Riddle: Limits of Friendship: China — A Partner, Not an Ally
Aleksei Chigadaev summarises key developments in?Russian-Chinese relations in?2024
By Aleksei Chigadaev - 14 December 2024
China is?growing weary. By?the third year of?the war, efforts to?organise peace talks between Russia and Ukraine have slipped not just to?the second but to?the third tier of?China’s foreign policy agenda. Within the vast structure of?China’s Ministry of?Foreign Affairs, the ‘Ukrainian crisis’ remains the responsibility of?a?single official—Li Hui, the government’s special representative for Eurasian affairs. Meanwhile, the foreign minister, the prime minister, and the president are preoccupied with a?more pressing issue: Donald Trump’s new presidential term.
China’s peace plan
Three years into the war, China continues to?uphold its neutrality, refraining from direct military support for either Russia or?Ukraine while simultaneously expanding bilateral trade with both countries.
On?2 March 2022, during a?special session, the?UN General Assembly adopted a?resolution condemning Russia’s operation in?Ukraine. Russia itself, Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea and Syria voted against it, leaving Russia with no?allies in?the war, its actions supported publicly only by?North Korea’s leader. China abstained and, a?year later, began forming a?large coalition of?nations advocating for negotiations.
The situation itself is?paradoxical. In?February 2022, China appeared content with issuing a?formal statement calling for peace talks while continuing normal trade relations. It?wasn’t until a?year into the conflict that Beijing took its first diplomatic steps, publishing ‘China’s position on?the political settlement of?the Ukraine crisis’. The document highlighted the necessity of?halting hostilities and resuming peace talks.
China’s all subsequent actions were aimed at?avoiding direct confrontation with the?US and?EU countries, which strongly support Ukraine. Apparently, many expected Beijing to?pressure Russia’s political leaders into freezing the conflict under Xi?Jinping’s pressure. The very possibility of?implementing such a?plan poses many questions: practice has shown that economic sanctions have little impact on?immediate political solutions.
China chose a?different path out of?the situation—neither condemning nor supporting anyone. Instead, it used the European war as?a?pretext to?consolidate the countries of ‘Global South’, presenting itself as?a?responsible global actor and a?judicious partner for negotiations. In?May 2024, Brazil and China released the ‘Common Understandings Between China and Brazil on?Political Settlement of?the Ukraine Crisis’. This six-point document, often mislabelled in?the media as a ‘peace plan’, urged the international community to?support and join the initiative, playing a?constructive role together in?promoting de-escalation and peace talks. In?August 2024, China’s special representative for Eurasian affairs Li?Hui said that the initiative had garnered support from ‘over 110 countries’.
On?27 August 2024, Li?Hui held a briefing summarising the outcomes of?the fourth round of?shuttle diplomacy on?the Ukraine crisis, following visits to?Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia.
On?27 September, on?the margins of?the?UN General Assembly in?New York, China, Brazil and the countries of?the ‘Global South’ announced the creation of?an?open platform for resolving the conflict in?Ukraine named ‘Friends of?Peace’. The joint communiqué was signed by?Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey and Zambia.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, speaking at?the?UN General Assembly, said that ‘any parallel or?alternative attempts to?achieve peace are, in?fact, efforts to?achieve a?lull, not an?end to?the war’. In?September, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said Russia welcomed the China-Brazil peace initiative. Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia familiarised itself with the China-Brazil initiative to?resolve the conflict in?Ukraine only after its public release, describing it?as a ‘solid basis’ for attempts to?seek peace.
China understands that a?diplomatic solution to?the conflict can only occur if?both Russia and Ukraine request negotiations. If?the world avoids nuclear escalation, negotiations will begin sooner or?later. The ‘Friends of?Peace’ platform does not aim to?pressure either side of?the conflict but instead calls for a?comprehensive and lasting resolution to?the war through diplomatic and political means grounded in?the?UN Charter.
The situation looks perplexing for both China and the ‘Global South’. The countries of?Europe appear unable to?resolve their mutual problems on?their own, and the?US becomes an?active actor in?the military conflict indirectly, providing not only financial aid, but also supplying arms to?one of?the warring parties.
