The role and responsibility of the international community, especially of the countries of the Americas, for a free and democratic Venezuela

Saturday, August 17th, in the afternoon. Today we remember the “passage to immortality” of General José de San Martín, liberator of Argentina, Chile, and Peru. It happened in Boulogne-sur-Mer, France, in 1850. He was 72 years old. He was born in 1778 in Yapeyú, a territory that today belongs to the province of Corrientes.

Inspired by their liberating feat, today was also a special day for the ongoing process of liberation in Venezuela.

I took the photo that illustrates this opinion piece during the multitudinous meeting organized in the Plaza de las Naciones Unidas, in Recoleta, in the city of Buenos Aires, behind the Faculty of Law of the UBA and in front of “Floralis Genérica”, the 23-meter-high and 32-meter-diameter stainless steel metal sculpture -with its open petals- that represents flowers from all over the world.

Everything was magical and extraordinary. Freedom, unity, hope, resilience, pride, courage, heroism, and gratitude were in the air.

The cry for freedom was constant, and it sounded strong and convincing.

The call for unity was more present than ever.

The hope for the prompt liberation of Venezuela was clear and genuine.

Venezuelans have proven to be so resilient that, although some have been living outside their country for many years, in exile, they have never forgotten it or resigned themselves to losing it. It was clear that they had their beloved homeland engraved in their souls. Others even risked their lives to go and vote on Sunday, July 28, and returned to Argentina amid great uncertainty and fears that proved to be true, as political persecution subsequently occurred that led to hundreds of arrests, kidnappings, illegal coercion, and even torture and murder.

Pride because Venezuelans not only conduct themselves in an honorable and respectable manner by turning to work as a way of life instead of causing pity and acting miserably during their exile abroad, Argentina being a direct witness to this, but also because they also stopped accepting handouts from the Maduro government in Venezuela, as demonstrated by the electoral results themselves.

Courage and heroism, because their struggle remained unshaken for more than two decades and, at key moments, such as when the election result was falsely announced, they did not hesitate to raise their voices despite the risks that it entailed and still entails. For this reason, the Venezuelan detainees and kidnapped people are heroes, and their dead, martyrs.

Gratitude because they got tired of thanking Argentina for having welcomed them, something that was noticeable through their songs, jubilation, and affectionate cheers, celebrating their second home.

There was an air of victory, struggle, and resistance “until the end,” that is, until the effective liberation of Venezuela.

All these virtues were brought together in the main protagonist of this story: María Corina Machado, who despite having been banned had the immense generosity of enthroning Edmundo González in her place as presidential candidate.

The protest was global in scope (Bogotá, Mexico City, Lima, Madrid, Miami, and many more cities) reaching approximately 300 locations worldwide.

Among the excellent interventions of the Buenos Aires meeting, I would like to highlight the words of the Venezuelan deputy Richard Blanco, whose speech can be seen at https://youtu.be/8MhEJNbdNWQ , clarifying that the recording was made by me, with my cell phone, and that it was later uploaded to YouTube with his authorization. It was one of the most applauded, without a doubt.

The crowd was hopeful, yes, but also aware that Venezuela is still at this very moment under the authority of a tyrant.

For this reason, I would like to draw attention to the responsibilities that fall not only to the executive branch of governments in the region and around the world, but also to the legislative branch, the judicial branch, and civil society, taken into account from the point of view of the broadest possible representation, including NGOs, universities, professional associations, companies, unions, etc.

The process of democratic deterioration that has been taking place in Venezuela for the last twenty-five years is reflected in most of the indices that measure the performance of democracies and respect for freedoms in the world (Democracy Index by The Economist Intelligence Unit; Global State of Democracy Indices by International IDEA; The Global Democracy Index by UNESCO; V-Dem, Varieties of Democracy, V-Dem Institute; Democracy Matrix, Julius-Maximilians – Universit?t Würzburg; Our World in Data; Freedom in the World, Freedom House; Human Freedom Index, Cato Institute; among others). In the same sense, the indices or reports that measure respect for or violation of human rights (IUDH, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations; Amnesty International; IACHR, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; among others).

Now, how did the international community react to the announcement of the election results by the National Electoral Council of Venezuela?

Just so you know, I have just checked the CNE website and they have still not published the results.

