SCIENCE AND TRUTH

Fernando Alcoforado*

This article aims to present the concept of scientific truth, the methods adopted for the search for scientific truth, the questions about the scientific method and how to prove the scientific truth.

1. The concept of scientific truth

In Greek, truth (aletheia) means that which is not hidden, manifesting itself in the eyes and the spirit as it is, becoming evident to reason. In Latin, truth (veritas) is what can be accurately demonstrated by referring to rigor and accuracy. In principle, truth is the genuine aim of scientific inquiry [RAMOS, Fábio Pestana. Concep??o filosófica da verdade (Philosophical conception of truth). Available at the website <https://fabiopestanaramos.blogspot.com.br/2011/09/concepcao-filosofica-da-verdade.html>, 2011>, 2011).

Truth is an interpretation of reality, confirmed by other human beings and confirmed by mathematical equations forming a model capable of predicting future events in the same coordinates. Truth does not have a unique meaning, either static and definitive, being influenced by numerous factors. The conception of truth has been the subject of study by many thinkers throughout the history of philosophy, but three particularly have had a strong influence: Leibniz, Kant, and Husserl.

For Leibniz, it would be necessary to distinguish two types of truth: truths of reason on the one hand, and truths of fact on the other. Truths of reason state that a thing is necessarily and universally and cannot be different from what it is, just as mathematical ideas that are innate. Actually, in fact, truths are those that depend on experience, expressing ideas gained through sensations, perception and memory, and are therefore empirical. According to Leibniz, the relationship between truths of reason and fact, judged by the rationalization of information, allows us to know reality.

For Kant, truth arises from the relationship between analytical and synthetic judgments, expressing the first intellectual operations and the second the structures or phenomena analyzed. In other words, the reality we know does not correspond to what it is, but to what reason interprets. Husserl, in turn, created phenomenology, a branch of philosophy that studies the reading of phenomena by reason, since reality would be relative and subordinate to manifestation for consciousness. Understanding would be influenced by the senses and reason, beyond the knowledge previously present in the mind and context.

Kant presents the definition of truth as the "concordance of knowledge with its object." The "concordance of knowledge with the object" means "the agreement of understanding with the object that is apprehended by it, namely the phenomenon." According to Kant, truth and illusion are not in the object as it is intuited but in the judgment upon it as it is thought. Consequently, both truth and error, therefore, also delusion, while inducing the error, can only be found in judgment, that is, in the relation of the object to our understanding [PERIN, Adriano. A verdade como um problema fundamental em Kant (Truth as a fundamental problem in Kant). Available on the website <https://blog.quadrante.com.br/kant-a-verdade-subjetiva/>).

Kant's basic question was: How can we know the truth? In his youth, Kant accepted the rationalist answer that we know the truth through the intellect, not through the senses, and that the intellect had its own "innate ideas." He later read empiricist David Hume, who, in Kant's own words, "woke him up from dogmatic sleep". Like other empiricists, Hume believed that man can know the truth only through the senses and that there are no "innate ideas." However, Hume's premises led him to skepticism, to the denial that one could know the truth with certainty. Kant considered both rationalist "dogmatism" and empiricist skepticism unacceptable and sought a third way [KREEFT, Peter. Kant: a verdade subjetiva (Kant: subjective truth). Available at <https://blog.quadrante.com.br/kant-a-verdade-subjetiva/].

Kant denied the premise that truth meant conformity with objective reality. Kant redefines the very concept of truth as reality that conforms to our ideas. Until then, it was argued that our knowledge must be adapted to reality. Kant considers that there will be more progress if we assume that the objects of thought must fit our knowledge. Kant stated that all our knowledge is subjective.

Peter Kreeft claims that there was a theory available since Aristotle's time: the philosophy of common sense, which is realism. According to realism, we can know the truth through intellect and the senses, provided that both work correctly together, like the blades of scissors. Instead of turning to traditional realism, Kant invented a whole new theory of knowledge, often called idealism. He considered it his "Copernican revolution in philosophy". But the simplest name for it is subjectivism, for it is meant to redefine truth itself as subjective, not objective.

