Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei is blowing it. Putin is not a reliable geo political partner. Putin is a scorpion whom stings all to death
and there we have the rationale
quote
Similarly, a July 24?editorial?in?Kayhan, a newspaper considered close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, praised Russia’s invasion as a “preemptive” measure that closed NATO’s path to aggressive actions in Crimea and even Iran. According to hardliners in Khamenei’s circle, the Ukraine war is a continuation of the “resistance axis” struggles in Iraq and Syria, so Russia’s efforts should be supported—for now with drones and drone technicians.
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This is an ass backwards view as Iran would be on Putin's hit list if Putin occupies Ukraine.
quote
Russia’s performance with?the Shaheds in Ukraine “suggests an evolution,” Bendett said. “They probably started with a basic concept the Houthis and the Iranians used themselves and built on it to possibly overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, to fly around them, to circumnavigate them, in one way or another.”
Iranian military leaders will probably seek feedback from Russian commanders on how they have evaded Western air defenses, experts have said. Such information could aid Tehran in any potential attacks it pursues against its regional adversaries.
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Again, major strategic blindness. Khameni whom touts himself as an "intellectual" has fallen for the trollip that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"
I assume Khameni has forgotten how Russian troops flattened Gronzy which is not that far away from Iran
Or the tunnel vision of denying the chezchen horrors, as that area, Moslem has been flattened by Russians for hundreds of years
Me thinks Khameni has also over looked this one
quote
A covert network expected to bypass the ban on Russian oil export
What appears to be a given is that a significant portion of Russian flows will be managed via a sophisticated, and frequently covert, network of ships, owners, ports, and safe routes, which is predominated by entities still prepared to do business with Russia.
In addition, there will very probably be a rise in ship-to-ship transfers, or the switching of cargo between tankers while at sea. This is a result of the requirement to combine a few modest cargoes onto bigger tankers for long journeys as well as the risk of restrictions associated with handling exports straight from Russian ports.
China and India poised to become top destinations
Although ships frequently sailed directly to European consumers, Asia, particularly China and India, seems poised to overtake Europe as the popular destination after December 5.
end of quote
Just smashing success for Iranian oil, don'tcha agree ?
Khameini the supposed great intellectual really needs to pay attention as to what playing footsie with Putin leads to
In the end, bad for Ukraine, Russia and Iran. It is industrial strength lunacy to play real politic with Putin.
quote
A ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tankers for Russia to bypass sanctions
Economy,?Europe,?Russia,?World?/ By?Mike Baines?/?October 23, 2022?/?3 minutes of reading
A “shadow fleet” of tankers with unknown owners is being assembled in the world to transport oil in the interests of Russia,?Bloomberg reported.
From December 5, the EU embargo on Russian oil will come into force, and from February 5 – on oil products. And Moscow is desperately looking for a solution to bypass sanctions.
Many ships are being sold to unknown firms
Chief Executive Officer of Maersk Tankers in Copenhagen, which operates a fleet of 170 ships, Christian Ingerslev said that “if you look at how many ships have been sold in the last six months to unknown buyers, it becomes clear that a fleet is being created to carry these cargoes”, Bloomberg is quoting him as saying.
Shipbroker Braemar estimates that 240 more ships – 102 Aframaxes, 58 Suezmaxes and 80 very large oil tankers – have been bought to support Russia’s four million barrels a day to the Far East. Last year they carried Iranian and Venezuelan oil.
A shadow fleet is being created
Anoop Singh, head of tanker research at Braemar, said there has been a sharp increase in tanker trading by unknown actors in Dubai, Hong Kong, Singapore and Cyprus. Many of them are older vessels and will be part of the shadow fleet, with some tankers also supplied by Russian shipowner Sovcomflot.
Bloomberg also predicts a surge in ship-to-ship transshipment. This is due to both the sanctions risk of handling exports directly from Russian ports and the need to transship small cargoes to larger tankers for long travels.
It is unclear whether the bloc’s measures, which are set to go into effect in roughly six weeks, will be enough to assist the third-largest oil producer in the world deliver most of its output to consumers and avert a supply shock.
A covert network expected to bypass the ban on Russian oil export
What appears to be a given is that a significant portion of Russian flows will be managed via a sophisticated, and frequently covert, network of ships, owners, ports, and safe routes, which is predominated by entities still prepared to do business with Russia.
In addition, there will very probably be a rise in ship-to-ship transfers, or the switching of cargo between tankers while at sea. This is a result of the requirement to combine a few modest cargoes onto bigger tankers for long journeys as well as the risk of restrictions associated with handling exports straight from Russian ports.
