Reviewing and Scaffolding Solutions for Compounding Failures from Lack of Supervision using "Black Hearts" to Guide Discussion.

Overarching Goal for our discussion is to recognize tension from Behaviors / Effective v. Ineffective Leadership and identify how we are encouraging and developing Leader Competencies so that this does not with Soldiers whom we are leading.

 Expectation is that those participating will have read, Black Hearts: One Platoon's Decent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death, Jim Frederick, Harmony Books, New York, 2009 ahead of time and have some experience with the Army's Leadership Requirements Model.  When we covered this with leadership in my current Army Reserve Unit the reading was given two months out and we set aside an hour to go over this with guided discussion led by the unit Chaplain, me, and wrapped up by a senior leader. Primary Leader responsibilities were to ensure everyone had the same understanding of the background for the issues and what led to the crimes that were committed and to draw out discussion from the questions provided and the interest and experience of the group. The Secondary Leader had the responsibility to pull an overview and summary of the top five main points learned from the group that we can apply in our own leadership and Staff Sections. 

    Reading from ADRP/ADP and review of Leadership Requirements Model can be done prior to meeting for discussion. In our discussion I spent ten minutes on the Leadership Requirements Model, ten on the Area of Operations and checking who had been there, from the questions provided twenty five minutes of guided discussion, then another ten from questions generated from additional discussion points, then another 15 minutes to wrap it up lead by a senior leader and identifying our lessons learned from the reading and discussion that we had.

   Included in the handout were quotes from the author, reviews of the book, and the leadership team, and the ADRP/ADP covering leadership as well as a pool of discussion questions for consideration to get us started.

ADP 6-22 pages 7-8

LEADER COMPETENCIES

30. There are three categories of competencies. The Army leader serves to lead others; to develop the environment, themselves, others and the profession as a whole;and to achieve organizational goals. Competencies provide a clear and consistent wayof conveying expectations for Army leaders.31. The core leader competencies apply across all levels of leader positions, providing a good basis for evaluation and focused multisource assessment and feedback. A spectrum of leaders and followers (superiors, subordinates, peers and mentors) can observe and assess competencies demonstrated through leader behaviors. 32. Leader competencies can be developed. Leaders acquire competencies at the direct leadership level. As the leader moves to organizational and strategic level positions, the competencies provide the basis for leading through change. Leaders continuously refine and extend the ability to perform these competencies proficiently and learn to apply them to increasingly complex situations.

LEADS

33. The category of leads encompasses five competencies. Two focus on the affiliation of the followers and the common practices for interacting with them. Leads others involves influencing Soldiers and Army Civilians in the leader’s organization. Extends influence beyond the chain of command involves influencing others when the leader does not have designated authority or while the leader’s authority is not recognized by others, such as with unified action partners. Builds trust is an important competency to establish conditions of effective influence and for creating a positive environment. Leader actions and words comprise the competencies of leads by example and communicates. Actions can speak louder than words and excellent leaders use this to serve as a role model to set the standard. Leaders communicate to convey clear understanding of what needs to be done and why.

34. Leaders are expected to extend influence beyond the chain of command, which usually has limited formal authority. This competency widens the responsibility and sphere of influence for a leader. Such influence requires insightful—and possibly nonstandard— methods to influence others. Its limited authority stems from the audience’s possible lack of the traditions, customs, and regulations of the Army and military forces. When extending influence, Army leaders have to assess who they need to influence and determine how best to establish their authority and execute leadership functions. Often they have little time to assess the situation beforehand and need to adapt as the interaction evolves. Extending influence is a competency that includes negotiation, consensus building and conflict resolution. Extending influence largely depends on the trust established with unified action partners and often applies to stability and defense support of civil authorities operations.

DEVELOPS

35. Leaders operate to improve or sustain high performance in their organization. They do so by focusing on the four develops competencies. Create a positive environment inspires an organization’s climate and culture. Prepares self encourages improvement in leading and other areas of leader responsibility. Leaders develop others to assume greater responsibility or achieve higher expertise. A leader stewards the profession to maintain professional standards and effective capabilities for the future.

