Safety Reports must be understood to be fostered

"Remember, there are no bad crews, only bad leaders." (Master Chief John Urgayle. G.I. Jane)

The first encounter I experienced with aviation happened when I was a kid. My father, a civilian aircraft engineer at the Peruvian Air Force, was sending safety messages to all of us at home, whenever he felt it was the proper time to do it. So, we could find out a wall was just painted, a faucett was under progressive repair or a door lock was replaced. The feedback was immediate. We could not touch such things, and we should be careful (that is what I remember the most from my Old Man), and the recognition was imperishable for him. The communication arrangement worked fine at home because of him, his training and briefings, I have to add.

Nowadays, we run management systems for quality, safety or other specialties. It is clear we must have a policy and something to solve, demonstrate or pursue, and that is when we set the objectives of the management system. All of these schemes have a design and a clear way to sucess. Sometimes, though, setbacks, procedural violations, and deviations set diferent ways, drag or shift the efforts elsewhere up to the point it turns out difficult to achieve the designed purpose of the system.

Human performance, the philosophy of the procedures, standards and regulations are really hard to understand and interact with each other. ICAO Document 9683, paragraph 1.2.12, states "Liveware-Software. This encompasses humans and the non-physical aspects of the system such as procedures, manual and checklist layout, symbology and computer programmes. Liveware-software problems are conspicuous in accident reports, but they are often difficult to observe and are consequently more difficult to resolve (for example, misinterpretation of checklists or symbology, non-compliance with procedures, etc.)." Why do not we have a good interaction here? According to ICAO Annex 6, part I, human performance means "human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety and efficiency of aeronautical operations". As long as we focus on the limitations and not on the capabilities human beings might have, we will always struggle to or just pretend to get corrections at least. That means proper leadership, a just and learning culture, and empowerment to all of us in the aviation industry, will be stronger and more effective than blaming, punishing, and sanctioning. If we are "nurtered" in this culture of blaming instead of monitoring, punishing (by punching, hitting, or demoting) instead of finding out the latent conditions that really trigger the deviations, we are condemned to correct all the time, and to become more expensive than expected or allowed.

Such cultures, wherein no learning or just arrangements are designed, make people living within it exclude themselves from the efforts or the objectives. And that is what really happens. People do not understand they will be an active asset for the preservation of their own lives and their jobs. As long as they deem they just go to work and play the technical or specialized roles they are recruited for, they will never understand they could help and keep the system in a safe status if they report unsafe conditions. That would be the individual side of the problem. What would be the other side? The leadership of managers of course. And here we have the onset of the solution (the problem if you want). It is not only the limitations to be focused on, do you remember? Organizations must focus on the capabilities. That is when the leadership of the managers is required. It is very human to imitate, to repeat, to get along within a system.

We might also say no one wants to write long or step-by-step safety reports (time, date, height, feet, pressure, and a lot of new screens to submit the safety reports). Some organizations are even using social apps to report unsafe conditions/activities, and CAAs are accepting these in the Safety Manauals. Some people do not have a problem with their names on the reports. Some do have a problem, and punishment could be the organizational answer. Matureness of the companies will be the ultimate answer then. By the way, times when pen/pencil and paper were used are almost over. They are replaced with tablets or smart phones, and it is fine. I remember these last months not using my pen for more than ten days or more, but my laptop all day long. It is not a "writer" time anymore. People just want to write, to use the tablet, to feel important doing this, to feel professional by sending a message that will reach the company in real time manner. And recognition is pretty much human around this endeavor. Some of us like to be "heard" and think I made this report and now the company is better!

So, organizations must:

• Understand their cultures by being aware of their own latent conditions through monitoring.
• Show the way for good behavior by the example (leadership) of their managers.
• Facilitate the way to submit safety reports.
• Be aware of the human performance features to improve the organizational performance.
• Prepare the way to face the safety reports (understanding), and once this is done, everything will be ready for fostering the safety reports.
• Have a feedback or recognition procedure for safety reporters.
• Achieve a two-way mature safety report thinking.

So, it will be better to understand, to be aware of the latent conditions, to be in full management of the culture, than correct and become expensive and not safe for your people, customers and equipment. Understanding first and fostering afterwards the safety reports shall be the proper sequencing and answer.