Risk Assessment, Not Finances Must Set Fire Service Deployment Model in Saint John, New Brunswick

In follow-up to the recommendations provided by the most recent Ernst & Young report that the City of Saint John drastically reduce the on duty response capability, I feel compelled to explore Community Risk, rather than just finances, to further positive informed discussion.

As Deputy Fire Chief I had the privilege one spring afternoon to address a class of new recruits at a ceremony similar to the one that had started my career in Saint John 25 years earlier. A father of one of the recruits, a well known and respected Saint John businessman attending with his wife, took me aside to ask a question; I remember the moment to this day. "Are you going to keep my son safe?" he asked with his eyes locked onto mine. This was a very difficult question to answer. At that time our Fire Service Administration, Council and the City Manager faced tremendous financial challenges that affected my ability at 0300 Hrs in the morning to service the needs of the citizens, industry and to keep that fine young man and his classmates safe.

In answering similar questions for community leaders in relation to risk and in my debates with the City Manager, curiously at the time I often cited another Ernst & Young report commissioned by the City of Saint John which cited that the level of on duty Fire Response Capability was too low, there should have been, amongst other improvements a staffed Ladder Truck on the west side of the Reversing Falls bridge. The report also discussed community risk and challenges of geography, old housing stock and a sprawling 126 sq. mile area filled with industry. I recognize that this first Ernst & Young report is now decades old and financial context in the City has changed; but when analyzed properly has the risk profile of the City changed? I grew up out east in the shadow of industry, of which I remain a tremendous supporter: I maintain property in Saint John and have stayed abreast of the risk in the city throughout the last 35 years, I would offer that unfortunately the risk profile has not changed. Over the past few years we only need to look at the industrial incidents, structure fires, increased poverty, aging demographic and flooding to see the challenges the City of Saint John faces when it considers its options.

A couple of years back I published a similar article on LinkedIn which received at this point 10,725 views, so I believe there is merit to re-visiting some of the facts regarding risk in Saint John in relation to the discussions that will fill the hearts and minds of our Fire Service Professionals, Industry Leaders, Citizens, Common Council and the City Manager. Community risk and commensurate response capability is not a subject which is often well understood; it is as complex and as the question asked by that father about his son at the recruit ceremony. To examine risk fully in order to make complex decisions, a great number of factors must be understood. In a 2009 report presented at City of Saint John Common Council 23 November 2009, outside Fire Service Professionals like the Canadian Director of the National Fire Protection Association stated “The complexity of operational expectations posed by the integration of multiple heavy industrial risks within the city, a mix of residential and other properties of various ages are unlike any community the author has assisted in Canada.” Like the first Ernst & Young report, I recognize the 2009 Fire Service Review is from quite a number of years ago; I would offer though there are facts regarding risk which remain as relevant today as the tense evening at Council when it was presented.

Reducing Fire Service Capability - The Risks Need To Be Fully Understood

In 2009, Common Council asked the Fire Chief to thoroughly analyze the risk to the City of Saint John N.B., industry, citizens, and Fire fighters in relation to lowering the number of stations, on-duty Fire Fighters and Command Staff. Given the decrease of on-duty Fire Fighters between 2012 and 2017 (arguably 8 Fire Fighters per shift) this “Fire Service Review” is more relevant now than it was at the time. With further cuts currently being considered, I believe the consequences examined in this report are particularly revealing.

The 700+ page report can be found in its entirety at:

 https://documents.saintjohn.ca/WebLink/DocView.aspx?id=35525&page=2&searchid=6ca3aba5-db4b-4805-87ed-40bc67bfb594

In addition to the Fire Chief and I (at the time in the position of Deputy Fire Chief), present at the Council meeting that night were the Fire Marshal of the Province of New Brunswick, Canadian Director of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Medical Director of the Saint John Fire Department (SJFD), and Director of the Insurance Advisory Organization. All parties had contributed to, read, and agreed with their aspects of the report to Council.

The report expressed concern that, back in 2009, the Fire Service had been diminished to the point where its capability was lower than the level of risk present within the city. Since that time, the level of on-duty firefighters has been lowered through cuts and “brown outs”.  It would appear that we are now on the brink of a massive cut to the on-duty capability. The City of Saint John is at a tipping point where citizens, industry, and firefighters face a high probability that they will be failed by the very service built to protect them. The Fire Service capability is no longer commensurate with the risk it is expected to mitigate. 

