Russian asset dispersion in?Kherson. Why it matters.

When our troops liberated Kherson and advanced to the Dnipro River, the Russians dispersed and relocated their equipment, helicopters, and C2 to various bases beyond the reach of HIMARS. Why is this significant, and what can be learned from this situation?

In this instance, compiled satellite imagery reveals the establishment of a new base to the south of Henichesk. Its construction commenced around November, aligning with our troops’ liberation of Kherson and the departure of russian forces from Chaplynka.

Their decision was correct — shortly after our forces secured Kherson, Chaplynka base experienced several strikes. Nevertheless, most of the equipment, the command and control center, and the helicopters had been relocated. Only minimal logistical operations were still there.

While determining the role of this new base is problematic, it’s crucial to recognize that the mere existence of a weapon with an approximate 80 km reach compelled the russians to entirely reconfigure their logistical and command and control operations in the South.

While long-range munitions like ATACMS, Taurus, and Storm Shadow offer significant capabilities, their scarcity, slower production rate, and high cost necessitate the inclusion of more affordable yet equally efficient options such as long-range loitering munitions and GLSDB

Undoubtedly, in response, Russians will relocate equipment and decentralize command and logistics into smaller nodes. However, this exacerbates preexisting logistical challenges and curtails their capacity to efficiently manage substantial force concentrations.

Hence, in my perspective, it remains crucial for Ukraine to get a diverse range of long-range weaponry, all the while continuing the development and utilization of its own resources, as exemplified by the successful deployment of our drones in both russia and sea environment.

Source: https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1690449017828765696/photo/1

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