Maritime Security Challenges & Procurement Problems faced by the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN)

The most important geopolitical & strategic interests of Malaysia lie at sea. According to the National Defence Policy, Malaysia’s geopolitical interests are connected with core area, offshore economic interests & strategic waterways.

Malaysia’s core areas encompass Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah & Sarawak, the territorial waters, & the airspace above them. Offshore economic interest areas are the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) & the continental shelf. Malaysia’s strategic waterways & sealines of communications (SLOC) are maritime connections between Peninsular Malaysia & Sabah & Sarawak, the Strait of Malacca & its approaches, the Strait of Singapore & its approaches. From a geopolitical point of view, the physical separation of Peninsular Malaysia from Sabah & Sarawak poses a serious threat to Malaysia’s security. It is therefore a particular point of interest in sea & air lines of communication between these 2 lands.

Malaysia surrounded by the Strait of Malacca & the South China Sea (SCS). The Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s most important waterways connecting the Indian & Pacific Oceans. It is heavily used for commercial trade, as a route between Europe, the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf & East Asia. The Strait of Malacca hosts Malaysia’s major ports & business centres that are crucial for its economy. About 80% of Malaysia’s imports & exports is transported via that SLOC. The Straits of Singapore is also vital for Malaysia’s security. It is important not only as a SLOC for international trade, but also as a sea route between Peninsular Malaysia & Sabah & Sarawak.

The maritime realm is pivotal to Malaysia’s security & socio-economic well-being. The Straits of Malacca & Singapore & SCS are vital sea lanes of communication for trade & navigation. The task of securing the regions’ maritime realm rests with Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN). The SCS is also an important maritime area for other countries. Oil transported through the Straits of Malacca, en route to East Asia through the SCS is crucial for the big Asian economies such as China, Japan, the Republic of Korea & Taiwan.

(Oil tankers using the Straits of Malacca & SCS)

Approximately 65% of South Korean & almost 60% of Japan’s & Taiwan’s energy supplies plus 80% China’s crude oil imports go through the SCS. Presumed large offshore oil & gas fields make that area even more important from the perspective of energy security & the Malaysian economy. According to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, SCS oil reserves are estimated to be 125 billion barrels & 500 trillion cubic feet of gas. Over the last decade all states involved in the SCS territorial dispute have tried to expand their oil & gas projects in both shallow & deep waters (over 200 meters under the sea) or even in ultra-deep waters (>1,500 meters).

(A map showing the competing claims in the SCS)

For Malaysia, the SCS is a significant area due to several reasons. Firstly, it divides Peninsular Malaysia from Sabah & Sarawak. One part of the country is peninsular & connected to the Asian continent whilst the other part is insular & distant from the demographic, political, economic & military core of Malaysia – something put on display during the 2013 Lahad Datu standoff.?Malaysia is also involved in the SCS territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands. The biggest player in the SCS dispute is the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China’s claim covers the majority of the SCS & overlap with claims from Brunei, Indonesian, Malaysia, the Philippine & Vietnam. Some SEA countries (especially Vietnam) see Chinese demands for control of the almost whole disputed region as a threat to their territorial integrity. Some of the territories claimed by the PRC are already occupied by troops of other states involved in the territorial dispute.

(Map of SCS showing naval & military fortifications of countries involved in the SCS dispute)

In the SCS, there are many military garrisons & naval fortifications. Increased military exercises are part of the process of militarization of the region. After constructing artificial islands and building military installations on a number of entities in the East Sea, China conducted anti-ship missile launches in early July 2019. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) reported that in May 2019 the China Coast Guard (CCG) Haijing 35111 vessel prevented Malaysia’s oil rig from operating near the Luconia coast off Sarawak, Malaysia.

The territorial dispute & growing militarization of the SCS pose a real challenge to regional security & threaten the freedom of navigation in a strategic artery of world trade.

(The Chinese-built base at Fiery Cross Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands, pictured in an Aug. 20, 2021, satellite image. Credit: Planet Labs Inc.)

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the PRC has widened the gap in its military spending & those of its Asia-Pacific neighbours. In 2016, the PRC spent about 4 times more than India on defence. The Chinese military budget is reportedly bigger than the combined military expenditures of India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, Pakistan, Philippines & Indonesia. The PRC doubled its military spending from $113 billion in 2008 to 225.7 billion in 2016.