The Carter Center released a statement on the Venezuelan election on July 30 (https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024-spanish.pdf ), stating that “Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election did not conform to international parameters and standards of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic.” Blunt.

On August 14, the United Nations published the preliminary report of its “Panel of Experts on the Presidential Election in Venezuela” (https://news.un.org/en/sites/news.un.org.en/files/atoms/files/Informe_Preliminar_PdE_Venezuela_090824.pdf ), issued on August 9, which states that “The pre-electoral period was marked by continued restrictions on civic and political space. The government campaign dominated state media, with very limited access to opposition candidates. Numerous restrictions on the right to run for public office remained in place for several prominent political figures…” (point 4); and “Electronic transmission of results worked well initially, but was abruptly stopped in the hours after the polls closed, with no information or explanation provided to the candidates at the time, or to the Panel. At the time of announcing the results, the President of the CNE stated that a terrorist cyberattack had affected the transmission and caused a delay in the tabulation process. However, the CNE postponed and subsequently canceled three key post-election audits, including one on the communication system that could have shed light on the occurrence of external attacks against the transmission infrastructure” (point 9).

The report goes on to say that despite the CNE announcing the results in the early hours of July 29 and August 2, declaring Maduro the winner with an alleged 51.95% (6,408,844 of the votes) to Edmundo González’s alleged 43.18% (6,408,844 of the votes), “The CNE did not publish, and has not yet published, any results (or results broken down by voting table) to support its oral announcements, as provided for in the electoral legal framework” (point 10).

Added to this grotesque irregularity is the fact that “the Panel received several reports that opposition party agents had been prevented from obtaining said copy…” and that “In addition, despite guaranteeing that it would do so, the CNE has not published these results protocols ...” (point 11).

In summary, by way of conclusion regarding the performance of the election, the Panel states that “the CNE’s results management process did not comply with the basic measures of transparency and integrity that are essential for the conduct of credible elections. It also did not follow national legal and regulatory provisions, and all established deadlines were missed. In the Panel’s experience, the announcement of the results of an election without the publication of its details or the disclosure of tabulated results to the candidates is unprecedented in contemporary democratic elections. This hurt the confidence in the result announced by the CNE among a large part of the Venezuelan electorate” (point 13).

However, the report does not stop there. In its final part, it relates other aspects linked to the consequences arising from the irregularities during the electoral process, stating: “Although figures from national sources vary and the Panel did not attempt to verify their accuracy, the Panel took note of reports stating that more than 20 people were killed, including one soldier, and that more than 1,000 people were arrested between 29 July and 2 August 2024 as a result of protests following the announcement of the results. The reported figures have continued to increase. The Panel also received reports of threats and intimidation against political party agents and polling station officials” (point 15).

On August 15, the IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) and the SRFE (Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression) of the Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the “practices of institutional violence in the context of the electoral process in Venezuela, including violent repression, arbitrary detentions and political persecution” (https://www.oas.org/pt/CIDH/jsForm/?File=/en/cidh/press/releases/2024/184.asp ). In their own words, “The regime in power is sowing terror as a tool to silence citizens and perpetuate the authoritarian official regime in power,” concluding: “Venezuela must immediately cease practices that violate human rights, reestablish democratic order and the rule of law.”

More recently, on Friday, August 16, in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, an important group of countries from the Americas, Africa, and Europe, including the European Union, adopted a joint declaration in which they make “a firm call for common sense and prudence in Venezuela.” They emphasize that “Acceptance and respect for the dignity and integrity of all people are the essential principles on which coexistence between our nations is built,” which is why they urge that “democratic principles be respected, as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Venezuelans and, in particular, the right to peacefully demonstrate and exercise freedom of expression.” They point out that they see with concern “that this is not the current reality in Venezuela. The reports of arbitrary detentions of Venezuelans without due process are alarming,” which is why they require their immediate release.

They also express their “profound rejection of the repression of protesters and the violence that has cost the lives of many Venezuelans in the post-electoral context” and make an urgent call “for Venezuela to end the violence and release all those who have been detained, including representatives of the opposition”; they request “that the urgent return to Venezuela of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights be allowed” and call on Venezuela “to guarantee the appropriate conditions so that he can fully carry out his mandate.”

