Securing Our Satellite Networks: Understanding the Risks and Building Resilience

Increasing integration of satellite communications, near-Earth orbits, and GPS technology has become integral to modern life, yet these advancements come with significant overlooked vulnerabilities. Since the mid-twentieth century, rapid technological growth, particularly in Radio Frequency (RF) communications, has created complex, interconnected systems that now extend into space. These networks, including critical infrastructures like the Internet and Internet of Things (IoT), have revolutionized communication but are plagued by legacy equipment, outdated technologies, and insufficient security measures.

This discussion examines the inherent risks associated with satellite networks, including cyber vulnerabilities, physical threats like the Kessler Effect, and the challenges posed by the aging technology stacks that underpin these systems. As commercial and military sectors increasingly converge in their reliance on these networks, the need for robust, resilient, and secure communication platforms has never been more urgent.

However, in focusing so heavily on these technologies, we have neglected to consider their origins, the risks they carry, and the technical debt accumulated over decades. We've come to expect these systems to function flawlessly, often without fully understanding their underlying vulnerabilities, especially regarding long-term security risks. As space becomes increasingly recognized as critical infrastructure, it is essential to heighten awareness of the security risks these systems face and prioritize their protection against emerging threats.

Post World War II advancements in RF and radio communications laid the foundation for modern satellite systems, driving the rapid growth of the Internet and IoT. This global connectivity has transformed industries and enhanced communication by enabling seamless data flow between terrestrial and orbital systems. However, the rush to expand these interconnected networks introduced significant security risks, as they often rely on outdated equipment with old software and firmware, similar to vulnerabilities found in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.

As our dependence on these systems grows, addressing their vulnerabilities and modernizing satellite communications have become critical to ensuring their safety and sustainability.

Historically, commercial satellite systems were seen as lower risk compared to military systems, but this assumption no longer holds. For example, the failure of a commercial satellite network could have far more widespread and devastating consequences than the loss of a military asset. Civilian applications, when disrupted, can affect billions of lives, whereas military systems are designed with redundancy and resilience from the outset.

The growing reliance on commercial satellite services for military purposes–such as enabling naval vessels to maintain internet connectivity in conflict zones–underscores the increasing interdependence between civilian and military systems. Although some details remain speculative, the use of commercial platforms underscores the critical role of constant communication and data exchange. However, this dependency has led to vulnerabilities, including the military’s use of applications that inadvertently exposed sensitive information. For instance, a recent breach revealed the movement patterns of military personnel in active war zones, endangering both soldiers and civilians alike. In response to these evolving threats, the U.S. Space Force has emerged as a crucial entity in safeguarding American interests in space. Tasked with protecting both military and civilian satellite networks, their role includes defending against physical attacks on satellites, such as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, as well as mitigating the risks posed by jamming and hacking, which threaten to disrupt communication and navigation systems. As our reliance on space-based technologies continues to grow, the role of the Space Force has never been more vital.?

While issues abound in this discussion, one simple issue is the outdated technology currently in use. Despite numerous innovations, much of today’s communication infrastructure still relies on standards developed in the mid-20th century. While military systems are generally hardened against attacks, they remain prime targets for adversaries. Both GPS signals and satellite-based communications are susceptible to jamming, spoofing, or outright interference. In the commercial sector, endpoint security is frequently neglected due to budget constraints or a lack of perceived urgency.

In the commercial world, the focus on cost-efficiency has resulted in an alarming lack of endpoint validation. Security implementations are often sacrificed to save money, leading to systems that are more vulnerable to attack. In addition, many of the commercial providers rely on security through obscurity with legal boundaries preventing wide scale research and reporting for firmware and software. This further impedes the ability to leverage lessons learned and tactics from the government and military to secure the class of system.The consequences of this approach are far-reaching, particularly as these networks expand to cover ever-larger portions of the planet.

Services like AWS and Microsoft Azure’s Ground Station as a Service (GSaaS) make it easier and more affordable to access and communicate with satellites, reducing the barriers that previously made targeting them difficult. Historically, the high cost was a prohibitive factor, but advancements in technology and understanding have lowered that threshold. Projects such as SatNOGS even provide an open source mechanism. The paradigm that satellites are prohibitively expensive to attack led to designs with minimal security. The industry has since evolved and the security must be adapted both for the legacy systems where possible, and for future deployments.

Vulnerability and patch cycles add an additional layer of complexity. The time to field a patch on a satellite may take weeks or months, far longer than an attacker may need either to conduct an attack or pivot to another asset. If the patch has the potential to impact functionality, the risk may be too great for the organization. This approach results in vulnerable segments throughout the infrastructure.

Space has become an essential part of global critical infrastructure, underpinning many of the systems we rely on daily–national security, economic stability, and even basic societal functions. Satellite networks support global communications, weather forecasting, financial transactions, military reconnaissance, and GPS navigation. Without these systems, essential services like air travel, disaster response, supply chain logistics, and modern agriculture would face significant disruption. Additionally, space-based assets are vital for military operations and strategic defense initiatives, further elevating their role in national security.?