At?this moment, what is?needed from all countries is?an?unequivocal condemnation of?Russian aggression and support for Vladimir Zelensky’s ‘peace formula‘. On?16 June 2024, the Global Peace Summit, organised by?the Swiss Government at?the request of?the Ukrainian authorities, concluded in Bürgenstock. Delegates discussed three of?Zelensky’s ten proposed points: security at?nuclear facilities, food security, and the exchange of?prisoners of?war and the return of?Ukrainian children taken to?Russia. The two-day summit’s final declaration was supported by?80 countries and four organisations. The second peace summit, scheduled to?be?held in?November, did not materialise.
A?paradoxical situation has emerged: nations of?the ‘First World’ can no?longer resolve their conflicts within a?relatively small geographical space while the position of?the ‘Third World’ countries is?becoming, if?not decisive, at?least important evidence that the global order of?the past decades is?no?longer working. This raises a?fair question: are we?discussing Europe’s security architecture or?is?there a?need for new global rules?
Eventually, even representatives of?France and Switzerland joined the ‘Friends of?Peace’ group, much to?the bewilderment of?Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
Remarkably, Russian propagandists and Ukrainian politicians occasionally find themselves in?rare agreement: China is?pursuing these initiatives to?support Russia. Yet, China is?leveraging the military conflict in?Europe to?build a?coalition of?Global South states, increase supplies to?Ukraine and Russia, and purchase cheap energy resources from Russia and agricultural products from Ukraine. Peace talks are, undoubtedly, only a?matter of?time. China has prepared the stage and moved on?to?more pressing concerns.
Russia-China trade in?2024
In?2022, the Russia-China trade turnover increased by?29.3% year-on-year to USD 190.27 billion. In?2023, trade turnover grew by?a?further 26.3%, hitting USD 240.11 billion—and, as?of?today, this appears to?be?the ceiling for further growth.
We?have previously written about the political implications of?the surge in?Russian oil exports to?China. According to?Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, China’s share in?Russia’s exports of?oil and petroleum products in?2023 was 50%, while India accounted for 40%. Although the proportions between India and China will undoubtedly shift by?the end of?2024, the list of?key importers and their balance is?unlikely to?change dramatically.
From April to?September 2024, Russian oil exports to?India increased by?2.5%, keeping Russia’s position as?India’s largest oil supplier with a?39% market share. From January to?October, Russia also boosted its oil exports to?China by?2.2% year-on-year, reaching 90 million tonnes. The value of?these supplies amounted to?USD 52.794 billion.
Between January and October, the trade turnover between Russia and China increased by?2.8% year-on-year, hitting USD 202.2 billion. Russian exports rose by?1.1%, to?USD 108.07 billion, while supplies from China grew by?4.7%, to?USD 94.14 billion.
The dynamic growth in?trade turnover between Russia and China is?slowing because the previous drivers of?expansion are no?longer working. The structure of?trade turnover remains unchanged: Russia’s exports to?China include energy resources (oil, gas and coal), which account for almost 90% of?exports, as?well as?metals, timber, seafood and agricultural products. Meanwhile, imports from China consist of?cars, computers, smartphones, toys and footwear. Only the growth in?mineral supplies has allowed Russia to?maintain a?positive current account balance with China.
What could significantly transform bilateral trade?
On?1 October 2024, the decision of?the Ministry of?Industry and Trade on?a?phased increase in?recycling fees for cars came into force, significantly raising the coefficients for cars imported from abroad for resale in?Russia. The Ministry’s goal is clear: to?compel automotive companies to?localise production in?Russia. As?of?today, Haval (Great Wall Motor) is?the only Chinese brand that has signed a?special investment contract (SPIC) with the Ministry of?Industry and Trade to?localise production. The Haval manufacturing plant opened in?the summer of?2019.
Whether Chinese car manufacturers will agree to?localise production in?Russia is?a?debatable issue. The Russian market is?relatively small and carries numerous risks, including secondary sanctions. According to?2020 data, Great Wall invested 42.4 billion roubles in?localisation of?production in?Russia. Considering the unstable rouble exchange rate and rising inflation, the initial investment required for localisation in?2025 should be?at?least twice as?high, and return on?investment with such market volumes and the economic situation inside the country is?even more difficult to?predict. However, domestic demand in?China is?stagnant, the problem of?overproduction remains unsolved, and external markets—including the?US and the EU—are not averse to?imposing additional protective tariffs. In?this case, redirecting some capacity for the production of?internal combustion engine vehicles to?Russia looks like a?viable solution in?the current situation for China.