As a Command Officer in charge of operational response and accountable for the safety of the men and women of the fire service, I had a thorough understanding of the risks and vulnerabilities facing those who were putting their lives on the line. The findings of the Fire Service Review substantiated and validated my concern: The Saint John Fire Department no longer had the resources to meet the ongoing emergency preparation and response needs of the city. 

I believed then, and I believe now, that the Fire and Emergency Preparedness and Response capability is no longer commensurate with the risks presented by the industry, the geography, and the housing stock contained within the city of Saint John. This lack of balance has predictable outcomes, including:

1.    Longer response times to reach victims; 

2.    No available fire apparatus at times of peak or simultaneous demand; 

3.    Lowered safety of firefighters conducting search and rescue;

4.    Difficulty training firefighters while on duty; 

5.    More frequent and higher economic loss of residential property; and 

6.    Lower capability to intervene at sudden industrial incidents (explosions, leaks, fires, etc.) that have the potential to cascade into the residential community.

Within the 2009 Fire Service Review, the Insurance Advisory Organization had dropped the City of Saint John from a grade 2 to a grade 3, and it was noted by the Fire Chief that there would likely be a drop to a grade 4 if there were any cuts to capability (personnel, trucks or stations). It was also noted that insurance rates levied against homeowners and businesses were tied to these risk measures and the resulting grade; as grades drop (higher number) the insurance rates go up.

The 2009, 740-page report went on to analyze the closure of any one of the City’s fire stations. Utilizing previous studies conducted in Saint John by third party experts, and what was at the time modern simulation software, the Fire Chief conducted an “optimization study” examining the increases to response times with the removal of what are already poorly placed fire stations serving the city’s massive 126 Square Mile geography.

“It could be easily surmised that given the 14 minute plus response times in 4 of the Fire Demand Zones; currently our seven Fire Stations are not in optimum locations given the continual development in the outlying areas of the city. Operationally the effects of a station closure or worse yet a station closure with the loss of a Fire Company (i.e. Engine) would result in significantly higher response times, significant safety issues for Fire Fighters, lower public safety and higher property losses”

Response Time Analysis Summary (2009)

The following is part of the 2009 Response Time Analysis Summary. When reading the findings it must be kept in mind that the current levels of on-duty Fire fighters is even lower than they were in 2009. Also, the following time analysis is based upon the assumption that all apparatus is available and ‘In Station’ at the time of call. Statistically, each hour of the day there is an emergency call in progress in some area of the City (2008 Statistics, 25.8 calls per day), thus resulting in greater response times.

Service to Industry – Our Economic Engine

Another significant concern in relation to the present level of Fire planning, training, and response capability is the service to industry. It is critical that the City of Saint John in partnership with industry understand their interdependent risk and jointly put forth an effort and capability commensurate with the true annually assessed risk. The interface between industry and the residential population in Saint John creates a complexity and possible cascading or cumulative impact that few cities have to worry about. When assessing the capabilities of the Saint John Fire Department in relation to the industrial realities in Saint John, the Canadian Director of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Mr. Sean Tracey stated the following within the Fire Service Review:

“The complexity of operational expectations posed by the integration of multiple heavy industrial risks within the city, a mix of residential and other properties of various ages are unlike any community the author has assisted in Canada.”

While participating in a community-wide risk assessment in Strathcona County, Alberta I witnessed a much more refined level of partnership between Industry and the Municipality. While the types of industry present within Strathcona County are quite similar to that of Saint John, the model by which the county and industry operate creates a risk to the community, from industry, that is much lower. The advantages that a new community like Strathcona County enjoys compared to Saint John in relation to proactive community planning are evident.

The following are excerpts from the 2009 Fire Service Review in relation to concerns at the time about our level of response to Industry:

“The following are examples of some of the high risk industries faced by the Saint John Fire Department: Canaport LNG, Irving Oil Refinery, Irving Paper, Atlantic Wallboard, Courtenay Bay Shipping, Irving Pulp and Paper, Colson Cove Generating Station, Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station and Emera Brunswick Pipeline (1,440 PSI, 30 inch, 41 miles). Despite a diligent commitment to safety by industry in Saint John, there are serious incidents which occur on a regular basis that challenge the ability of the Department to respond.”

