Section 1983 Claims and Civil Rights Litigation

Section 1983 Claims and Civil Rights Litigation Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code is one of the most significant statutory tools for protecting constitutional rights. Originating from the Reconstruction Era, it was enacted to combat abuses of power by state actors and to provide a federal remedy when state courts were unwilling or unable to act. Today, it serves as a powerful avenue for individuals to seek redress against government misconduct. What makes § 1983 so impactful is its ability to hold state and local officials accountable for constitutional violations. However, it also intersects with common law tort principles in ways that create unique challenges for plaintiffs and defendants alike.

The Core of a Section 1983 Claim

To succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) The deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law by a "person"; (2) That the deprivation occurred under the "color of state law," meaning the defendant acted with authority derived from state law. This framework allows § 1983 to act as a bridge between federal constitutional protections and tort principles. Claims often mirror torts like false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force, but they must tie directly to constitutional violations to proceed.

The Role of State Torts in Section 1983 Litigation

A significant overlap exists between § 1983 claims and state tort law. For example, false arrest, a Fourth Amendment violation under § 1983 often parallels the state tort of false imprisonment. Constitutional violation claim due to excessive force reflects the tort of battery, but it adds the dimension of analyzing whether the force was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Constitutional rights violation as a result of malicious prosecution requires the plaintiff to establish a lack of probable cause, malice, and termination of the prosecution in their favor. While similar to the state tort, federal courts require an additional showing that the prosecution violated specific constitutional rights. However, not all tortious conduct by state actors constitutes a § 1983 violation. The Supreme Court has consistently held that § 1983 does not federalize state tort law. For example, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Court rejected a claim that defamation by state actors amounted to a constitutional violation, emphasizing that not all wrongs are actionable under § 1983.

Who is a "Person" Under Section 1983?

A key question in § 1983 litigation is whether certain government officials or entities qualify as "persons" who can be held liable for constitutional violations. Section 1983 applies to state and local officials acting under color of state law, but its application depends on the capacity in which the official was acting—whether as a representative of the state or a local entity. The Supreme Court in McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), established a framework to determine whether a government official acts as a state or local actor under § 1983. In McMillian, the plaintiff sued an Alabama sheriff for allegedly violating his constitutional rights. The Court ruled that the sheriff was a state official when enforcing criminal laws because Alabama law granted sheriffs broad authority derived directly from the state. This classification shielded Monroe County from liability under Monell, as the sheriff's actions were attributable to the state.

The Ninth Circuit applied this reasoning in Brewster v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2001). In Brewster, the plaintiff alleged that the Shasta County sheriff violated his rights during a criminal investigation. The court held that sheriffs in California act as county officials when enforcing criminal law, such as conducting investigations or making arrests, and was thus subject to § 1983 liability. The decision relied heavily on California law, which, unlike Alabama law in McMillian, designates sheriffs as county agents when performing law enforcement duties. The court also clarified that sheriffs may act as local officials when performing administrative functions, such as managing county jails.

Municipal Liability Under Monell

The 1978 case of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, established that municipalities can be liable under § 1983, but only for actions taken pursuant to official policy or custom. To prevail on a § 1983 complaint against a local government under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test: (1) The official(s) must have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and may not be an isolated incident; and (3) A nexus must link the specific policy or custom to the plaintiff's injury. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–92.

No Vicarious Liability: A City cannot be held liable simply because it employs a wrongdoer.

There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a municipality:

(1) By showing a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity;

(2) By showing that the decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the area of decision or

(3) By showing that an official with final policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir.2005).

This significantly narrowed the scope of municipal liability.

Policy, Custom, or Failure to Train: Liability arises only when a constitutional violation results from an official policy, widespread practice, or deliberate indifference in training employees.

Procedural Considerations in Section 1983 Litigation

Unlike traditional tort claims, § 1983 lawsuits often involve heightened procedural requirements. The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), emphasized that plaintiffs must plead specific facts showing a plausible constitutional violation, raising the bar for § 1983 cases. In some cases, such as those involving prison conditions, plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit under § 1983. Federal courts often exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims filed alongside § 1983 claims, but the procedural standards for each may differ. Additionally, for some claims such as malicious prosecution, the Courts have held that “such is not generally cognizable under § 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987).

Challenges for Plaintiffs

While § 1983 provides a critical avenue for redress, plaintiffs face significant hurdles. Not all misconduct rises to the level of a constitutional violation. For example, negligence alone is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983, as clarified in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Qualified and absolute immunity doctrines frequently bar claims, requiring plaintiffs to establish egregious misconduct to proceed. Courts also vary in how they interpret "policy or custom" under Monell, creating challenges for plaintiffs trying to hold municipalities accountable.

A Defense Perspective

Section 1983 claims also differ from state tort claims in the defenses available to defendants. For defendants, § 1983 cases require a robust understanding of constitutional law and tort principles.

In malicious prosecution claims, demonstrating probable cause for the underlying criminal action often defeats the plaintiff's claim. In deliberate fabrication cases involving prosecutors, defendants can argue that the independent judgment of the District Attorney breaks the causal chain between their actions and the alleged harm. Also, demonstrating that there was no fabrication, or the alleged fabricated evidence was not the cause in fact and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury would defeat the Plaintiff's claim. Caldwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1115-16.

Qualified and absolute immunity are critical tools for defending individual officials, while municipalities can rely on the absence of a policy or custom. Qualified Immunity shields government officials from liability unless they violated clearly established law. This doctrine, upheld in cases like Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), aims to protect officials from frivolous lawsuits while holding them accountable for blatant misconduct. Certain officials, such as judges and prosecutors, enjoy absolute immunity for actions taken within the scope of their duties. For example, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), shields prosecutors from liability for decisions to prosecute and presenting the State's case. (See however Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 715 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2013) finding California district attorneys acting as local policymakers when adopting and implementing internal policies and procedures related to the use of jailhouse informants, and, thus, a county could be held liable for those actions under § 1983. These defenses add a layer of complexity, particularly in cases involving allegations of malicious prosecution or fabrication of evidence.

Final Words

Section 1983 claims represent a unique fusion of constitutional law and tort principles. They empower individuals to hold government actors accountable but also come with significant legal and procedural challenges. Whether representing plaintiffs or defendants, attorneys must navigate these complexities to ensure that justice is served in cases that test the boundaries of governmental power and individual rights. The distinction between state and local officials under § 1983 depends on the function the official was performing and the state law governing that role. For plaintiffs, this means carefully tailoring claims to the specific capacity in which an official acted. For defendants, McMillian and cases like the Nineth Circuit court of Appeal's decision in Brewster provide strong defenses by highlighting the limited scope of liability for municipalities when officials act as agents of the state.