Safety Evolution | The Fifth Approach - Shared Safety Culture

In aviation, safety is “the state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level”.?

Aviation safety is dynamic. New safety hazards and risks continuously emerge and must be mitigated. As long as safety risks are kept under an appropriate level of control, a system as open and dynamic as aviation can still be kept safe.?

According to ICAO, it is noted that acceptable safety performance is often defined and influenced by domestic and international norms and culture. ( ICAO Doc 9859 (2.1.3),).

You may ask!

What is a safety culture??

A safety culture within an organization can be regarded as a set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices concerned with minimizing the exposure of employees, managers, customers, and members of the general public to conditions considered to be dangerous. A safety culture promotes among participants a shared attitude of concern for the consequences of their actions, which extends to material consequences as well as possible effects on people. (ICAO, Doc 9806 AN/763, Human Factors Guidelines for Safety Audits Manual,( 3.3.8))

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Safety culture in aviation refers to the personal dedication and accountability of individuals engaged in any activity that has a bearing on the safety of flight operations. It is a pervasive type of safety thinking that promotes an inherently questioning attitude, resistance to complacency, a commitment to excellence, and the fostering of both personal accountability and corporate self-regulation in safety matters. (ICAO, Doc 9806 AN/763, Human Factors Guidelines for Safety Audits Manual, (Appendix 1 to Chapter 3,2))

Organizations with effective safety cultures demonstrate many facets of tangible evidence. Many characteristics show as an indicator to the ICAO safety oversight team that a State is fostering an effective safety culture and vice versa. When I talk about safety culture the main responsibility for fostering it relies on states and the adoption is the responsibility of all safety stakeholders within that State.

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What is considered a good safety culture?

Safety culture comprises shared beliefs, norms, values, practices, and structures (including functions and related social relationships), concerning safety, in an organization.?

For example, it is commonly highlighted that there should be a commitment to the improvement of safety behaviors and attitudes at all organizational levels; an organizational structure and atmosphere that promotes open and clear communication where people feel free from intimidation or retribution in raising issues and are encouraged to ask questions; a propensity for resilience and flexibility to adapt effectively and safely.?

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Levels Of Safety Culture

Within one State, the safety stakeholders may reach different levels of safety culture at the same time, these levels are:

Level 1 (pathological)

Safety is considered unimportant and even senseless.

Level 2 (reactive)?

Safety is generally regarded as a burden that is imposed by the Authorities.

Level 3 (calculative)?

Safety is considered a factor that has to be accounted for. Safety is taken into account in management’s decision-making, but in itself, safety is not a core value. Action is only taken after an accident.

Level 4 (proactive)?

In a proactive safety culture, safety is considered a prerequisite. Safety is a core value of the organization and plays an important role in decision-making at the management level as well as in day-to-day operations.

Level 5 (generative)?

Safety is the core value of the organization and is recognized as essential for the continuity of operations. There is a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior.

Aviation Safety Evolution?

Progress in aviation safety is described by four approaches from the early 1900s until the beginning of the 21st century, these approaches roughly align with eras of activity such as Technical, Human factors, Organizational, and Total systems.?

The current era is a total system that has a goal “All aviation safety stakeholders Work together to put public safety at the center of everything that they do”.?

But the fact is, the safety performance within the total system is not stable because it can be low within one State and high in another State due to the different levels of safety culture.

When it comes to the corporation between States to maintain a total system, it needs a high safety performance to minimize the risks and accidents, there will be a gap because there is no?shared safety culture?that supports a high level of safety performance.

The third approach - Organizational era —safety is viewed from a systemic perspective which considered the impact of such things as organizational culture and policies on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. But it focused on individual organizations, it doesn't cover the importance of?shared safety culture?internationally.

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ICAO Doc 9859, says that many States and service providers had embraced the safety approaches of the past and evolved to a higher level of safety maturity. They have begun implementing SSP or SMSs and are reaping the safety benefits. However,?safety systems to date have focused largely on individual safety performance and local control, with minimal regard for the wider context of the total aviation system.?(ICAO Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual,2018, (2.1.3))

Why??

I kept asking myself over and over again, what is the next era for aviation safety evolution after the?fourth approach - the total system? I am going to share with you my point of view which is based on my analysis of the most needed new approach. it is a?shared safety culture?that can maintain acceptable safety performance internationally.?

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While it is complicated theoretically but it can be implemented gradually through the next years within each?State?through their?State Safety Program?and move to a wider scope of implementation internationally through?sharing and learning.??

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I will clear it, for example in one state, there are three stakeholders XYZ airline, ABC airport, and EFG aircraft maintenance company. These stakeholders established a safety management system in line with the state safety program. but the first one was marked with a level 3 safety culture [calculative], the second was marked with a level 2 safety culture [reactive], and the third one was marked with a level 1 safety culture [pathological]. We cannot assume that all those stakeholders have the same level of safety performance, or they have the same qualities for managing risks.?

Of course, no.?

The risks to aircraft may come from one of these three stakeholders because the aircraft operated by XYZ airline was repaired by EFG aircraft maintenance company to initiate its flight through ABC airport in State 1, and the risks may reach the sky of another State, or airport.?

Safety culture and risks

The relationship between safety culture and the risk field is reciprocal, as it is between, for example, management and the risk field. The safety culture enables and constrains the organization’s activities as regards risk understanding and risk management. Similarly, if adopted by the organization, new risk science developments can fertilize the safety culture, leading, for example, to better awareness of risks.

Let me share with you the IAEA concepts regarding risks & safety culture,?in the nuclear context?it uses a?‘graded approach’ to prioritize which problems to tackle.?

Regulators can use this approach in planning inspections, to inform what should be inspected, how the target should be inspected, as well as how often and to what extent.

Other example in the same nuclear context, in Finnish requirements for licensees, it is stated that the management system shall be developed and applied with consideration of the safety significance of the operation. The assessment of safety significance shall take into account, for example, the following: the complexity of the organization’s operations; complexity, uniqueness, and novelty of product or function and the resulting lack of experience; and risks related to the plant operation, based on, for example, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). See 1.

These safety principles look like the same safety concept used by the risk-based IOSA, and IATA is going to be the well-knowing future for aviation. IATA should start Auditing airlines according to the safety culture maturity level, then spreading the adoption of this safety culture between airlines to improve their safety culture to be ready for risk-based IOSA.?

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Risk-based IOSA will lead to the fifth approach - shared safety culture, and that is my point of view.

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This subject needs further study by academic research to approve the need and the positive side of it, then form a new safety model.

1 | Reference | How the risk science can help us establish a good safety culture

This title is a name of risks research by Terje Aven and Marja Ylonen, Faculty of Science and Technology, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway.?

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