36. Leaders are responsible for development. They must ensure that they themselves are developing, that they are developing subordinates, and that they are sustaining a positive climate and improving the organization. Leaders encourage development and set conditions while performing missions. Development occurs by having subordinates reflect on what happened during an event, by assessing whether units performed at or well above standard and why, in addition to having a positive mindset of improvement and learning. Every experience is developmental.

37. Leaders have choices to make about developing others. Leaders choose when and how to coach, counsel and mentor others. Leaders often have the freedom to place people in the best situation to maximize their talent. Then the leader provides resources the subordinate needs to succeed, makes expectations clear, and provides positive, meaningful feedback. While leaders need to develop others, they have to set a positive climate in which individuals and the unit can improve and operate. As part of their developmental responsibilities, leaders must prepare themselves and act to promote long-term stewardship of the Army.

ACHIEVES

38. Gets results is the single achieves competency and relates to actions to accomplish tasks and missions on time and to standard. Getting results is the goal of leadership but leaders must remain mindful that leading people and creating positive conditions enable them to operate as successful leaders. Getting results requires the right level of delegation, empowerment and trust balanced against the mission. Adaptability to conditions and adjustments based on adversarial actions are ever important elements of success.

Handout for Discussion and Overview: 

Author Notes:” Human organizations are flawed because humans are flawed. Even with the best intentions, men make errors in judgment and initiate courses of action that are counterproductive to their self-interest or the completion of the mission.” (Location 137)

“True leadership, the book says, inspires people to follow you because you serve their psychological need for purpose, value, and direction.” (Location 784)

From ADRP 6-22 Army Leadership, pages 1-2:

ARMY LEADER DEFINED

1. Leadership, the lifeblood of an army, makes a difference every day in the United States Army. Since the formation of the Continental Army until today with Soldiers deployed around the globe, Army leaders have accepted the challenges before them. The United States Army has always had great leaders who have risen above hardships and have drawn on a range of leadership qualities to influence Soldiers, build units, and accomplish the mission. 

2. Leadership is characterized by a complex mix of organizational, situational, and mission demands on a leader who applies personal qualities, abilities, and experiences to exert influence on the organization, its people, the situation, and the unfolding mission. Difficult and complex situations are the proving ground for leaders expected to make consistent timely, effective and just decisions.

An Army leader is anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.

PURPOSE OF LEADERSHIP

3. The Army requires leadership to make choices and establish unifying direction for the organization. Organizations have multiple sources to monitor and assess situations and provide input for decisions; however, a central leader must oversee and ultimately accept responsibility for the conduct of missions.

Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.

4. Leadership is a process of influence. Since first publishing leadership doctrine in 1948, the Army has consistently defined leadership as a process. This is significant because a process can be learned, monitored and improved. While personality and innate traits affect a process, the Army endorses the idea that good leadership does not just happen by chance but is a developable skill. A leader influences other people to accomplish a mission or fulfill a purpose. The means of influence include actions to convey motivation. Accomplishing the current mission is not enough—the leader is responsible for developing individuals and improving the organization for the near and long-term.

5. As an element of combat power, leadership unifies the other elements (information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection). Leadership is a multiplier of effects; with it, organizations are focused and synchronized, resources are used efficiently, people become energized and motivated, and missions are more likely to achieve desired outcomes. Leadership serves a motivational purpose: to energize others to achieve challenging goals. An organization with effective leadership has a clear purpose, common methods, and ordered processes; sustains itself; and accomplishes its missions. Effective organizations rely on leaders to balance uncertainty, remain flexible, and provide a climate where subordinates have the latitude to explore options.

As ADRP Continues it addresses: Applying Influence, Leader and Courage, Situational Leadership, Informal and Collective Leadership, Command and Leadership, Leadership Requirements Model, Leader Attributes, Leader Competencies, How Leaders Develop.

