Fahim). According to police, Fahim led a JI cell that had recruited at least 50 members in the province in the past 5 years.

(Upik Lawanga)

On December 8, 2021, the East Jakarta District Court sentenced JI member Taufiq Bulaga, (a.k.a. Upik Lawanga), to life in prison after finding him guilty of assembling explosives used in 3 deadly bombings. The attacks include a 2005 market bombing that killed 22 people & injured 91 others, a 2004 passenger minibus attack that killed 6 people & a 2006 attack using a flashlight bomb that killed 1 person. Lawanga had evaded authorities for 16 years until his capture in December 2020. During his trial, other militants testified that Lawanga was nicknamed the “professor” because of his bomb-making & firearms expertise, which made him an important figure in the group.

Islamic State (IS)

Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, was named in a list of potential global targets by IS in its official magazine, Dabiq & the country has been the victim of several attacks in the past claimed by Islamic militant groups.

According to USAID,?IS’s military successes during its prime in Syria & Iraq raised the group’s profile in Indonesia. IS has reportedly recruited Indonesian jihadists who went into hiding following the Indonesian government’s early-2000s crackdown on terrorist activity. IS has also inspired a new generation of young recruits in the country. According to a January 2016 USAID estimate, between 1,000 & 2,000 Indonesians have pledged allegiance to IS.

(Photo of one of the attackers in the Jan 2016 attack in Thamrin, Jakarta)

(Photos of the Jan 2016 terrorist attack in Thamrin, Jakarta)

IS claimed responsibility for a 4-hour siege in the heart of Indonesia's capital in January 2016 that killed 7 people, including the 5 attackers. A gun battle broke out between the attackers & anti-terror police squads. Witnesses described seeing bodies in the streets as heavily-armed security forces were deployed. The brazen daylight assault injured 24 people as attackers detonated explosions & waged armed battles with police around a busy shopping area in downtown Jakarta, turning it into a battlefield as the attack unfolded.

(TNI troops arriving in Jakarta to help secure the city)

According to Anton Alifandi, principal terror analyst at?IHS Country Risk, this attack was the most serious in Jakarta since the July 2009 bombing of the JW Marriott & the Ritz-Carlton hotels. In the past, militants have carried out a number of small-arm attacks targeting the police. The location of this attack in Thamrin is significant as it indicates the continuing terrorist capability to perpetrate attacks in the heart of the capital.

(Site of the terrorist attack on a police station in Riau)

In May 2018, IS also claimed the attack on a police station in Riau province on Sumatra's island where 4 terrorists & a police officer were killed. Attackers arrived at the police facility in a white minivan & rammed through a side gate. After entering the yard of the regional police headquarters, a perpetrator wearing a mask got out & drew a samurai sword & attacked … injuring 2 policemen. A police officer struck by the van was rushed to hospital & declared dead moments later.

Police shot dead the swordsman & 3 others who got out of the van. The driver fled the scene but was later captured. 2 television journalists who were nearby preparing to cover the destruction of confiscated drugs also received cut injuries.

Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)

The Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT ) is a UN-designated terrorist group that has pledged allegiance to IS. Some of the group’s members reportedly traveled to Syria to fight with the extremist group. MIT was formed by a former JAT commander, Santoso (a.k.a. Abu Wardah al-Syarqi) in 2011. MIT comprised an array of jihadist cells in Central Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara & East Kalimantan. MIT had already forged strong links into Syria by late 2013, being frequently featured in the international jihadist. Santoso was one of the first Indonesian jihadist leaders to declare allegiance to IS in July 2014.

(Santoso)

In the early 2010s, MIT went for high-profile targets, including police officers & businesses in the city.?In May 2011, they launched daylight attack on a private bank in the provincial capital Palu & killed 2 policemen. A major security operation that followed failed to stop the militants from killing more officers. In October 2012, 2 police officers were kidnapped & killed by MIT members. Authorities found their bodies around a week later.

