Russian Nuclear Security Update #12

Grossi defends the IAEA position on ZNPP; Rostechnadzor inspection report for 2023; Russian ZNPP chronology; Rosatom to increase presence in international organizations; Russian software in Rosatom.

GROSSI DEFENDS THE IAEA POSITION ON ZNPP

April 15, 2024

Speaking at the press conference after the UN Security Council meeting, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi defended the agency's position on Zaporizhzhya NPP (ZNPP).

Grossi was asked at a press conference why he did not say who he thought was responsible for the incidents. He said: "You raise a very important point and it's a point that everybody is talking about, this issue of attribution and pointing a finger and saying 'it's this country or that country'. We are not commentators. We are not political speculators or analysts, we are an international agency of inspectors. And in order to say something like that, we must have proof, indisputable evidence, that an attack, or remnants of ammunition or any other weapon, is coming from a certain place. And in this case it is simply impossible." He said that the recent attacks had been carried out by drones, which have a diverse range of trajectories and can hover and circle, and can be easily obtained: "Remember this plant is at the front line, it can go to the Russian occupied territory, it can come from different places. It could be manned from one side and belong to another side. So for us, it would be impossible ... to say it is, indisputably something coming from here, or from there. This is why we keep the information as accurate as we can. And we do not trade into speculating."

Responding to the question about the heavy weapons at the territory of ZNPP, Grossi said that “when it comes to heavy weaponry at the plant … vicinity is something else, but at the plant, within the plant, our experts so far have not been …? have not seen that.” This statement should, however, be viewed in the context that IAEA inspectors regularly report restrictions on access to certain areas of the plant, so they cannot see everything.

ROSTECHNADZOR PUBLISHED INSPECTION REPORT FOR 2023

March 20, 2024

Rostechnadzor published a report summarizing the results of inspections and enforcement practices in the area of nuclear and radiation safety and security for 2023. I will provide a review of this report and trends in nuclear security based on Rostechnadzor reporting in a dedicated post soon.

RUSSIAN GONGO PUBLISHES OWN VERSION OF ZNPP EVENTS TIMELINE

April 12, 2024

PIR Center, a Russian NGO with a substantial legacy of research on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security issues, published a timeline of events around ZNPP. The selection and interpretation of events reflect Russia’s official position. [Disclaimer: I worked at PIR Center during the early years of my career and am still a member of its advisory board, although my advice has been largely ignored over the last couple of years - DK]

ROSATOM DEVELOPS POOL OF EXPERTS FOR WORK IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

April 19, 2024

Rosatom Technical Academy (Rosatomtech, which provides specialized training, including in nuclear security) awarded a contract to Rosatom Corporate Academy (which provides general business training) to test personnel's English language skills and provide training in business English and business communication skills. According to the published statement of work, this contract is intended to support Rosatomtech's contract with Rosatom Headquarters to provide training, advisory, and logistics services aimed at growing Rosatom’s presence in international organizations.

ROSATOM TRANSITIONS TO THE USE OF RUSSIAN SOFTWARE IN ITS INFORMATION SYSTEMS

April 17, 2024

Rosatom’s Director for Information Infrastructure, Evgeny Abakumov, stated that Rosatom no longer uses foreign software for “essential objects of critical information infrastructure.” “Objects of critical information infrastructure” is the category defined in Russian cyber security legislation and regulatory documents. Most, if not all, information systems used for nuclear security fall within this category. However, it is not clear what systems are considered “essential,” and when transition will be completed.