Mongolia has not included the ‘Power of?Siberia-2′ gas pipeline project in?its national development plan until 2028. The Russian Federation had planned to?build the pipeline through Mongolian territory to?transport gas to?China. As?a?result, the laying of?the pipeline—personally promoted by?Vladimir Putin—will not take place for at?least the next several years. China is?still satisfied with the current volumes of?supplied energy carriers. Some equipment for maintaining these supplies is?already being imported from China, but new projects require money, and China is?not yet prepared to?pay.
The number of?actual Chinese investments is?difficult to?estimate. Firstly, since 2022, Russia’s Central Bank has ceased publishing statistics on?foreign direct investment in?Russian companies. Secondly, most analysts agree that the volume of?Chinese investments in?Russia—which were modest even before the coronavirus pandemic—has not increased since 2022, despite numerous statements from the Russian-Chinese intergovernmental commission on?investment cooperation. According to?the commission data, its portfolio currently includes 83 investment projects (10 of?which were added in?2022?2023), with a?declared investment volume of?approximately USD 200 billion across 24 Russia’s administrative regions and five Chinese provinces.
However, production chains—including component manufacturing and related production—are underdeveloped in?Russia, making production in?China more economically justified. As?a?result, the opposite trend often occurs: Russian companies are more eager to?invest in?China. For example, on?24 October 2024, RUSAL, one of?the world’s largest aluminium producers, announced that it?had signed an?agreement to?acquire a?30% stake in?Chinese steelmaker Hebei Wenfeng New Materials (HWNM). This deal secures RUSAL access to?alumina and supply of?critical raw materials.
The key to?attracting investment from China lies in?macroeconomic and geopolitical stability without the risk of?secondary sanctions. For the foreseeable future, this remains a?challenge for the Russian market.
The Russian transport and logistics infrastructure continues to?be a?significant obstacle to?the growth of?trade turnover. Issues with modernisation of?ports and transport corridors significantly increase costs and delivery times. For example, there are regular queues at?the Zabaikalsk road border crossing point due to?incomplete construction of?infrastructure for trucks. Transport infrastructure is?a?major focus of?Chinese investment, but China is?certainly investing in infrastructure in?border areas to?boost cargo flows and trade. Examples include the construction of?the Russia-China cross-border railway bridge Nizhneleninskoye-Tongjiang, the Bely Rast terminal and logistics complex, the Europe-Asia telecommunications highway, a?road bridge and cable car between the cities of?Blagoveshchensk and Heihe.
In?March 2024, a?total of?80% of?settlements between Russia and China were suspended due to?Western sanctions, severely impacting trade and commercial relations. Fearing potential?US restrictions, 98% of?Chinese banks, including regional ones, began refusing to?accept direct payments from Russia. In?November 2024, the Bank of?China increasingly began blocking yuan-denominated transfers from countries its compliance department deemed potentially linked to?shipments to?Russia. Due to?fears of?secondary sanctions, Chinese banks only want to?engage with banks they deem safe, and banks in?China continue to?restrict the ability to?transfer funds even between accounts held by?the same customer. In?coms cases, Chinese banks cite the need for special authorisations to?process payments from foreign to?domestic bank accounts.
On?21 November 2024, the?US Treasury Department’s Office of?Foreign Assets Control announced a?new large-scale package of?restrictions targeting Russia’s financial sector. More than 50 banks, including Gazprombank and VTB Shanghai—one of?the main channels of?cross-border settlements for business—have been added to?the blacklist of?citizens and organisations, prohibiting all?US individuals and companies from doing business with them. Notably, VTB Shanghai is?the only bank in?China facilitating yuan transactions originating in?Russia.
Since the beginning of?2024, up?to?70?80% of?Russian payments have been rejected, and about half of?cross-border payments have been processed through intermediaries and alternative routes.
We?will not assess the numerous initiatives to?introduce cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and settlement platforms within international organisations: all these projects failed to?gain traction in?2024. Russia has been unable to?propose an?alternative settlement system that could be?attractive at?least to?its BRICS partners.
