Risk perception

Numerous factors influence how risk is perceived.

The frequent mismatches between perceived risk and measurable probabilities of risk suggest that the following factors are clearly important in clarifying how people understand and respond to risk:

?? Psychological aspects of decision-making (e.g. formed opinions are more difficult to change; activities with demonstrable benefits can facilitate greater receptivity to risk; an event is judged more probable if its occurrence, or something similar, can be readily recalled);

? All people use speculative frameworks to make sense of the world and selective judgement in their responses to risk. Improved risk communication depends on appreciating that these ‘non rational’ factors are not necessarily incorrect and recognizing the significant differences between the way ‘the public’ and ‘experts’ perceive risks.

What is risk?

While risk is a term used daily, its more conventional, technical meaning is used to refer to:

A combination of the probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence: how often is a particular potentially harmful event going to occur, [and] what are the consequences of this occurrence? (Harding 1998: 167)

One might presume that this definition is straightforward. However, the term risk is highly contested.

The following explores some of the different emphases and nuances associated with ‘risk’.

?Graubard summarises this change as follows:

It is perfectly obvious that the concept “risk” has taken on wholly new dimensions in recent decades and is today being reflected on in ways that would have been almost inconceivable even a few years ago. The older idea, that risk is essentially a wager, which individuals take in the hope of gaining something significant, substantial, has almost disappeared from common parlance. Risk today is conceived principally as danger…” (1990: v)

Measuring risk: probabilities and quantification

Given the link between risk and uncertainty, it is not surprising that there are processes that attempt to reduce risks by increasing certainty in decision making. One of the most common techniques for doing so is by allocating probabilities to both desirable and undesirable outcomes. As Smithson notes, “If there is any approach to ignorance that bears a creditable claim to generalizability and rationality simultaneously, it is probability. Virtually all modern accounts of uncertainty refer to the concept and theory of probability as a benchmark” (Smithson 1989: 41).

?Probability has limitations as a predictive risk management tool, because it is based on past events. According to Bernstein (1996: 35) data based in the past constitute a sequence of events rather than a set of independent observations that are required in the laws of probability. He points out that the challenges for probability are the contrasting tasks of having to look into the future while interpreting the past and balance opinions with what is ‘known’.

The availability heuristic and visceral risk.

Shark attacks are a good example of events whose probability is greatly over-estimated by the general public due to the newsworthiness of such an event and the visceral nature of the individual’s reaction to the occurrence. The International Shark Attack File indicates that only five people were killed by unprovoked shark attacks in 2000. Fifteen times as many people were killed by falling coconuts. (New Scientist 2002)

Should I fly?

The probability of a single event.

“Probability expresses a tendency for a system failure to occur which applies equally to any population but, because it is the application of a ratio to what is essentially a binary condition, it must always be wrong in all cases. For example, 100 aircraft are about to embark on a flight and it has been computed that each plane has a 99% chance of arriving safely. But in practice, each plane will either arrive safely or it will not, i.e. in any individual case such a ration has no sensible meaning. If 99 aircraft arrive safely and 1 crashes, then for the 99 safe arrivals the prediction is overly pessimistic but for the one that crashed it is overly optimistic. For a passenger considering a flight in one of those aircraft the significant consideration is not the probability, but whether it will arrive safely.” (Jackson and Carter 1992)

Risk perception What counts?

There has been a considerable amount of empirical research undertaken on the way people perceive risk, how they manage it and how they live with it. An important starting point is that, in some important instances, perceptions of risk do not appear to correlate with measurable probabilities of risk and therefore other factors are clearly important in understanding how people understand risk. This can have an important impact on the ability of policy makers to communicate risk analysis decisions in cases where such mismatches occur. It has been suggested that societies select particular risks for attention and that risks are therefore “exaggerated or minimized according to the social, cultural, and moral acceptability of the underlying activities” (Covello and Johnson 1987: viii). Personal experience, memory and other factors influence the way people perceive risks and these may ignore the probability of the event’s occurrence – thus risk perception is socially constructed (Spangler 1984:7; Garvin 2001:450). In addition, it appears that people have a level of risk with which they feel comfortable and will adjust the riskiness of their behaviour in the presence of safety measures. Adams calls this tendency the individual’s “risk thermostat” and uses it to explain why people tend to drive faster when they have airbags and child restraints fitted in their cars (Adams 1995).

?Different types of risk generate different reactions. For example, voluntary activities are not seen as risky as involuntary activities and new risks are regarded differently from familiar hazards (Finucane 2000: 31). Natural disasters do not generate the same level of moral indignation as the type of man made hazards described by Beck and his followers. As Blomkvist argues, “Moral indignation puts damage in another light, and the costs are probably perceived as much higher when they are man[1]made disasters, or even caused by a group of people whose willingness to avoid damages to other people has been doubted.” (1987: 107) These so-called “modern risks” seem to be of special concern to the public due to their potential for catastrophe, inequities between the generators of the risk and those bearing its consequences and the possible irreversible nature of the consequences (Merkhofer 1987: 5). Examples include the accidents at Chernobyl and Bhopal where all these factors were present.