Our common understanding of the environment for the reading.  B CO started with 135 Soldiers, Nine of the Combat losses came from 1st Platoon, Bravo Company. 42 of the B CO Soldiers did not complete the year-long deployment because they were either wounded, or transferred. Twenty-one Soldiers from the BN were killed during their deployment, and. Forty percent of the battalion were treated for mental or emotional anxiety while in country. Narrative of the book gives impression that they did not have resources or manpower to execute the mission assigned.

Images for AO are included in the Chain of Command Performance of Duty, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, 2005-06A Case Study Offered to the Center for the Army Professional Ethic, LTG John H. Cushman, https://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/BlackHeartsCase.pdf

According to the book significant factors that contributed to the units issues/failures were:

●The decision, at the Department of the Army level, to grant large numbers of “moral waivers” (one for every four recruits) in order to meet recruiting goals was irresponsible. One of the perpetrators of the murders and rape had dropped out of high school in the 10th grade, been arrested twice for drugs and alcohol by the time he was 19, and had served time in a juvenile detention center for one offense and in jail for another. He was well known for his verbal tirades denigrating “n-----s,” Jews, northerners, foreigners, and other groups to which he did not personally belong. He had been granted a moral waiver to enlist.

● The pressure at the highest levels to reduce combat strength without a corollary adjustment in the mission was a disaster. Even when insurgent attacks were on the rise (from 26,500 to 34,000 in 2005), General Casey, the U.S. military commander for Iraq, “unrelentingly, consistently, and adamantly pushed for fewer troops in Iraq.” This obdurate, single-minded focus on a particular policy which, based on the evidence, must have been motivated solely by politics rather than the tactical reality on the ground, was irresponsible.

●The opulence and excesses of the living conditions in the Green Zone was preposterous and had a detrimental effect on the morale and attitude of front lines troops when, while visiting on business, they witnessed military and civilians tanning by the pool, playing Frisbee, being able to choose among several fast food stands such as Burger King and Pizza Hut, and being served lobster and steak in the dining hall. Frederick’s interviews point out that front-line Soldiers were constantly berated for rolling up their sleeves or taking off their helmets in scorching heat.

●Decisions made (against strong objections) by L. Paul Bremmer, leader of the Coalition Provisional Authority, to bar from government employment everyone who had been with Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and to dissolve the entire Iraqi military and national police force were disastrous. The first decision, according to Frederick, “jettisoned the midlevel doctors, bureaucrats, and engineers who actually provided essential public services to the people on a daily basis.” The second decision, made in the face of even more opposition, put “between 500,000 and 900,000 people, the majority of them armed and now humiliated men, out of work—on top of the already 40 percent of Iraqi adults estimated to be jobless.”( The Army Ethic 2010, Military Review, https://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100930ER_art018.pdf)

 Because it is possible that some of our Soldiers had served in this Area of Operations or even within the time period of this event it was important to check on that. Also good to know who has performed these types of duties before to validate what they may bring to the conversation.

Experience Check:

1. Who has pulled duty out on Traffic Control Points, TCP, or entry ways to a Base?

2. Has anyone had mission to plan /supervise setting up TCP, Combat Outposts, COP, or Guard rotations at Gate?

3. Anyone here operational in the area where the book took place, during or after that time?

Issue:

On 12 March 2006, four members of 1st Platoon, James Barker, Paul Cortez, Steven Green and Jesse Spielman Bravo Company, 1/ 502d IN, 2 BCT, 101st Airborne Division, planned and committed the brutal rape and murder of Abeer Qassim Hamzah Rashid al-Janabi, a 14-year-old Iraqi girl, then executed and mutilated her parents, Qassim Hamza Raheem, Fakhriyah Taha Muhasen and Hadeel Qassim Hamza Al-Janabi, her six year old sister to cover up that it was done by Soldiers and not an insurgent group in Yusufiyah, Iraq (Also called Mahmudiyah Massacre). A PFC from the platoon overheard an off-hand remark implicating one of the perpetrators and reported his suspicions to his chain of command. Additionally there were incidents from firing on vehicles at the Alamo Checkpoint, Soldiers who were abducted and killed from the JSB Bridge, and reactions during IED engagements.