China and India poised to become top destinations
Although ships frequently sailed directly to European consumers, Asia, particularly China and India, seems poised to overtake Europe as the popular destination after December 5.
The so-called ship-to-ship transfers will very definitely be prohibited once the sanctions take effect, and conducting them inside the Baltic Sea won’t be very advantageous for Russia or its purchasers. This is so that oil destined for Asia can, in theory, be transferred onto enormous supertankers that are too large to leave the Baltic with commodities on board.
A shuttling effect was created when the initial vessel turned around after transferring its cargo to the supertanker and went back for additional Russia oil. All of that will lead to further Russian economic fall and Putin’s regime crisis will deepen. Finally, Moscow will not be able to pursue its war against Ukraine. It’s what the Western sanctions aimed at after Russian troops invaded Ukraine in late February.
Source:?Bloomberg
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U.S. has viewed wreckage of kamikaze drones Russia used in Ukraine
Such information could prove crucial in helping the United States and its Ukrainian allies better identify and ultimately defeat the unmanned craft
By?Shane Harris,?Dan Lamothe,?Alex Horton?and?Karen DeYoung?
Updated?October 20, 2022 at 4:21 p.m. EDT|Published?October 20, 2022 at 2:00 a.m. EDT
The U.S. government has examined the wreckage of Iranian-made drones shot down in Ukraine, deepening its insight into the unmanned craft that Russia has launched in a spate of kamikaze attacks on the country’s critical infrastructure, according to two U.S. officials.
Information about the drones’ structure and technology could prove crucial in helping the United States and its Ukrainian allies better identify and ultimately defeat them before they can reach their targets. Officials said the process has been used in the past to study weaponry deployed by Iran’s proxies in conflicts in the Middle East. People interviewed for this report spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence collection.
The Shahed-136 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used in this week’s attacks on the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, have targeted power stations and other utilities, killing at least four, authorities there have said. Their use by Russian forces has underscored the growing ties between Moscow and Tehran, alarming Western leaders whose sanctions and other punitive economic measures have drastically undercut the Kremlin’s ability to regenerate its military after eight months of war.
The Iranian-made drones are being launched from three Russian military bases in Crimea and another position in Belarus, a Ukrainian official said. The White House on Thursday confirmed?previous reporting?that Tehran has dispatched advisers to Russian-controlled areas, where they have provided operators with technical instruction.
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National Security Council communications coordinator John Kirby told reporters that “a relatively small number” of Iranian trainers and technicians are in Crimea “to help the Russians use [the drones] with better lethality.” Russians remotely pilot the aircraft with Iranian personnel “assisting,” Pentagon spokesman Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters in a separate briefing.
“Both Iran and Russia continue to lie about it,” Kirby said, but “the fact is this: The Iranians are now directly engaged on the ground and through the provision of weapons ... killing civilians and destroying infrastructure” in Ukraine. He said the United States, along with partners and allies, is working to address with sanctions Iran’s transfer of drones and to ensure Ukraine has air defense systems to shoot them down.
It is unclear how the United States gained access to the drone wreckage, though the Pentagon coordinates closely with Ukraine’s military and maintains a small administrative presence at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. That team is led by a one-star Army general. Asked if the United States has been able to inspect the drone wreckage in Ukraine, Ryder said, “I don’t have any information on that.”
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Drones over Ukraine: Death in different sizes
Iranian Shahed-136 drones can loiter over areas for hours until their cameras identify
a target and the drone drops on it like a bomb. The Russians are using these weapons to devastating effect without risk to their troops.
SHAHED-136 (IRAN)
Length:?11 feet
Max. speed:?115 mph
Approx. weight:?440 pounds
Range:?About 1,100-
1,500 miles
Nose contains explosive warhead as well as cameras
But the Iranian drones are bigger, noisier and reportedly easier to shoot down than the tiny Switchblade 300s the U.S. is supplying to Ukraine.
领英推荐
SWITCHBLADE 300 (U.S.)
Length:?20 inches
Max. speed:?100 mph
Approx. weight:?5.5 pounds
Range:?About 6 miles
Sources: Defense Express, AeroVironment
WILLIAM NEFF/THE WASHINGTON POST
The Shahed is a large, lumbering aircraft that flies very low and appears to have few metallic parts, making it difficult to detect with radars and other sensors before reaching its target. Examination of the wreckage may help overcome those challenges.