The doubling in China’s military spending combined with a more assertive posture is causing greater concern throughout Asia. Naturally, Malaysia is one of the countries that is worried about China’s growing military potential in disputed areas. According to Ralph Jennings of Forbes Magazine, Malaysia tends to avoid exacerbating the conflict with China due to economic concerns. The PRC is Malaysia’s main economic partner in terms of trade & a important source of direct foreign investment. However, growing Chinese assertiveness in the SCS territorial disputes has led Malaysia to harden its stance. In March 2016, Malaysia’s defence minister suggested that the country may be forced to pushback against the PRC, if China has placed military assets on the Spratly Islands. Malaysia cannot fail to notice that Chinese ships has often encroach on Malaysia’s waters. A Chinese coast guard ship was reported to be defiantly anchored at the Luconia Shoals, well inside the Malaysia’s EEZ.

Sea control is a preoccupation for all navies since it is a precondition for conduct of any operation at sea.?Having strong & reliable maritime forces are crucial for Malaysia’s policy towards the SCS & to secure its interests. To reinforce its claims, Malaysia maintains a military presence in the Swallow Reef, the Mariveles Reef & the Ardasier Reef. However, all these military outposts are away from the nearest Malaysian air & naval bases. ?

Malaysia also in conflict with Indonesia over the Ambalat Block, located in the Celebes Sea. The dispute began with the publication of a map produced by Malaysia in 1979 showing its territorial waters and continental shelf. The map drew Malaysia's?maritime boundary running in a southeast direction in the Celebes Sea from the eastmost point of the?Indonesia-Malaysia land border?on the eastern shore of Sebatik Island, thus including the Ambalat blocks, or at least a large portion of it, within Malaysian territorial waters. Indonesia has, like the other neighbours of Malaysia, objected to the map.

Negotiations between the 2 countries were largely harmonious until 2005 when Malaysia’s national oil company, Petronas, granted 2 deep water oil concessions in the disputed area to Shell. Tensions fueled by mass media & public opinion in both countries rose quickly & the navies of both countries appeared in the disputed region. However, the leaders of both countries managed to de-escalate the conflict. Nonetheless, the dispute over the Ambalat Block remains unresolved & is an example of how energy security concerns impact relations, including maritime boundaries in SEA.

For Malaysia, securing access to the oil & natural gas fields is particularly important. The oil & gas industry has contributed up to 20% of Malaysia’s GDP. Petronas has provided a substantial contribution of income for the Malaysian government. Going forward, the oil & gas industry will remain an important contributor for the Malaysian economy. Malaysia’s proven crude oil reserves are estimated at 3.9 billion barrels (2017) & its crude oil production is 666,900 barrels per day (2016). Unfortunately, Malaysia’s new oil & gas reserves are being found mostly off the coast of Northern Borneo in waters measuring between 200 to 1,200 meters deep, which make them more costly to extract. Securing the new sources of oil & natural gas are of paramount importance for the Malaysian economy. Without an efficient & effective navy, Malaysia cannot protect its SLOCs & secure access to natural offshore resources.

Malaysia must also protect itself from the territorial claim on Sabah by the descendants of the Sultan of Sulu. In February 2013, approximately 200 armed men, followers of the self-proclaimed Sultan of Sulu (Jamalpur Kiram III), entered a town in the Lahad Datu district of Malaysia’s Sabah state. From the beginning of March 2013, Malaysian security forces began forcing the Sulu Sultan’s followers out of the town. Both sides faced casualties until the end of March when Malaysian forces, with the help of air support, gained victory.?

Another threat which Malaysia faces is maritime piracy. Piracy mushroomed after the end of the Cold War & waters close to Malaysian territory are affected. ?Maritime piracy is also a useful tool for terrorists to raise funds. However, Malaysia does not see piracy as a serious problem. In fact, Malaysia has not joined the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy & Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) & has not ratified the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA Act). However, Malaysia cannot ignore the problem of maritime piracy & has sent some naval units to combat this activity.

Maintaining a formidable naval force is vital for the country as other SE Asian countries are bolstering their maritime capabilities. The development of Chinese & regional maritime forces cannot be ignored by Malaysia’s officials & acts as an incentive for the Royal Malaysian Navy’s (RMN) improvement. Possession of a modern maritime force is essential for Malaysia & the RMN. It made significant progress in the last decades despite facing financial limitations. In comparison to neighboring countries, the Malaysian military budget is not high. Only Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar & the Philippines spend less money on the military.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the RMN had 2 frigates, 4 torpedo boats, 8 minesweepers, 23 patrol boats & 20 landing craft of different types with approximately 4,000 personnel.

