"Safety is pure waste": hyperbole or fundamental belief?

In light of recent events, this quote is jarring.?It seems, at first, inexcusable.?I had hoped to see there was additional context to help explain what Stockton Rush was trying to say.?For others who might be feeling the same, the interview transcript can be found here:

https://unsungscience.com/news/back-to-titanic-part-1/

Safety can be provided by redundancy.?If one system fails, another can take over.?The Titan's redundant buoyancy systems illustrate this principle.?Now, if the primary system never, ever fails then the redundant systems are indeed "pure waste".?And in that regard, Mr. Rush had a point. But.... what are the chances of those systems failing??And what's the severity if they do??There are good, established ways of wading through this. One of them involves analyzing the hazards, characterizing the balance of probability and severity with each, then redesigning or employing operational mitigations as necessary.?To illustrate, here are the primary hazards I could think of:

1. Structural failure

2. Loss of control (primarily vertical/buoyancy)

3. Loss of life support (related:loss of navigation, communication)

The podcast interview above touched on impressive redundancy with buoyancy systems to address hazard #2.?Much has been written in the press about hazard #3.?Life support provisions need to be designed around the prospects of successful recovery and its associated timeline.?Communication losses and navigation / position-reporting losses are certainly complicating factors.?The public record doesn't seem to have any real evidence here.?Public records do show, however, significant issues with hazard #1 and that seems to have been with the viewing port.?Structural integrity involves every part of the hull since fluid pressure is applied to every part of the exterior equally. The titanium endcap and the 5-inch carbon fiber main hull aren't enough on their own.?The viewing port needs to handle pressure too.

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/missing-titanic-submarine-oceangate-safety-warnings-lawsuits/

Now, I admit personal fondness for the hazard analysis technique.?But there is a fundamental weakness with it too.?Identified hazards could be incomplete. Probabilities and severities could be understated. And...the expense of carrying through suggested mitigations can be undesirable to businesses trying to balance their checkbook.?In all of this, we can be our own worst enemies.?Involving other, critical viewpoints can afford protection from our personal biases or blindspots.

People and organizations who would achieve high safety levels naturally seek defense against this.?The sad story here instead shows a record of resisting rather than welcoming independent review. In that, I feel I've found the answer to the headline question. Stockton Rush was right in that we all might as well stay in bed if we want zero risk.?But if you're going to take on risk, please -- please -- keep yourself open to critical review.?It is in your own best interest.