The drones’ points of origin pose another challenge, the Ukrainian official said: They are too far for U.S.-supplied rocket artillery to strike, blunting options for destroying the aircraft before they are airborne.
Ukraine, which says it has?destroyed more than 220 Shahed-136 drones?since Sept. 13, appears to be studying the platform, Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur told reporters this week. Pevkur said it was of regional urgency to learn about the aircraft.
“We all have to understand that we all have to put our efforts to that. To understand how it works, and to understand how to take it down,” he said. “Because it’s not only the question of Ukraine at war at the moment, but it’s a question of all of us who are in the situation where we are.”
Iran produces a variety of drones and has reportedly supplied them to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthi rebels in Yemen, among other groups. The Pentagon believes Iran-allied forces have used them against U.S. military personnel in Syria, including in?an August attack?at the U.S.-run base at Tanf.
The Houthis claimed to have used Samad-3 drones to attack a refinery in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, last spring, and launched Samad-1 drones at Saudi Aramco facilities in other parts of the country. Those drones are distinct from the weapons used by Russia in Ukraine.
In February, the United Arab Emirates was hit by several drone and missile attacks claimed by the Houthis. In a military parade last month in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, the Houthis reportedly displayed a local version of the Shahed-136.
Ukraine has asked the United Nations to examine the wreckage, to determine the aircraft’s country of origin. In a letter dated Friday, Ukraine’s U.N. ambassador invited “experts to visit Ukraine at the earliest possible opportunity to inspect recovered Iran-origin drones.” The letter maintained that Iranian transfers of the drones would violate both U.N. sanctions against Iran and terms of the 2015 U.N. Security Council resolution on the Iran nuclear deal that year.
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The Council held a closed-door meeting Wednesday to hear “an expert briefing … on recent evidence that Russia illegally procured Iranian UAVs that it is using in its war on Ukraine,” Nate Evans, spokesperson for the American U.N. mission, said in a statement after the session. “These UAVs were transferred from Iran to Russia in open violation of provisions” of the resolution approving the nuclear deal Iran signed with world powers.
Earlier this week, France and Britain — signers of the deal along with Iran, the United States, Germany, Russia and China — echoed Ukrainian charges that sending the drones to Russia violated a provision prohibiting Iran from transferring unmanned aerial vehicles with a range of more than 300 kilometers (186.4 miles) unless it had specific permission from the council.
“As was outlined during today’s meeting,” the statement from Evans said, “there is ample evidence that Russia is using Iranian-made UAVS” in its attacks on Ukraine. “By procuring these weapons in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, Russia continues to flout international law in its pursuit of a senseless and brutal war.”
Kirby said Thursday that while the U.N. discussion centered on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the nuclear deal is known, the U.S. focus was not on the negotiations that began early last year to revive the agreement after President Donald Trump withdrew from it in 2018.
“We are way far apart with the Iranians in terms of a return to the deal,” Kirby said. “We are just simply not focused ... on the diplomacy at this time.”
The Shahed loiters in the air until it identifies a target, often a fixed position, and then dives into it, detonating onboard explosives. Unlike bigger reusable drones that fire missiles and return to a base, it flies low and slow.
Ukrainians call it “the lawn mower” because of the loud buzzing sound it makes. The distinct noise has served as a warning of its approach, allowing people to scramble for cover and brace for the explosion, which is smaller than the impact caused by conventional ballistic missiles.
The drones pose a significant problem, analysts say. Many defensive systems capable of defeating them are costly, designed mostly for bigger threats like jets and helicopters, and take months or years to produce, forcing military planners to prioritize sites deemed most vulnerable.
While Ukrainian air defenses have shown some success against the drones, even a few slipping through can cause havoc, said Samuel Bendett, an expert on the Russian military at CNA, a research group. “It’s a demonstration of Russian capability, and now they have cheap plentiful weapons that can constantly remind Ukrainians that their skies are not 100 percent safe,” he said. “It’s a very powerful psychological weapon.”
Russia’s performance with?the Shaheds in Ukraine “suggests an evolution,” Bendett said. “They probably started with a basic concept the Houthis and the Iranians used themselves and built on it to possibly overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, to fly around them, to circumnavigate them, in one way or another.”
Iranian military leaders will probably seek feedback from Russian commanders on how they have evaded Western air defenses, experts have said. Such information could aid Tehran in any potential attacks it pursues against its regional adversaries.
