Salvage and SCOPIC - Answers to the common questions

What is SCOPIC and why is it an essential safety net in the context of remunerating salvors who act to protect the environment? Given there is international legislation pre-dating SCOPIC, addressing the very same issues of compensation, why was SCOPIC necessary? Is SCOPIC fit for purpose and does it cure the mischiefs that it set out to address?

If you haven't read my article on "Salvage - Answers to the common questions," you may find it of value.

I suppose the initial questions are (a) what does “SCOPIC” stand for, (b) what does it achieve and (c) where does it come from?

“SCOPIC” is the acronym for the, “Special Compensation P&I Club” clause. The name derives from, and can be considered a partial successor, to Article 14 of The London Salvage Convention 1989 (the 1989 Convention). By way of background, Article 14 is entitled, “Special Compensation.”

Both SCOPIC and Article 14 of the 1989 Convention provide a safety net to salvors to compensate them for the services they have provided in protecting the environment that they cannot recover through their usual salvage remuneration entitlement, which focuses on rewarding the saving of property from danger.

SCOPIC is the creature of the International Salvage Union, the International Group of P&I Clubs and later the Property Underwriters who wished to provide an alternative renumeration mechanism to Article 14 to reward salvors’ efforts in protecting the environment. It was introduced on 1 August 1999.

Why do salvors need a safety net? Why not just have the arbitrator add an extra slice to the salvage award based on the salvors additional services in protecting the environment?

Well, the underlying approach to salvage is that of, “no-cure, no-pay.” It works like this: When a salvage operation is complete and there is a redelivery of the vessel to the owners from the salvors, a salvage fund is calculated, (made up of the value of the saved property and the freight at risk).

Following this, salvage renumeration is established taking into consideration the threat to the property and the extent, nature and risks involved in providing the salvage services, against the background of the size of fund. The criteria for determining the amount to be received by the salvors are set out in Article 13 of the 1989 Convention. The salvage remuneration is frequently referred to as the Article 13 Award, (although most salvage services are settled by agreement between the parties without the need to trouble the courts or the arbitrator for an award, so when we say "Award" we mean, "Award or agreement reached between the parties"). See here for more information on determining the value of salvage services.

...if there was no salvage fund because the vessel was lost, there could be no compensation for services provided by the salvors to protect the environment. ?

However, if there is only a small salvage fund, (or no salvage fund at all if the vessel is lost), there may be no mechanism under a “no-cure no-pay” approach for the salvor to be compensated for his time and expense in full where he has mobilized equipment and personnel to protect the environment from damage.

So, while an Article 13 Award could, in theory, have an additional, "slice" added for services to protect against damage to the environment where property was also saved, if there was no salvage fund because the vessel was lost, there could be no compensation for services provided by the salvors to protect the environment. ?

By way of example, in 1979, Atlantic Express was on a voyage from the Persian Gulf to Texas, laden with 270,000 tons of crude oil, when she collided with Aegean Captain. Atlantic Express was holed and caught fire. Oil started flowing out of the vessel. There was an extreme risk of major pollution to Trinidad and Tobago and the South American mainland.

Salvors towed Atlantic Express away from land as they continued to fight the fire. During this exercise, there was a massive explosion and the vessel was lost. She sank with much of her cargo still on board. This remains the largest oil spill from a tanker on record at about 8 times the volume of oil lost by Exxon Valdez, but features little in the public’s consciousness, as thanks to the efforts of the salvors, there was no pollution ashore. Unhappily though, for the salvors, salvage law as it stood at the time, meant that the salvors were entitled to no compensation for their services in protecting the environment, as they had not been successful in saving the property from danger.

If as a matter of public policy, we want to encourage salvors to use their skill and equipment to protect the environment, we need to provide them with a safety net...

If as a matter of public policy, we want to encourage salvors to use their skill and equipment to protect the environment, we need to provide them with a safety net independent of an Article 13 Award that compensates them for this.

There is then, in addition, the issue of who properly pays for the different services provided by the salvors if we are to reward both (a) saving the vessel along with the other property on the vessel, and (b) protecting the environment.

In the context of an Article 13 Award, where a vessel and cargo are saved by salvors the award will be prorated against the value of the vessel and cargo, (leaving aside, for the sake of simplicity, other property saved and freight at risk). So, if the saved value of the vessel is USD2m and the cargo is USD8m, (a salvage fund of USD10m), and an USD2m Article 13 Award is made, the vessel will contribute USD400k and the cargo USD1.6m.