According to Edgar Morin, several previous philosophers had assumed that the truth is objective. By the way, according to common sense, this is simply what we mean by speaking of “truth”: knowing what it really is by shaping the mind according to objective reality. Some philosophers (the rationalists) thought they could achieve this goal with reason alone. Early empiricists (like Locke) thought they could reach her through the senses. Skeptical empiricist Hume, later, felt that there was no way to reach the truth with certainty. Descartes' mechanistic model has long served its intended purpose and enabled the development of various fields of science. Yet, already got proven the unsustainability of certain concepts that were considered fundamental by the Cartesian model. In formulating the Theory of Complexity, Edgar Morin criticized Descartes' mechanistic model by trying to link what is separate [MORIN. Edgar. O Método 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,6 (Cole??o) (Method 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,6 (Collection). Porto Alegre: Editora Sulina, 2005].

2. Methods for the Search for Scientific Truth

In his main work Discourse on the Method, René Descartes expressed his disappointment with the knowledge of his time. Much of what he believed had turned out to be false. Descartes then resolved to seek only the knowledge he could find within himself or in nature. He strove to find an irrefutable truth that served as the elementary principle of knowledge. René Descartes considered the mathematical method as the safest way to reach knowledge. By applying mathematical reasoning to philosophical problems, we can achieve the same certainty and clarity evidenced in geometry. The Cartesian deductive method perfectly complements Francis Bacon's inductive approach, which emphasizes observation and experimentation. The scientific achievements of modern times originated in the skillful synchronization of inductive and deductive methods [DESCARTES, René. Discurso do método (Discourse on the method). L&PM Pocket, 2004].

Descartes defended the thesis that it is sufficient to understand the parts to understand the whole. According to René Descartes, the scientific method comprises two complementary approaches to knowledge: the empirical (inductive) and the rational (deductive). In the inductive approach employed in descriptive sciences such as biology, anatomy and geology, general principles are extracted from the analysis of data collected through observation and experimentation. René Descartes formulated the deductive method in the seventeenth century. The main characteristics of the inductive method were defended by the Englishman Francis Bacon, who considered data from sensory experience as the basis of knowledge. The inductive thinking proposed by Francis Bacon leaves the scene to give way to the Cartesian deduction where experiences serve only to confirm the general principles outlined by reason. In the deductive approach employed in mathematics and theoretical physics, truths are derived from elementary principles.

Prior to Isaac Newton, two opposing trends guided science: 1) the empirical, inductive method represented by Francis Bacon; and 2) the rational, deductive method, represented by René Descartes. Overcoming Bacon in his systematic experimentation and Descartes in his mathematical analysis, Newton unified the two trends. Thus, the model of science that was in force up to the present moment was set up, which was one of the major responsible for the advances and setbacks, for the benefits and harms that modern society lives to date. It was Newton who gave life to Descartes's dream by completing the Scientific Revolution.

Mathematics is the science of logical reasoning that has its development linked to research, the interest in discovering the new and investigating situations of high complexity. Mathematics today is the most important science in the modern world because it is present in all scientific fields [RONAN, Colin A. História Ilustrada da Ciência (Illustrated History of Science). Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002]. The Scientific Revolution, which began in the 15th century, made knowledge more structured and more practical, absorbing empiricism as a mechanism to consolidate the findings. Amid all the effervescence favorable to the Scientific Revolution, Mathematics gained space and developed with great relevance for the development of a more rigorous and critical scientific method. Mathematics has come to describe scientific truths [ROONEY, Anne. História da Matemática (History of Mathematics). S?o Paulo: M. Books, 2012].

Lakatos and Marconi affirm that the specific methods of the social sciences are: 1) the inductive that, from the occurrence of the phenomena are originated the laws and theories; 2) the deductive that from the theories and laws one has the explanation about the phenomena; 3) the hypothetical-deductive that formulates hypotheses and tests the occurrence of phenomena; 4) the dialectic that analyzes conflicting elements; 5) the historic that investigates the past to relate its influence on the phenomena of the present; 6) the comparative that is used to verify similarities and explain divergences; 7) the monographic that studies a certain group of factors to obtain generalizations; 8) the statistician whose objective is the analysis of complex sets to thereby establish relationships with each other and provide a quantitative description of this group under study; 9) the typological that serves as a model for conducting analyzes and understanding existing cases; 10) the functionalist, which is a method of interpretation that aims to study a particular group through its system of organization; 11) the structuralist that is used to analyze the concrete reality of various phenomena; 12) the ethnographic whose main focus is the analysis of the cultural aspects of a particular group of society; and 13) the clinician who is used in case studies and has psychopedagogic intervention with an intimate relationship between researcher and what is researched and can be of qualitative or quantitative scope [LAKATOS, E. M. e MARCONI, M. de A. Métodos específicos das ciências sociais in Metodologia científica (Specific methods of Social Sciences in Scientific Methodology). S?o Paulo: Atlas, 1991].