China does not put its banks at?risk and continues to?keep Russian banks at?arm’s length. Could China have acted differently and worked more actively to?create a?joint platform with Russia? Certainly. However, such risks offer no?long-term benefit. China needs dollars and access to?SWIFT, not roubles and the Bank of?Russia’s Financial Messaging System.
The limits of?friendship: China?— a?partner, not an?ally
By?the end of?2024, the level of?support China could afford to?provide had reached its maximum threshold: any further moves could negatively impact Chinese companies and banks, and expose certain industries to?the risk of?secondary sanctions.
Sanctions are working. They also influence the strategies of?the two countries. Over the first two years, China derived remarkable profits from the sanctions regime, increasing its imports of?energy carriers and replacing European manufacturers in?entire market niches, from cars to?other goods. It?appears that a?certain ceiling has been reached in?the growth of?trade turnover, which can only be?surpassed trough large-scale, groundbreaking initiatives like those discussed earlier. Such new steps, however, come with growing costs for China itself, leading not only Chinese business but also financial institutions to?question the feasibility of?such a?rapprochement.
Every partnership has its objective limits. Over the past two years, no?significant bilateral binding documents have been signed, meaning that both China and Russia still maintain a?high degree of?autonomy in?foreign policy, economic, military and other decisions, occasionally coordinating their positions in?the?UN Security Council or?other international organisations. To?put it?more bluntly, China owes nothing to?Russia and Russia owes nothing to?China. The growing economic and political disparities on?the global stage will increasingly push the political leadership of?the two countries further away from any long-term formal alliances or?joint projects.
China is?preparing for another Donald Trump presidency and a?new wave of?trade wars, initiated by?Trump himself. The local military conflict in?Europe between Russia and Ukraine, as?well as?Russia’s payment difficulties caused by?secondary sanctions, were not a?priority in?the past, and have now slipped even further down the agenda.
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There moment will come when China’s political leaders, with ceremoniousness and utmost politeness, will ask Russia’s political elites, ‘What are you willing to?offer in?return, besides oil and gas?’ By?that time, Russian diplomacy must ensure that there are alternative options beyond China or?be?ready to?share military technologies more actively, lower the entry barrier for Chinese companies, or?perhaps even become part of ‘greater China’.
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Riddle
Syria without Assad and Russia’s inertial assistance
Platon Nikiforov explains how the fall of?the Assad regime will affect Russian positions in?the region
By Platon Nikiforov - 10 December 2024
In?the language of?Vladimir Putin’s favorite daily, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Russia is?in?the midst of?a?fascinating spectacle: its leading politicians, military officers and Z-bloggers are turning on?a?dime and publicly declaring that, despite their recent writings and comments to?the contrary, they have in?fact long since realized how weak and corrupt Bashar al-Assad’s regime is?and actually expected his army to?quickly fall apart. Such skepticism is?no?coincidence: as?far as?we?know, after the Syrian army fled Aleppo and Hama in?what the Syrian Defense Ministry, perhaps, out of?a?habit of?euphemism, kept calling a??redeployment?, the scriptwriters of?Russian television programs began rewriting the plans for their shows as?if?on cue. Instead of?the originally planned barrage of?criticism against Turkey, at?the behest of?which ?militant thugs went on?the attack?, all the anger was directed against Russia’s once ?reliable ally in?the Arab world?, whose salvation the Kremlin had previously used to?demonstrate its commitment to?its strategic and national interests.
On?7 December, however, the narrative made a?U-turn. Media editors, experts and admins of?Telegram channels began to?receive new guidelines: Abu Muhammad al-Julani (Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa), the 42-year-old leader of?the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorist structure banned in?Russia, is?now said to?have worked for MI6 for many years, and more recently, with Ukrainian intelligence as?well. Consequently, the British and the Ukrainians are the real culprits of?the unfolding events in?Syria. Even Fyodor Lukyanov, a?regular moderator of?the Valdai Club sessions with Putin, who has tried his best to?maintain some sanity, jumped on?that new playbook in?the International Review program. However, by?the morning of?December 8, when the Assad regime finally collapsed, the talking points contained in?this playbook that were interspersed in?the information field with statements by?Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (statements that seemed to?be?made out of?inertia and were indistinguishable from the 2015?2016 rhetoric about the importance of?protecting ?national sovereignty? and ?countering terrorism?) had to?be?dropped. On?the airwaves, yesterday’s ?militant thugs? and ?terrorists? began to?morph into ?armed units? and ?members of?the Syrian opposition.?
