The Rising Threat to Aviation Safety from GPS Jamming and Spoofing
The growing threat of GPS jamming and spoofing in certain regions is causing concern within the aviation industry
Background
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based navigation system
GPS technology, originally developed for military purposes
The Emerging Threat
This reliance on GPS comes with significant vulnerabilities. GPS jamming involves transmitting a powerful signal that overwhelms GPS receivers, effectively rendering them unusable. Spoofing, on the other hand, involves sending fake GPS signals that can trick receivers into believing they are in a completely different location. These attacks can have serious consequences for aviation, potentially causing pilots to make dangerous decisions based on incorrect data.
Recent Occurrences
GPS jamming has been reported in various locations, including the Black Sea, the northern part of Norway, and near Kaliningrad. Finnair, like many airlines, is facing a growing challenge posed by GPS interference, a threat that has significantly escalated since 2022.
This interference, manifesting in two forms – jamming and spoofing – has disrupted flight operations in the Caspian Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean also.
The Impact of GPS Interference
What is GPS Jamming?
This type of interference completely disrupts GPS signals, preventing pilots from accurately determining their location via this tool.
Jamming, how does it work?
Perpetrators of GPS jamming and spoofing attacks use large radio dishes that throw up radio frequency RF noise that block specific signals, but their effectiveness can be hindered by terrain.
Spoofing
This more sophisticated form of interference tricks aircraft systems into displaying an incorrect position, potentially leading to dangerous miscalculations.
Spoofing, how does it work?
GPS spoofing works by using a radio transmitter to broadcast fake GPS signals and drowns out the weak GPS signals from satellites with a powerful signal transmitted from the ground. These signals mimic authentic GPS signals, but are stronger, overriding the genuine signals from satellites. This deceptive manipulation causes receivers to calculate inaccurate positions, potentially leading to disrupted navigation, timing errors, and other unforeseen consequences. These fake signals can be tailored to target specific aircraft or regions making them an ongoing threat.
Mitigation Strategies
Some airlines have equipped their aircraft with systems that detect GPS interference. Pilots are thoroughly trained to recognize and respond to such situations. They also have backup navigation systems
The Challenge of Airport Dependence on GPS
While most airports have alternative approach methods, some, like Tartu, until recently relied solely on GPS-dependent procedures. This dependence highlights a vulnerability, as GPS interference can render these airports inaccessible. In response to GPS interference in Tartu, Finnair was forced to temporarily suspend flights until alternative solutions could be established.
Beyond Navigation
The threat of GPS jamming extends beyond simply losing navigational data. Increasingly, aircraft avionics rely on GPS information for other functions, such as compass readings, angle of attack indicators, and wind speed measurement systems. A disruption in GPS could potentially affect these critical systems, leading to a loss of basic instrumentation and potentially endangering flight safety.
The Complexity of Defense
Defending against GPS jamming and spoofing is a complex issue. While some mitigation techniques exist, such as using directional antennas to filter out ground-based signals or implementing more robust error detection systems, these measures are not 100% effective. The constant evolution of jamming and spoofing techniques necessitates continuous research and development
The Future of Navigation
The aviation industry is actively exploring alternative navigation systems
Continued Monitoring and Vigilance is Required
The increasing prevalence of GPS interference underscores the urgency for airlines, aviation authorities, and technology developers to collaborate in mitigating these threats. This includes developing more robust GPS systems, exploring alternative navigation solutions and procedures, and enhancing awareness among pilots and air traffic control personnel. Addressing these threats requires a multi-faceted approach, including technological advancements, enhanced security measures, and increased vigilance within the aviation industry.
By Noel Cox
Principal Aviation Consultant at avcox
References and Further Information
Increasing International Civil Aviation Resilience: A Proposal for Nomenclature, Categorization and Treatment of New Interference Threats, January 2019, DOI:10.33012/2019.16699
领英推荐
Conference: Proceedings of the 2019 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation At: Reston, Virginia, Authors: Ignacio Fernandez-Hernandez, European Commission
Todd Walter, Stanford University, Ken Alexander,Barbara Clarke
Finnair Press Release
Finnair suspends flights to Tartu for a month
Khan, S. Z., Mohsin, M., & Iqbal, W. (2021). On gps spoofing of aerial platforms: a review of threats, challenges, methodologies, and future research directions. PeerJ Computer Science, 7, e507. https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.507
Spoofing in aviation: Security threats on GPS and ADS-B systems
April 2021Vojnotehnicki glasnik 69(2):461-485
69(2):461-485
DOI:10.5937/vojtehg69-30119
ADS-B spoofing attack detection method based on LSTM
August 2020EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2020(1)
2020(1)
Authors: Jing Wang, Yunkai Zou, Jianli Ding
DOI:10.1186/s13638-020-01756-8
Collaborative Solutions for Interference Management in GNSS-Based Aircraft Navigation
July 2020Sensors 20(15):4085
20(15):4085
DOI:10.3390/s20154085
Authors: Mario Nicola, Civitanavi Systems
Gianluca Falco, Istituto Superiore Mario Boella (ISMB)
Ruben Morales Ferre, Tampere University
Elena Simona Lohan, Tampere University
A Survey on Coping With Intentional Interference in Satellite Navigation for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft
October 2019IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials PP(99):1-1
PP(99):1-1
DOI:10.1109/COMST.2019.2949178
Authors: Ruben Morales Ferre,Tampere University
Philipp Richter,
Emanuela Falletti, Istituto Superiore Mario Boella (ISMB)
Alberto Fuente, GMV
1999 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab
(APL) Risk Assessment Study
– 2001 DOT Volpe Vulnerability Assessment