“…it is recommended that there be a minimum of 3 Command Officers at site: 1) the original District Chief (Fire Command) 2) Deputy Fire Chief (Operations Officer) and 3) a second District Chief (Safety Officer). The number of Command Staff required could be much higher based upon the complexity of the incident, as well as, the geographical size of the incident. Often following the deaths of Fire Fighters, Departments are criticized by such bodies as the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (N.I.O.S.H) for not providing enough “Command” depth. Upon the activation of EMO with the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) activated, a fourth District Chief performing the Fire/Operations Branch function is recalled and the Chief of the Department, usually acts as the Director of the EOC (if not required to be at site). It is clear that the Saint John Fire Department Command staff is almost fully exhausted.”

“In the case of an incident of short duration, high complexity, the requirement is 6 of the existing 9 Command Officers. In the context of a long incident or “Campaign” (days or weeks), the number of Command Officers runs thin very quickly.”

“In the following instances, there will be significant issues around the staffing and rehabilitation of Command roles:

1.    Incidents of long duration – hours/days/weeks;

2.    Incidents of high technical knowledge/experience requirement;

3.    Simultaneous Demand;

4.    Cascading Emergencies – one Industry affecting another or release of hazardous materials creating a second site;

5.    Intentional Acts involving industry;

6.    Loss of Command Staff due to illness or injury during incident;

7.    All existing Command Staff who are not on leave may be required to be available for recall to duty.

8.    Inability to fill positions on the Incident Management System (I.M.S) organizational structure. It is clear that the Department may stumble and fall and that operational effectiveness diminish as each complexity is added burdening capacity.”

In relation to the pre-planning for change within and response to Industry, the 2009 report carried on to explain that there needs to be a dedicated Fire Service resource to be the liaison person to understand new and evolving Industrial response requirements:

“The Industrial burden that exists in Saint John today presents serious capacity challenges for any one person in this role. As a result, there exists potentiality for fire crews to respond to an emergency incident, that they are not trained for, nor has the department adequately planned for. This capacity gap presents a high level of consequence for the public, workers at site, Fire Fighters taking an aggressive attack, the strategic command of the incident, the level of financial loss to the industry/city, as well as, delayed business continuity/recovery.

This Command position is integral to the response by contract outside the City of Saint John for Regional Hazardous Materials Command or to the Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station.”

Vulnerable Citizens and High Risk Wood Frame Construction 

Regarding the safety of citizens and Fire fighters in large, wood-framed balloon construction homes, there remain serious concerns about the capacity of the Saint John Fire Department to respond to and rescue civilians from these complex buildings. For eight (8) years as a member of the Fire Department Rescue Squad, I was responsible for removing occupants from burning buildings. During this time, the Rescue Squad received immediate support from 4 trucks, 16 fire fighters and, when needed, 2-3 Command Officers ensuring we too could be extracted should we be overtaken by fire or became disoriented. By 2009, I had serious reservations with our current depth and ability to adequately rescue civilians and, God forbid, a downed Fire crew assigned to search and rescue. Fire Fighters will undoubtedly deploy aggressively to rescue our citizens, no matter the potential consequence to themselves…that is what they are trained for, and some might suggest it is hardwired into their very being. A good Fire fighter would rather die saving a citizen than live knowing the citizen died when they could have been rescued. 

The 2009 Fire Service Review speaks more quantitatively about the challenges in responding to these large wood frame structures, which are where I predict we will lose our first firefighter(s). 

“The Fire Underwriter’s Survey charts a standardized “Initial Response to Alarms of Fire,” for severe hazards in large area buildings with major exposures” (as follows):

“Large congested frame districts: 3 Pumper Companies; 2 Ladder Companies. Add for Severe Life Hazard: Pumper, Ladder or Rescue Company at least… Currently because of lack of aggregate on duty resources, the initial deployment in Saint John to these structures/areas is: 2 Pumper/Engine Companies, 1 Ladder Company and 1 Rescue Company compared to the Fire Underwriters document: we are short 1 Engine and 1 Ladder Company, thus 8 Fire Fighters short of the recommended practice.”