As our dependence on these space-based systems continues to grow, the need to protect them from both physical threats—such as collisions and debris–and digital threats–such as cyberattacks and jamming—becomes increasingly urgent. The recognition of space as critical infrastructure underscores that any disruptions in this domain would ripple across industries, societies, and economies, affecting billions of people worldwide. Safeguarding space is crucial to maintaining the functionality of modern civilization.

In addition to cyber threats, physical threats like the “Kessler Effect”--the theoretical scenario in which the density of objects in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) becomes so high that collisions between satellites and debris create a chain reaction of collisions–post a significant risk to both military and commercial satellite networks, as it increases the likelihood of damage to critical infrastructure. With the growing number of satellite launches, the likelihood of space debris collision grows. Without mitigation strategies, such as active debris removal and better orbital management, the long-term viability of satellite communications could be jeopardized.

Jamming attacks, where malicious actors deliberately disrupt communication signals by overwhelming them with interference, have occurred in various contexts, from military operations to commercial settings. These forms of interference can have cascading effects, leading to a loss of communication and navigation systems. Such attacks have been prevalent throughout history and remain a pressing issue, now more than ever.

During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russian forces have extensively used jamming techniques to disrupt GPS signals across the Ukraine, particularly in areas close to the front lines. These jamming attacks have impacted both military operations and civilian infrastructure, including navigation systems and drones used by Ukrainian forces. The goal has been to degrade the Ukrainian military’s ability to use GPS for navigation, targeting, and reconnaissance.

In 2018, reports surfaced that China was jamming U.S. military drones operating over the South China Sea. The jamming efforts targeted the GPS signals that these drones relied on for navigation and operations. This tactic was seen as part of China's broader strategy to assert control over the region and limit the U.S. military’s ability to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions.

Moving forward, we must rethink how satellite networks—both military and commercial—are designed, implemented, and maintained. Security should be a priority from the ground up, with multi-layered systems that can withstand both technological and environmental disruptions. Commercial platforms, given their significant societal impact, deserve the same level of scrutiny and protection as other critical infrastructure. In addition, it is essential to develop new standards that can replace aging technologies, reducing the risks associated with outdated protocols, and ensuring the resilience of these critical networks in the years to come.

The convergence of civilian and military satellite networks has introduced new security challenges. Civilian platforms, once considered low-risk due to their non-combat roles, now play crucial roles in military operations, making them attractive targets for adversaries. The use of civilian networks in conflict zones highlights the dependency both sectors have on continuous satellite communications. Failure of these systems could have global implications, affecting both military and civilian infrastructure. This growing interdependence necessitates a proactive security approach, treating civilian networks with the same level of scrutiny as military systems due to their operational significance and potential as high-value targets.

To address the growing security risks surrounding satellite networks and critical communication infrastructure, a multi-faceted approach is required across both military and commercial sectors.?The first essential step is to adopt stronger encryption and authentication protocols to ensure that satellite communications remain secure. Using advanced encryption standards like AES-256 can protect data in transit, while multi-factor authentication (MFA) can help prevent unauthorized access to satellite uplinks and downlinks. This combination of encryption and authentication enhances the overall security of communication networks. A proactive approach to vulnerability management is essential for strengthening cybersecurity. Regular audits and penetration testing should be employed to identify any weaknesses before they are exploited. Patch management should be improved to ensure timely updates. Enhanced monitoring systems using AI-driven analytics can help detect vulnerabilities early, allowing operators to respond quickly to threats.

The challenge of debris mitigation presents the limitation of current technology and practical solutions. While emerging technologies such as lasers and AI have potential for deflecting or removing space debris, acting within milliseconds of impact remains highly impractical. The complexity of targeting, maneuvering, and deploying systems fast enough to neutralize a threat is beyond current capabilities.

The U.S. Space Force plays a critical role not only in securing military assets, but in ensuring the broader orbital environment remains safe and usable for both civilian and commercial enterprises. This requires collaboration with private companies and international organizations to establish and enforce space traffic management protocols and prevent a space debris crisis that could disrupt future operations.?

One of the most effective debris mitigation strategies is to prevent debris creation altogether, much like the global moratoriums on intercontinental network cables and pipelines. Recognizing space as a critical infrastructure is key–though vast, the orbital areas where satellites operate are limited and increasingly crowded. Implementing similar moratoriums and restrictions for space would not only help prevent the cluttering of orbital zones but also act as a deterrent against intentional destruction of these vital, finite areas. These proactive measures would help preserve the viability of the space environment for future use.

Real-time threat monitoring and response systems must be implemented to detect and mitigate security threats such as jamming, spoofing, and hacking. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) can monitor ground stations and satellite networks for any suspicious activity, while artificial intelligence (AI) can help identify patterns and emerging threats. AI-driven monitoring can be particularly useful in analyzing vast amounts of data and complex interconnectivity to detect security anomalies in real time.