According to Karl Popper, in addition to the inductive, deductive, hypothetical - deductive methods, the dialectical method formulated by the German philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel and developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which is applied to the social sciences, is also a way of analyzing reality from the confrontation of theses, hypotheses or theories. Dialectics is the investigation through the counterposition of conflicting elements and the understanding of their role in a phenomenon. The researcher must confront any concept taken as "truth" with other realities and theories in order to draw a new conclusion, a new theory. Thus, dialectics does not analyze the static object, but contextualizes the object of study in the historical, cultural and social dynamics. Dialectical argumentation was also used in metaphysics, and was systematized by the German idealist thinker Friedrich Hegel, an exponent of German classical philosophy, who identified three basic moments in the dialectical method: the thesis (an allegedly true idea), the antithesis (the contradiction or negation of this thesis) and synthesis (the result of the confrontation of both ideas). Synthesis becomes a new thesis and the dialectical cycle begins again [GEORG, Gadamer. La dialética de Hegel (Hegel's dialectic). Madrid: Editora Catedra, 1988].

3. The scientific method and its questions

Until the beginning of the twentieth century the scientific method predominated based on the mechanistic model proposed by René Descartes in his Discourse on the Method. Descartes' mechanistic model for a long time served to the principles that was proposed and made possible the development of various fields of science. However Albert Einstein's (1879-1955) theories of relativity and Niels Bohr's (1885-1962) quantum mechanics challenged some of the pillars of the Cartesian model. Einstein and Bohr's findings proved impossible to determine even the reality of the results of an observation, overturning the precept that “to know the whole, it′s enough to know the parts” by demonstrating that many phenomena have no explanation if not viewed within a situation or system and, above all, overturned the precept that the object is separate and independent of the observer, showing that what we know of what we believe to be the real object is only the result of our intervention in it and not the object itself. In formulating the Theory of Complexity, Edgar Morin criticized Descartes' mechanistic model by trying to link what is separate [MORIN. Edgar. O Método 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,6 (Cole??o) (Method 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,6 (Collection)). Porto Alegre: Editora Sulina, 2005 ].

Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) sought to examine, like David Hume (1711-1776), whether or not the repetition of a phenomenon in a given number of past experiences is a guarantee of its later occurrence in the future. Russell asked two other questions: (a) Are past experiences the source of our future expectations? (b) How to justify such expectations? Russell asks: Does finding a certain number of occurrences of a law being satisfied in the past provide evidence that the same law will continue to be satisfied in the future? The English thinker argues that as the same events are repeated, their occurrence in the future will become more likely. Therefore, his argument tends to replace justification of induction with justification of probability of induction. Our experience with nature has so far shown, Russell tells us (here in strict accordance with Hume), that the frequent repetition of a succession or coexistence of events has been the cause of our expectation that the succession or coexistence of events will continue to occur in the future. The mere fact that something has happened a number of times gives to animals and men the expectation that it will happen again (RUSSELL, Bertrand. Les problems de philosophie. Paris: Payot, 1989).

What Russell therefore questioned is whether or not our conviction about the permanent regularity between past and future is pertinent, which is based on the realization that the future has continually become the past, always being similar to the past, so that one can use Russell's terminology of past futures. The use of experience could underlie inductive reasoning with regard to examples already examined. With regard, however, to future cases, only the belief in the inductive principle could justify any inference that attests to the regularity between the already observed and the unobserved. As for deductive reasoning, Russell argues that it does not effectively allow us to make predictions about future occurrences, as their statements necessarily derive from already established generalizations.