Additionally, Venezuela is required, “as a State party to the 1954 Caracas Convention on Democratic Asylum, to comply with its provisions and issue safe-conduct passes that allow the six asylum seekers who remain in the official residence of the Argentine Republic to safely withdraw from Venezuelan territory.”

Based on the aforementioned preliminary report of the UN Panel, they request “the immediate publication of all the original minutes and the impartial and independent verification of these results, preferably by an international entity, to guarantee respect for the will of the Venezuelan people expressed at the polls,” adding that “Any delay in this happening calls into question the results officially published on August 2, 2024.”

He concludes by saying that “Today, more than ever, Venezuela must … recover peaceful coexistence, public security, and political stability which, according to reports from the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of the UN Human Rights Council, are being threatened by the Venezuelan security authorities themselves.”

Clear and forceful.

The signatory governments are Argentina, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, USA, Guatemala, Guyana, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, and Uruguay for the Americas region; and outside the region, the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Portugal and the European Union.

The absences are painful, especially within the region, of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.

In parallel, the OAS Permanent Council approved by consensus a resolution based on a (non-binding) proposal co-sponsored by Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Suriname, the United States, and Uruguay, which, while also demanding that the Venezuelan authorities “expeditiously publish the minutes with the results of the presidential elections at the level of each polling station” and “respect the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty through an impartial verification of the results that guarantee the transparency, credibility, and legitimacy of the electoral process,” it differs from the aforementioned declaration, among other things, in that it demands that the impartial verification be “independent” (no longer through an “international entity”). Two weeks earlier, on July 31, the first attempt by the OAS Permanent Council to discuss the Venezuelan elections had failed, with only 17 votes in favor, 11 abstentions (including Brazil, Colombia, and Bolivia), and five absences (including Mexico and several Caribbean countries), a real disgrace.

What is happening and what happened in the field of parliamentary diplomacy with the elections in Venezuela?

There are lights and shadows.

As a specialist in the field and a practitioner, respecter, and believer in parliamentary diplomacy as a legislative function that is increasingly necessary and challenging in the context of a hyper-complex, interconnected, and interdependent world, I cannot help but appeal to the truth and tell things as they are. Those who approach it superficially do not contribute in any way to the promotion and improvement of parliamentary diplomacy, even less so when pretentious diagnoses are drawn up that, instead of describing reality, formulate grandiloquent “contributions” devoid of any evidence.

Let us look at two concrete examples, one at the bilateral level and the other at the multilateral level.

In the sphere of the Argentine National Congress, Deputy Fernando Iglesias (PRO) and Senator Francisco Paoltroni (LLA) have brought proactivity and dynamism to the foreign relations commissions of the lower house and the Senate respectively, which contrast sharply with the virtual paralysis of those same commissions during the mandate of the previous period (2022/2023), in the hands of legislators of another political sign (UxP).

Among the many activities that took place during the pre-election period in Venezuela, one can mention, for example, the live interview with María Corina Machado on March 14, 2024, which was attended not only by national legislators from Argentina but also by the Vice-Chancellor of the Nation, Ambassador Leopoldo Sahores, who was also present as a speaker during today's meeting at the United Nations Plaza.

The interview can be seen at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/live/6_L6dqIwsjI?si=dzfzO56CqPmTSn-t

Added to this, of course, was the activity of the committees:

a).- On July 31, the CREyC of the H. Chamber of Deputies adopted a ruling that unifies seven initiatives (3962-D-2024 and others) presented by deputies from different political blocs, ready to be discussed in the chamber.

Unfortunately, included in OD 232 (Order of the Day) for the special session of August 14, a motion of order was made for its treatment by Deputy Silvana Giudici - who was also present at today's meeting at the United Nations Plaza as a speaker - but it was not approved, so the project could not be treated yet.

