Part 2: The Role of the Power Elite in Building and Framing the Media Agenda

(originally published in April 2018)

?The belief that the media exerts considerable influence over people and society has been around at least since the beginning of the 20th century. Research shows that media industries are becoming more and more consolidated, resulting in media conglomerates and oligopolies. Who owns these companies? How much power do they have in shaping the media and political agendas? What strategies and tactics do they use in the process?

In 2018, I delved further into these questions by doing a case study on the big news of the day: the Russia collusion, which dominated much of the news cycle throughout the months surrounding the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Unsurprisingly, the same strategies and tactics are very noticeable regarding events that have been dominating the news cycle over the past few months.

In this three-part series, I’ll take you behind the scenes to get a glimpse of what’s really happening. In Part 1, we looked at who owns the media, who the “power elite” are, and how much influence they have controlling the messages we see and hear. In this article, we’ll dive further into how they do it.

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Strategies and Tactics

Working through foundations and think tanks, as well as through lobbyists and politicians that they finance, elites influence—and oftentimes dominate—key issues in U.S. policymaking (Gilens & Page, 2014; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). However, they need assistance when it comes to shaping the public’s preferences. That is where the media and the theories of framing and agenda-setting come into play.

Agenda-setting

Agenda-setting refers to the ability of the news media to tell its audience what issues are important. In 1963, Bernard Cohen wrote that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” (p. 13). The key is saliency. In looking at the measurement of issue salience, Spiro Kiousis (2004) identified three dimensions: attention (how frequently news was devoted to a particular topic), prominence (appearance, placement, amount of time or space given), and valence (how much conflict is involved in the story or its overall tone, whether it is perceived as positive or negative). Attention and prominence are external factors (i.e., how something is placed and compares in relation to other objects), but valence is considered internal (i.e., the emotional impact on an individual’s mind or will).

Walter Lippman first alluded to agenda-setting in 1922 when, in “The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads,” he described the news media as the principal connection between world events and the images in the public’s mind, a world that at that time was, for the most part, “out of reach, out of sight, out of mind” (p. 29). The agenda-setting theory is attributed to Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in a study they did on the 1968 U.S. presidential election, which looked at what the news media was reporting as the most important political issues of the day and what the residents of Chapel Hill, North Carolina thought were the most important issues. McCombs and Shaw found a strong correlation between the two (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Since that initial study, more than 400 follow-up studies have been done; and agenda-setting effects now carry over into the Internet: blogs, online newspapers, websites, news channels, and chat rooms (McCombs, 2005).

When it comes to attitudes and opinions, the consequences of agenda-setting are threefold: (1) forming an opinion, (2) priming opinions about public figures by emphasizing particular issues, and (3) shaping opinions by emphasizing particular attributes (McCombs, 2005). Thus, if agenda-setting tells us what to think about, then framing—which focuses on attributes that define a central theme—tells us how to think about it.

Framing

The concept of framing has its origins in psychology and sociology (Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). It oftentimes overlaps with other theoretical models of communication such as agenda-setting, priming, and persuasion. Frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and/or suggest remedies (Entman, 1993). Entman wrote, “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). It involves highlighting particular aspects of a topic while simultaneously deflecting attention away from other aspects, similar to a photographer framing a shot that shows an object in the best possible light while hiding its flaws and defects. What is omitted can be just as critical as what is included in guiding the audience’s response.

An important component of framing is to consider what Goffman (1974) calls “schemata of interpretation” (p. 21). How an audience receives and interprets a message is based upon previous natural or social frameworks, oftentimes connected to features of which the recipient is totally unaware. As such, framing pertains to perception, emotion, and interpretation of a message. By framing something as an idea or central story line, the likelihood of connecting with the audience is greater; and media packaging is made easier. By using such devices as catchphrases, depictions, metaphors, exemplars, and visual images (Entman, 1993; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), communications professionals can package a topic in such a way that it resonates with the intended audience in either a positive or negative way, depending upon whether the intent is solidarity or creating discord. Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) point out, however, that this does not mean journalists are trying to spin or deceive their audiences; it is sometimes simply a necessary tool to reduce the complexity of an issue and fit it within the constraints of space and air time.

Nonetheless, to imply that deception is not within the realm of possibility would be deceiving in and of itself. Framing is done in multiple ways throughout the communication process: via the communicator, the text, the receiver, and culture. In addition to highlighting some aspects and failing to mention others, issues can also be framed by the choice of journalists covering the story or the selection of sources (Kosicki & Pan, 1996). “Organizational policy actors” are known for attempting to collaborate with the media to frame particular issues, and the ability to do so grants them a certain power (Zoch & Molleda, 2006). Bringing in public affairs specialists allows them to communicate their frames efficiently and effectively. Andsager and Smiley (1998) write, “Policy actors are entities—such as government agencies, large corporations, elite professional organizations and even citizen-activists—who are outside the media but, because of their size and influence, also possess the ability to intervene in the production of news. Policy actors employ public information officers to communicate their frames” (p. 185); and how they do this can affect regulation, litigation, and public understanding of the issue. Perhaps Steven Davis (1995) summarized it best when he wrote, “As important as any other factor, especially in an ideologically polarized, zero-sum policy arena, is the quality of a group’s message and the cleverness, articulateness, and sheer intensity with which they can deliver it” (p. 39).