Obviously, the ban on?media criticism of?Turkey was imposed in?order not to?undermine the background negotiations with Ankara, which was consulted through various channels that took great care not to?offend local sensitivities/mindful of?local political and cultural specificity. Publicly, the Turkish authorities denied any support to?the HTS on?their part, officially only endorsing the Syrian National Army, which is?mainly fighting Kurdish formations in?northern Syria, but it?was clear that numerous opposition groups could not have possibly infiltrated unnoticed and unhindered through the nearly hundred Turkish strongholds deployed in?the Idlib region. Nor could they have obtained enough components for the mass use of?FPV drones and equipment for training courses to?operate them. However, on?the eve of?the meeting of?the diplomatic ?Astana Troika? (Russia, Iran and Turkey) held on?the sidelines of?the Doha Forum, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in?his own style, dropped a?subtle but clear hint that the collapse of?the Syrian regime was a?consequence of?Assad’s refusal to?normalize relations. While noting that what was happening in?Syria was ?not what we?wanted?, he?expressed hope that ?the march towards Damascus will continue without upheavals and disasters?. Moreover, at?the time of?the Qatar talks, Ankara indicated that it?was in?a?position to?influence the HTS and other opposition groups by deploying certain military units into Aleppo where the regime had already fallen.
It?is?likely that the fact that the Russian diplomatic mission in?Damascus continued to?operate even when the opposition forces were on?their way to?the city (just like the Russian diplomatic mission in?Kabul, which was open at?the time of?the Taliban’s seizure of?power) attests to?the existence of?some prior agreements. This is?also evidenced by?the Russian Foreign Ministry’s subsequent statement that ?Assad decided to?resign from the presidency and left the country, instructing the transfer of?power to?be?carried out peacefully.? At?the same time, not only Turkey but also the HTS group, which in?advance circulated an?appeal to?Russia and China to??respect the will of?the people?, promised to??establish diplomatic relations? and to?protect ?diplomatic missions?, embody this careful approach to?the fallen dictator’s allies. Although Lavrov continued to?describe HTS as??terrorists? mere hours before the fall of?Damascus, after the city had surrendered the Russian Foreign Ministry said it?was in?contact ?with all factions of?the Syrian opposition?. The Foreign Ministry’s statement that Russia did not take part in?the negotiations ?between Assad and a?number of?participants in?the armed conflict?, after which he?supposedly left office, was a?smoke screen designed to?deflect any accusation of?Russia’s involvement in?the quick capitulation of?Damascus and, more generally, to?distance itself from any of?Assad’s decisions. After all, it?was not for nothing that Putin once said that the Syrian leader had ?made many mistakes in?the course of?the development of?the conflict in?Syria.?
It?is?hardly an?overstatement to?suggest that Assad made one of?his gravest mistakes when he flew to?Moscow in?late November to?seek urgent help. The absence of?the president and his family for several days (according to?the Russian media, the entire family attended the son’s doctoral defense in?Moscow) and the refusal of?the Russian army, bogged down in?the fighting in?Ukraine, to?provide urgent and large-scale assistance may have strengthened the confidence of?the Syrian security forces that some kind of?deal had been struck behind their backs in?Moscow. Given the Syrians’ penchant for conspiracy theories, combined with the country’s poor economic situation, it?is?reasonable to?assume that some degree of?sabotage did take place, which is?why Moscow did not confirm that Assad had visited Moscow, as?they should not have allowed this visit to?happen in?the first place, given the gravity of?the situation.
At?the same time, while the Russian diplomatic corps was still trying to?somehow explain the events in?Syria and its own reaction to?them, the actions of?the military raised many an?eyebrow. The sluggish reaction of?the Russian air force to?the launch of?the HTS offensive on?27 November raised suspicions, even among authoritative Middle East experts. There has been speculation that Moscow’s position is?not so?simple and that it?is?coordinating its actions with Turkey and ?is?behind the opposition because the Kremlin is?fed up?with Assad?.
There have indeed been strange aspects to?the Russian military’s handling of?the situation, but these are unlikely to?be?linked to?any behind-the-scenes arrangements.