So, it’s a fair question to ask as to why an additional slice can’t be added to the Article 13 Award for the services in protecting the environment?

Part of the answer is to ask where the funds will come from to pay (a) the Article 13 Award and (b) the additional services expended in protecting the environment. As insurance is generally in place, it will be the property underwriters (hull and cargo) that, subject any deductible, pay the Article 13 Award. However, that leaves the second question of who pays for the costs of mitigating against and/or cleaning up pollution, even if those efforts were unsuccessful?

It is not the cargo’s business to be compensating salvors for work they do in minimizing the vessel’s exposure to environmental claims.

Liability for pollution will lie with the vessel, not the cargo, other property or indeed the freight at risk. It is not the cargo’s business to be compensating salvors for work they do in minimizing the vessel’s exposure to environmental claims. ?

In addition, property underwriters do not provide cover for environmental damage, (or the cost of efforts to prevent environmental damage), so it is not for the hull underwriters to be putting their hands in their pockets.

Those expenses lie with the owner alone and his third-party liability insurers, typically the P&I Clubs. So even if it were possible to add an environmental protection uplift to an Article 13 Award, it would (a) still be necessary to have a methodology for calculating the amount to be attributed to mitigating against environmental damage, so it could be allocated for the account of the vessel owners and their third party liability insurers only and (b) the risk remains that the salvage fund would be insufficient to cover such an environmental uplift, (which would certainly be the case if the vessel were lost).

Lastly, for General Average purposes we would need to separate out the Article 13 Award and any additional payment pursuant to protection of the environment. I explain this further below.

Ok. I see the need to encourage salvors to protect the environment, so how was this achieved?

The first attempt at a safety net came with Lloyds Open Form 1980 (LOF1980). This applied only to laden or partially laden oil tankers carrying a cargo of oil but included protecting against bunker spills from those vessels. (Oddly, this meant that a large container vessel, or bulk carrier, that may have been carrying more bunkers than a small tanker, fell outside of the scheme, as would a tanker with no cargo).

LOF1980 allowed a salvor who was unsuccessful, or only partially successful, in providing salvage services, to still recover his expenses plus an uplift of 15% of those expenses.

The concept of a “fair rate” would prove to be problematic though, and become a mischief it would take the industry two decades to cure.

So, if a salvor contracted in a tug for example, a 15% uplift could be added to the charter rate. In addition, LOF1980 provided for the salvor to be awarded a “fair rate” where the salvor’s own assets and personnel were utilized. This part of an award would be applied solely against the owner of the tanker and could be considered as an encouragement to the salvors to protect the environment. The concept of a “fair rate” would prove to be problematic though, and become a mischief it would take the industry two decades to cure. More on that later. ?

So far so good. A step in the right direction, though only for tankers carrying oil cargoes, and only applicable where LOF1980 had been executed and not one of the many other salvage agreements that were, and are, in use worldwide.

What happened next?

Then came the 1989 Convention, and within that, Article 14, the “Special Compensation” provision, a methodology for rewarding salvors that took steps to protect the environment. This was intended to put the LOF1980 safety net on a statutory footing and would apply in all contracting states irrespective of the salvage agreement utilized.

I have set out below the first 4 clauses of Article 14, but I wouldn’t spend too much time examining them because as we will see, they have become a bit of a historical footnote, (in so far as Lloyds Form Arbitrations are concerned), so feel free to skim read them:

·???????? (1) If the salvor has carried out salvage operations in respect of a vessel which by itself or its cargo threatened damage to the environment and has failed to earn a reward under article 13 at least equivalent to the special compensation assessable in accordance with this article, he shall be entitled to special compensation from the owner of that vessel equivalent to his expenses as herein defined.

·???????? (2) If, in the circumstances set out in paragraph 1, the salvor by his salvage operations has prevented or minimized damage to the environment, the special compensation payable by the owner to the salvor under paragraph 1 may be increased up to a maximum of 30% of the expenses incurred by the salvor. However, the tribunal, if it deems it fair and just to do so and bearing in mind the relevant criteria set out in article 13, paragraph 1, may increase such special compensation further, but in no event shall the total increase be more than 100% of the expenses incurred by the salvor.