Agenda building / information subsidies

If agenda-setting tells us what to think about and framing tells us how to think about it, then someone or something must be in charge of actually building the agenda. Who? The answer to that question is complicated. Many researchers would argue that the process involves a feedback loop among opinion leaders, the press corps, and the public (Cobb & Elder, 1971; Lancendorfer & Lee, 2010; Lang, Lang, Wilhoit, & de Bock, 1981; McCombs, 2005; Weaver, 2007).

One way this is done is through “information subsidies” (Gandy, 1982; Jung Moon & Hyun, 2014; Zoch & Molleda, 2006), packets of information created by public relations professionals and distributed freely to the press in an effort to promote an organization’s viewpoint, facilitate the newsgathering process, and communicate certain aspects of specific issues to internal and external publics. Through these information subsidies, the likelihood of information being consumed by journalists and used in media content is much higher (Turk, 1986). This, in turn, fosters conversation among the general public, which then generates press coverage based upon what people are talking about, which then results in organizations and key influencers responding; and the cycle starts over again.

With the rise of social media, political tweets on Twitter are now seen as information subsidies (Parmelee, 2014). Whereas press releases and traditional information subsidies were prepared directly for the media and indirectly made their way to the general public, tweets are distributed to journalists and the general public simultaneously. Because members of the press appreciate the cost-effectiveness of the information subsidies and the creators of the subsidies benefit from the information being widely disseminated, fostering mutually beneficial relationships is a key component of agenda-building (Cobb & Elder, 1971; Turk, 1986; Zoch & Molleda, 2006).

Media As a Tool

While the concepts of persuasion and propaganda are far too broad to delve into in this paper, it is important to note a few general observations regarding them, especially when looking at the media as a tool. As mentioned earlier, someone is in charge of building the media’s agenda. Although it may not always be clear just who the builder is, it is becoming much more obvious that the process involves some piece of persuasion.

O’Keefe (as cited in Dainton, 2005) argued that there are three requirements for something to be considered persuasive: (1) the sender intends to achieve a goal; (2) communication is the means by which the goal is attempted; and (3) there must be free will on the part of the recipient. Traditionally, objective journalism, investigative reporting, and ethics prevented persuasion from transitioning into propaganda; however, journalistic propriety appears to be something of a rare jewel these days, especially with regard to President Donald Trump. New York Times columnist, Ross Douthat, remarked that the media “seem to palpate with contempt for him” (Kurtz, 2018).

Truth is relative, investigative journalism is dying a slow death (Just, Levine, & Dean, 2002; Kurtz, 2018; R. W. McChesney, 2004), and everyone wants to get in on the communication action. Anyone with something to say can simply blog, tweet, or videotape it. If they are lucky, the mainstream media may pick it up. Unfortunately, respect for the “fourth estate” has diminished considerably. A September 2016 Gallup poll showed Americans’ trust in the media at an all-time low (Swift, 2016). Increased negativity among voters has resulted in increased political polarization (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017), and the media seems to feed (and feed off of) this frenzied state of affairs. Howard Kurtz described it as “sheer repetition [creating] an atmosphere of ‘crisis’” (2018, p. 154). If one were to believe the news, it would appear that the Russians are the instigators of this chaos; but is that true? [Author’s note: This article was originally written in April 2018. Today, some might argue that the Chinese are the instigators.]

“Fake news”

Although the term “fake news” is not new, it has increased in popularity with the rise of social media and, more recently, with the controversy surrounding the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In their research regarding these recent events, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) defined fake news as “news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers” (p. 213). Although their definition rules out such things as unintentional reporting errors, unsubstantiated rumors, conspiracy theories, satire, false statements made by politicians, and distorted reports, it is nonetheless important to at least be aware of them (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Tandoc Jr, Lim, & Ling, 2018).

Claire Wardle and Danah Boyd echo what others are saying, “We are at war, an information war” (Wardle, 2017). Journalists are disconnected from much of the country, and media malfeasance is not uncommon (Kurtz, 2018). Smoke-and-mirror tactics and obscuring or embellishing the truth with misinformation or disinformation has become a new normal. Deception, fraud, and unsubstantiated claims are commonplace. The press has resorted to relying too heavily on anonymous sources with an obvious agenda to push (Kurtz, 2018).

If two main motivators underlying fake news are financial —what Kurtz refers to as “the rise of quick clicks” (Kurtz, 2018)—and ideological (Tandoc Jr et al., 2018), one cannot discount the importance, especially with regard to political communication, of using fake news to promote favored ideas or people while, at the same time, discrediting others (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). If powerful elites want to sway public opinion in their favor, it stands to reason that they will build and frame their agendas in such a way that will persuade others to join their way of thinking (Beder, 2004; Esser, Reinemann, & Fan, 2001; Kurtz, 2018; Lewis, 2014; O'Shaughnessy, 2016). For the elite, public relations takes precedence over objective and ethical journalism.