Despite having remained the most wanted terrorist in Indonesia until his death in July 2016, Santoso proved to be an effective jihadist commander. His group in Central Sulawesi was estimated to number between 30-40 individuals. It was their control of a small tract of land at Biru Mountain near the city of Poso that earned Santoso much respect in Jihadist circles. MIT’s control of territory & the provision of a?safe haven where Sharia law was upheld was viewed as hugely symbolic within the extremist terrorist landscape in Indonesia & SE Asia. Traditionally, a major portion of MIT’s funding came from local supporters. As such, the group intentionally avoided civilian causalities so as to ensure donors were not deterred.

In December 2018, a villager named Ronal Batau, 34, was beheaded & his severed head was left on a bridge away from the body in the district of Parigi Moutong. A police team en route to the scene to pick up the body was ambushed by MIT fighters, resulting in 2 officers being wouded.

In early December 2019, 5 MIT gunmen ambushed Salubanga village in Central Sulawesi province, holding villagers & several police officers hostage. The hostages were able to escape during a gun battle between the militants & police, which left one officer dead. MIT also claimed responsibility for several killings of police officers & minority Christians.

(Ali Kolara)

Ali Kalora was not a high-profile target until July 2016, when Santoso was killed by security personnel & his immediate successor Basri bin Baco Sampe was captured alive a few months later. When Ali became leader, MIT was already weakened & cornered to the jungles and rural areas, forcing them to shift target to villagers. The group was responsible for the killing of at least 40 civilians.

In December 2012, a police patrol was ambushed in the village of Kalora, Ali’s childhood home. The attack left 3 officers dead. For more than a decade, the government has made fruitless attempts to capture or kill Ali despite multiple extensions of the Tinombala Operation, a mix of around 2,000 personnel from the police & the army. Ali who was a villager knew the jungles like the back of his hand.

On November 27, 2020, he led his men in the gruesome murders of a Christian family in the district of Sigi. One of the 4 victims was beheaded & 2 others were mutilated. The National Police formed a special unit called Madago Raya Task Force in January 2021 to hunt down Ali & his men.?

In September 2021, Ali & another key MIT member identified as Jaka Ramadhan were killed in a shootout with government troops in a remote village in the district of Parigi Moutong. Police seized M-16 rifles & explosive devices at the scene.

Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD)

In 2015, JAD was formed as an umbrella organization headed by Aman Abdurrahman, a radical preacher who had previously been involved in establishing a jihadi training camp in Aceh in 2010, for which he was sentenced to 15 years in prison on Nusakambangan Island. However, he is best known for his translation of the writings of the Jordanian hardline Salafi cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi into Indonesian & is credited with importing the ideology of the Islamic State. JAD is territorially organized across Indonesia into regions, branches & cells. It is a hierarchical organization in the sense that it is headed by an Amir & has command structures at the local level. At the same time, it is also a loose organization that allows branches, cells & individuals to operate independently from each other. While some directives for operations between 2016 & 2018 have come directly from imprisoned JAD leaders, often relayed through prison visitors, many attacks have been conceived ad hoc at the local level. What ties them together is a standardized ideological curriculum used in Islamic studies sessions, including online pengajian groups as well as the shared compendium of bomb-making instructions, which includes the tried & tested pressure cooker bomb instructions from AQAP’s Inspire magazine, the TATP instructions circulated by the IS & various instructions disseminated by Bahrun Naim (including some for a dirty bomb).

(Aman Abdurrahman)

On January 7, 2017, the US Department of State designated JAD as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist for its link to IS & its role in the January 2016 attack.

(Photos of one of the families involved in the Surabaya suicide attacks)

On Sunday, May 13, 2018, 3 churches (Kristen Indonesian Diponegoro Church, Surabaya Centre Pentecostal Church & Santa Maria Catholic Church) in Surabaya, were targeted by almost simultaneous suicide bombings, killing 13 & wounding 41. Triacetone triperoxide (TATP) was used in all 3 bombings & they were carried out by 1 family comprising Dita Oepriarto; his wife, Puji Kuswati; teenage sons, Yusuf Fadhil (18) & Firman Halim (15); & young daughters, Fadhila Sari (12) & Famela Rizqita (9). Bombs planted at 2 of the city's other churches?failed to explode.

The explosives used in the 3 Surabaya church attacks is the sensitive & difficult to make high explosive used in major attacks in Paris, Brussels & Manchester between 2015 & 2017. These bombings indicate both an increase in the capability of IS sympathizers in Indonesia as well as a new modus operandi.