The failure to?stop and contain the opposition breakthrough is?most likely due to?the failure of?the Russian command to?take seriously the possibility of?an?opposition offensive, although even Syrian pro-government newspapers reported in?early October that preparations for such an?offensive were underway. The Russian military also failed to?properly assess and report on?the available fortifications. Despite a?series of?measures to?reduce the size of?its fleet, Russian aviation continued to?carry out regular strikes on?HTS positions after the start of?the full-scale invasion of?Ukraine and up?to?the current events. Moreover, a?Russian SU-25 attack aircraft, which had been withdrawn from the Khmeimim Air Base with the start of?the Ukrainian campaign, was shown on?Syrian TV only after the fall of?Aleppo. However, it?is?clear that the command of?the Russian group relied on?Syrian intelligence?— the state of?which left much to?be?desired,?— to?select targets. It?is?also obvious, that the shortage of?army aviation (helicopters) and poor maintenance did not allow mobile targets to?be?attacked with the necessary intensity.
For comparison: in?2016, the intensity of?Russian air support for the regime was such that some of?the aircraft from the Khmeimim Air Base airfield not only carried out strikes on?the so-called planning table of?hitting targets identified, for example, by?the Il-20M equipped with a?side-scan locator, but were also in?the ?air duty? position (i.e. continuously remaining in?the air in?a?given area) with a?reaction time for hitting targets of?10?20 minutes (the reaction time from the ?airfield duty? position was no?more than 50 minutes). Probably, the mistakes at?the current stage were the reason why Lieutenant General Sergey Kisel’, the general in?charge of?Russian forces in?Syria, was hastily replaced by?Colonel General Alexander Chaiko.
The Russian move to?conduct military exercises near the Syrian coast from 1 to?3 December (i.e. after the loss of?Aleppo), announced by?the Russian Defense Ministry on?the last day of?the official maneuvers, also looked extremely strange.
On?the one hand, the statement coincided with the spread of?information about the beginning of?the withdrawal of?Russian ships from the Naval base in?Tartous, which was reported by?Naval News and confirmed by?satellite images. If?the Military Ministry wanted to?refute rumors and justify the dispersal of?ships in?the near sea due to?the increased danger from the opposition forces, to?which the Syrian army ?left? in?its flight several launchers of?the long-range Uragan (220 mm) and Smerch (300 mm) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), it?is?unclear why it?was necessary to?mention such a?short period of?military exercises. The Russian military has more than once openly and without any cover resorted to?such a?maneuver to?increase the survivability of?the ship grouping. This was the case in?2018, when the Assad regime’s position was strong and Moscow initiated the creation of?so-called de-escalation zones to?consistently weaken and displace pockets of?opposition resistance in?Idlib.
On?the other hand, the Russian military may well have decided not to?cancel the planned exercises involving firing at?a?target position at?sea, about which, if?the Defense Ministry is?to?be believed, the Chief of?the General Staff of?the Russian Armed Forces, Sergey Gerasimov, informed his ?American counterparts? in?telephone negotiations as?early as?27 November. However, in?this case it?is?unclear why and to?whom the Defense Ministry demonstrated the capabilities of?missile weapons to?hit abstract targets in?the sea, although the Syrian opposition had by?then already taken Aleppo and was advancing toward Hama, and the firepower of?Russian aviation was clearly insufficient to?contain the real onslaught and prevent the capture of?the city. It?is?as if?your friend, who you believe to?be?loyal and trustworthy, decides to?stick to?their morning exercise routine and shows off their athletic or?acrobatic prowess on?the bar at?the local gym while the local skinny thugs beat you to?a?bloody pulp.
Paradoxically, while the Russian command was busy hitting the sea with super-expensive missiles thereby sending confusing messages either to?Assad that it?would not save him, or?to?the opposition so?as?to scare it, or?to?the ?West? so?as?to contain it?out of?inertia, many Russian military strongholds and posts remained deployed in?terrain with difficult evacuation conditions. While in?the south the positions were withdrawn almost at?the last moment as?the local population, including the pro-Russian 8th Brigade of?the 5th Corps, organized their own offensive towards Damascus, some of?the official forces and, apparently, operators of?the PMC ?Redut? affiliated with Russian Defense Ministry, which replaced ?Wagner? in?Homs, found themselves cut off from the main contingent. According to?pro-Kremlin ?Z? bloggers, part of?the contingent, including from the Kuweires base on?the outskirts of?Aleppo, was withdrawn at?the end of?November and beginning of?December to?the territory of?the US-backed Kurdish-Arab alliance, the Democratic Forces of?Syria. Its fate eventually became the subject of?negotiations with Turkey on?the creation of?special corridors.