In the early 1980s, the RMN was the smallest of the 3 services, possessing about 8,700 personnel. The RMN’s assets then were quite significant as it included 4 frigates (Type FS 1500), 8 missile fast attack craft (Spica M class & Perdana class), 6 gunboats (Jerong class), 2 patrol vessels (Marih class), 21 patrol boats (Kedah class, Sabah class, Kris class) & 35 landing craft. Malaysia sought to build a navy capable of performing operations in blue-water & as well as inshore & coastal patrols tasks. At the end of the 1980’s, the RMN had about 11,000 personnel.

The RMN played a key role in protecting Malaysia’s maritime & territorial claims in the SCS especially in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness & fears of Vietnamese expansionism.

In 1999, the RMN received Leiku–class frigates (KD Leiku & KD Jebat) which were its most advanced vessels then & marked a significant improvement in its maritime capability. The Leiku–class frigates are armed with anti-ship missiles MM40 Exocet, Seawolf surface-to-air missiles, ASW torpedoes, one Bofors 57 mm gun & two MSI 30 mm cannons. These warships are equipped with helicopter, modern electronics, sensors & countermeasures.

From 1997 to 1999, Malaysia introduced into service 4 small Laksamana–class missile corvettes. These warships are armed with anti-ship missile Otomat Mk2s, Albatros naval surfaceto-air missile systems, ASW torpedoes, 1x76 mm OTO Melara guns & 2x40 mm multi role guns,The RMN’s modernisation efforts were driven by 5 factors -

• Defence of national interests,
• External & regional factors,
• Emerging issues,
• Economic growth
• 2010 National Defence Policy.

Defence of national interests is a key driving force & related mainly to maritime territory, sovereignty, SLOC security, resource protection & environmental protection. Since the 1990s, Malaysia has reinforced the surface component of its fleet.

New Generation Patrol Vessels (NGPV)

In 1993, the New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) project was initiated to acquire 27 Kedah-Class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) for the RMN, though only 6 ships were eventually commissioned between 2006-2010, delivered far behind schedule. The cancellation of the project bankrupted local contractor PSC Industries Bhd, which BNS acquired in 2005, inheriting all associated liabilities. Displacing 1,850 tons, the German-designed & Malaysian-built ships are lightly fitted with respect to armaments (a 76 mm OTO Melara gun & a 30 mm Breda cannon) but feature a helicopter hangar. These warships are built using a “fitted for but not with” concept - when needed, Kedah–class vessels may be equipped with weapons systems & electronics without having to go through serious & time-consuming modifications. They are fitted for but not with surface-to-air missiles & anti-ship missiles. These Kedah–class vessels have been useful in protecting Malaysia’s interests in its EEZ, but there are challenges connected with protecting the country’s coastline require small & nimble crafts designed to fight against smuggling, illegal fishing & maritime piracy. The RMN also possessed a series of in-shore patrol crafts, but a majority of them have been withdrawn from service.

Anti-piracy missions in Gulf of Eden

Faced with a taxing demand for ships to deploy to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy missions, the RMN adopted an unorthodox solution by introducing what was in effect auxiliary patrol ships. In 2009, Malaysia purchased 2, 9,000 ton container freighter ships & converted them into lightly armed patrol vessels equipped with a helicopter hangar. The 2 ships, the KD Bunga Mas Lima & the KD Bunga Mas Enam are sister ships of the same design. After Malaysia’s anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden came to an end, the ships were used to patrol East Malaysia’s coastline (on the island of Borneo) in light of the 2013 Lahad Datu standoff when Philippine militants landed on the island to claim the land as their own, sparking a Malaysian military intervention in which the navy played a vital role.

(RMN Bases)

Scorpene Submarines

In 2001, the RMN had approximately 15,400 personnel. In order to provide a deterrent to regional navies in light of the long-running SCS dispute, in 2002 Malaysia ordered two French-designed & built Perdana Menteri-class (Scorpene-class) submarines. Commissioned in 2009, the two submarines are based at TLDM Seppangar in Sabah, East Malaysia in order to provide rapid access to the zone around Malaysian occupied features in the SCS. The two submarines are the first submarines in Malaysian service & have provided an important new capability to the RMN. Both RMN submarines have been adapted for operation in the region’s warmer & more saline waters. The Malaysian Scorpene–class submarines are fitted with SUBTICS integrated & UDS International–supplied weapons control & sonar systems. Besides being armed with torpedoes & mines, they also possess the ability to launch anti-ship SM 39 Exocet missiles from 533 mm torpedo tubes, which makes them potent weapon platforms.