Later that day, a premature bomb explosion in a house in Sidarjo, just kilometers from the Surabaya churches, involving another family of 6, injured the bomb maker Anton Febrianto & the 2 younger children, Farisa Putri (11) & Garida Huda Akbar (10), while killing his wife, Puspitasari & the eldest son, Hilta Aulia Rahman (17). Febrianto was subsequently shot dead by police.

On Monday, May 14, a family of 5 rode two motorbikes to the entrance of Surabaya police HQ where they blew themselves up. 4 of the attackers were killed & 3 police officers plus 3 civilians were injured. The 8-year-old daughter of the suicide bombers, who had no explosives strapped to her, was flung off the motorbike & survived.??

(Map of the suicide attacks in Surabaya in May 2018)

(Aftermath of the Surabaya church attack)

Indonesian police believe that all 3 families were members of JAD & met every Sunday for an Islamic study group, where they viewed extremist propaganda. Investigations into?the Surabaya suicide bombings led to the arrest of 110 suspects, as Indonesian police move to unravel the terrorist network behind the attacks. National Police Chief, Tito Karnavian told reporters on June 15 2018 at the Bogor presidential palace that all 110 suspects are linked to each other.

According to the?Wall Street Journal, the group is thought to have 1,000 members nationwide with several hundred in detention as of August 2018.

On July 31, 2018, a Jakarta court ruled to outlaw JAD, stating that it was a terrorist organization with ties to IS. On March 18, 2019, an Indonesian court sentenced JAD leader Abu Umar (a.k.a. Syamsul Arifin), to 10 years in prison for his involvement in the May 2018 Surabaya bombings. According to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, he hosted meetings with known Indonesian extremists & directly recruited a man who would go on to organize one of the attacks. Throughout 2017, Abu Umar delivered speeches in East Java, including Surabaya, during which he reportedly praised martyrdom, encouraging his followers to bomb churches & government offices.

In May 2019, 2 cornered terrorists were killed in an explosion they had triggered themselves to avoid arrest by antiterror squad Densus 88 in Jatikramat, Bekasi, West Java. Densus 88 were led to the alleged terrorists following the capture of 3 suspected JAD members in Babelan, Bekasi regency & Tegal, Central Java, a day earlier.

(Photo capturing the stabbing attack on Wiranto)

In October 10, 2019, in Menes Square,?Pandeglang, Banten, a JAD member & his wife attempted to assassinate Wiranto, Indonesia's Coordinating Political, Legal & Security Affairs Minister. The man, Syahrial Alamsyah (a.k.a. Abu Rara), stabbed Wiranto twice in the abdomen, but the 73-year-old security minister survived. The woman, Fitria Diana, managed to injure a member of Wiranto’s entourage. Days before the attack, the pair had pledged allegiance to the late IS leader al-Baghdadi. During their trial, prosecutors revealed that the couple was radicalized after being exposed to extremist propaganda online. They allegedly watched videos of Muslims fighting in Syria & listened to speeches from convicted terrorists Abu Bakar Bashir & Aman Abdurrahman. On June 25, 2020, Alamsyah was sentenced to 12 years in prison & Diana received a 9-year sentence.

(Syahril Alamsyah & Fitria Diana)

(Site of suicide bombing at police station in Medan)

Following a November 13, 2019 suicide bombing at a police station in Medan, Indonesian anti-terrorism forces conducted raids targeting suspected militants across the country. Authorities uncovered a JAD network with ties to the November 13 attack, arresting 43 people & killing 2 alleged bombmakers in a shootout. Among those arrested were 20 JAD members who had allegedly received military-style jihadist training at a camp in North Sumatra’s Mount Sibayak.

On January 6, 2021, Densus 88 raided a hideout belonging to suspected JAD members in Makassar, South Sulawesi. During an ensuing firefight, the police killed 2 militants who were also involved in the January 2019 Philippine cathedral bombing that killed more than 20 people.

On January 20-21, 2021, police in Aceh province arrested 5 JAD members for their suspected role in a series of terrorist attacks & links to IS. Among those arrested was an employee of East Aceh district government.