“The National Fire Protection Association concurs with the Fire Underwriters Survey in their quantification of the tasking and capabilities of the functional apparatus staffing level…” The Fire Service Review continues stating: “When an incident escalates beyond an initial full alarm assignment or when significant risk is present to the Fire Fighters due to the magnitude of the incident, the Incident Commander shall upgrade the IRIC to a full Rapid Intervention Crew(s) (RIC) that consists of an officer and at least three Fire Fighters who are fully equipped and trained in RIC operations.”

“It is clear that immediately following a second or third alarm fire within a large wood balloon frame building, the operational capacity of the Saint John Fire Department drops significantly. This capacity drop inhibits its ability to be resilient at the fire, during May Days (emergency calls for help from Fire Fighters) and in responding to simultaneous alarms.”

“The Saint John Fire Department does not possess the operational capacity to provide the above‐mentioned Rapid Intervention Crew. This void has been cited in a number of Fire Fighter death reports from National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as being an act which would prevent future deaths.”

Further, considering the risk assessment perspective, it must be noted that since the delivery of the Fire Service Review to Common Council, there has been a number of multi-unit lightweight truss construction of both sprinklered and non-sprinklered buildings erected in Saint John. The change in building methods to lightweight truss construction will too, in the fullness of time, challenge the Saint John Fire Service. These buildings will fail very quickly if the attic or floor assemblies are involved in fire. Without capacity to perform rescue quickly, these structures pose increased danger to citizens and Fire Fighters; again, in these types of structural failures people become entrapped. There are now provisions within the new National Fire Code to permit 6-storey lightweight truss buildings with sprinklers. On-duty Saint John Fire Fighters would struggle to evacuate a 3-storey building heavily involved in fire let alone a 4 to 6-storey building.

The above excerpt from the Fire Service Review also discusses the use of a “Rapid Intervention Crew” which because of previous cuts we did not have the capacity to launch in 2009. Should Fire fighters become entrapped or suffer a health related illness such as a heart attack while performing search and rescue, the crew of on duty firefighters (basically a dedicated engine crew of four) would be put into the building to rescue them. I have studied these teams in great depth in the United States in response to concerns of safety gaps in Saint John. In an attempt to address these safety gaps, the “Save Our Own” program was launched to do the best we could with the number of Fire Fighters we had at the time. Realistically, even at the higher levels of staffing we had in 2009 we would not likely have been able to successfully extract two (2) downed firefighters from a complex “may day” situation in the time needed to send them safely home to their family. 

Summary

The 2009 City of Saint John N.B. Fire Service Review is a matter of public record. It is accessible to the public and may be a reference to help explain to the current Common Council, City staff, leaders of industry and the citizens of Saint John the facts around the response capability of the Saint John Fire Department in relation to community risk. 

In 2009 I felt strongly that we would lose firefighters or civilians needlessly due to a lack of prioritization of the Fire Service by City Staff and Council, to mitigate the risk accepted within the community. Ironically, around the time the Fire Service Review was accepted by Council, in 2010 there was an independent “Ipsos Reid” poll of the citizens of Saint John that ranked the Fire Service as the highest rated of Municipal services, and provided a “hold or grow the service level” recommendation for Council. In 2011 following the departure of Fire Chief Simonds for a position in Hamilton, I was named Acting Fire Chief by Council and was urged by the City Manager to compete for the role of Fire Chief. By then it was clear to me, however, that I was not going to have the support from City Staff and Council to run the Fire Service at a level that I felt was safe with the risk present within Saint John. I was not able to adequately answer the question posed to me by that father at the recruit ceremony. The response capability in Saint John was then at a point where it was no longer commensurate with the risk. In 2011, after 27 years as a Saint John Fire Fighter, I decided to move on and take a role as the director of a firm within the private sector.  I have the privilege now to work on risk management projects at all levels across Canada and Internationally, but my heart is always here in Saint John.

I have not spoken with the current Fire Chief, Deputy Fire Chiefs, or the President of the Fire Fighter’s Association about the content of this article.  I urge the parties responsible for pending cuts to take a step back and look at the gap between community risk and Fire Service capability. The citizens, industry, and Fire Fighters of Saint John, were in a dangerous position in 2009; the cuts between 2012 and 2019 were devastating and should have made the Fire Service an urgent priority. The proposed decreases in funding to the Fire Service planned for 2021 would lead to a high probability of predictable failure of the service to fulfill its mission and the expectations of citizens and industry.                                                                   

Mark Gillan BBA, CFO, MIFireE

[email protected]