·???????? (3) Salvor’s expenses for the purpose of paragraphs 1 and 2 means the out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred by the salvor in the salvage operation and a fair rate for equipment and personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage operation, taking into consideration the criteria set out in article 13…

·???????? (4) The total special compensation under this article shall be paid only if and to the extent that such compensation is greater than any reward recoverable by the salvor under article 13.

·???????? (5)…

·???????? (6)…

As the 1989 Convention became part of UK domestic law, so it was automatically incorporated into the LOF agreements. (LOF is in effect a “bolt on” that sits alongside and operates with 1989 Convention, not a substitute for it).

So, given there is a Special Compensation clause in the 1989 Convention providing a safety net, why are the P&I Clubs meddling by producing their own SCOPIC Clause instead of just following international law?

Well, when it came down to it, although well intentioned, Article 14 really didn’t work very well. To address some of the points in turn:

When is Article 14 triggered? - The simple answer is the safety net would come into being when damage to the environmental was threatened. However, things are rather murky as to what ocean-based location of the casualty and combination of tidal, current and weather conditions would need to exist to trigger Article 14 for a Special Compensation payment.

To explain: Threat to the environment is the trigger for Special Compensation. Such a threat is defined in the 1989 Convention as meaning the threat of, “…substantial physical damage to human health or to marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution, contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents.”

While possibly simple to assess with hindsight, probably not so easy when immediate mobilization decisions must made to deploy craft and personnel where the wrong decision could result in a salvor being seriously out of pocket.

You could have sympathy with a salvor’s in-house counsel who on being asked for legal advice, notes that this is a purely factual question and not a legal one, and that should salvors be 100% successful in preventing environmental damage, opponents may have a parade of experts before the Lloyds Form Arbitrator opining that the lack of damage is evidence there was never?threat in the first place and no Special Compensation should be due.

What are the rules for applying the uplift? - Article 14.2 provides for an uplift on the salvors expenses up to a maximum of 30%, although the tribunal may increase the uplift to a ceiling of 100%.

However, there is no guidance as to when different uplift rates may be applied.

What is a “Fair Rate”? - Reflecting LOF1980, Article 4.3 sets out the calculation methodology. The salvor receives his out-of-pocket expenses, (tugs, equipment, disbursements – flights, hotels etc. - personnel the salvor must contract in – say local divers - etc.), plus an uplift, (see above), and then in addition a “fair rate” for the salvors own equipment and directly employed personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage operation.

For example, a fair rate can be applied for the salvors own craft, salvor’s staff on site, or say a naval architect at head office fully engaged in modelling the vessel’s stability and longitudinal strength.

So far so good. But then at this point, matters get a bit sticky. What is a fair rate?

Would a fair rate be, for example, what a salvor could earn if he rented out the equipment in question? (Such a rental fee would of course include a profit element). Or should the arbitrator consider a fair rate to be confined to the costs to the salvor in owning and maintaining the equipment, the storage costs, the inspection costs etc. What about the managing director’s company car, the accounts department, IT, HR? Should the cost of these be apportioned pro-rata across all income earning assets to determine a fair rate or be seen as coming off the corporate headline profits. Management accountants will argue this point endlessly, a dream exercise for them, a nightmare for the rest of us.

The issue of “profit” however, did go to the House of Lords (now known as the Supreme Court) in the Nagasaki Spirit. It was determined by their lordships, that a fair rate did not include an element of profit. However, as should be clear from the above, to determine the cost to the salvor in owning, maintaining and keeping in a state of operational readiness the equipment, required a time consuming and expensive accounting exercise, subject to multiple litigation challenges, with disclosure of the salvor’s accounts to the other parties. What about a tug on salvage station that is called out twice a year, Is a fair rate all the costs associated with that tug for the year divided by two?

Uncertainty is the enemy of controlling legal costs, and certainly an impediment to a negotiated settlement, thereby greatly increasing the risk of litigation. Knowing some of those involved in the Nagasaki Spirit litigation, it is fair to say there is very little appetite for a repeat exercise.

In addition, the more complex a hearing, the longer it takes, so the greater the delay in fixing a date where the parties have a clear window for the litigation, and so the greater the elapsed time before the salvors obtain their funds. Moreover, the uncertainty of a correct Article 14 result leaves an award ripe for appeal. Further costs and delays and more time before the salvors receive their funds. And cash flow is king.

Did Article 14 need to be re-drafted then?