(Aftermath of Makassar church attack)

In January 2019, JAD members 32-year old Ulfa Handayani Saleh & her 35-year old husband Rullie Rian Zeke, bombed the Cathedral of Our Lady of Mount Carmel in Jolo, in the southern Philippines, killing 23 & injuring more than 100. A few minutes before 9 am, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) exploded?inside the church. As churchgoers scrambled to get out of the cathedral, a second IED blew up in the nearby parking lot. The couple could have been encouraged to come to the Philippines by spiritual advisor & JAD member Khalid Abu Bakar, who once said, “If you can’t go to Syria to fight jihad, go to the Philippines.”?

On March 28, 2021, a married couple, believed to be JAD members, carried out a suicide bombing at the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral in Makassar & injured at least 20 people. In the weeks that followed, Indonesia’s counterterrorism unit Densus 88 arrested at least 31 suspected members of JAD for their alleged involvement in the attack. This church bombing was the 3rd such attack perpetrated by husband & wife suicide bombers in recent years.

3 days after this attack, 25-year old Zakiah Aini was shot dead at POLRI HQ in Jakarta after attacking police officers. Kapolri Listyo Sigit Prabowo told a press conference that Zakiah fired 6 shots at police officers in the compound at around 4:30 p.m. She was a university student majoring in accountancy. On her Instagram account, she had posted an image of the IS flag & the word jihad. She also sent a farewell message to her family's WhatsApp group prior to the attack.

(Zakiah Aini)

In May 2021, authorities disrupted another JAD cell suspected of plotting attacks on churches in a predominately Christian region. Densus 88 arrested 11 JAD members in Papua’s Merauke district & seized weapons, explosives materials & attack plans. A 2021 study by the Singapore-based International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) found that JAD was responsible for the highest proportion of suicide bombing attacks among terrorist groups operating in SE Asia.

Front Pembela Islam?(FPI))

FPI?is an Indonesian?hardline Islamist?organization founded in 1998 by?Muhammad Rizieq Shihab?with backing from military & political figures. Like many other Islamist & conservative organizations in Indonesia, FPI holds a?negative sentiment towards Chinese Indonesians, to the point of spreading hate speech, racist remarks & threats of?lynching? them. Its members & sympathizers regularly accused the ethnic Chinese of being illegal immigrants, often with?false narratives?claiming that the Chinese are?communists & an enemy of Islam. FPI also often holds protests against what it sees as the?spread of Christianity in Indonesia. Notable targets include GKI Yasmin Bogor & HKBP Church Bekasi, where the group used violence to force the closure of the churches.?It also endorsed the?closing of 20 churches in Singkil,?Aceh.

(Rizieq Shihab)

FPI has been vocal against?liberalism & multiculturalism & to the extension of the?Pancasila's Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) doctrine which upholds religious pluralism. On 30 December 2020, the Indonesian government issued a joint ministerial decree in which it banned the FPI.?The government said that the FPI had threatened Indonesia's?national ideology, committed illegal raids & atrocities including?terrorism.?The government also showed footage of Rizieq Shihab pledging the FPI's allegiance to IS & advocating the establishment of a?caliphate.?The disbandment came a few weeks after 6 FPI members were shot dead by police. FPI is considered as a terrorist organization by the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium. (TRAC).

In March 2021, based on information provided by a jailed terrorist, Densus 88 arrested 4 suspected terrorists in the Condet area, East Jakarta & Sukasari Village, Bekasi Regency. According to the South China Morning Post, at least 5 active bombs & 35 kilograms of Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) were found at the 2 locations.?Officers from Densus 88 were reportedly astounded by the discovery of explosives that could have been used to carry out terror attacks on a “disastrous scale”. This also marked a major success for the country’s de-radicalisation program, which aims to change the mindset of hardened militants who view the police & government as the main obstacles to them establishing an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia, using violence if necessary.

