Securing the Public Side of Airports from Attack
By James Braver, TIX Group
Peter DiDomenica, Quantum Innovation Corp.
In light of the recent terrorist suicide bombing attacks at Zaventem International Airport in Brussels, Belgium in March 2016 and Istanbul Ataturk International Airport in Istanbul, Turkey in June 2016 it is has become evident that international terror groups have shifted the focus of terror attacks on commercial aviation from the aircraft to the airport terminals. While taking down an airliner will always be attractive as a target to terrorists, and attempts will continue, the immediate need for successful dramatic and deadly attacks have shifted the targeting to the more vulnerable public side of airports.
The commercial aviation industry may be unprepared for this threat. Passengers are increasingly concerned about the vulnerability of airports as soft targets and they expect airport operators to take appropriate action to upgrade security to meet this growing threat.
History of Terrorism Directed at Commercial Aviation
The first terror attack specifically targeting commercial aviation is generally thought to have been the July 1968 hijacking of El Al Flight 426 from Rome to Tel Aviv by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Prior to this event hijackings were principally used as a means to escape a country or for ransom. Hijackings peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970 with 151 hijackings or attempted hijackings from 1968 to 1970. Since the 1970s hijackings have steadily declined, largely due to enhanced passenger screening procedures and technology.
The terrorist tactic of using explosives to down airliners started with the explosion of a bomb concealed in luggage on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988 killing all 270 on board. This tactic became a frequent means of attack starting shortly after the 9-11-2001 attacks with the December 2001 failed attempt to down American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami by Richard Reid using explosives concealed in his footwear.
The terrorist attacks against airports began with 1972 attack of the Lod Airport in Israel by the terror group Japanese Red Army in which 26 were killed and 80 injured. This launched a decade of 39 terror attacks against airports from 1973 to 1982. There were three major attacks on airports in 1985 at Rome’s Leonardo da Vinci-Fiumicino Airport, Vienna’s Schwechat Airport, and Tokyo’s Narita International Airport followed by relative quiet until the bombings of Madrid-Barajas Airport in 2006 and Glasgow International Airport in 2007.
The Desirability of Terrorist Attacks against Commercial Aviation
Commercial aviation is one of the most, if not the most, desirable of targets for international terror groups such as Al Qaeda. One need only consider the enormity of the 9-11-2001 attacks or attempts such as the failed 1995 “Bojinka Plot” to see actual and potential catastrophic results of such attacks, which is what terrorist groups seek.
In addition to the catastrophic nature of these attacks, there are several other reasons for the targeting of commercial aviation. In addition to maximum loss of life, terror groups have three other principle objectives: Gain maximum media coverage which thereby maximizes the infliction of fear and panic in the targeted populations; attack an important symbol of the enemy; and, inflict the maximum economic damage on a nation which terrorist groups have found to be the most effective way to get a nation to change its policy. Targeting of commercial aviation serves to advance these objectives in several ways.
In part due to the effect on our collective memories of the 9-11-2001 attacks media coverage of terror attacks against commercial aviation, or even the threat of an attack, is intense and dominating. Likewise our collective memories of the 9-11-2001 attacks tends to increase the sense of fear experienced when commercial aviation is attacked. As many as 30 percent of people are already apprehensive about flying under normal conditions so it doesn’t take much of a threat to keep people away from airports which leads to negative economic consequences. Attacks on airliners and airports, particularly international flights and terminals, enables the terror groups to have the effects of their terror attacks reach out to numerous nations and increase international attention on their cause. And finally, there is the symbolic importance associated with commercial aviation as airlines are perceived by most in the world to be extensions of national power and prestige.
How do Airports Increase Protection for their Public Spaces?
“Soft targets” such as airport terminals, stadiums, malls, casinos, and theme parks have become potentially ‘high-value, low-profile targets’. Any place where large crowds congregate with open public access is vulnerable.
A failure to take reasonable precautions may result in civil liability with damages for such suits costing tens of millions of dollars. Although the expense for security improvement might be considered unnecessary by cutting into profits, there is a potentially a much higher price if reasonable measures are not taken.
There are many approaches that can be adopted to help airport operators be better prepared to prevent an attack and minimize the damage of an attack such as perimeter vehicle inspections, increased CCTV coverage and monitoring, increased police patrols, increased K-9 sweeps for explosives, placement of bollards or planters to prevent vehicle incursions, and use of facial recognition software. While these type of strategies must be considered and implemented when feasible, the single most cost effective method however is training police, security, and all front-line airport and airline employees in behavior detection of hostile intent.