Arguably, yes. However, there was an element of urgency. Both the P&I Clubs and salvors became increasingly concerned about Article 14 and the litigation costs concerning the application in practice of determining Special Compensation. In addition, the Clubs were concerned about their lack of control over costs of the salvage operation. Bear in mind that prior to this, P&I Clubs had little exposure to salvage, save where the need for salvage services arose from causative unseaworthiness on their member's vessel and cargo were seeking a salvage indemnity from the carrier pursuant to the contract of carriage. More on that here.

Although perhaps Article 14 could be redrafted, it would be a time-consuming process and frankly the industry was probably better positioned to cure the mischiefs arising from Article 14.

The outcome, following negotiation between the interested parties, led to the development of the SCOPIC Clause. More on the practical operation of the clause below.

Can we forget about Article 14 then?

Unfortunately, no, not fully. SCOPIC must be incorporated into the Salvage Agreement for it to apply. As we will see, SCOPIC features in the LOF Agreements, so far as I am aware, it is not found in other Salvage Agreements. So, in those cases, and where there is a contracting state to the 1989 Convention, Article 14 will still feature. In addition, if salvage services are provided subject to English law, without an LOF agreement, (often referred to as a common law salvage), then the appropriate forum would be the High Court, not the Lloyds Form Arbitrator, SCOPIC would not feature, and Article 14 would apply. (Of course, the Parties would be free to vary this by consent).

In addition, as mentioned below, even in the context of an LOF, Article 14 may come into play, in circumstances where security for Special Compensation is not in place.

How do I know whether SCOPIC or Article 14 applies?

On the face of LOF, there is box 7, with a question, “Is the SCOPIC Clause incorporated into this agreement?” There are two options, “yes” or “no”. Usually, the response will be, “yes.” A copy of LOF2024, the latest version, is here.

Furthermore, contained within the SCOPIC Clause itself, is a provision requiring the salvor, assuming SCOPIC is incorporated, to invoke or trigger the SCOPIC clause by written notice to the owners of the vessel. SCOPIC remuneration only runs from the time of invoking the clause, not from the date of agreeing the LOF that incorporates it.

So, can we summarize the operation of SCOPIC?

Absolutely. In summary, SCOPIC provides for the following:

1.????? As foreshadowed above, if SCOPIC is incorporated into the LOF, then during any period that SCOPIC has not been invoked by the salvor, the salvage is purely a “no-cure, no-pay,” salvage, there is no “safety net.” The salvor cannot make a claim pursuant to Article 14 for services during that time.

2.????? The salvor may invoke SCOPIC at any time prior to termination of salvage services. There is no requirement to identify an environmental threat, so this removes any uncertainty in respect of whether there is an environmental threat and Special Compensation is payable. This will not be a dispute that the arbitrator will have to address.

3.????? Once SCOPIC is invoked, the owner, (or more typically the P&I Club), can appoint a Special Casualty Representative, (the SCR) to attend the salvage. The Salvage Master and SCR liaise daily in respect of the salvage plan and equipment deployed. The SCR is at liberty to dissent in respect of the Salvage Master’s daily report and challenge the equipment and personnel deployed. (Remember the Club is effectively paying, in part, for the attending personnel and mobilized equipment daily, so it wants value for money). If the SCR gives a dissenting report, any initial SCOPIC remuneration is at the rate the SCR believes to be applicable until the dispute is resolved by way of agreement or arbitration. This gives those parties paying the Special Compensation comfort that the charges and services are legitimate.

(I should add, I have never seen a dispute between a Salvage Master and an SCR that has not been resolved on site. As to the nature and extent of any discussions relating to a disagreement on site, whatever they may be, news rarely makes its way back home and it should be remembered that the salvage master remains in charge of the operation).

Typically, a spreadsheet is issued daily with the equipment, detailing personnel activated, the daily rate and cumulative expenditure so all parties can monitor the costs. Hull and cargo may also appoint their own Special Hull Representative and Special Cargo Representative, although this a relatively rare. (In LOF salvages all interested parties are entitled to receive the Salvage Master’s Daily Position Report and the SCR’s report if one is appointed. This is either provided directly by the salvors, or by the Council of Lloyds).