Link to the meeting coverage: https://www.diputados.gob.ar/prensa/noticia/RELACIONES-EXTERIORES-Y-CULTO-DICTAMINO-SOBRE-LA-SITUACION-ELECTORAL-EN-VENEZUELA/

It is worth noting that in that same session on August 14, a large group of Argentine deputies displayed from their seats the images of four Venezuelan parliamentarians who were kidnapped by the Venezuelan government (Dignora Hernández, Freddy Superlano, Williams Dávila and Américo De Grazia), following an initiative by Elisa Trotta Gamus - Venezuelan lawyer and diplomat who served as ambassador to Argentina during the interim government of Juan Guaidó - aimed at making visible the fight for democracy and human rights.

b) On August 7, the CREyC of the H. Senate of the Nation adopted a ruling that also unifies different initiatives presented by senators from different political blocs (S-2185, 1287, 1289, 1301, and 1324/24), in conditions to be treated in the chamber, with the peculiarity that on this occasion the officials of the Argentine embassy in Venezuela who had to evacuate it participated: Minister Andrés Mangiarotti, Secretary Bárbara Aubert, Secretary Tomás Gibson, Secretary Norberto Fernández, and the Administrative Attaché Santiago Valle, accompanied by the Undersecretary of American Affairs, Ambassador Mariano Vergara.

The project strongly and vigorously condemns the “fraud perpetrated in the elections of July 28 in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in which citizens of other countries were prevented from entering the country to observe the electoral process, by deporting them. In addition, millions of Venezuelans abroad were arbitrarily prevented from voting.”

It was decided to support the “recognition of the minutes presented by the candidate Edmundo González Urrutia” and express “solidarity with the Venezuelan people and commitment to remain attentive to the situation in Venezuela; striving to ensure that the human rights of Venezuelans who are being violated by the regime of Nicolás Maduro are guaranteed and that the security of diplomatic facilities and the rights of political asylum seekers and of persons who request it are protected, by international public law and in particular international treaties such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.”

Although by the provisions of Art. 110 of the Senate Regulations, the opinion goes directly to the agenda of the next session, to date it is pending treatment until its new call and effective realization.

Link to the meeting coverage: https://www.senado.gob.ar/micrositios/nota/21899/noticias

Link to the meeting: https://www.youtube.com/live/zNKe6mEajxQ?si=31xpS3kfTyQ5Fv7w

That is to say, none of the initiatives described above regarding the elections in Venezuela have yet been approved by either chamber of the Argentine National Congress. However, they have passed the examination of the respective committees, and are in a position to be discussed and approved soon.

Before going into the examination of the example in the multilateral sphere, I would like to make an important reflection based on what happened at the Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on 08/07/2024 in the Senate.

As can be seen from the debate through the recording on YouTube or the shorthand version of the meeting, the link to which we have just shared, the opinions were divided into two large blocks:

a) those who defended democracy and human rights, in line with the Inter-American Democratic Charter and related norms.

It should be recalled that through the Quebec Declaration, in April 2001, the representatives of the OAS member countries, meeting during the Third Summit of the Americas, reaffirmed their commitment to democracy and ordered their respective foreign ministers to prepare an “Inter-American Democratic Charter” to strengthen the OAS instruments that already existed in the area of defense of representative democracy (cf. historical background of the OAS, https://www.oas.org/es/democratic-charter/#:~:text=Washington%20(1997).-,What%20is%20the%20Inter-American%20Democratic%20Charter%3F,democratic%20system%20in%20the%20region .).

The date of its approval, September 11, 2001, is unforgettable because it was the same day as the terrorist attacks on the east coast of the United States of America, using commercial airplanes as if they were missiles, hitting the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, among other frustrated objectives, leaving almost three thousand dead and tens of thousands injured, in addition to causing one of the most shocking shocks in recent history.

The United States was represented by its then Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who, like the rest of the representatives of the other member countries of the OAS, was in Lima, Peru that day.

Among the essential values and rights recognized in the Americas are respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; periodic, free, and fair elections; transparency, integrity, and respect for social rights; the exercise of power based on the rule of law; a plural system of political parties and organizations; separation and independence of public powers; elimination of all forms of discrimination; and the right and duty of all citizens to participate in decisions relating to their development, all of which are clearly and openly violated by the Venezuelan government.

The Democratic Charter (https://www.oas.org/en/democratic-charter/pdf/demcharter_en.pdf ) was a direct response to the process of democratization in the region after overcoming the dictatorships of past decades.

In the words of José Miguel Insulza, then Secretary General of the OAS, “The Democratic Charter constitutes … a collective commitment to maintain and strengthen democracy in the Americas and contains regional mechanisms for these purposes. It thus responds to the need to confront the problems of instability and poor performance of some democratic regimes, which are evident in the frequent political crises in the recent history of the region. Hence its normative nature, by which it provides means of joint action to confront crises and respond to threats against the democratic constitutional order.”