Media bias

According to the Ethical Journalism Network’s website, there are five core principles of ethical journalism: (1) truth and accuracy (i.e., getting the facts right); (2) independence (i.e., not acting on behalf of special interests); (3) fairness and impartiality; (4) humanity (i.e., do no harm); and (5) accountability (i.e., correct errors and do it sincerely) ("The 5 principles of ethical journalism", n.d.). However, in the past few years, these core principles seem to be lacking more often than not. The lines between news and opinion seem to have been obliterated (Kurtz, 2018; Ladd, 2010; Plaut, 2014).

The media coverage of the 2016 U.S. presidential election and first year of President Donald Trump’s presidency—coined “Trump Trauma” by Howard Kurtz—was unprecedented and went beyond media bias. In Media Madness: Donald Trump, The Press, and the War Over the Truth, Kurtz pointed out how the melodramatic coverage of the president’s troubles blotted out any strides he was making in changing the country. “[N]eutrality was out. Opinion, dressed up as ‘truth-telling,’ was now in on the program [CBS Evening News] once anchored by Walter Cronkite” (2018, p. 107). Cobb and Elder explained this phenomenon nearly a half-century ago when they wrote, “Through the manipulation of bias and prevailing values, those who wield power may stifle, or reinterpret an issue and thus prevent it from gaining agenda status” (1971, p. 904).

Propaganda

Rebecca Curnalia, in her 2005 retrospective study on propaganda, defined propaganda as “a series of targeted, systematic messages disseminated through multiple channels for a prolonged period of time that offer biased opinions or perspectives through the selective use of specific, emotionally arousing, comprehensible, and aesthetically appealing techniques that circumvent scrutiny of the message to influence attitudes and beliefs” (p. 240). It is a strategy with intent behind it—usually with an organized, funded campaign—the purpose of which is to promote a political agenda or viewpoint (Bergstrom, 2018).

Karthik Narayanaswami, in his behavioral study analyzing Nazi propaganda, provides an excellent overview of how cognitive biases can be manipulated in the masses by providing an artificial stimulus seeking to induce certain responses. He points out that Otto Dietrich, the Third Reich’s press chief, testified during the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in1949 that, “The [Nazi propaganda] campaign’s only rationale was to blunt the sensibilities of the people” (Narayanaswami, 2011).

Adolf Hitler, in Mein Kampf (itself a work of propaganda), wrote:

Immediately after Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany, the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, under the direction of Dr. Joseph Goebbels, took over control of all forms of communication in Germany ("Nazi propaganda and censorship", n.d.; Narayanaswami, 2011; O'Shaughnessy, 2016). At the beginning, the Nazis controlled less than three percent of Germany’s 4,700 papers; but as time passed, they exerted more and more control, destroying the printing presses and newspapers of opposing political parties, establishing new media empires that drove out competition, forcing Jewish publishing houses out of business, and requiring remaining editors and journalists to register with the Reich Association of the German Press, which mandated them to follow specific instructions or face being fired or sent to concentration camps. Even the Associated Press was not immune (Blakemore, 2016; Oltermann, 2016). By 1944, no more than 1,110 of Germany’s 4,700 newspapers remained; and those papers had a circulation of approximately 4.4 million in comparison with those owned by the Nazi Party, which reached a circulation of 21 million ("The press in the Third Reich", n.d.).

Although the media in the United States has not yet reached this level of authoritarian control, it is important to note the danger that potentially exists, given the consolidation of U.S. media companies over the past 35 years. In 1983, 90% of American media was owned by 50 companies; by 2011, that same 90% was controlled by six companies (Lutz, 2012). Therefore, it is worth looking more closely into how the political and economic elite use the press to control the narrative today and determine whether or not it might be a precursor for things to come.

The DNC, the Clinton campaign, and the political elites have used propaganda strategy very effectively over the past few years with their Russia collusion narrative and their tactics to thwart President Trump’s ascension to the presidency. Just as the German population was ripe for such propaganda—given the political and economic climate in Germany at the time—so, too, is the U.S. population ripe for a similar propaganda campaign given the growing dissension and political polarization occurring today. In Nazi Germany, Jews and other undesirables were “successfully framed and defined” as either ugly degenerates associated with vermin or as greedy, “unpleasant elements who sided with the enemy”; and it became easier for the Nazis to rally the masses” (Narayanaswami, 2011). Likewise, in the United States today, the Democrats’/liberals’ so-called “enemy” (i.e., Trump and his “basket of deplorables”) is also being framed and defined via such propaganda tactics as Russia collusion, various phobias (e.g. Islamaphobe, xenophobe, racist, misogynist), etc.

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In light of the media coverage over the past few month—particularly concerning COVID-19, George Floyd, and the ensuing riots—it’s easy to see these same strategies and tactics being used over and over again. As a free nation, we in America need to be aware of what is happening and ask ourselves, “Are we being manipulated?” and, if so, “What are we going to do about it?”

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