The rise of ultra conservative / radical Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia

Approximately 65% of the global Muslim population resides in SE Asia. The region is home to the most populous Muslim country in the world, Indonesia, which also supplies the largest contingent of about 200,000 pilgrims to the annual Haj pilgrimage each year. Indonesia & Malaysia are home to roughly?208?million &?18?million Muslims respectively.

The growth of Islamic radicalism in SE Asia was catalyzed by the worldwide Islamic revival & the influx of funds (during?King Salman’s visit to Asia, Malaysia received a US$7 billion deal while Indonesia discussed investments amounting to US$25 billion) & ideologies from the Middle East. Saudi Arabian money came in 2 forms: Above-board funds for religious & educational purposes & funds quietly disbursed for militant Islamic groups. Saudi Arabia has long seen Malaysia & Indonesia as regional bastions of Islam & has consistently tied its investment in both countries to Wahhabism – the brand of conservative Islam initially embraced by Muhammad Ibn Saud in 1744 through a pact with Abd al-Wahhab to expand the former’s empire. This pact resulted in Wahhabism gaining legitimacy which allowed its followers to represent themselves as defenders of the true teaching of Islam. Whilst the more extreme tendencies of Wahhabism have been much toned down throughout the years by the Saud ruling dynasty in the interest of modern statehood & international relations norms, Saudi Arabia’s dissemination of Wahhabi thought in the guise of Salafism has proceeded apace since the 1970s. This evangelical fervour was further buoyed by its desire to outflank post-revolutionary Iran in the rival claim for the true mantle of an Islamic state. Under the guise of ummatic unity, Saudi institutions such as the Rabitah al-‘Alam Islami (MWL: Muslim World League) & the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) have served as conduits for exporting Wahhabi dogma worldwide. The transmission process in SE Asia has been well documented, penetrating structures of Muslim states, ruling parties, charity associations, non-governmental organizations, Islamist movements & educational networks.

Islam is an important symbol in both Indonesia & Malaysia. It has become the defining force in politics in Malaysia & Indonesia. Political figures & parties accept that they cannot afford to be seen to be against Islam or be considered unfriendly to it. The political elites in both countries have used religion as a political weapon. In Indonesia, the opposition employed Islam in order to weaken/defeat the ruling elite while in Malaysia, religion was used by the ruling elite to maintain political power & gain support in elections. The unfortunate consequence in this power game is that both countries have been advancing the “Islamisation of Politics” which may destroy the pluralistic nature of each society. In Indonesia & Malaysia, religion is the root?of many problems such as communal tensions, intolerance & economic inequalities. However, political parties & governments are more interested in accommodating the conservative Islam teachings as it would help them secure votes in elections.

The rising Islamist influence & pro-Shariah movements are not unique to SE Asia. A number of other states with large Muslim populations have undergone similar trends since the 1980s, with Islamists gaining greater influence as critics of both military & civilian secular rulers.

In 2019, the Brunei government implemented stringent Islamic penal codes, known as?hudud, which include corporal punishment & the death penalty for those accused of breaking Shariah law.

Islamic extremism is usually associated with terrorism. However, it also refers to the use of Islam in mobilising Muslim voters. Termed as political Islam, this is increasingly prevalent across countries with Muslim populations & bodes particularly dangerous consequences for Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia & Malaysia.

Malaysia

A divide between Islamists & secularists occurred during the pre-independence period. Debates over the appropriate role of Islam in public life intensified among Malay elites starting in the 1930s & shaped different conceptions of Malay nationalism. These divisions led Muslim clerics to break off from United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to form Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in 1951.

The enduring push for a less secular state has shaped Malaysian politics for decades, sharpening differences over political Islam. At the same time, divisions between Islamists & secularists have reinforced Malaysia’s ethnic polarization. Almost all Malays are Muslim, whereas ethnic minorities predominantly are not & Islamist groups thus have melded their religious appeals with Malay nationalist messages.

Malaysia’s polarization feeds on 3 primary divisions, each with deep historical roots. The country’s main dividing line is ethnic. Ever since independence, the dominant narrative of national identity has been that Malaysia is for the Malays - the country’s largest ethnic group, which comprises about 50.8% of the population.?Other communities, namely the Chinese & Indian Malaysians, whose families immigrated to the country before independence & the plethora of smaller indigenous ethnic groups on the island of Borneo, do not enjoy equal rights & status in various ways.

UMNO has dominated politics in Malaysia since independence in 1957 but has found it increasingly difficult to maintain its hold on government during the past 3 election cycles (GE13, GE14 & GE15). Although initially rolled out as a strategy to curb PAS’s influence on young middle class Malays, UMNO has come to increasingly rely on political campaigning focused on Islam to attract & retain the Malay vote. Both parties believe that an Islamist agenda is vital?to prove that they are indeed the champion of Islam in Malaysia.

Malaysia’s creeping Islamisation in accordance with Muslim Brotherhood ideology & strategy, aimed at strengthening shariah courts vis-à-vis civil courts, enhancing Islamic identity in the civil service & institutions, & popularising Islamic idioms in politics. This shift has transformed Malaysia into a stricter, more literal version of Islam instead of the more moderate & tolerant version upon which the nation was founded.