Pierre Duhem (1861-1916), a French physicist and historian of science, states that science, far from being able to prove its claims by a logical derivation of self-evident principles, has as its method derive empirical predictions from its theories and compare them with what is observed. By this method, however, no theory can be definitively established, since it is always possible for more than one theory to satisfactorily fit the empirical data. That is, for any observational data set, an indefinite number of theories may be suitable for it. Duhem states that the experimental method cannot turn a hypothesis of physics into an undisputed truth because one can never be certain that all imaginable hypotheses that can apply to a group of phenomena have been exhausted (Duhem, Pierre. Sauver les apparences, Paris: Vrin, 2003).

Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), mathematician, physicist and philosopher of French science, and Albert Einstein (1879-1955), German theoretical physicist, in spite of the significant divergences of their respective philosophies of scientific knowledge, had in common the conviction of that scientific ideas in the elaboration of physical and mathematical theories are free constructions of thought. In this sense, they understood that they are not induced in a logical and univocal way, necessary and compulsory, from the data of experience and, moreover, that they are not inscribed in an innate or a priori structure of thought. It is in this space of freedom that the idea of creation enters into scientific work that leads to discovery. In the clearest way, Poincaré and Einstein both insisted on this aspect which was for them the most important feature of the activity of knowledge, and which was effectively at the center of their epistemologies.

According to Henri Poincaré, science can teach us nothing about truth, can only serve us as a rule of action. From this perspective, science would be no more than a rule of action, for we would be powerless to know anything, and yet how we need to act we make rules. It is the set of these rules that we call science. Almost all contemporary philosophers of science have come to the conclusion that science cannot literally describe an unobservable world of microscopic particles and intangible waves. And a significant number of philosophers of science have come to the conclusion that science cannot succeed in this goal since it is beyond the reach of human perception. All contemporary philosophers of science accept that scientific theories aim to literally portray an unobservable world and conclude that, for that reason, it would be a mistake to believe in any scientific theories (POINCARé, Henri. Science et hipothèse. Paris: Flammarion, 1902).

In his work Contra o método (Against Method) Paul Feyerabend, who was born in Vienna in 1924 and lived in the United States and Europe, states that there is no universal ahistorical scientific method openly criticizing the scientific method. According to its epistemology, science is an anarchic enterprise. It rejects the existence of universal rules and defends the violation of these methodological rules. It affirms that the advance of science occurs by violating the imposed methodological rules. The epistemological anarchism that he defends must be understood as a defense to an epistemological pluralism, that is, against a unique method of making science. It defends an “anything goes”, that is, a radical methodological pluralism. His epistemology states that no theory can be consistent with all facts and that there cannot be a set of rules that will lead to scientific progress [FEYERABEND, Paul. Contra o método (Against method). S?o Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2003].

Feyerabend openly defends the counter-rule, that is, if the rule is induction, counterinduction should be used, which focuses on the acceptance of alternative hypotheses. According to Feyerabend's view, all theories are fallible by nature. It proposes the following counter rules: (a) introduce hypotheses that conflict with the observations; (b) introduce hypotheses that do not fit the established theories. Theories should always be seen as approximations, never as definitions. One cannot reach the truth, but only approach it.

4. Proof of scientific truth

Karl Popper (1902-1994) states that one of the issues that most afflict human beings, no doubt, concerns the search for truth and, therefore, the validity of science. It is well known that the task of the scientist is to delimit the scientific laws and, for this, must adopt a method. Since Francis Bacon, science has followed the principle that to describe a law of nature one must repeatedly test, gather and record the results, wait for it to be repeated with several other researchers, and then be considered valid. That is, a scientific law is valid when the scientific community, founded on particular experiences, reaps similar or allegedly equal results over and over again (POPPER, Karl. Lógica da Investiga??o Científica, in Os Pensadores [Logic of Scientific Research, in The Thinkers). S?o Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1975].

Karl Popper states that an inference is called “inductive” when it goes from particular statements, or experiments, to universal statements, such as hypotheses or “theories”. Popper wonders if he can move from single to universal statements with the certainty of the truth. To begin solving the problem, induction advocates feel it is necessary to establish an Induction Principle, which can guarantee the process. For Popper, this is impossible or even superfluous, since this Principle guarantees nothing since it is based on the same inconsistent method. To be valid, an Induction Principle should be universal and since the researcher always starts from the singular, this would not allow him to logically reach the universal, according to Popper.