TATP is a very sensitive high explosive. It is popular because it can be improvised with basic equipment from common household materials such as Acetone, Hydrogen Peroxide, Hydrochloric Acid & Sulfuric Acid. TATP explosions are about?80% as powerful as TNT but the substance is much harder & much more dangerous to handle.?The use of TATP therefore often indicates that the perpetrator has received training or direction from a foreign terrorist group. TATP was used in the 2015 Paris Attack on 11/13/2015, the 2016 Brussels Airport Attack on 3/22/2016, the 2017 Manchester Concert Bombing on 5/22/2017, the 2017 Brussels Central Station Attack on 6/20/2017, the 2017 Barcelona Car-Ramming Attack and Cambrils Stabbing on 8/17/2017, the 2017 Parsons Green, London Underground Attempted Bombing on 9/15/2017 & in the Surabaya 2018 suicide attacks on 3 churches.

Biological Agents

In October 2019, Indonesian police discovered that a JAD cell had plotted biological weapon attacks that would target a police station & house of worship in Cirebon, West Java. The police seized 310 grams of rosary pea seeds used in the production of abrin, categorized along with ricin as potent biological toxins derived from plant sources.

This was the first assembled bomb in Indonesia that used a biological substance as one of its ingredients. However, this was the 2nd terror plot in 8 years that used biological agents. The first plot was in 2011, when a militant group in Jakarta attempted to kill policemen by poisoning the latter’s food using ricin.

The usage of category B agents (plant toxins) can be partially attributed to?the agents’ availability & low-cost procurement. Both castor beans & rosary peas grow in tropical countries like Indonesia & with the advent of e-commerce, they can be bought online at a relatively low price. The terrorists had extracted ricin directly from castor bean plants they found in Jakarta. Poisoning was chosen as a method partly due to the cell?lacking?in funds.

Indonesian terrorist groups do not seem to have the intention or capability of using a category A biological agent such as anthrax to launch an attack. The last known effort to develop anthrax was in mid-2000, when Riduan Isamuddin (a.k.a. Hambali) - AQ's point man in SE Asia & head of JI’s Mantiqi I region covering mainland Malaysia & Singapore, introduced Malaysian JI member Yazid Sufaat to AQ. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Yazid had a degree in medical technology & biochemistry from California State University & was tasked to lead AQ’s biological weapons program. Yazid helped set up the AQ laboratory in Kandahar, Afghanistan & would spend several months cultivating anthrax for the terror outfit. Despite AQ’s generally unsophisticated laboratory, Yazid was successful in developing some pathogens. He asserted that anthrax was not his favorite as it was good for sabotage but not enough to kill people. The laboratory was destroyed when NATO bombed Kandahar in 2001. Yazid returned to Malaysia & was arrested. He was released in 2008 & rearrested in 2013. He was finally released in?November 2019.

Indonesian terrorist cells have attempted 2 out of 3 ways that bioterrorism researcher Gregory D. Koblentz listed as main methods to disseminate a biological toxic agent. First, to disseminate biological agents using explosive energy; this was the method planned by the Cirebon cell. Indonesian militant groups have traditionally used either low or high explosive materials, with added nails or nuts and bolts to enhance the bomb’s deadly effect.?The Cirebon cell had assembled a high explosive bomb & added abrin to make it even more lethal. This suggested that the Cirebon cell’s use of abrin was not intended as a biological attack per se but rather to give the conventional bomb a more lethal effect.

Security agencies have not uncovered any other efforts by Indonesian groups to weaponize a “category A” biological agent. This could be partially attributed to the absence of serious intention by Indonesian terrorist groups or inadequate resources available - bio-scientists & laboratories - to weaponize a biological agent.

Associate Professor Gregory D. Koblentz, Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy & Government, argued that while the acquisition of many agents is simple & relatively inexpensive, weaponizing them to inflict mass casualties is the most significant challenge to a potential bioterrorist. In the 1990s, the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan failed to effectively aerosolize “category A” virulent strains of anthrax & botulinum toxin in 7 separate incidents. According to terrorism expert Adam Dolnik, this is despite the group having an estimated $1 billion in assets & some 26 university-trained chemists & microbiologists working in top-notch research facilities, virtually without constraints in conducting experiments.

Based on available information, the capability of Indonesian militant groups & radicalized individuals of using category A as a weapon of terror does not match that of Aum Shinrikyo or even Yazid Sufaat.

Foreign Fighters

Australian authorities have expressed concerns that fighters trained by IS are returning to Indonesia, posing a threat to the region. Analysts fear that returnees could reignite extremism in Indonesia to the level seen during JI’s violent wave in the early 2000s. These problems can be traced to Indonesia’s relatively lax immigration laws, which allow Indonesian citizens to travel freely in & out of conflict zones.