4.????? Attached to the SCOPIC Clause is a tariff for equipment and personal, giving a daily rate for say (a) tugs of specific bhp ranges, (b) equipment such as pumps and hoses, and (c) personnel such as divers, salvage masters and naval architects. This substitutes the need to determine a “fair rate” and ensures all parties understand the expenses being incurred daily. The general rule then is a 25% uplift, though this can be varied, but the rules for this are clearly set out. The combination of the SCR working with the Salvage Master and the tariff sheet means that, in the absence of a challenge by the SCR, there is rarely a need for the arbitrator to involve himself in costs or to determine what uplift applies. ?

5.????? Unlike Article 14, the SCOPIC Clause provides for a relatively quick payment of the SCOPIC remuneration that is not disputed by the SCR, (if this should occur), giving salvors predictability with respect to their cash flow.

6.????? Having invoked SCOPIC, salvors are entitled to receive USD3m as security within two working days. This provision is of a particular advantage to salvors. Pursuant to the 1989 Convention, property owners are required to provide security for salvage remuneration and the owner is required to provide security for Special Compensation. However, if the vessel is lost and Special Compensation is owing, there is no maritime or possessory lien for the salvors to enforce. Even if not lost, the value of the vessel may be insufficient for the Special Compensation that will be awarded. The provision of security by the Club at an early stage provides comfort to the salvor that the funds are there for their services.

7.????? The overriding bonus for all parties, is that the additional certainty brought to the table by the SCOPIC Clause, greatly reduces the risk of litigation and hence the legal costs while generally speeding the process of settlement up, frequently without the need to trouble the arbitrator.

What if the security amount of USD3m is inappropriate?

If it is reasonable in the circumstances to increase or decrease the security level, the parties must do so. If an agreement cannot be reached, Lloyds can be requested to appoint an arbitrator to resolve the issue. A costs penalty may be levied against a party that the arbitrator considers has acted unreasonably.

There doesn’t seem to be a termination provision with Article 14, what about SCOPIC?

Once the SCOPIC Clause has been invoked, the vessel owner can terminate SCOPIC with five days’ notice. The Vessel will be liable for the existing SCOPIC costs, and for that five-day notice period along with any reasonable demobilization time, (returning personnel and assets to their home base etc.).

However, if the Contractor is prevented from demobilizing his equipment by Government, Local or Port Authorities or any other officially recognized body having jurisdiction over the area where the services are being rendered then SCOPIC services continue, and the owner remains liable.

If security is not provided to the salvors within 2 working days of SCOPIC being invoked, the salvor may at his option withdraw from SCOPIC and continue under the main salvage agreement, and be entitled to Special Compensation pursuant to Article 14 as though the SCOPIC Clause had not existed.

The situation is slightly more complex where an increase in security is required. Where an increase has been agreed, or ordered by the arbitrator, and not provided with two working days, salvors may terminate SCOPIC under the SCOPIC Clause and terminate their salvage services under the main agreement. The Owner will be liable for all SCOPIC based Special Compensation to date, plus the demobilizing time.

You’ve not focused on the salvage remuneration for saving the property, what’s to stop salvors just invoking SCOPIC and earning all their money on the tariff and uplift? Is there even a need to determine an Article 13 Award for saving the vessel, property on the vessel and freight at risk?

Good questions. Let’s deal with the second one first. By way of reminder, we refer to the salvage remuneration awarded by the Lloyd’s Form Arbitrator for saving the property as the Article 13 Award, as it is this article in the 1989 Convention that sets out the criteria for the award.

The Article 13 Award must always be determined, since that will be paid first by the property, (or more usually their insurers). If the compensation due under the SCOPIC Clause is greater than the Article 13 Award, then the vessel owner, (or more usually the third-party liability insurer, typically a P&I Club), will pay the difference between the Article 13 Award and the SCOPIC Special Compensation.

And if the SCOPIC compensation is less that the Article 13 remuneration?

In that case, the property (or their insurers) will pay the Article 13 Award in full and the vessel owner (or the third-party liability insurers will pay nothing).

There is one final little wrinkle though. If the Article 13 Award or settlement (before currency adjustment and before interest and costs) under the main agreement is greater than the assessed SCOPIC remuneration then, notwithstanding the actual date on which the SCOPIC remuneration provisions were invoked, that Article 13 Award or settlement shall be discounted by 25% of the difference between the Article 13 Award or settlement and the amount of SCOPIC remuneration that would have been assessed had the SCOPIC remuneration provisions been invoked on the first day of the services. This in effect acts as a penalty on those salvors who may be a little over enthusiastic in invoking SCOPIC.