In addition to digital security, defenses against jamming and spoofing attacks must be developed. Techniques such as spread spectrum technology and frequency hopping make it more difficult for adversaries to disrupt satellite communications, while signal authentication protocols, such as time, frequency, and amplitude analysis? ensure that transmitted data is genuine and unaltered. These countermeasures are essential in maintaining the integrity and availability of satellite networks, especially in high-stakes military and commercial operations. With the rise of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), particularly in military contexts, defenses against physical attacks on satellites must also be prioritized. Satellites equipped with maneuverability can avoid potential threats, while those with physical shielding or electronic hardening can better withstand kinetic attacks or space-based EMP weapons. It is worth noting that the maneuverability of an unprotected satellite could easily be used as an attack mechanism through Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) hijacking or spoofing commands to the AOCS through a replay attack. The segmentation mentioned previously is one of the recommended mitigation measures. Protecting satellites from such threats is essential in safeguarding critical national security assets.

Building redundancy and resilience into these systems is also vital. By using multi-orbit redundancy—combining LEO, Medium Earth orbit (MEO), and Geostationary Orbit (GEO) satellites—networks can be protected against single points of failure. Additionally, battery resiliency and isolation is worth noting as the intentional focused drain of power systems as a practical avenue for denial attacks with the added benefit of being easier to obscure. Resilient systems should be designed to ensure continuous operation, even in adverse conditions.

Backup communication systems, such as drones or high-altitude balloons, can provide redundancy in case satellite networks are compromised or disabled. These alternatives offer temporary solutions to ensure continuous connectivity during outages or attacks. The integration of backup options complement satellite redundancy, adding to our military and civilian operational resilience.

Commercial satellite platforms are often built with minimal security considerations and require significant hardening. Adopting a security-by-design approach - embedding secure hardware, software, and data governance practices from the start - is essential for long-term resilience. Regular independent security audits should be conducted to identify vulnerabilities and ensure compliance with industry standards, which are currently only recommended and not enforced by bodies like the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS).

Strong regulatory oversight is crucial. Governments and international bodies should establish clear cybersecurity frameworks and enforce global standards for satellite security. Effective regulation, similar to the regulatory oversight seen in the aviation and telecom sectors, will help protect satellite infrastructure from unauthorized access and interference.

Network segmentation is vital to improving security. Techniques such as zero-trust architecture - where access is continuously verified - and physical isolation methods, like air-gapping in sensitive military environments, help safeguard critical systems. Properly isolating the Command and Data Handling System (CDHS) from other payloads and adopting Out-of-Band (OOB) traffic management can further modernize network security. As the use of as-a-service models for satellites and ground stations grows, the need to protect the underlying infrastructure due to their shared and publicly accessible nature becomes even more critical. As these systems are being used by larger and more uninformed commercial entities. Causing unforeseen resiliency risk in a supply chain or delivery issues in critical infrastructure as a whole.

Industry collaboration is key to strengthening satellite network security. Public-private partnerships between governments and commercial operators can facilitate the sharing of threat intelligence and best practices. Cross-sector security alliances should be established to ensure that cybersecurity experts, satellite operators, and industries reliant on satellite services work together to address shared vulnerabilities. This collaborative approach will help create a more secure global satellite ecosystem, protecting both civilian and military operations. Education and awareness programs play a crucial role in preventing security breaches caused by human error. Organizations must invest in regular cybersecurity training for personnel working on satellite systems. These training sessions should include simulated cyberattacks, such as red team exercises, where experts simulate potential breaches to identify weaknesses and improve defenses. Security-conscious behavior from operators can significantly reduce the likelihood of successful attacks.

?Satellite networks are vital to modern communication, navigation, and defense, yet they face significant risks from both digital and physical threats. Outdated technology, insufficient security in commercial platforms, and cost-cutting measures expose these systems to cyberattacks such as hacking, jamming, and spoofing. Physical threats like the Kessler Effect further endanger satellite infrastructure.

The growing interdependence between civilian and military satellite systems complicates this security landscape, as civilian networks now play critical roles in military operations. A failure in these interconnected systems could have severe, widespread consequences, impacting billions of people worldwide. To secure this critical infrastructure, we must prioritize robust cybersecurity, enhanced physical protections, and resilient network designs. Collaboration across public and private sectors, along with stringent regulatory oversight, is essential for a secure and sustainable satellite ecosystem. Taking proactive measures now will ensure these networks remain reliable for the future.

About:

Nathan Case is a cybersecurity leader specializing in cloud governance, incident response, and SecOps. With a passion for innovation, he drives security advancements and fosters resilience in complex systems.

Jess Ingison is a recognized Strategic Cybersecurity leader, excelling in bespoke security policy, engineering, and architectures. He is deeply committed to proactive, risk-driven security, with a strong focus on continuous improvement and delivery.