Russian Cyber-based Influence, Information, and Intelligence Operations: Exploring the Emerging Threats Posed by the Metaverse

Introduction: This paper is centered on exploring the emerging threats stemming from the evolution and development of communications and connectivity technology. More specifically, this paper will focus on these emerging threats within the context of intelligence, influence and information operations carried out by US near-peer adversary Russia. The aim of this paper will be to explore how the Metaverse might offer new opportunities and capabilities for Russian Cyber operations targeting the US. This essay will begin by providing background on Russia’s Cyber strategy with a focus on its use of social media platforms for information, influence, and intelligence operations. The paper will also provide a working description of the Metaverse. The text will then explore how the Metaverse’s immersive, augmented/virtual reality (AR/VR) when compared with existing social media technology may offer a more powerful vector for Russia’s already formidable and effective information, influence, and intelligence operations. To conclude, this essay will provide recommendations for how the US might counter such operations.

Background: With the global focus shifting to renewed great powers competition, the US is prioritizing curbing China’s expanding influence around the globe. While China remains the focus of the US foreign policy agenda, Russia’s strategy of disruption has launched it to an increasingly nearpeer adversary to the US. Over the past decade Russia has interfered with US policy objectives in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. Russia’s gradual rise over the past 2 decades came as result of the development of a multidimensional unconventional warfare strategy. This strategy is based on hybrid and liminal tactics with a key focus on the information realm.

The first major case of Russia’s use of a Cyber warfare strategy emerged during its 2008 invasion of Georgia. Until this point, Russia had been undertaking a modernization of its military along with an emphasis on developing its cyber capabilities. Despite Russian efforts “ultimately, Georgia gained the upper hand in the conflict” in the information and psychological domain (Iasiello, 2017, pg. 53). Russia’s war with Georgia may not have had significant influence operations with regards to social media platforms however what it did reveal was an intent to 1) utilize the Cyber domain in conjunction with military operations on the ground and 2) implement Cyber operations to limit the flow of information and seize control of the narrative (Lange-Ionatami?vili, 2016). Immediately following the conflict, the Russian military began to analyze its shortcomings and focus on how it could improve its information operations. In the 6 years following the war in Georgia, Russia altered its approach based on lessons learned and a more developed hybrid warfare strategy.

In 2014, Russia’s improved strategy emerged as a critical component in its strategy for Crimea. By this time social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter had emerged, coinciding with the common usage of smart phones, had transformed how information was accessed and disseminated. By this time, Russia’s influence and information strategy had been shaped by the hybrid warfare strategy developed by Russia’s Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov (Rumer, 2019). It should be noted that Gerasimov’s approach was based on developing the Primakov doctrine “that has guided Russian policy for over two decades” (Rumer, 2019, para. 3). Key elements to these approaches include information, propaganda, disinformation, and deception, as such social media served as a powerful tool. In the case of Ukraine, the Russian state attempted to control social media as part of efforts to block access to pro-Ukrainian sources and collect information on pro-Ukrainian activists from social networking sites (Lange-Ionatami?vili, 2016). Two years prior to operations in the Crimea, a story in The Guardian “reported that a pro-Kremlin group runs a network of internet trolls”, the Russian government also “cultivates a large number of bloggers” all of whom are used to “spread information supporting Russia’s narrative and to silence opponents” (Lange-Ionatami?vili, 2016, pg. 22). This force of trolls and bloggers were used to “spread disinformation, spread rumors and falsified facts” and even for recruitment of pro-Russian fighters. Research shows that Russian operatives were also pushing falsified stories that were designed to further divide and polarize the Ukrainian population (Lange-Ionatami?vili, 2016). The strategy was aimed at Ukrainian, Russian and global audiences and culminated in February 2014 with the occupation of Crimea that was supported with a social media campaign known as “Polite People”. These operations were aimed at confusing the population and pushing a narrative that the Russian soldiers that had entered Crimea without any insignia were in fact not Russian. The result was indicative of “Russia learned from its mistakes in Georgia, centralizing generation and dissemination of its information and propaganda” (Iasiello, 2017, pg.59).

Russia’s information and influence operations would evolve to a greater degree of sophistication as in 2016 they would extend their reach to the US through aiming to influence the presidential elections. Subsequent investigations led to the indictment of “13 Russian individuals and 3 Russian organizations for engaging in operations to interfere with US political and electoral processes, including the 2016 presidential election” (House.gov, n.d., para. 1). The January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) stated:

“Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls” (House.gov, n.d., para.8).

In addition to the documented cases of Russian attempts to influence the US elections more concerning are the reports that indicate that Russian operatives are using social media and online chat forums to aggravate the civil strife that already exists within the US (Troft, 2021). There are also cases where Russian intelligence appears to be operating within online chat forums such as 4Chan which are predominantly used by far-right groups based in the US (Riley, 2021). These operations involve spreading disinformation and actively collecting “illicitly obtained information that has been hacked or stolen, and then weaponizing it” (US Senate, n.d.). One case allegedly shows 4Chan users providing OSINT to Russian intelligence which resulted in an airstrike of an al-Nusra training camp in northwest Syria (Zoltany, 2017). One of the more devastating online campaigns known as QAnon, which has generated numerous, elaborate conspiracy theories that have pulled in people from the US and around the world and exacerbated polarization, destroyed families and in some cases inspired serious crimes has also attracted the attention of Russian operatives with reports indicating that “Russian government-supported organizations… amplifying” its content (Menn, 2020, para. 1).