Chain of Command:

502d IN, 2 BCT, 101 ABN DIV

COL Todd Ebel, CSM Brian Stall

1/502 IN LTC Tom Kunk, CSM Anthony Edwards

XO Fred Wintrich, S3 James Salome, S2 CPT Leo Barron

HHC CPT Shawn Umbrell, Alpha CO, CPT Jared Bordwell, B CO CPT John Goodwin, 1SG Rick Skidis, SFC Andrew Laskoski, 1st PLT – 1LT Ben Britt, 1LT Tim Norton, SSG Phil Miller, SFC Rob Gallagher, SFC Jeff Fenlason, Medic, SPC Collin Sharpness, 1st Squad SSG Travis Nelson, SSG Chaz Allen, 2nd Squad SSG Chris Payne, 3rd Squad, SSG Eric Lauzier, SSG Matthew Walter, SGT Kenith Casisca, SGT Roman Diaz, SGT John Diem, SGT Tony Yribe, SPC David Babineau, SPC James Barker, SPC Paul Cortez, SPC Thomas Doss, SPC James Gregory, SPC Anthony Hernandez, SPC William Lopez-Feliciano, PFC Chris Barnes, PFC Justin Cross, PFC Steven Green, PFC Shane Hoeck, PFC Bryan Howard, PFC Kristian Menchaca, PFC Jesse Spielman, PFC Thomas Tucker, PFC Justin Watt, PVT Nicholas Lake, PVT Seth Cheller

C CO (Cobra’s/People Army) CPT Bill Dougherty, 1SG Dennis Largent,

D CO CPT Lou Kangas

Combat Stress- LTC Elizabeth Bowker, LTC Karen Marrs, SSG Bob Davis

( Names taken from Appendix at the end of Blackhearts)

Questions to Guide Discussion (To be used as discussion starters based on group, not meant to have all gone through / covered during discussion) :

