Returning to Our Amphibious Roots: Time for the U.S. Army to Rediscover Amphibiosity

The United States Army, historically, is the most experienced amphibious formation in American military history? The Marine Corps over the course of the entire Second World War made fifteen amphibious landings with six Marine Divisions.?Most of the Marine landings, while requiring nothing short of incredible and heroic sacrifice, were on smaller islands, although still vital to the Pacific campaign, like Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Peleliu to name a few.?Left to often to the dusty annuals of history are the Army’s landings on the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, the Aleutians, Okinawa, Borneo, and Guadalcanal to name a few.?Each of these landings were often Corps level operations on an enormous scale that only the Army, supported by the Navy, could execute.?And this does not include the landings in the European Theater of Operations in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Normandy, Southern France, and Operation Varsity—the crossing of the Rhine.?History aside, materially, and based on the volume of sheer combat power, there is no service better suited to put men and capability over the beach.??It is true, the Army has abandoned its amphibious roots since the end of the Korean War.?However, the Army has always been ready, able, and willing when the country called, and circumstances required, to do the nation's bidding.?This article suggests the United States Army needs to study what will be required of it in the Pacific in the event of war with China. It would be easy to dismiss this suggestion based on the U.S. Navy’s current limited “Gator Navy” capability, but the hard right is studying the requirement, using history and current threat models and PLA writings.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is diplomatically making inroads into Micronesia.??These inroads are designed to reduce international support for Taiwan, secure access to nature resources, and expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).?Chinese efforts to establish a military presence in Vanuatu served as a bellwether to United States allies Australia and New Zealand, as Vanuatu sits astride trade routes between the US and its allies in Oceania.?Vanuatu also puts China in striking range of US administered islands in the western and eastern Pacific.?Chinese military think tank writings further suggest the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) have studied Imperial Japanese World War II operations to determine where they committed the martial sin of overreach.?Open-source writings suggest the PLA believe Imperial Japanese operations achieved overreach when they expanded beyond the Second Island Chain (Figure 1-Map of the First and Second Island Chains).?Therefore, the Second Island Chain should be viewed as the PLA’s future first line of defense in a conflict with the U.S. and the First Island Chain the second or fallback line of defense. ?

China watchers might say the PLA does not have the capability to expand out to the Second Island China, let alone have access.?One should examine the sheer volume of warships and submarines built by the PLA Navy (PLAN) in the past decade. One could argue the competence of their Fleet is in question, but sheer numbers should not be dismissed. The PLAN’s third aircraft carrier recently came off the ways.?Detractors would say the U.S. still enjoys a better than 3:1 advantage in Carrier Strike Groups (CGS), but it would be useful to remember China has the luxury of interior lines of operation and we only enjoy a 2:1 advantage in the Pacific, assuming we could generate all six CSGs.?Some might also say COMSEVENTH Fleet is forward postured in Japan and would serve as a capable contact force.?It should not be lost on readers Atsugi, Yokohama, and Sasebo are within PLA Rocket Forces effective range and it's safe to assume the PLA has rehearsed strikes on these U.S. outposts.?The CCP is arguably setting the stage militarily for pushing the U.S. out of the First Island Chain and beyond, requiring us to fight our way back in if we decide it is in our national interest to do so.?

Fighting our way back in will be both costly and require more amphibious forcible entry capability than we have today.?One might say, well we could sail our East Coast amphibious capability through the Panama Canal.?While it is possible, the Chinese have again made a move in their great game of Go, actively posturing themselves in the Canal Zone to deny us that option as the newly installed USSOUTHCOM Commander recently reported.?One might say we could transit the Suez and the Strait of Malacca, yet again the PLA have postured themselves at Djibouti to interdict our maritime forces.?And more recently China broke ground on a naval installation in Cambodia in the Gulf Thailand, a location that would posture its forces to interdict our Strike Groups transit of the Straits of Malacca.?The trap is slowly closing like a Venus Fly Trap.?And while it is useful to watch where the Chinese are posturing their forces, it is also useful to watch where they are placing casinos.?Much like Chinese COSCO ships whose Captains are PLAN officers, it is logical to assume Chinese casinos are run by state security and are prepared to provide a staging base to carry out subterfuge as well as direct action.?

Based on the rough battlefield geometry just laid out a three division Marine Corps is insufficient to fight our way back across the Pacific, assuming the PLA can seize the First Island China and hold at risk the Second Island Chain. You might say what about the Australians, they have amphibious capability.?Yes, but again their amphibious capability is extremely limited.?The same is true of the Japanese with their singular Amphibious Ready Defense Brigade, which is currently incapable of operating unilaterally.?Options are limited.?Therefore, it is time for the United States Army to open a dialogue with the United States Navy and consider training and equipping one Division as an experimental amphibious unit.?Logically the 25th Infantry Division would be ideally situated to conduct amphibious experiments; however, one must recall beaches certified for amphibious assault training are extremely limited in the Hawaiian Islands.?One has only to watch Amphibious Ready Group Operations off Bellows Beach to appreciate this reality.?The better options are beaches off California that are long and have appropriate compactness of sand to handle equipment over the beach.?It must be said, it is incredibly unfortunate the Army turned over Fort Ord to the State of California.?It was the last post in the Army where amphibious training was feasible on the West Coast in the Lower 48 States.

The 7th Infantry Division (7ID) has a legacy of amphibious operations as long and storied as the 25th Infantry Division.?While 7ID is a Stryker equipped force that should not stop consideration.?For starters, the Army and Navy need to initiate talks at the Service level regarding amphibious capability.?The Joint Staff and Indo-Pacific Command and its Components need to undertake a classified study of the problem under the conditions of Anti-Access and Area-Denial (A2AD) with the assumption Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) and Air Forces are severely attrited or forced to withdraw from East Asia.?No more poignant example can be given than the PLA’s current ongoing show of force in the East China Sea.?Were Xi Jinping’s patience to run out and his calculus assume the United States has consumed enough strategic readiness and war stocks supporting Ukraine and we are no longer able to generate sufficient, immediate capability to stop him, his show of force might become an invasion.?Xi has been embarrassed by the Speaker of the House’s visit to Taiwan as he seeks a third term at the helm of the CCP.?He could easily transport 100,000 North Korean replacements to Ukraine to keep NATO tied down while he secures the First Island Chain.?China is more sanction proof than Russia and more inextricably linked to the global economy.?Were China to secure the First Island Chain it would have time to deploy its forces to the Second Island Chain before we were fully ready to respond.

In conclusion this article is but the opening salvo in a conversation that demands lengthy debate, but while we debate the CCP’s great game of Go continues.?Time and geography are not on our side.?It is instructive to recall that our World War II Pacific operations were compromised of multiple axis of advance and the same will be true in the event of a U.S.-China War.?Diplomacy may yet prevent Xi from exercising the military option, but his presumed posturing should be instructive.?

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Colonel (Retired) O. Kent Strader is a 2006 School of Advanced Military Studies graduate.?He spent the final nine of his 28-year career in the Indo-Asia Pacific serving as a planner at a Number Fleet, Land Component Headquarters, and Corps Headquarters.?His final posting was as a Corps G5.?He is currently enrolled as a doctoral student of Global Security at American Military University.