Malaysia has also shown an interest in cooperating with submarine forces of other navies, such as the US Navy, the Royal Australian Navy & the Indian Navy. Submarines are particularly useful in deterring potential adversaries due to the fact that submerged & silent submarines are hard to detect. They possess a wide range of armament designed to combat enemy maritime forces & merchant fleet.

Submarines increase sea denial capabilities & attract a disproportionate level of response in the development of a potential enemy’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

The LCS Scandal

The majority of RMN warships had been built in France, the UK, Germany, Italy Sweden & the Republic of Korea. Malaysia has developed its indigenous shipyard industry & has become more independent from foreign contractors.

(Malaysia's LCS design)

In 2007, Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd (BNS), a unit of Boustead Heavy Industries Corporation Bhd (BHIC), which was controlled by the Armed Forces Fund Board (LTAT), sought the support of the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) in the Prime Minister’s Department & then defence minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak for a program to build 6 LCS at its Lumut dockyard. Aside from making sure the RMN was suitably equipped, BNS said the program would support activities & enhance the capabilities of the dockyard & also enable it to continue with its vendor development program for 2,000 Bumiputera suppliers.

(Photo taken at the ceremonially launching of KD Maharaja Lela in August 2017.?It was supposed to have been delivered to the RMN in April 2019)

After several years of discussions between BNS with the EPU, ministries of finance (MoF) & defence (Mindef) & the RMN, the green light was given in March 2011 to launch the program at a cost of RM9.13 billion through direct negotiations with BNS. (This project is the largest procurement in the history of Mindef). The program's first-of-class, which will be in service as KD?Maharaja Lela?once it is commissioned, was ceremonially launched in August 2017. It was supposed to have been delivered to the RMN in April 2019, with the final ship scheduled for handover in June 2023. However, the first vessel is only about 60% complete, while work on the final ship has yet to begin. The remaining ships are in various stages of completion at between 16% & 44%. To date, not a single one is ready although the government has paid BNS RM6 billion. BNS also needs additional funding of a few billion ringgit on top of the original price tag of RM9.13 billion, to complete all 6 LCS. (According to the PAC’s findings, 400 million ($89.1 million) of the 1.4 billion ringgit found to be misdirected from the LCS project was used by BNS to pay old debts from the NGPV project, a fact that Ahmad Nazim Abdul Rahman, chief executive of the Armed Forces Pension Fund (LTAT) – BNS’ biggest shareholder – confirmed in a Facebook post after the tabling of the committee report.)

(Photo of KD Maharaja Lela in Lumut dockyard as at Aug 2022)

In May 2011, Mindef, then helmed by Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, agreed to the Sigma design from a Dutch firm & the combat management system from French firm, Palanise. However, the choice of Sigma & Palanise were not that of the RMN as the end user. In June 2011, Mindef abruptly changed its mind following intense lobbying by BNS to opt for the Gowind design & SETIS CMS, both from France. The Gowind design is by France’s Naval Group, formerly DCNS, which also built the controversial Scorpene submarines in 2002 for Malaysia. Investigations into alleged kickbacks in the €1.2 billion deal are still ongoing in France.

Mindef U-turn was met with strong objection by the then navy chief Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Jaafar, who wrote 10 letters, including to then prime minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, defence minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, as well as to the Chief Secretary to the Government & the secretaries-general of MoF & Mindef. The thrust of his objection was that the choice of design should be decided by the end user & not by the BNS (the contractor) & that Gowind & SETIS were unproven. But his protests were ignored & BNS proceeded with Gowind & SETIS.

On Dec 16, 2011, BNS in which LTAT has an effective stake of 61%, received a letter of award from the Ministry of Defence to deliver 6 LCS dubbed “Second Generation Patrol Vessels Littoral Combat Ships (Frigate Class)” as part of its fleet renewal plan.

BNS appointed 2 companies as the main contractors for the project - Contraves Advanced Devices Sdn Bhd (CAD) & Contraves Electrodynamics Sdn Bhd (CED). Boustead Heavy Industries Corporation Bhd (BHIC) held the majority 51% stake in both companies while Germany’s Rheinmetall Group held the remaining 49%. However, this joint venture agreement was lopsided with BHIC virtually conceding decision-making & management control to the minority partner.