??Once people have determined an assessment of a particular risk, their opinions can be difficult to change (Covello et al. 1984:226; MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986: 41). This seems to be particularly the case if they feel they know something about the subject – research has found that people are more likely to be swayed by expert opinion in areas about which they know nothing than on topics they believe they understand (Siegrist and Cvetovich 2000). People are also selective in the evidence they will accept and more likely to see less risk in cases where they see benefits from the activity (Ross and Anderson 1982:149; Siegrist and Cvetovich 2000: 714). Supporters of the import of a new product are therefore more likely to accept the associated risk than its opponents who will regard it as riskier.

Risk & modern society

While risk might be a term used widely across society, its meaning varies and remains somewhat contested. Over the last two decades, research has found that ‘risk’ is often now associated with ‘bad risk’. The shift away from the original technical probabilistic meanings of the term has significant implications for risk assessment, management and communication processes.

We have sought to reduce risk in society by increasing certainty in decision-making. This preferred course of action has not been without its consequences. Allocating probabilities to both desirable and undesirable outcomes has been a common method, despite vigorous debates about our ability to calculate the probability of a single (or multiple) event(s). While there are considerable theoretical and technical limitations to using probability as a predictive risk management tool, we have also seen there are substantive social implications for continuing to base our assessments and responses strictly along these lines. Risk perceptions The socially constructed nature of risk mandates an understanding of risk perceptions. There are often mismatches between perceived risk and measurable probabilities of risk. This discrepancy suggests that other factors are clearly important in clarifying how people understand and respond to risk. For example, the characteristics of risk are a significant influence on perceived risk – different types of risk generate different reactions (e.g. voluntary activities are not considered as ‘risky’ as involuntary activities, new risks viewed differently from familiar hazards). The psychological dynamics of decision-making are important as well. Formed opinions can be difficult to change, particularly when people feel they have knowledge about an issue. When people see benefits from an activity, they may be more receptive to the risks. People are more inclined to judge an event more probable if they can readily recall an occurrence of it or something similar. And hazards that have potentially severe consequences on people’s lives, even if the statistical likelihood of their occurrence is ‘insignificant’, attract considerable attention.

?It is important to recognise that all people, irrespective of their role in society, employ speculative frameworks to make sense of the world and selective judgement in their responses to risk. These so[1]called ‘non rational’ factors are not necessarily incorrect. However, there are likely to be significant differences in these understandings and responses, and such divergences are critical to understanding how best to manage and communicate about risk. One of the more significant differences discussed recently is that between ‘the public’ and ‘experts’. The public tends to be more concerned about: ? the unknown effects of risky activities;

? significantly negative consequences, irrespective of the ‘low probability’;

? what the ‘experts’ do NOT know; and

?? why they cannot agree.

Risk dialogues

In numerous areas, particularly for those portfolios which rely heavily on scientific and technical expertise and risk assessment and management tools, increasing the time and resources devoted to improving dialogues with the public may be especially pertinent. Declining trust in institutions responsible for science and technology has been well documented. Where there is not sufficient recognition of the differences between the ways ‘expert’ and ‘laypeople’ perceive risk, ‘expertise’ itself may invite public suspicion. Where science and technology have once provided

reassurances to society, they may now be seen as creating risk. These trends have inspired new research, which revisits older models of risk communication.

?The newer models of risk communication essentially reconstrue notions of risk and risk perception by:

?? Emphasizing the socially - constructed nature of risk;

? valuing different forms of knowledge; and

?? advocating for greater levels of public participation in risk assessment and management.

Most advocates of these models recognize the significant challenges in facilitating more and inclusive dialogues with the public and recommend a range of capacity building strategies targeted at both the broader community, as well as the policy and scientific communities.

JVPS

References

Adams, J. 1995. Risk London: UCL Press.

Ansell, J & Wharton, F. 1992. Risk management: a review. Pp 203-212 in J. Ansell & F. Wharton (Eds), Risk: Analysis, Assessment and Management, John Wiley & Sons: Chichester.

Ballard, G.M. 1992. Industrial risk: safety by design. Pp 95-104 in J. Ansell and F. Wharton (Eds), Risk: Analysis, Assessment and Management, John Wiley & Sons: Chichester.

Jackson, N. & Carter, P. 1992. The perception of risk. Pp 41-54 in J. Ansell & F. Wharton (Eds), Risk: Analysis, Assessment and Management, John Wiley & Sons: Chichester.

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