The United States has provided Ukraine with air defense systems capable of destroying drones. One, the?Vampire, can take down drones with a launcher attached to a pickup truck. The Pentagon also has promised to send Ukraine NASAMS, a surface-to-air missile system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and other aerial threats. Two NASAMS are slated for delivery in the coming weeks, U.S. officials have said. Six others pledged to Ukraine are expected to take years to build and deliver.
There is no one-size-fits-all answer to air defense threats and to these drones specifically, experts say. They point to a diverse set of weapons capable of defending priority targets, from Stinger missiles, which are shoulder-fired weapons developed long ago, to newer, more sophisticated systems like the NASAMS, said Tom Karako, the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank.
Also needed, Karako said, are electronic warfare systems that can disrupt the connection between drone and operator, taking it offline. “You may not need the world’s biggest interceptors,” he said, “but you are going to need something.”
As the United States considers Ukraine’s calls for more air defense systems in response to the attacks on Kyiv, Kirby said, the Defense Department “is looking hard at what’s in the realm of possibility, including what could be possible from allies and partners.” Earlier this month, Germany and Spain announced an accelerated shipment of new air defense systems.
Both the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates have said Patriot interceptors have been used to thwart Houthi missile attacks — along with, in the UAE, a THAAD defense system. Neither has specified the defenses they have used against drones.
Ukraine uses kamikaze drones as well. The Pentagon has provided its military with hundreds of?Switchblades, which are much smaller than the Shahed and are designed to strike small groups of soldiers or armored vehicles, depending on the variant. While smaller and more evasive than the Iranian drones, they lack the range, with the larger Switchblade version able to travel 25 miles. The domestically produced RAM II also is in use, but its range tops out at 18 miles, making both weapons more suitable near the front lines.
Ellen Nakashima contributed to this report.
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quote
Iranian Drones to Russia: Capabilities and Limitations
Aug 1, 2022
Also available in
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Farzin Nadimi, an associate fellow with The Washington Institute, is a Washington-based analyst specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Persian Gulf region.
Brief Analysis
Besides signaling that Iran has shifted to active military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, the prospective transfer gives Moscow a stopgap option until its own advanced drones are ready for service.
Over the past month, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has?revealed?declassified intelligence on Iranian plans to transfer hundreds of combat drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, and to train Russian operators inside the Islamic Republic. The Biden administration also published satellite imagery that reportedly showed a Kremlin military delegation visiting the Shahid Karimi UAV base in central Iran, run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force. The facility, which shares its runway with the pseudo-civilian airport in Kashan, is known to have been heavily involved in Iranian and proxy?drone operations in Syria?and elsewhere.
The exact terms of the deal have not been made public, so it is unclear whether the drones will be sold directly to Russia, loaned, or permanently transferred as partial repayment for Tehran’s substantial nuclear debt to Moscow. Whatever the case, the proposed transfer indicates that sanctions-induced supply chain problems and other issues are hindering Russia’s domestic production of drones, which was already lagging for reasons discussed below. It also demonstrates Tehran’s willingness to offer substantial military support despite the possibility of negative political ramifications—a risk that may be counterbalanced by the prospect of promoting and boosting Iranian military industries.?
Why Does Moscow Need Iranian Drones?
Both Russia and Iran had been expanding their drone capabilities over the past decade—the former as a result of combat experiences in Crimea and Donbas since 2014, the latter after watching U.S.-led coalition forces deploy UAVs effectively in Afghanistan and Iraq. Drones have also found an increasingly important place in Iran’s asymmetric way of warfare.
As part of this development, Iran’s drone industry has produced?a wide range?of reconnaissance, attack, and suicide models, some of which have been exported to other countries (e.g., Ethiopia, Tajikistan, Venezuela). In October 2013, the IRGC Aerospace Force?gifted?a Yasir—a small reconnaissance UAV copied from the American ScanEagle—to the visiting commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force.
Russia likewise aims to become a major drone power, with the Kronstadt Group currently?completing?the country’s first modern production line for large UAVs in Dubna. Yet because Moscow has been slower to prioritize drone development, it has now turned to Tehran to fulfill its immediate needs for UAVs in Ukraine, including armed reconnaissance models and possibly even suicide drones.
