Science and what is not
If there is a demarcation criterion between science and the rest, that is falsification. We especially owe this idea to Austrian philosopher Karl Popper (1902 - 1994). Of course you may disagree, but actually this criterion is largely accepted by the whole scientific community, including epistemologists, even if it does not necessarily imply that scientists at times do not violate this principle, trying to push or support theories which are not scientific as such.
There are at least two known general examples of what science is not, and those are ideology (e.g. politics) and metaphysics (e.g. religion). The first usually refuses the confrontation with empirical data, while the second explicitly deals with something which is not empirical (beyond physics), and as such not testable. Therefore, it is more often politics that pretends to be scientific (we shall see a famous example below) while religion usually admits that it is based on faith.
I have nothing against either, and the fact that they are not science is not a negative trait per se. Many positive and beautiful things are not science, like art, music etc. and they have largely contributed to make our lives better. Still, in this article I am going to discuss about what science is and what is not, so that we may more easily distinguish the former from the latter.
So what is falsification? It is the possibility to demonstrate that a hypothesis is false by means of evidence, that is by means of factual observations. This is the aim of experiments: test an idea and see if it can stand the challenge of evidence.
This process is not symmetric, in the sense that tests can prove an idea to be wrong (false, in logical terms) but no trial can prove definitely that an idea is true. In fact, we cannot rule out that sooner or later that idea will fail a test, no matter how many tests it has previously passed. This also implies that science does not produce certain theories. Truth is beyond the reach of science, even if it certainly is its aim.
The fact that a statement is not falsifiable does not imply that it is false, obviously. For example, A=A is a tautology and as such is not falsifiable but it is true. But this is logic, while we are discussing the domain of empirical sciences.
It is a good thing when theories are easily falsifiable. This is not the same as saying that it is good that theories are weak. Good theories are robust, capable of passing hard tests, and therefore they are not easily falsifiable empirically, yet they are easily falsifiable from a logical point of view. Still, there are at least three common ways in which a theory can avoid falsification.
The first, and in my opinion the easiest to spot, are arguments ad personam. The person trying to criticize a theory is usually attacked as follows: “You are not qualified to discuss this” or “You do not have the adequate or necessary knowledge" (or job title, university degree etc.) which may of course be true. Criticisms are not even taken into consideration because their proponents are not qualified. But this is not acceptable, as the objective of criticism should not be the person but the ideas and arguments used in favor or against a hypothesis. Further, if it were true that the person challenging the theory is not sufficiently educated to discuss the matter, it should be even easier for a properly qualified person to dismantle their arguments.
As I usually say, arguments ad personam are the arguments of those who have none. We have all witnessed the abuse of such arguments during the recent pandemic, whenever someone who was not a virologist was attacked personally in case they dissented with subject experts. Such arguments could even involve individuals with a medical background, but they were usually deemed to be not enough specialized, which is an unusual way to defend a hypothesis in a domain like modern science which has become more and more interdisciplinary (and rightly so).
Historically, Popper used psychoanalysis as an example of non-falsifiable theory. It was of course an offspring of his time and place (he was originally from Vienna). He notoriously highlighted the fact that whenever someone tried to counter psychoanalysis, psychoanalysts asserted that critics had some psychological problems. Which may be the case, but this is a variation of the argument ad personam and not the way to defend a theory. Arguments against psychoanalysis may be strong regardless of the mental conditions of the persons who challenge it, and its defenders should not attack them. Rather, psychoanalysts should accept criticism and eventually face them directly, instead of avoiding them using such kind of ad personam attacks. This would definitely help psychoanalysis in its way to advance as a science.
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The second way in which a theory can avoid falsification is by means of ad hoc hypotheses, aka the “no true Scotsman” (you can Google this for more) argument. It works as follows: a theory fails to pass a test when it is applied in practice. Those who still support it, notwithstanding the evidence (the failed test) do not accept the result, saying that was not the right application of the theory, that has been inaccurately or insufficiently applied etc. which may be of course true, but it is nonetheless a suspicious argument. Eventually, we may even realise that the theory is not applicable, cannot be enforced or would require an unreasonable amount of resources to apply it.