1.  As the Commander of 1/502 IN what did you catch about the leadership dynamics/ picture for LTC Kunk? (How approachable does he appear, what value is placed on subordinates input, how is decision making approached?)
2. The author makes the statement (location 3148) “when the formal command breaks down, the informal command steps up...” How do we as Senior Leaders address this when we observe that is what is happening within a Staff, or at the BN/Company Level. ( Second Platoon and 3rd Platoon survived, stayed sane, and arguably even thrived in the exact same environment in great part due to their outstanding platoon sergeants and their daily, active effort to combat hate 1st Platoon had given in.” location 3849)
3. As Senior Leaders and members of a Staff what is our responsibility to ensure that dialogue between the Staff and Commander occurs as part of our Formal and Informal Military Decision Making Process, MDMP, and Courses of Action, COA, are developed for discussion and wargaming? (Rules for Planning such as 20 Soldiers per 1,000 civilians for post war reconstruction, American Policy during WWII was to never leave troops on the front lines longer than eighty days.)
4. The picture painted of LTC Kunk in the book is one that shows him as being unable to hear disagreement or different opinions. Getting the Kunk gun pointed towards you meant either an angry tirade, or verbal abuse, and he is shown to dig in his heels and not want to hear opinions or actions that are different from his own. Working on a Staff with a leader that has that reputation what are our options to ensure that Mission requirements are met and Soldiers are Coached, Mentored, and Lead so that they can perform at the optimal level of support and performance?
5. Both COL Ebel and LTC Kunk sought to pin responsibility for the deaths of SSG Nelson and SGT Casica upon the men and their unit. Based on our Army Systems how is this a leadership failure? (15-6 Investigation) What from LTC Kunk’s response to the men’s concerns about lack of logistical, personnel, and engineering support should have engaged the staff, (i.e. S3, S4, Chaplain)
6. Order, cleanliness and hygiene, have a place, during combat operations some areas will slip. What did the 1/ 502d IN leadership do when they were out inspecting checkpoints and outposts? How have you dealt with the tension between being responsible for command and ensuring that standards were maintained? Lack of Soldier Persona Hygiene and Cleanliness is a symptom of what types of larger problems here?
7. How can we ensure Soldiers receive a benefit from Critical Incident Debriefs after a casualty occurs? Has anyone seen how this has been helpful for Soldiers?
8. How our Soldiers appear, meeting appearance standards is a direct reflection of unit leadership. While at War, as OPTEMPO increases things slide, sometimes right off the table. How can we encourage junior leaders so that they do not end up with “They had their Kevlar’s off and no weapons”, said Allen. “So nobody had situational awareness, nobody was pulling guard. Sometimes people will say to me, it’s a direct reflection of your leadership” (Location 4761) Hint: Answer is not just send them to the Chaplain.
9. What opportunity does CSM Brian Stall miss in his exchange with the Soldiers after one was killed and two were missing from Jurf al-Sukr Bridge, JSB? How is this a leadership failure?
10. When there is a memorial for Fallen Soldiers in the Operational Area (i.e deaths of Tucker, Menchaca, and Babineau) what else needs to happen besides the Memorial Service to ensure the unit returns/maintains operational effectiveness?
11.  What different approaches can we identify that would have supported the Soldiers, and built up the unit?
12. Do you agree with the concept that Troops to Task calculations are just straightforward mathematics (location 1940)? How do you work with a subordinate who is not able to manage? How do you convey to a Command Team or Staff that the math will just not work in that instance?
13. As Officers we all have an oath that we took to obey those lawfully appointed over us. When the “Task and Purpose … are retarded. Some of the missions I just wouldn’t do. Is that wrong? Yes, it’s probably wrong. But I was not going to risk the lives of my men for something that didn’t make sense.” (location 2091) What do you do?
14. Is there a difference between the consequences from making unethical decisions v. being a poor leader?
15. There are times when we get to ‘Embrace the suck”, where do Soldiers get the endurance and resiliency from to be able to do that. How do we foster that in training at Home Station, and then ensure they are recovering during Combat Operations? “In Charlie’s opinion, the battalion did not understand that the operations tempo they were asking the company to perform outstripped the limits of long-run human endurance.” (location 2140)
16. Has a Soldier like PFC Steven Green came across your time in the military, how have you seen those with his attitude worked with to successfully integrate into Military? How did failure to address his language and attitude contribute to his later actions?
17. When a Soldier comes to you with information about something that is questionably ethically or just plain wrong, if not illegal such as what PFC Watts shares that he has heard what are our obligations to process/act on that information? What could have been done differently to care for PFC Watt?
18. What does SGT Yribe do with the information PFC Green provides to him, (2X) about what he had done?
19. When you hear that something is being planned, that Soldiers are speaking about others in a way that has dehumanized them (Foreign Nationals, the Enemy, another Unit on the COB/FOB) what are the preemptive steps so we can avoid another incident such as this from happening? ( Barker, Cortez, Green, Spielman) 

After witnessing the “...tirade of abuse, scorn and personal attack, and the message was clear: 1st Platoon was to blame for 1st Platoons problems” (location 5122), “the chaplain came in and said, “I don’t agree with what happened here, but if you guys need any help, you can come and see me.” Is that offering authentic care to help rebuild these Soldiers? What could the command be doing to help them after what they have gone through and the ethical/moral failures of some of their platoon members?             

Additional Resources for review:

The Lucifer Effect, Phillip Zimbardo, https://lucifereffect.com/

Center for the Army Profession Ethic, https://cape.army.mil/

Jim Frederick, Leadership and Accountability in 21st Century, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZBWL1CFDb-A

Jim Frederick, Books and Coffee, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y8Ov6nIcUHw

Chain of Command Performance of Duty, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, 2005-06 A Case Study Offered to the Center for the Army Professional Ethic, LTG John H. Cushman, https://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/BlackHeartsCase.pdf

ADP 6-22, ADRP 6-22 Army Leadership, 08/01/2012

ADP 7-0, ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, 08/23/2012