Indeed, drones are playing a key role in the current war, and deploying a large number of new ones over the battlefield could give Russia the same type of psychological and tactical boost that Ukrainian forces enjoyed when they first began using Bayraktar drones?imported from Turkey. Moscow may even hope to alter the course of the entire conflict by using drones more widely. Yet truly modern Russian designs have yet to enter production, let alone active service—including combat models such as the Orion-E, Inokhodets-RU (Sirius), Helios-RLD, Grom, and Molniya, which boast significantly better performance, larger payloads, and satellite communication capability for longer range. The ZALA/Kalashnikov KUB loitering munition is being used in Ukraine, but its short range and very small warhead make it inferior to similar Iranian designs. In short, Tehran’s drones can be an ideal stopgap until the Kremlin’s “real” drones are available.
What Iran Can Offer
Iran could provide a variety of multipurpose UAVs to Russia:
The current Russian order apparently includes direct delivery of 50-100 midrange Ababil-3 drones built by Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA) and presently in service with the IRGC and Artesh national armed forces. This type has been in production at HESA’s Shahin Shahr facility near Isfahan since at least 2010, but it is unknown what percentage of the Russian order will be new-built. The Iranian military has fielded many of these drones in the original Ababil-3 form, the slightly upgraded A3N variant, and the Ababil-4 model, using them for attack roles and surveillance/artillery spotting purposes. For attack runs, the Ababil-3 can carry two small-diameter Qaem guided bombs with a 1.7-kg warhead and range of 6 km, or Almas top-attack guided missiles with a range of 8 km. The drone has a maximum range of 250 km and can reportedly stay airborne for up to 8 hours at an altitude of 5 km.
Notably, the Ababil-3 is powered by a four-cylinder Mado MD550 engine, an inferior copy of the German Limbach L550e engine using Chinese parts and assemblies. The IRGC-affiliated Oje Parvaz Mado Nafar Co., based in Shokuhieh Industrial Town northwest of Qom, is currently the largest producer of drone piston engines in Iran. In October 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department?sanctioned?the company and its directors for procuring engines and parts for Iran’s military and drone industry.
To be sure,?Iranian factories probably cannot manufacture new drones fast enough to meet Russia’s urgent demand. Even if they maximized output at their three active or partially active drone production lines near Tehran and Isfahan, they would still need to import or manufacture many electronics and engine parts. Hence, a significant part of Moscow’s order will presumably need to be drawn from existing stocks. And given that the deal reportedly calls for “hundreds” of drones, Iran will be tapping heavily into its aerial forces and sending a mix of different types.?
Receiving a mix of drones will also lengthen the familiarization and training period for Russian personnel and complicate their operations. For every batch of 100 Ababil-3 drones, Iran must train 200 Russian pilots, communications specialists, technicians, and handlers—though each training session will likely take no longer than two weeks. In addition, Iran must produce sufficient numbers of associated mobile command-and-control and communications stations—otherwise Russia will not be able to use the drones efficiently in the vast spread of Ukrainian battlefields. Each Iranian station can control only one drone at a time.
As for Iranian personnel, a relatively large number of technicians and engineers will need to accompany the drones to Russia—and probably Ukraine—in order to handle equipment and software standardization issues. Although this could put Iranians in harm’s way, their presence might offset Russia’s challenges with integrating new weapon systems from new suppliers under combat conditions. And Tehran would no doubt try to minimize the domestic impact of any casualties by keeping them a secret.
Conclusion
If Iranian drone deliveries to Russia are carried out, they will likely sound the starting gun for further bilateral military cooperation in Ukraine. Whether such cooperation will eventually lead the IRGC Qods Force to deploy proxy forces to Ukrainian battlefronts is unclear, but in the meantime it could open the way for delivery of more controversial weapons such as short-range Iranian ballistic missiles. Given Russia’s dwindling stocks of Iskander ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, an influx of Iranian munitions would enable it to attack more long-range high-value targets in Ukraine.
Such deliveries would also be in line with the Iranian leadership’s strategic views on great power competition with the United States. On July 21, the chairman of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri,?noted?Tehran’s delight at the fact that Russia is emerging from “passivity” and actively confronting NATO’s “expansionism to the east,” referring to Ukraine. In his view, the current “transitional period” will coincide with the “decline of American power.”
Similarly, a July 24?editorial?in?Kayhan, a newspaper considered close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, praised Russia’s invasion as a “preemptive” measure that closed NATO’s path to aggressive actions in Crimea and even Iran. According to hardliners in Khamenei’s circle, the Ukraine war is a continuation of the “resistance axis” struggles in Iraq and Syria, so Russia’s efforts should be supported—for now with drones and drone technicians.
Farzin Nadimi is an associate fellow with The Washington Institute, specializing in security and defense in Iran and the Gulf region.
end of quote
Andrew Beckwith, PhD