To try to solve this problem, Popper established what he calls the deductive method of testing. To test a theory, Popper follows four steps, or kinds of evidence: 1) Internal tests: seek the coherence of the conclusions drawn from the statement; 2) Tests of form: consists of tests to know if the theory is, in fact, an empirical or scientific theory or merely tautology, that is, an analytic proposition that always remains true, since the attribute is a repetition of the subject; 3) Innovation tests: verification if the theory is really new or already understood by others existing in the system; and 4) Empirical tests: verification of the applicability of the conclusions extracted from the new theory. These are the main tests, since the theory can pass unhindered in the previous three steps and be falsified by the empirical application of its conclusions, in which case the theory will not be considered valid.

For Karl Popper the support of a theory is always provisional since its conclusions will always be tested empirically. As long as the theory holds, no progress has been made. On the contrary, when a proof distorts current theory, then science will evolve. In this sense, therefore, one should always try to falsify the theory and not confirm it, also because the attempt to confirm it would be infinite, in time and space. Thus, Popper claims that a theory will be more valid the more it is falsifiable, that is, the more likely it is to be falsified and yet it continues to respond to scientific problems. Once proposed, speculative theories will have to be rigorously and relentlessly proven by observation and experimentation. Theories that do not exceed observable and experimental evidence must be eliminated and replaced by other speculative conjectures.

According to Popper, Science progresses through trial and error, conjecture and refutation. The method of science is the method of bold and ingenious conjecture followed by rigorous attempts to falsify it. Only the fittest theories survive. One can never lawfully say that a theory is true, one can say with optimism that it is the best available, that it is better than any of those that existed before. According to falsifiability, it can be shown that some theories are false using the results of observation and experimentation. But Popper, in trying to overthrow the inductive method, also created another problem, namely, the need for a new criterion of demarcation between what is Science and what is not, since hitherto the inductive method was proper to Science and distinguished it of Metaphysics, the latter, known to be speculative. In other words, it is not limited, just by induction, what is and what is not science. Therefore, what marks the science of non-science is falsifiability, as Popper says. Finally, for Popper, the statement needs to be empirically tested, not for its verifiability, but for its falsifiability. Thus, the myth of scientific truth is clearly evidenced, above all by the inadequacy of its methods, which should lead us to reflect on scientific solutions.

* Fernando Alcoforado, 80, awarded the medal of Engineering Merit of the CONFEA / CREA System, member of the Bahia Academy of Education, engineer and doctor in Territorial Planning and Regional Development by the University of Barcelona, university professor and consultant in the areas of strategic planning, business planning, regional planning and planning of energy systems, is author of the books Globaliza??o (Editora Nobel, S?o Paulo, 1997), De Collor a FHC- O Brasil e a Nova (Des)ordem Mundial (Editora Nobel, S?o Paulo, 1998), Um Projeto para o Brasil (Editora Nobel, S?o Paulo, 2000), Os condicionantes do desenvolvimento do Estado da Bahia (Tese de doutorado. Universidade de Barcelona,https://www.tesisenred.net/handle/10803/1944, 2003), Globaliza??o e Desenvolvimento (Editora Nobel, S?o Paulo, 2006), Bahia- Desenvolvimento do Século XVI ao Século XX e Objetivos Estratégicos na Era Contemporanea (EGBA, Salvador, 2008), The Necessary Conditions of the Economic and Social Development- The Case of the State of Bahia (VDM Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, Saarbrücken, Germany, 2010), Aquecimento Global e Catástrofe Planetária (Viena- Editora e Gráfica, Santa Cruz do Rio Pardo, S?o Paulo, 2010), Amaz?nia Sustentável- Para o progresso do Brasil e combate ao aquecimento global (Viena- Editora e Gráfica, Santa Cruz do Rio Pardo, S?o Paulo, 2011), Os Fatores Condicionantes do Desenvolvimento Econ?mico e Social (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2012), Energia no Mundo e no Brasil- Energia e Mudan?a Climática Catastrófica no Século XXI (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2015), As Grandes Revolu??es Científicas, Econ?micas e Sociais que Mudaram o Mundo (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2016), A Inven??o de um novo Brasil (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2017), Esquerda x Direita e a sua convergência (Associa??o Baiana de Imprensa, Salvador, 2018, em co-autoria) and Como inventar o futuro para mudar o mundo (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2019).