The government issued its letter of award to the main contractor, Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd in December 2011, although the contract for the project was only signed in July 2014. The defence minister was Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, but by the time the contract was finally signed, Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein was the minister in charge.

What made matters worse was that the needs & opinions of the end-user, the RMN were dismissed because in July 2011, BNS was said to have persuaded Zahid to swap the original Sigma system, which was of Dutch origin, to the French Gowind design.

For Malaysians, their fears were compounded by the fact that there had been no open tender, the contract had been drafted in such a way that it did not favour the government & after it was signed, no action had been taken to address the various anomalies which annual auditing reports uncovered.

On Aug 10 2022, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri Yaakob said the cabinet had decided that the Special Committee on Governance Investigation, Government Procurement & Finance’s report on the LCS project, chaired by former auditor-general Tan Sri Ambrin Buang, would be made available to the public.

The cabinet also declassified the forensic audit done by Alliance IFA. The declassified forensic audit report on the LCS project stated that Boustead Heavy Industries Corp Berhad could face potential losses of RM890 million.?In a table, the report summarized losses of up to RM23.368 million due to alleged payments to 3 companies for “fake services” related to the LCS project from 2011 to 2012.?Further down, the report noted that invoices for such non-existent technical evaluation services were a mode to siphon the funds & named Alizes Marine as one such company. It added that the money released to Alizes Marine was suspected to be received by a Labuan-registered entity. Other examples of mismanagement & irregularities detailed included double claims for the same services, but with different terms, which came up to RM537 million.

The report also noted other instances of a lack of proper corporate governance, such as the predetermination of vendors before the government had issued its letters of award in favour of BNS.?Major decisions were also made through a director’s circular resolution without convening a board meeting, thus further reducing transparency & the opportunity to discuss in detail & go through vital documents before approving the resolutions. “Despite various red flags raised by ex-officers & associates of the company about the irregularities in the execution of the LCS program, no corrective measures were taken either by the management or the Chairman of the board of BHIC to stop the abuse of power,” the report noted.

The LCS as a component of 15-to-5 is very much needed to fulfill the RMN’s requirements for a naval surface combatant capable of anti-surface, anti-submarine & air defence missions at sea. However, this did not prevent the acquisition from being mired in political interference that has compromised its integrity.?If this LCS fiasco is not resolved, it will have a huge impact on the Boustead group & eventually LTAT.?A recently declassified report on the LCS project mentioned Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi’s involvement, despite an earlier denial by the former defence minister.

On Aug 11 2022, the Malaysian Anti Corruption Commission (MACC) issued a statement saying it has completed its probe, recommend charges that should be made to the AGC & was waiting for a decision.

Going forward

The RMN has been mired in multiple scandals for over 3 decades, from the New Generation Patrol Vessels, the Scorpene Submarines & the LCS. The Navy claims 61% of naval assets are operating beyond their expected service life & all surface combat vessels are more than 20 years old. As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the ships of the RMN are well over 25 years old.

In 2016, the RMN’s 15 class of vessels were reduced to just 5 categories - Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), Littoral Mission Ships (LMS), New Generation Patrol Vessels (NGPV), Multipurpose Support Ships (MRS) & submarines. By consolidating its naval units of many different classes to just 5 new classes, it has reduced the problem of logistics (e.g. supply with munitions, overhaul, and spare parts) & strengthened the fleet as a whole.

The situation in the disputed areas in the SCS & the distance between Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah & Sarawak requires sealift & amphibious capabilities. Malaysian efforts to put into service at least 3 new Multipurpose Support Ships (MSS) have been delayed due to financial problems. The RMN possesses 2 MSSs (KD Sri Indera Sakti & KD Mahawangsa), both built at the beginning of the 1980s. However, both vessels need to be replaced. Malaysia has announced plans to build a new marine corps to be based in Bintulu, the nearest port to James Shoal. The port needs a new armory & equipment, as well as amphibious ships, landing vehicles & helicopters. Such amphibious forces will be very useful in protecting Malaysia’s interests in the SCS & Sabah.

The RMN is no match for China's expanding People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), but it is being developed to deter unwelcome naval activity & inflict damage even to much stronger opponents. Gradually, Malaysia is building up its naval potential & introducing new classes of vessels, including submarines & warships built with stealth technology.

