The Road Towards the Maldives Independence

Part 1 of 3

The Maldives will celebrate its 59th Independence Day, on Friday, July 26. The path that led to the full external independence was turbulent and perilous, which nearly split the country in two.

The Maldivian Prime Minister Ibrahim Nasir arrived at the Westminster House in Colombo—the residence of the British ambassador to Ceylon—sharp at 10.30am, on Monday, July 26, 1965. Nasir was in an unusually joyful mood. For he would shortly be signing an agreement with British ambassador, Michael Walker, declaring the Maldives as “a composite sovereign and fully independent State possessing all rights to have direct relations politically and otherwise with all countries and international organisations.”[1] Since then, it is known in the Maldives as the Independence Agreement, and July 26 is marked as the Independence Day.

The agreement indeed restored external independence of the Maldives. But it fell short of restoring full sovereignty that the Maldives, which was surrendered to Britain, following the exchange of letters signed between the two countries in December 1887. The independence agreement allowed Britain unrestricted rights to the airbase in Addu atoll Gan, which it had been operating since 1956. Under the agreement, the Maldives did not have the right to allow “the entry into or use of the territory, territorial waters or air space” by the armed forces of any other country. It also did not allow the Maldives to give “rights and facilities of a military character” in any part of the Maldives to a third country. These limitations on Maldives sovereignty continued until the 1965 Agreement was terminated, eleven years later, in 1976 (after Britain withdrew its military from Gan).

The discussions between the Maldives and Britain which led to the independence agreement were among the most asymmetric and lopsided bilateral negotiations that the Maldives has ever had. And its implications were so profound that the country’s future as a nation-State was hanging in the balance. Negotiations began in August 1956. The initial purpose was to agree on a framework in which Britain could establish and operate a military base in Addu atoll Gan, and a communication station in Hithadhoo in the same atoll.

Britain—still a global empire—was the “protectorate” power of the Maldives; a status it assumed following the exchange of letters between the two countries in 1887. The Maldives, on the other hand, was one of the tiniest and most impoverished countries in the world. The country was represented at the negotiations by individuals who had no diplomatic experience of any kind, at any level. It was a time when the country did not have a single trained lawyer, much less a university graduate. Most importantly, the Maldives did not have an organised civil service, which would only emerge fifty years later, in 2007. There was simply no system in place to help political leaders make crucial national decisions.

Britain got all it wanted in the negotiations, which lasted for a period of nine years (from 1956 to 1965). Britain, as one would expect, resisted making any compromises on its key interests. It sought to establish and operate an airbase in Gan and a communication station in Hithadhoo, with unrestricted access to the facilities.[2] Britain also wanted to ensure that no other country could establishes such facilities in any part of the Maldives. The only issue on which it showed some flexibility, albeit reluctantly, was the length of the lease period of these two islands, which was reduced from 100 to 30 years.

Islands of Interest

For Britain, the Maldives had very little strategic significance. But that would change, over time. ?

Addu Atoll (in the far south of the Maldivian archipelago, where the British operated a military base during World War II) was fast becoming geo-strategically significant. Following Ceylon’s independence in 1948, Britain started to believe that its forces in Ceylon may soon be asked to leave.[3] Addu Atoll, therefore, became an alternative to Ceylon in implementing the colonial grand strategy in the Indian Ocean.

It was at that point that the Maldives came into the picture—as an insurance policy if Ceylon became unavailable. With this shift, Britain’s attitude towards the Maldives also began to change, albeit in a rather gradual fashion.

One such occasion was when the Maldivian Home Minister (and the country’s future President) Mohamed Amin suggested to Britain in 1946, the idea of updating the “protectorate” arrangement of 1887.[4] The updated version became a new agreement, which was signed in Malé in April 1948. It included an article stating that Britain “will have the right to establish and maintain in the Maldives such facilities for [its] Forces . . . [and the Maldives] will afford every assistance to this end”. The same article appeared in another updated version of the agreement which was signed in 1953. But Britain showed very little interest, at least in the eyes of Maldivian leaders, in putting that article into action.

This situation would soon change. And with devastating consequences for the Maldives.

In August 1956, Maldivian Prime Minister Ali Didi was visiting Ceylon. (The Maldives had a constitutional monarchy at this time. The King, as head of State, had more of a ceremonial role, and the Prime Minister, as head of government, held executive power.) British ambassador, Cecil Syers, approached Ali Didi with an important proposal.[5] Britain wanted to purchase Addu atoll Gan for establishing and operating a military base and lease a large part of Hithadhoo to set up radio communication facilities.

Ali Didi gave a nod in agreement, subject to the endorsement of his cabinet. But instead of an outright sale, Gan and parts of Hithadhoo would be leased for a period of one hundred years, for ￡2,000 annually.

A few weeks after returning from Ceylon, Ali Didi convened a meeting of his cabinet and presented Britain’s proposal, in the form of a draft agreement. The text of the draft was in English,[6] a language that not everyone in the meeting grasped well. To the embarrassment of Ali Didi, the cabinet refused to endorse the draft.

Following this setback, Britain promised to provide economic support to the Maldives, including two cargo vessels.[7] Following the offer, Ali Didi initialled the text in December 1956.

This put the Maldives in an unprecedented, unfamiliar, and uncomfortable position. Never before in the country’s history, had it initialled a draft bilateral agreement, but not formally signed. The distinction between “initialling” and “signing” was not too clear to the Maldivian leadership at the time,[8] which proceeded as if the agreement was concluded.

It was a fateful decision, we would later learn; for the Maldives, and for Ali Didi, too.

[. . . to be continued as part 2 on July 24]

[1] United Nations Treaty Series, No 7980, Agreement between Her Majesty’s Gov Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Government of the Maldive Islands, signed at Colombo, on 26 July 1965: New York, United Nations.

[2] Britain’s interests and objectives in the negotiations with the Maldives were set out in cabinet paper in 1959. See Ronald Hyam, and Roger Louis, “Cabinet conclusions about establishment of an air staging-post at Gan 60 CAB 128/33, CC 37(59)3 23 June 1959”, in British Documents on the End of Empire Project: The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1957–1964. Volume 4 (Part I), p 244-45, London: The Stationary Office, 2000.

[3] Ashton, S.R, ed, ‘The Security of the British Empire: Report by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 29 June 1945, 43 CAB 81/46 PHP (45) 29(0) The British Documents on the End of Empire Project: Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice, 1925-1945 (Part I: Metropolitan Reorganisation, Defence and International Relations, Political Change and Constitutional Reform), Volume 1, p 231-243, London: The Stationary Office, 2004.

[4] For a detailed account of the discussions with Britain in 1946-48, see, Mohamed Amin, Dhivehi Raajje: Hanguraama ah Fahu [The Maldives: After the War], Malé, Novelty Press, 1960.

[5] For a first-hand account of the discussion, see Ibrahim Shihab, Raajjeyge Verikamuge Thaareekhuge Therein Al Sultan Mohamed Faree al-Awwal [Political History of the Maldives: The Reign of King Mohamed Fareed I], Malé, National Centre for Linguistic and Historical Research, 1990.

[6] Shihab, Political History of the Maldives, p 62.

[7] Peter Doling, From Port T to RAF Gan: An Illustrated History of the British Military Bases at Addu Atoll in the Maldive Islands 1941-76. 2nd ed. 2004, West Sussex: Woodfield Publishing, p. 91-92.

[8] This is evident in Shihab’s Political History of the Maldives, p 72.