In GE13, the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition narrowly won despite losing the national popular vote. Subsequently, the administration of Prime Minister Najib Razak was further battered by the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal. Najib aggressively courted conservative voters who historically supported PAS, hoping to win over a sizable number of these voters to make up for BN’s meagre support among urban ethnic Malays, Chinese & Indians.

Considering all these developments, Malaysian leaders found it hard to push back against revivalism. When Tun Dr Mahathir was Prime Minister for the 2nd time in 2018, he had to give in to conservative pressure - he came out in support of controversial Indian preacher Zakir Naik being allowed to remain in Malaysia despite requests from the Indian government to have him extradited. Zakir is an radical Islamist preacher who has made many insensitive comments about non-Muslims.

In June 2014 while celebrating the 20th anniversary of one of UMNO’s branches, Party President & Prime Minister Najib Razak called on members to?emulate ISIS?to ensure the survival of UMNO. Quoting an example where ISIS defeated the Iraqi army despite being outnumbered, Najib said, “when someone dares to fight to their death, they can even defeat a much bigger team.” This statement was at glaringly at odds with his support, made clear at various international fora, of Malaysia being a moderate Islamic country.

In GE15 (2022), PAS won 49 seats (the most number held by a single party) in the 222-seat lower house which was double of what it won in GE14 (2018). PAS is a component of Perikatan Nasional (PN). The northeast of the Malay Peninsula has been a bastion of the conservative PAS. It had pushed for hudud to be adopted in Kelantan, a state it controls, despite setbacks to earlier efforts.

Malay political elites have propagated the view that they are the “protector” of the Malay/Muslim community. As such, they are implicitly entitled to control state resources as they see fit, including for their own personal benefit.?This did not materialize until 1969, when the governing Alliance lost its two-thirds majority in parliament for the 1st time, leading to racial riots & 18 months of emergency rule.

In the aftermath of this turmoil, rising Malay nationalism became tightly intertwined with a hierarchical, undemocratic model of politics. In this period, Malay special rights became embedded in a social contract through the concept of?Ketuanan Melayu?or Malay Dominance. The government also introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, an affirmative action plan nominally based on need but that favored Malays in practice

A certain percentage of the Malays have gone conservative & they continue to support PAS. UMNO, being a Malay-based party, therefore has to come to terms with the nature of the political spectrum.

Compared to Indonesia, Malaysia appears to be sliding faster towards conservative Islam. Parties like PAS & UMNO subscribe to an Islamist agenda?to prove that they are indeed the champion of Islam in Malaysia. A Muslim youth survey in 2011 has also shown strong agreement for harsh Islamic penalties. These harsh punishments act as a further deterrent against anti-conservative Muslims.

The reliance of successive governments on race-based policies to address the long-standing socio-economic inequalities has resulted in more racial & religious tension, thus rendering conservative Islam an attractive vehicle for change.

Malaysia will inevitably continue down a less tolerant, more conservative path, unfriendly to unbelievers and suspicious of everyone not conforming to a fundamentalist way of life.

Malaysia has experienced?growing Islamic fundamentalism for the past few decades, with ultra-conservative movements pushing for reforms toward a harsher, more rigid model of Islam. The ultra conservative PAS led PN coalition are on a mission to transform largely secular Malaysia - long regarded as a model of multi-ethnic harmony in SE Asia - into an Islamic state where alcohol sales, gambling & the public mingling of men & women are outlawed. There is a very strong likelihood that extremists will adopt a mainstream political mechanism with which to introduce the Afghan Taliban’s model of harshly interpreted shariah, much like Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI) approach in Indonesia.?

Indonesia

Indonesia is home to the largest number of Muslims on Earth. Despite 87% of its population being Muslim, it has been a “secular state” or a “Pancasila state” since independence in 1945. Pancasila's 5 Principles was first initiated by then President Sukarno on 1 June 1945. It includes (1) Belief in One Almighty God (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa), (2) Indonesian Unity, (3) Internationalism, (4) Democracy through Deliberation & (5) Social Justice for all People.

Indonesia's 6th President Yudhoyono’s accommodation of radical Islam was seen in his tolerance of attacks on religious minorities. He appointed Suryadharma Ali who was close to Front Pembela Islam (FPI) as Minister of Religious Affairs, Lieut-Gen Sudi Silalahi who was projihadist during the Muslim & Christian conflict as his State Secretary & General Timur Prodopo who issued the statement to embrace FPI as his Police Chief.

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), FPConservative & hard-line religious parties have contested many elections & debates about the role of Islam in the state have existed since the country was founded. Within Indonesia, hard-line groups have pushed national government ministers to take repressive stances toward homosexuality, religious minorities & people who supposedly blaspheme Islam.

Hard-line Islamist groups, organizing on social media, advocating via sympathizers in government bureaucracies & building networks in religious schools, have increasingly swayed elections in Indonesia.