Malaysia’s successful test-fire of three live anti-ship missiles during the August 2021 Taming Sari exercise clearly showed that it is prepared to deal with intrusions into its SCS territory. During the exercise, the RMN submarine, KD Tun Razak, successfully launched 1 Exocet SM39 anti-ship missile, while the KD Lekiu & KD Lekir, launched 1 Exocet MM40 guided missile each. Both the anti-ship missiles are made by French defense manufacturer MBDA Systems. The SM39 Exocet can reach 22 miles while the MM40 Exocet can hit a target as far as 35 miles away. This was conducted following the intrusion of 16 Chinese military planes into Malaysia’s maritime airspace over the disputed SCS in May 2021. It sent a clear message across to other SCS claimants, including China, that Malaysia is no pushover, & nor is it unprepared to use force, if absolutely necessary, to rebuke imminent external threats, despite the obvious power asymmetry vis-a-vis the likes of China.

The RMN is comparable to the navies of other regional states, such as Thailand, Indonesia, or Vietnam & is in much better condition than the Philippine navy.

(Ships of the Republic of Singapore Navy berthed at Singapore's Changi Naval Base)

Only the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) is better equipped & trained, but the relations with these 2 neighbours have improved considerably during the last decade.

(Ships of the Republic of Singapore Navy)

References

Yoichiro Sato, “Perceptions of Transnational Security Threats in Malaysia and Singapore: Windows of Cooperative Opportunities for the United States,” in Issues for Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges, ed. David Fouse (Honolulu, HI: Asia– Pacific Centre for Security Studies (APCSS), 2010), 146.

Lukasz Stach, “Never-Ending Story? Problem of Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia,” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity 7, no. 12 (2017): 726.

“Royal Malaysian Navy,” Global Security, November 27, 2014, https://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/malaysia/navy.htm.

Maciej Sobanski, “Royal Malaysian Navy,” Warships, no. 3 (2006): 83. [in Malaysian]

“Royal Malaysian Navy,” Global Security.

“SSK Scorpene Class Attack Submarine,” Naval Technology, https://www.naval-technology. com/projects/scorpene.

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Scorpene, “Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems.”

Sam Bateman, “Navies and Coastguards in Southeast Asia: Striking the Balance” (paper presented at the conference organized by S. Rajaratam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, January 26–27, 2011), 18, https://ro.uow.edu.au/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1851&context=lhapapers.

“Lekiu Class,” Naval Technology, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/lekiu/

Prashant Parameswaran, “Malaysia’s New China Warship Deal: Promises and Prospects,” The Diplomat, February 4, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/malaysias-new-china-warship[1]deal-promises-and-prospects/

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Prashant Parameswaran, “Malaysia’s New China Warship Deal: Promises and Prospects

Mike Yeo, “Malaysia Launches its First French–Designed LCS as Navy Moves to Modernize,” Defense News, August 24, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2017/08/24/ malaysia-launches-its-first-french-designed-lcs-as-navy-moves-to-modernize/

“Thales SMART-S Mk2 Radar and CAPTAS-2 Towed Sonar Confirmed for Malaysia LCS Program,” Navy Recognition, February 18, 2014, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/ news/defence-news/year-2014-news/february-2014-navy-naval-forces-maritime-industry-technology-security-global-news/1576-thales-smart-s-mk2-radar-and-captas-2-towed-sonar-confirmed-for-malaysia-lcs-program.html

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“Multipurpose Support Ship (MSS),” Global Security, April 15, 2013, https://www. globalsecurity.org/military/world/malaysia/kd-mss.htm

https://www.navy.mil.my/index.php/sejarah-3

“Royal Malaysian Navy Equipment,” Global Security, March 26, 2017, https://www. globalsecurity.org/military/world/malaysia/navy-equipment.htm.

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Endro Sunarso is an expert in Security Management, Physical Security & Counter Terrorism. He is regularly consulted on matters pertaining to transportation security, off-shore security, critical infrastructure protection, security & threat assessments, & blast mitigation.

Besides being a Certified Protection Professional (CPP?), a Certified Identity & Access Manager (CIAM?), a Project Management Professional (PMP?) & a Certified Scrum Master (CSM?), Endro is also a Fellow of the Security Institute (FSyl) & the Institute of Strategic Risk Management (F.ISRM).

Endro has spent about 2 decades in Corporate Security (executive protection, crisis management, critical infrastructure protection, governance, business continuity, loss mitigation, due diligence, counter corporate espionage, etc). He also has more than a decade of experience in Security & Blast Consultancy work, initially in the Gulf Region & later in South East Asia.