In February 2020, the Indonesian government decided that it would not repatriate Indonesian foreign fighters. The government conceded that it does not have a precise understanding of just how many militants & their families travelled to join extremist groups abroad. Indonesia’s Ministry of Law & Human Rights estimated that there could have been as many as 1,276 Indonesians that fled to conflict zones.

However, the government has adopted a CIA estimate of 689 Indonesian foreign fighters, of which only 228 identities have been established. The majority of Indonesian jihadists reportedly left to join ISIS while others joined HTS. The majority of Indonesian foreign fighters in Iraq & Syria have links to Indonesian extremist groups. As of July 2018, the Indonesian government maintained that only 86 of those who fought in the region have returned to Indonesia, though 539 who attempted to travel to Syria were stopped & deported back, primarily from Turkey.

Indonesia has previously dealt with foreign fighters & the threat posed by returnees. In the 1980s, young Indonesians travelled to Pakistan, which served as a base for the Afghan jihad against Soviet occupation. These foreign fighters established independent networks in Pakistan & with AQ affiliates, giving them access to financing & resources for their own groups in SE Asia. According to Zachary Abuza, a specialist in SE Asian security studies, Abu Bakar Bashir & Abdullah Sungkar founded JI by leveraging their newly-formed AQ contacts for resources.

Conclusion

Moving forward, Indonesia needs to adapt faster in anticipating the changing trends of terrorist recruitment & mobilization. There is the possibility that Indonesian militant groups still harbor the intention to use plant-based toxins for attacks. This is due to these agents’ availability & relatively simple production process for use in a small-scale attack with limited impact. Manufacturing of category B agents in past attack plots did not require a laboratory & trained bio-scientists like Yazid. Paimin, who manufactured ricin, did not even complete his primary school education. He worked under instructions based on internet research.

A black swan circumstance could occur if Indonesian militant groups manage to recruit trained biochemical scientists with access to the equivalent of a state-run laboratory. However, there is little to suggest that they currently have the intention or capability to weaponize biological agents as a mass casualty tool. The use of biological agents may thus be limited to poisoning or being used as a mixture in other conventional attack tools (bombs or sharp weapons), rather than aerosolizing the agent with a sophisticated device, the most deadly procedure in bioterrorism.

The key to disrupting such attacks in the future will heavily rely on the Indonesian security apparatus’ surveillance & disruption of militant cells, as successfully done so far today. There should also be multi-pronged approaches to address Indonesia’s development gaps & the country’s widening socio-economic inequality and the lack of quality jobs, especially for the younger generation. Ensuring the equitable development of Indonesia will be important to ensure that its people, especially the youth, have less impetus to give in to the allure of radical Islamist terrorist groups in the medium to long term.

Conviction & leadership must be displayed in setting up an intensive & effective de-radicalisation program that seeks to rehabilitate deportees returning home to Indonesia & addresses the hundreds of convicted terrorists that will be released from prison once their jail terms are up. Anti-terrorism laws also need to be strengthened & enforced so that Indonesian police can act quickly to stop terrorist attacks from being planned or taking place.

Overall Security Risk Rating - Medium

Terrorism Event Likelihood Rating - High. (The threat's source is highly motivated & very capable & controls/mitigation may not impede a successful exercise of the vulnerability.)

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Endro Sunarso is an expert in Security Management, Physical Security & Counter Terrorism. He is regularly consulted on matters pertaining to transportation security, off-shore security, critical infrastructure protection, security & threat assessments, & blast mitigation.

Besides being a Certified Protection Professional (CPP?), a Certified Identity & Access Manager (CIAM?), a Project Management Professional (PMP?) & a Certified Scrum Master (CSM?), Endro is also a Fellow of the Security Institute (FSyl) & the Institute of Strategic Risk Management (F.ISRM).

Endro has spent about 2 decades in Corporate Security (executive protection, crisis management, critical infrastructure protection, governance, business continuity, loss mitigation, due diligence, counter corporate espionage, etc). He also has more than a decade of experience in Security & Blast Consultancy work, initially in the Gulf Region & later in South East Asia.