The Rising Threat to Aviation Safety from GPS Jamming and Spoofing

The Rising Threat to Aviation Safety from GPS Jamming and Spoofing

The growing threat of GPS jamming and spoofing in certain regions is causing concern within the aviation industry.

Background

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based navigation system. It provides users with geolocation and time information by receiving signals from at least four GPS satellites. GPS operates independently of telephone or internet networks, although these technologies can enhance its capabilities. Satellite navigation, or satnav, systems utilize a network of orbiting satellites to pinpoint a user's location on Earth. These systems rely on the precise timing of signals emitted from the satellites and received by a user's device to calculate their position. While satnav systems can be localized, those with global coverage are known as Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). GNSS, like the well-known GPS (Global Positioning System), enables users anywhere on the planet to determine their position, regardless of location, provided they have a clear line of sight to at least four satellites.

GPS technology, originally developed for military purposes, has become ubiquitous in modern life. From smartphones and cars to aircraft, GPS receivers are now commonplace. In aviation, GPS has revolutionized navigation, replacing traditional ground-based systems with GPS-based area navigation and even approach procedures.

The Emerging Threat

This reliance on GPS comes with significant vulnerabilities. GPS jamming involves transmitting a powerful signal that overwhelms GPS receivers, effectively rendering them unusable. Spoofing, on the other hand, involves sending fake GPS signals that can trick receivers into believing they are in a completely different location. These attacks can have serious consequences for aviation, potentially causing pilots to make dangerous decisions based on incorrect data.

Recent Occurrences

GPS jamming has been reported in various locations, including the Black Sea, the northern part of Norway, and near Kaliningrad. Finnair, like many airlines, is facing a growing challenge posed by GPS interference, a threat that has significantly escalated since 2022.

This interference, manifesting in two forms – jamming and spoofing – has disrupted flight operations in the Caspian Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean also.

The Impact of GPS Interference

What is GPS Jamming?

This type of interference completely disrupts GPS signals, preventing pilots from accurately determining their location via this tool.

Jamming, how does it work?

Perpetrators of GPS jamming and spoofing attacks use large radio dishes that throw up radio frequency RF noise that block specific signals, but their effectiveness can be hindered by terrain.

Spoofing

This more sophisticated form of interference tricks aircraft systems into displaying an incorrect position, potentially leading to dangerous miscalculations.

Spoofing, how does it work?

GPS spoofing works by using a radio transmitter to broadcast fake GPS signals and drowns out the weak GPS signals from satellites with a powerful signal transmitted from the ground. These signals mimic authentic GPS signals, but are stronger, overriding the genuine signals from satellites. This deceptive manipulation causes receivers to calculate inaccurate positions, potentially leading to disrupted navigation, timing errors, and other unforeseen consequences. These fake signals can be tailored to target specific aircraft or regions making them an ongoing threat.

Mitigation Strategies

Some airlines have equipped their aircraft with systems that detect GPS interference. Pilots are thoroughly trained to recognize and respond to such situations. They also have backup navigation systems that can be used when GPS is unavailable, mitigating the immediate impact of these disruptions.

The Challenge of Airport Dependence on GPS

While most airports have alternative approach methods, some, like Tartu, until recently relied solely on GPS-dependent procedures. This dependence highlights a vulnerability, as GPS interference can render these airports inaccessible. In response to GPS interference in Tartu, Finnair was forced to temporarily suspend flights until alternative solutions could be established.

Beyond Navigation

The threat of GPS jamming extends beyond simply losing navigational data. Increasingly, aircraft avionics rely on GPS information for other functions, such as compass readings, angle of attack indicators, and wind speed measurement systems. A disruption in GPS could potentially affect these critical systems, leading to a loss of basic instrumentation and potentially endangering flight safety.

The Complexity of Defense

Defending against GPS jamming and spoofing is a complex issue. While some mitigation techniques exist, such as using directional antennas to filter out ground-based signals or implementing more robust error detection systems, these measures are not 100% effective. The constant evolution of jamming and spoofing techniques necessitates continuous research and development of countermeasures.

The Future of Navigation

The aviation industry is actively exploring alternative navigation systems and enhancing GPS security to address these evolving threats. However, the transition to new technologies will take time to develop and deploy.

Continued Monitoring and Vigilance is Required

The increasing prevalence of GPS interference underscores the urgency for airlines, aviation authorities, and technology developers to collaborate in mitigating these threats. This includes developing more robust GPS systems, exploring alternative navigation solutions and procedures, and enhancing awareness among pilots and air traffic control personnel. Addressing these threats requires a multi-faceted approach, including technological advancements, enhanced security measures, and increased vigilance within the aviation industry.

By Noel Cox

Principal Aviation Consultant at avcox



References and Further Information

Increasing International Civil Aviation Resilience: A Proposal for Nomenclature, Categorization and Treatment of New Interference Threats, January 2019, DOI:10.33012/2019.16699

Conference: Proceedings of the 2019 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation At: Reston, Virginia, Authors: Ignacio Fernandez-Hernandez, European Commission

Todd Walter, Stanford University, Ken Alexander,Barbara Clarke

Finnair Press Release

Finnair suspends flights to Tartu for a month

https://company.finnair.com/en/media-centre/all-releases/news?id=2568789F7B492403

Khan, S. Z., Mohsin, M., & Iqbal, W. (2021). On gps spoofing of aerial platforms: a review of threats, challenges, methodologies, and future research directions. PeerJ Computer Science, 7, e507. https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.507

Spoofing in aviation: Security threats on GPS and ADS-B systems

April 2021Vojnotehnicki glasnik 69(2):461-485

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Authors: Ruben Morales Ferre,Tampere University

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Emanuela Falletti, Istituto Superiore Mario Boella (ISMB)

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