One cannot blame Indonesia’s growing conservatism on organizations like FPI, because it gets its legitimacy by riding the tide of rising Islamic conservatism. Two research findings from Pew Research Center (PRC) in 2013?found that 72%?of Muslims in Indonesia favor having the Sharia Law as the law of the land with a staggering 50% believing that the Sharia Law should be enforced to non-Muslims. In?2020, PRC highlighted that 96%?of Indonesians believed religion to be important as it equates having religion as having good moral values. Based on this data, one can conclude that Indonesian Muslims want Islam to play a more significant role in the country's governance.

Widespread computer literacy among a younger generation of Indonesians has given Muslim activists & preachers a national and even SE Asian platform. The messages of these preachers are conveyed effectively by social media through their YouTube, Twitter, Facebook & Instagram accounts as well as encrypted messages on Telegram channels.

A national survey of Indonesia commissioned by The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) between 20 & 30 May 2017 clearly showed that Indonesian society has been “Islamized.”

1. 49% of respondents wanted the Indonesian government to prioritize Islam over any other religion.
2. 41% agree with the implementation of sharia law at the local level, but only 39% agree for sharia law to be implemented throughout Indonesia.
3. 67.2% of respondents believe implementing sharia law would help strengthen moral values.
4. 36% of respondents agree Islam should become Indonesia’s only official religion.
5. 58% of respondents agree it is very important to choose a Muslim leader in elections.
6. 63% of the respondents agree blasphemy against Islam should be punished more severely.

Those who wanted to prioritize Islam constituted half of the population & 39% wanted to introduce sharia law throughout Indonesia. It also became evident that having an Islamic background was crucial in the national election (58%). Another survey done in Indonesia & released on 31 Oct 2017 revealed that nearly 20 % of secondary & tertiary education students were in favour of establishing an Islamic Caliphate in Indonesia.

Perhaps even more dangerous for Indonesia’s future are religious hard-liners?building alliances with Prabowo Subianto, a former Indonesian special forces Lieutenant General & Minister of Defence in President Joko Widodo’s government. Prabowo appears to be laying the groundwork for a populist-military-Islamist alliance for the coming election.

The establishment of fundamentalist Islam will come with steep economic costs. There are linkages drawn between religion tensions &?a decline in foreign investments. If?cultural or religious wars?were to break out, they will destroy religious & social harmony, & threaten to displace non-Muslim citizens. If the government is not careful, Indonesia may end up as a hotspot for?terrorist groups.

Conservative Islamist groups which slowly amassed power in the late 2000s, have gained greater influence over law & politics. They have done so by organizing within democratic politics in Indonesia & to some extent Malaysia, through grassroots campaigns & local electoral victories. Their goals are implementing laws based on sharia & rolling back protections for religious minorities.

In 6 Dec 2022, Indonesian lawmakers approved a new criminal code which applies to Indonesians & foreigners alike. It criminalizes insulting the president, vice-president & state institutions, views that contradict the state ideology Pancasila, protests without a permit,?sex outside marriage & non-marital cohabitation. Any law that sets out to regulate morality & regulate the private sexual lives of its citizens, it inevitably ends up being mostly about women & women’s sexuality in very religious societies. Women are much more vulnerable than men to accusations of behaviour that are deemed immoral.

The rise of Islamism in Malaysia & Indonesia can have severe consequences for their societies, political systems & overall stability. There have been deadly attacks by IS-inspired militants in Jakarta in Jan 2016 & May 2017. Indonesian & Malaysian militants also mount attacks in neighboring countries. Indonesian fighters have been arrested in Marawi where the Philippine army fought an IS-linked group in 2017 & 6 Indonesian militants were detained in Batam in 2016 for?allegedly planning a rocket attack on Singapore's Marina Bay Sands (MBS) integrated resort.

The growth of radical Islamic movements in the region is very alarming. It is already a major destabilizing force, with the potential to become much worse.

The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have experience with political violence has been focused on left-wing terrorism, communism & militant Islamism.

Far right or right-wing extremism as an ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is the least understood security threat in SE Asia.

The surge in peaceful Islamic fundamentalism as well as violent extremism is now viewed by many government officials, political analysts & diplomats as one of the most serious threats to stability in SE Asia, a region whose shipping lanes, low-cost manufacturing & emerging markets make it a crucial player in the global economy.

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Endro Sunarso is an expert in Security Management, Physical Security & Counter Terrorism. He is regularly consulted on matters pertaining to transportation security, off-shore security, critical infrastructure protection, security & threat assessments, & blast mitigation.

Besides being a Certified Protection Professional (CPP?), a Certified Identity & Access Manager (CIAM?), a Project Management Professional (PMP?) & a Certified Scrum Master (CSM?), Endro is also a Fellow of the Security Institute (FSyl) & the Institute of Strategic Risk Management (F.ISRM).

Endro has spent about 2 decades in Corporate Security (executive protection, crisis management, critical infrastructure protection, governance, business continuity, loss mitigation, due diligence, counter corporate espionage, etc). He also has more than a decade of experience in Security & Blast Consultancy work, initially in the Gulf Region & later in South East Asia.