Anything on the litigation risk, it is after all a litigation risk newsletter?

Very little really. SCOPIC is quite formulaic, that’s the beauty of it. It’s a great example of industry bodies coming together to provide a solution to the sort of un-forecast complexities presented by the drafters of Article 14 of the 1989 Convention. Not every instance of SCOPIC use is a happy result for all the parties, but most of the time it works well.

If there is one tip, it is this: Where the SCOPIC is going to be paid by a Club, keep them closely involved in the Article 13 negotiation, after all, assuming that the SCOPIC is greater than the Article 13, which it should be unless there has been an error on the part of salvors, the closer in value the Article 13 Award or settlement is to SCOPIC, the less the Club pays. It would be ill advised to for property underwriters to settle Article 13 without the knowledge of the Club.

Interestingly, in these circumstances, where SCOPIC is greater than Article 13, the salvors are relatively relaxed, since they know what they will be receiving pursuant to the SCOPIC clause, just not where it will all be coming from. It’s important though that the split of that sum between property insurers and third-party liability insurers is seen as transparent and fair. There may even be value in investing in an opinion from one of the members of the Bar who act as Lloyd’s Form Arbitrators for their view on a reasonable and fair award. Alternatively, if you have instructed a law firm with several experienced admiralty practitioners, it is common practice for a “guestimate” request to be circulated within the firm based on an overview of the facts and an informed Article 13 assessment derived from the responses.

You mentioned above the fact that an Article 13 Award and the safety net being combined into a single sum would raise General Average issues. Why is that?

The Article 13 Award is properly part of a GA Adjustment. It is an expense incurred to safeguard the common maritime adventure, by preserving or contributing to preserve the property that makes up the common maritime adventure, from danger.

Costs incurred by the salvors that exceed the Article 13 Award, to protect the environment and thereby limit third party claims against the vessel for environmental damage, do not fall within the General Average definition of, “…any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is voluntarily and reasonably made or incurred in time of peril for the purpose of preserving the property imperiled in the common adventure”, meaning that for GA purposes, the Article 13 Award and Special Compensation need to be accounted for separately.

This is addressed in the SCOPIC Clause, para 15, as follows:

·???????? 15 – General Average - SCOPIC remuneration shall not be a General Average expense to the extent that it exceeds the Article 13 Award; any liability to pay such SCOPIC remuneration shall be that of the Shipowner alone and no claim whether direct, indirect, by way of indemnity or recourse or otherwise relating to SCOPIC remuneration in excess of the Article 13 Award shall be made in General Average or under the vessel’s Hull and Machinery Policy by the owners of the vessel.

An overview of General Average can be found here.

So, is SCOPIC fit for purpose and has the "mischief" been cured?

I'd say as fit as it can be. There are tensions on occasion, but that's hardly unexpected in the context of a document governing multi million dollar claims for services. It difficult to see what other solution would be acceptable to all the stakeholders, and therein lies the key, these are matters that all sides of the table need to reach common ground on.

Has the "mischief" been cured? I'll let you judge for yourself, but for my part, I'd say mostly and probably about as far as is pragmatically possible.

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Other Articles

• The legal threats that arise during casualty management: Do you/your Emergency Response Team know how to recognize and mitigate against those threats?
• Carriage - Is a certificate of competency sufficient to prove competence? (An introduction to carriage of goods by sea law and when negligence is a defence).
• In Class, STCW compliant, all certificates valid, yet still unseaworthy. Why?
• The master's statement of facts, what should be included, and more importantly, excluded.
• Accident Investigations - What is the purpose, who investigates, and must you answer questions?
• General average - Common questions
• Salvage - Common questions
• The Ever Given - Why was there a dispute over salvage and what were the findings of the court.

The Legal Stuff

Please note that I am no longer a practicing solicitor, and the content here, which is in the context of English law, (except where otherwise highlighted), only provides a generic overview. Exceptions and conditions apply to the statements of law which given the space available are very generalized. You should always seek assistance and guidance from the vessel's P&I Club, or your legal advisor, based on the fact-specific issues before taking any action and you should not rely on this content.

Fair winds, calm seas and, as always, it is to be hoped that the above is only ever of academic interest.

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Litigation Risk Management Newsletter by Ian MacLean

#litigationriskmanagement #salvage #shipping #cargoinsurance #marine

Ian MacLean

Singapore - 5 November 2024

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