This is often the problem with politics and economics, and in particular with those theories that stem from Idealism, in the sense of the XIX century philosophy which originated in Germany, having Hegel as one of its most eminent proponents (and maybe Plato as one of its precursors, according to some). The refusal of Idealism to confront its theories with facts was programmatic, and it is usually exemplified by the following statement: “This is the theory, and if facts do not agree, too bad for them” (this sentence is usually referred to several philosophers of that school of thought).
Marxism and its political application, communism, fall into this category. No matter how many failed attempts to produce good and stable results, in particular in terms of economic policies, and notwithstanding the enormous amount of violence adopted by the dictatorial regimes which tried to put it into practice, Marxists insist saying that those were not examples of true communism, not considering the fact that - in case they were right - it could mean that it is either impossible or undesirable - or both - to put it into practice, or that to apply it would require an even larger amount of enforcement.
The third and last way in which a theory can avoid falsification is to turn it into a tautology, something which cannnot be logically contradicted. One of the most famous and illustrious examples given by Popper is the theory of evolution. The supporters of this theory often use ad personam arguments in order to avoid criticism, like “You are not a biologist” or “You do not know genetics” etc. But most often, it is the way in which the theory itself is proposed that is tautological and therefore very difficult - if not impossible - to falsify. Popper recalled how any natural mutation was considered an evolution by evolutionists. Therefore, if any observation can be comprised within the terms of evolution, it becomes impossible to falsify it. Again, this does not mean the the theory itself is wrong, but that is arguably scientific.
Nowadays, a similar case may be that of climate change. Till some decades ago, you could only hear of pollution and the fact that it was rapidly increasing, something which can be considered biologically harmful by definition (otherwise it would not be pollution). Also, pollution is easily observable and measurable. Therefore, it is easily falsifiable from a logical standpoint by means of measuring its concentration in the air, water, food etc.
In more recent years though, our attention was turned towards global warming. This is still observable and measurable (in degrees of temperature). Yet, it is not immediately evident that it is a problem, like pollution. It is even more difficult to understand why it should be a problem in case it were caused by humans, and why not in case it were not caused by humans. Lastly, the fact that it is getting warmer recently does not rule out the fact that it may get cooler in the future (this point has something to do with the problem of induction).
But the least falsifiable declination is that of climate change. Similarly to evolution, if not more, climate change is almost a tautology, and as such cannot be easily falsified. Obviously, the climate changes, in both time and space. Animal species which have not adapted or evolved have disappeared. Again, this cannot deny that such changes in climate may be harmful and caused by humans. Unfortunately though, most of climate change supporters have an ideological approach, and they try to defend their ideas making them more tautological. But to make a theory less falsifiable makes it less scientific, not more robust. Such theories in fact do not withstand rigorous tests. Rather, they merely avoid them.
Misunderstandings and arguments between climate change supporters and climate change deniers may have their roots in a limited understanding of what science is and how it works, and that’s why such discussions tend to become ideological confrontations.
Some may think that such a skeptic approach to science may lead to inaction. This is not necessarily the case. We must accept that we have to decide and act notwithstanding the lack of certainty, acknowledging that we may be wrong and make mistakes. Humans (and animals) always act in conditions of insufficient information, that is of uncertainty. This applies also to politicians.
The beauty of science lays in the fact that it does not provide truth, but only some glimpses on it. It gives more questions than answers, and every new theory raises new questions, but usually they are interesting and intriguing questions. Science is a continuous challenge, and the only way to test whether ideas and theories are strong and well-founded is to fight against them.
Everything is always unique
1 年Congratulations, Davide, for your piece of work I again enjoyed reading! Let me add some thoughts to it. Firstly, I’d like to recall what Aristotle said about science, that it is “de universalibus”, about universal, or general, ie. it applies to everything in a class or category. Therefore, even if Popper’s definition brings clarity, it was implicit in Aristotle’s definition. That is: it takes one single case only that contradicts or escapes the general/universal (theory) and the general/universal is no more general/universal. Moreover, Popper’s definition stresses what science is NOT, not what science IS. It deals with the scientific result rather than with scientific aim. Of course, it is helpful to teach children and students that the scientific study should be falsifiable. But it’s not enough or sufficient. They need to know what are looking for when doing science. Because you have to have a theory first before it can be falsifiable. And my guess is that science is in shambles not because some teachers forgot about what science is not, but because they forgot about what science is.