The first major terrorist attacks against commercial aviation were directed against Israel as noted above. After the 1968 hijacking of El Al Flight 326, there has not been a single successful hijacking against Israel commercial airlines. After the 1972 attack of Lod Airport in Israel, there has not a single successful attack of an Israel commercial airport. Israel airport security is viewed uniformly around the world as the best in the world. One of the main contributing factors to their success is the use of behavior detection trained employees throughout the airport.
Behavior Detection Programs in the United States
Following the 9-11-2001 attacks, the Massachusetts State Police at Boston Logan International Airport sought to incorporate the Israel behavior detection concept at the airport. In attempting to implement such a program they discovered two major impediments. First, as performed in Israel, a person’s nationality, ethnicity or religion is used as a factor in determining the level of risk. Under the laws of North American countries, the European Union, and many other nations, disparate treatment based on such factors is unlawful. Second is scalability. The Israel airports and airlines devote substantial manpower and resources to behavior detection. Virtually every passenger is interviewed and interviews may last up to an hour. In an airport system in the United States that has 45 times the volume of passengers (900,000,000 versus 20,000,000) such level of attention to passengers would cause the system to grind to a halt. Moreover, Israel airports spend 10 times more per passenger on security than does the United States. To increase spending per passenger for security in the United States to levels equal to Israel would amount to additional $62.2 billion in spending.
The Massachusetts State Police created their own behavior detection program called Behavior Assessment Screening System (BASS) in 2002 which explicitly forbade use of race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion as a factor of suspicion and trained officers on the effects of unconscious bias which can result in discrimination. The program also sought out the latest scientific research on deception and non-verbal communication in order that any interviews would be structured to be customer oriented and last on average only 90 seconds. Based on the success of the Massachusetts State Police BASS program, the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) adopted it for their screening program under the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT). SPOT employees 2,800 TSA Behavior Detection Officers deployed at every major commercial airport in the United States. The program was also adopted by the British Transport Police in 2006 for their nationwide rail system.
Behavior Detection Techniques a “Force Multiplier” to Detect Threats without High Costs, Slowing Throughput, and with Minimal Customer Awareness.
By training all airport and airline security, police, and front-line employees in behavior detection, the airport gains an army of observers who are trained to detect pre-attack planning and surveillance activity in the days, weeks, and months before a planned attack and who are trained to detect an attacker farther away from the critical densely populated areas of the terminals. This program does not involve the hiring of any additional staff nor the purchase of expensive equipment and therefore is highly cost effective.
Since about 95 percent of patrons are merely observed and, for those interviewed, the process lasts generally no longer than two minutes, there is no measureable effect on throughput and the process largely goes unnoticed by patrons.
In a validation study of the SPOT program by the US Department of Homeland Security using proxy measures of prohibited items and arrests, about 70,000 random searches were compared to about 20,000 searches based on SPOT. The study found that the discovery of prohibited items increased nine times (900%) and the arrest rate increased 50 times (5000%) for searches conducted based on SPOT suspicion indicators of the passenger.
In general, behavior detection programs rely upon a system using situational and behavioral baselines that are time and location specific and, where appropriate, through brief non-confrontational conversations with a small percentage of patrons. If the suspicion is not resolved, the passenger may be subjected to a higher level of screening, or, in exceptional cases, the airport police are called to investigate.
The authors, through the collaboration of leading security experts in the United States and Israel, have created behavior detection systems that combine the best both countries have to offer with a special emphasis on meeting the legal, cost, resource, and throughput requirements of airports worldwide.
By taking advantage of all front-line employees’ ability to observe and analyze their environment for signs of danger, airports can enlist an army of security associates actively engaged in protecting the airport. This critical additional layer of security for the public spaces of the airport can be acquired for minimal cost and with minimal effect on airport operations.
James Braver is US Director for the TIX Group, an Israeli security consulting group composed of former high-level officials from Israel’s security community. TIX Group’s leader is Assaf Heffetz, former Commissioner of the Israel National Police.
Peter DiDomenica is president of Quantum Innovation Corporation and is a retired Massachusetts State Police Lieutenant who served as the Director of Security Policy for Boston Logan International Airport in the two years after the 9/11 attacks and designed the TSA behavior detection program SPOT.