To save Ukraine, Europe needs a Trump-compatible plan.

Fabrice Pothier is the CEO of European geopolitical advisory firm Rasmussen Global and served as Director of Policy Planning at NATO from 2010-2016.

While European leaders had plenty of time to prepare for Donald Trump’s eventual return, they still show little understanding about what it will mean for Europe’s most important security issue: Ukraine. You often hear—in the same sentence—delusional talk of Trump-proofing Ukraine and anxious speculation about what Trump 2.0 will mean.

While Ukraine and Europe have the most to lose if Putin succeeds, the United States is indispensable to reaching a just end to the war. Trump’s correct instinct is to end the war as soon as possible, but Europe and Ukraine must together quickly go on the offensive and shape his approach for doing so.

The Biden administration’s approach has set Ukraine on a slow but inevitable and painful path to failure. Fear of Russian escalation is given greater priority than Ukraine’s survival. As a result, the Ukrainians are fighting a nuclear power supported by China, North Korea, and Iran with one hand tied in their back.

Not yet in the Oval Office, Trump is already shaking things up. In conversations with his advisers, you will generally hear the right instincts: the need to have a strategy to end the war—and to quickly build the leverage required to meet this objective. This, at least, differs from the Biden approach of “as long as it takes,” which lacks any semblance of an end goal.

However, the obvious unknown, including most likely with Trump himself, is what a peace agreement would look like. Leaving him with free rein and hoping for the best is too great a risk—as evidenced by his deal with the Taliban which paved the way for their swift return to power.

This is where Europe and Ukraine must actively shape the terms of a deal: one that enhances European security by guaranteeing a sovereign Ukraine and helping avoid future conflicts—in Ukraine and beyond—of the kind that Trump ran against.

Europe must first demonstrate its willingness to step up militarily and address one of the main grievances from Trump’s Republicans. Doing so could strengthen Ukraine’s hand ahead of difficult negotiations and send an important signal to Washington that a fair agreement would not require US troops on the ground—something obsessed over by many of Trump’s allies.

A group of willing European military powers, led by France and the UK with contributions from the Nordics and Eastern Europe, should form a new train-and-advise mission away from the frontlines in western Ukraine. While this could later serve as the foundations of a peace enforcement mission, Europe should not wait for a ceasefire—something the Ukrainians see as dangerously freezing the conflict—to start deploying them.

In that vein, Ukrainian border NATO allies like Poland and Romania should also extend their air and missile defence to cover Ukraine’s border territory and free up Ukrainian air defence systems for use elsewhere.

In parallel, European allies should develop a long-term plan for the defence of Ukraine, which would see Europe and Ukraine together taking on 70 per cent of the future burden for Ukraine’s security.

Both Republicans and Democrats view EU membership as their preferred driver of Ukraine’s long-term survival—in no small part because it means Europe picking up the bill for reconstruction and reform. Yet EU membership for Ukraine is and will remain unacceptable in most European capitals unless Ukraine can count on the US-backed security guarantee that comes with NATO membership.

However, a major sticking-point for the US—under Biden and with Trump’s advisors—is the prospect of future Ukrainian membership in NATO requiring significant deployments of US troops to Ukraine as deterrence against a rested and rearmed Russia.

But Ukraine’s forces are battle-tested, western-trained, and armed with billions of dollars in NATO-standard equipment. Together with the support of European forces, they will be capable of territorial defence over the coming decade. While surveillance, air defence, and other critical US enablers would still be required, an approach that does not require large numbers of US boots on the ground would be more palatable in DC.

New NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte could then present this 70/30 plan to the White House, and in return seek the US’ support for Ukraine’s NATO membership.

Trump is not a transatlanticist—he is a transactionalist. Instead of talking about Trump-proofing our support to Ukraine, Europe must make it Trump-compatible. The future of Ukraine—and Europe’s long-term security—could depend on our ability to do so.