The Rise of The Cyborg You

Gulnara Z. Karimova

Many philosophers have noted the gradual transformation of humans into cyborgs, a process that is increasingly evident in our deepening entanglement with technology. Heidegger’s concept of ‘ready-to-hand’ in his seminal work “Being and Time” (1962) offers a lens through which we can understand this phenomenon, particularly in the context of AI. Heidegger suggests that technology becomes an extension of our body and mind. This idea aligns with the concept of humans evolving into cyborgs, as our reliance on AI and other technologies grows, not merely as external aids, but as integral components of our cognitive and physical existence.

Marshall McLuhan’s theories further develop this transformation. In his work, McLuhan proposed that all technologies serve as extensions of human faculties, such as the wheel extending the foot or electronic media extending the nervous system. In the same way, AI extends our cognitive capabilities, becoming a part of our mental processes.

In the context of AI, these technologies are not merely tools; they possess a form of agency, capable of making decisions based on algorithms and data. This agency challenges the simplistic view of AI as a mere functional entity and invites us to see it as part of a larger existential framework where it reveals new forms of knowledge and interaction. As the distinction between subject and object dissolves, humans find themselves increasingly enmeshed in a state of mutual transformation with AI, cyborg-like existence.

In this light, the possibility of humans becoming cyborgs is not a distant science fiction scenario but an ongoing reality. As we continue to integrate AI into our daily lives, the lines between human and machine blur, leading to a future where our identities are increasingly intertwined with the technologies we create and use. This transformation, as both Heidegger and McLuhan suggest, is not merely about technological advancement but about a fundamental shift in the nature of human existence itself.

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