He adds: “The Democratic Charter also has a second content, as fundamental as the first, more novel and with a vision for the future. It does not limit itself to defending democracy as a form of election and majority government, but at the same time identifies it with a set of values and rights that also constitute part of its essential content.”

Something else, very applicable to the case of Venezuela: “… the Charter goes beyond the idea of electoral democracy – to which it also assigns, however, an essential character – to opt for a well-defined tendency of the democratic progress of our time: democracy is not only practiced in the generation of power but also its exercise. Democracy does not only mean being democratically elected, but also governing democratically.”

One of the disvalued conducts of the Venezuelan government regime has been its letter of resignation to the OAS in 2017. However, from the point of view of all member states, including Argentina, the Democratic Charter requires its observance within the country and the region.

Article 23 is clear in establishing that “Member States are responsible for organizing, carrying out and guaranteeing fair and just electoral processes.” Venezuela did not comply with this, nor with the preservation and respect of human rights, which it systematically violated, in particular, through proscription and other multiple forms of violence.

b) those who refused to express their opinion on the elections in Venezuela based on Article 2, paragraph b) of the OAS Charter (https://www.oas.org/xxxivga/spanish/basic_docs/carta_oea.pdf ), according to which one of its purposes is established as “Promoting and consolidating representative democracy while respecting the principle of non-intervention.”

The Charter was signed on April 30, 1948, in Bogotá, Colombia, and has been amended four times to date (1967, Buenos Aires, Argentina; 1986, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia; 1992, Washington, DC, USA; and 1993, Managua, El Salvador). It predates the Democratic Charter.

The first is mentioned but the second is avoided.

What are these contradictions?

A Manichean position based on the hypocrisy of the phenomenon of “double morality” or “double standards”, which consists of treating similar cases differently depending on sympathy or antipathy; alliances or enmities; and even and fundamentally on the geopolitical interests of a certain country or, worse still, of a certain government, extending this practice to legislative blocs and even to legislators considered individually.

Respect for or violation of the Democratic Charter is a factual matter. The perpetrators may be right-wing, left-wing, or centrist, regardless of their political orientation.

As we always say, it is necessary to differentiate between government policies and State policies. The latter are those adopted with high levels of consensus and maintained over time and may be crystallized in legal norms, as is the case with the OAS Democratic Charter.

Parliamentarians, whether individually or grouped in party blocs, especially those who do not belong to the ruling party, may contradict a political decision of the government in power in matters of foreign policy as long as it is not a State policy. However, when it is a State policy, they may adopt nuances regarding the position of the ruling party, but they should not oppose it, since this would mean a bad exercise (malpractice) of parliamentary diplomacy.

The issue transcends the foreign policy of governments and extends to the diplomacy of parliaments in the multilateral arena.

Although human rights violations and the alteration of the constitutional order in Venezuela have been going on for a long time, on October 17, 2023, through the so-called “Barbados Pact”, a partial agreement was reached on the promotion of political rights and electoral guarantees. This occurred, among other reasons, due to the pressure exerted by the international community on the Venezuelan government. From the field of multilateral parliamentary diplomacy, for example, at the end of 2021 a delegation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) led by its then president, the Portuguese Duarte Pacheco, and made up of parliamentarians from around the world, visited Caracas to hold consultations with interested parties to assess the general political situation in the country and help find solutions to the cases under study by the Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarians.

In this context, on the occasion of the 148th IPU Assembly, to be held in Geneva, Switzerland, the Argentine delegation proposed the political situation in Venezuela as an “urgent point” in the context of the presidential elections to be held that year. The topic was included as point 9 of the ordinary session of the Geopolitical Group of Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC), held on March 22, 2024.

The Argentine proposal generated a heated debate but did not achieve unanimity in GRULAC. However, it did gain support from Guyana (whose representative, the Honorable Manzoor Nadir, is the first vice-president of GRULAC and will assume the role of provisional president as of September 1st); Peru (whose representative, María del Carmen Alva Prieto, was President of the Peruvian Congress and President of its Foreign Relations Committee); and Uruguay (whose representative, Beatriz Argimón, is Vice-President of the Nation and President of the Senate).

What happened?