Considering Russia’s effective execution of a hybrid warfare strategy in Ukraine which swiftly resulted in the Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in early 2014, attempts at influencing the 2016 US presidential elections, combined with evidence in Europe of similar enhanced capabilities, it is evident that Russia has managed to develop and implement a number of formidable unconventional warfare capabilities (Kilcullen, 2020). Russia’s cyber presence proved capable of intelligence gathering, information and influence operations across the social media platforms (Tashev, Purcell & McLaughlin, 2019).

Russia does not use the term Cyberwarfare but instead “they conceptualize cyber operations within the broader framework of information warfare” (Connel & Vogler, 2017, pg. i). The Russian approach to cyber operations is based on the belief that “the information space opens wide asymmetric possibilities…” and observations that showed that information “could be used to disorganize governance, organize anti-government protests, delude adversaries, influence public opinion and reduce an opponent’s will to resist” (Connel & Vogler, 2017, pg. 4). Building on that vision, Russia developed sophisticated Cyber capabilities and a broad infrastructure composed of civilian and military units supported by a network of foreign contractors (CRS, 2022). Russia’s Cyber program has deployed “disinformation, propaganda, espionage [operations] and destructive cyber-attacks globally” (CRS, 2022). From a US Cyber defense perspective, one of the most concerning areas of Russian Cyber operations is across social media platforms (Calabresi, 2017). Successes since 2016 have seen the development of the Russian Disinformation Chain, which describes how misinformation and misinformation strategies are crafted and implemented through a chain of organs and proxies (Russian media), amplification channels (social media) and arrive to the consumers (US citizens, decisionmakers, allies and partners) (Bodine-Baron & et. Al., 2018).

While Russia’s information operations have had some success in both regional and global theaters, it is important to consider their role in Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine. Since the threat of a Russian invasion escalated with troops being massed on the border of Ukraine in late 2021, Russia’s information and influence operations were in full swing across social media channels (UACrisiss.org, 2021). What is interesting to note is how it appears that the US and its partners have studied Russia’s strategy and tactics from 2014 and have been able to effectively counter all their most recent information and influence operations (Ott, 2022). Russian efforts have also faced significant resistance from a growing network of online activists and factchecking experts and organizations (Ott, 2022). The most impressive effort to counter Russian information and influence operations appears to be coming out of Ukraine and pro-government forces. Reports indicate that Ukraine has not only managed to effectively counter Russian information and influence operations but have been outmaneuvering them in local, regional, and global theaters (Singer, 2022). While these developments indicate a positive evolution of US and allied countermeasures, it is important to recall how Russia has consistently demonstrated its ability to learn, adapt and improve based on its shortcomings. As evolutions in communications and connectivity technology continue to emerge so will new opportunities for Russian influence, information, and intelligence operations.

As of 2021, Meta announced the launch of the Metaverse, a fully interactive, 3-D cyber world that combines elements of social media and communication applications with virtual/augmented reality (Needham, 2022). The Metaverse is designed to function as the nexus for all connected, digital activity. The Metaverse, like Web3 or 5G are major technological breakthroughs that are expected to completely reshape how people interact with technology, the internet and each other. Such virtual reality cyber environments will offer an entire virtual world and for people to interact, organize, share ideas and information all through virtual avatars with the option of complete anonymity. It is already evident that what happens in the cyber domain can easily or directly manifest in the physical world with very real consequences, see Stuxnet or more recently QAnon (The One Brief, n.d.). Given Russia’s already formidable intelligence and information operations across the cyber domain, it is evident that the Metaverse will provide a powerful new vector to pursue its interests and act against the United States (US) and its NATO allies.

Conclusion:

The cases referenced in this paper are far from exhaustive, however by reviewing these cases several key points are clear. First, Russia’s current military doctrine is built upon a hybrid warfare approach that prioritizes the use of the Cyber domain for influence, information, and intelligence operations. Second, throughout Russia’s history since the fall of the Soviet Union, they have continued to demonstrate an ability to learn, adapt and improve from its failures and successes. Third, the US and the West has made the mistake of underestimating Russia’s capabilities and directing its focus on the adversary du jour be it state or non-state. Lastly, and most importantly, Russia has demonstrated a willingness and capability to directly target the US with Cyber-based information, influence, and intelligence operations, and has done so effectively using existing social media platforms. Factoring together these key points and considering the evolution and convergence of communications, connectivity and information technologies represented in platforms like the Metaverse, it is evident that the US will be faced with a new, dynamic and changing range of threat vectors from Russia.

Recommendations:

To counter Russian intelligence and information operations against the US and its allies, the US must develop its own formidable presence in the Metaverse and view the cyber domain as a space equally critical as air, land, sea and space. To do so, the US must continue to develop its relationship with Meta and use it to foster an in depth understanding of its functionality, capabilities, and potential social and cultural impact. Using this understanding, the US would be wise to develop a red team exercise based on historical data of Russia’s information and influence strategies. Attempts to prevent mirror-imaging will be critical to this exercise as evidence appears to indicate that the Kremlin’s and Putin’s thinking and decision-making process may be undergoing changes due to shortcomings in the latest operations in Ukraine. Finally, the US intelligence community should consider its conceptual understanding of AR/VR and the Cyber domain, as the Metaverse and technologies like it are offering new, hybrid vectors for collection. It will be necessary to reimagine HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT as platforms such as the Metaverse will offer a space where all disciplines will be applicable.

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