As?for the official military installations in?Latakia and Tartous, Syrian Prime Minister, Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, who handed over power to?the opposition, said that their fate would be?decided by?the new authorities. Hypothetically, in?the absence of?a?system of?authority, the presence of?official facilities on?Syrian territory could become a?kind of?guarantee against external attack, which the quasi-state structures of?the HTS, which are adept at?diplomacy, could use as?part of?an?unconventional move (for example, to?counterbalance the?US contingent in?eastern Syria).
However, it?is?hard to?believe that the opposition, which Russian aircraft and ships have been trying to?destroy since 2015, deliberately failing to?distinguish between rebel factions and Islamic State militants, will agree to?provide Russia with a?tool to?project power in?the MENA region. Turkey, despite its uneasy relations with the United States and the European Union, hardly needs it?either. Especially since the facilities in?Syria in?recent years have served as?an?African hub for the development of?Russian military and economic presence in?various African countries, which has caused nothing but trouble for the Syrian population, as?their country has been incorporated by?the Kremlin into its overall strategy of?containment and struggle against ?the West?. For Russia, reducing its military capabilities or?leaving Syria altogether means withdrawing from the Middle East altogether, where few would respect a?country that has no?bridgehead for operations and can only provide a?rare call of?one or?two ships to?a?particular port under a?simplified approval scheme or conduct nominal counter-terrorism exercises involving 100 paratroopers.
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Hudson Institute
Re: Building Defense | Next Steps for the Pentagon in 2025
Congress and the United States Department of Defense have a long list of initiatives to fix America’s defense industrial base...
The list of to-dos?facing Congress and the Pentagon to rebuild America’s defense industrial base is comprehensive but imperative for American security in this great power competition. The next step is to implement and scale these ideas. Below are three top items for the Department of Defense’s 2025 checklist to achieve this.
The To-Do List
1. Rebuild comprehensively. 2. Adopt a mass production mindset. 3. Focus on joint experimentation to develop real-world solutions.
Sketching Out the Details
Reindustrialization is not all about additional government spending. It is about incentivizing new supply and demand opportunities and unleashing American capital and ingenuity. The second Trump administration could redefine America’s industrial future by focusing on six lines of action. These are the underlying conditions required to make the progress that Donald Trump is driving toward:
This comprehensive approach would not only bolster national security but also ensure long-term economic prosperity, restoring America’s position as a global manufacturing leader.
Read Nadia Schadlow’s op-ed “Reindustrialization: A Strategy for American Sovereignty and Security.”
The Pentagon’s?depleted?weapons magazines don’t look like those of a military preparing to fight China in?two years. Facing shortages for training and future contingencies, Washington has constrained weapons shipments to?Ukraine. At home, industry is unable to?keep up?with demand and the?changes?needed to counter GPS jamming. But the uncomfortable truth is this—today’s scarcity is self-imposed. With their custom components and bespoke integration, the DoD’s preferred munitions are more like the artisan products featured on?Etsy?than the mass-produced?weapons?that came off assembly lines during World War II. The Arsenal of Democracy turned auto plants into aircraft and bomb factories by designing—or redesigning—military hardware for producibility. To prepare for protracted conflict, the DoD needs to think like a manufacturer and pursue weapons that leverage existing parts and elastic production facilities.
The traditional approach of developing requirements first and then demonstrating individual systems struggles to address the new reality that warfighting advantage is increasingly derived from hyperconnected kill chains that cross service boundaries. Joint experimentation provides a way to discover how systems can be combined in novel ways, to understand the interactions between new technologies like uncrewed systems and legacy platforms, and to rapidly evolve concepts of operation alongside technical capabilities. Joint experimentation enables the rapid learning and adaptation needed to deploy cross-service operational capabilities in this dynamic environment. The potential for joint integration is not just about creating new concepts; it is also about finding ways to implement them, experiment with them, refine them, and scale them into the deployed force.
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