The urgent point did not prosper in the Assembly, partly due to the short-sightedness of many parliamentary delegations that, despite being democratic, caught up in the urgent point regarding the situation in Gaza, chose - wrongly from my point of view - to penalize Venezuela with a negative vote or abstention.

However, 225 votes in favor (some total and others partial) were obtained from countries such as Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Bolivia, Chile, Finland, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Montenegro, Korea, Spain, Suriname, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

Within the GRULAC, the confrontations responded -as at the domestic level in the Argentine National Congress- to the "double morality" or "double standard."

The initiative can be consulted at: https://www.ipu.org/event/148th-assembly-and-related-meetings#event-sub-page-32638/

Today, with the result of the elections of July 28 and what is happening in Venezuela - electoral fraud and consequent repression - it is evident that it was appropriate to have supported the proposal.

The action of Argentina, Guyana, Peru, and Uruguay was not in vain, because although the urgent bill on the elections in Venezuela was not approved, the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee issued a decision regarding the violation of the human rights of María Corina Machado that was directly in line with what was denounced in the aforementioned bill. In the end, the objective was achieved, but in a different format.

The issue was taken up again by GRULAC at the end of July, when an intense debate took place remotely, which resulted in the "Declaration of the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Geopolitical Group for Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC-IPU) on the elections in Venezuela", adopted on 31 July 2024. The declaration expressed "deep concern about the events related to the presidential elections held in Venezuela on Sunday, 28 July"; it was considered essential "that the electoral authorities of Venezuela publish the full, transparent and detailed results, including data by voting table, which allows the validity and legitimacy of the election to be verified", adding that "Transparency in the electoral results is crucial to ensure that the will of the Venezuelan people as expressed at the polls is truly reflected".

It was also agreed that "political parties had great difficulty in accrediting their witnesses at the voting tables, even though they had the right to be present by the law. In addition to this fact, we learned that the electoral records of each voting table were not made public. These facts seriously affect the certainty and reliability of the CNE and have directly generated a series of peaceful protests by the Venezuelan community in its territory and the world."

In light of these preliminary considerations, GRULAC expressed concern "at the acts of repression against peaceful civil protests, as well as at the persecution of leaders who express opinions different from the current government. These actions are not only unacceptable but also go against democratic principles and human rights."

For this reason, GRULAC urgently calls for "the Venezuelan authorities to respect the democratic rights of citizens, ceasing any act of repression or political persecution against demonstrations and political positions that validly demand certainty and transparency in the electoral process."

GRULAC also demands that "the use of armed forces against the Venezuelan people who legitimately express their concerns and demands regarding the electoral process" be avoided. They also ask that "the safety of the leaders who lead the protests be guaranteed."

Finally, the GRULAC declaration publicly expresses its support for "the democratic aspirations of the Venezuelan people and their right to demonstrate without fear of reprisals," expressing its solidarity "with their struggle for a democratic process, where human rights are respected, all voices are heard, justice prevails and their aspirations for freedom and democracy are guaranteed."

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Mexico, and Uruguay signed the declaration.

In conclusion, there is undoubtedly a duty to protect both democracy and human rights, which is universal in nature, but which is solidly structured through the OAS in the Americas.

Venezuela, like any other country in our region, must comply with the mandate to respect democratic values, both through their observance and their faithful application. The “double backside” or “double standards” are unacceptable, whether the conduct belongs to official diplomacy (in the hands of the executive) or parliamentary diplomacy, with the aggravating factor that it is state diplomacy but belongs to the family of “plural” diplomacies, whose main characteristic is to be naturally associated, precisely, with peace, democracy and the protection and guarantee of human rights.

But let us not despair.

Parliamentary diplomacy is challenged both by the demand for ethical integrity and by its capacity to have a real impact on people's quality of life. Today, as it is of low intensity, its effects, both positive and negative, are minimized.

But if its performance improves, its effects will become more powerful and therefore more significant in the area of regional and global governance, and then it will be necessary to appeal to greater professionalism, better management quality, adherence to the rule of law and, above all, to the ethical and moral integrity of its protagonists: the parliamentarians.

From the academy, we do our best to effectively contribute to this objective through the actions of Cideipp, the International Centre for Parliamentary Studies, Research and Foresight of the School of Politics, Government and International Relations of Universidad Austral and its International Program on Parliamentary Diplomacy.