"Reliance on a single foreign supplier can leave a nation vulnerable to extortion and intimidation." Donald Trump
"Reliance on a single foreign supplier can leave a nation vulnerable to extortion and intimidation."
"That is why we congratulate European states, such as Poland, for leading the construction of a Baltic pipeline so that nations are not dependent on Russia to meet their energy needs. Germany will become totally dependent on Russian energy if it does not immediately change course.â€
Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly | New York, NY - 25 September, 2018?
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Reuters: Pentagon asks top 8 U.S. weapons makers to meet on Ukraine -sources
WASHINGTON, April 12 (Reuters) - The Pentagon will discuss the industry's capacity to meet Ukraine's weapons needs if the war with Russia lasts years, two people familiar with the meeting said on Tuesday.
Demand for weapons has shot up after Russia's invasion on Feb. 24 spurred U.S. and allied weapons transfers to Ukraine. Resupplying as well as planning for a longer war is expected to be discussed at the meeting, the sources told Reuters on condition of anonymity.
The Pentagon's office of Acquisition and Sustainment, the weapons buyer for the U.S. Department of Defense, will host the 90 minute meeting and Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks was expected to attend, one of the people said.
The Pentagon has said that the most useful weapons are smaller systems such as Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, which Washington and allies have been shipping to Ukraine on a nearly daily basis.
The White House said last week that it has provided more than $1.7 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the invasion, including over 5,000 Javelins and more than 1,400 Stingers.
The Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Administration is having weekly meetings of its European Crisis Management Team to review specific requests related to Ukraine.
To speed up U.S. government approval for sales and transfers of arms produced by American defense contractors, the Pentagon has re-established a team to respond to the increased demand.?read more
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WAR IN UKRAINE
Another Problem for Russia in Ukraine: Effective Satellites Are Few and Far Between
By Mark Krutov Sergei Dobrynin - Published 12 April 2022
?The Russian forces have faced many problems in Ukraine. A big item on the list of problems: satellites — there are too few of them, and too few with high-quality capabilities. According to experts and open-source information, Russia has long been saddled with a small and inadequate fleet of communications and surveillance satellites that in many cases rely on either outdated technology or imported parts that are now harder to come by due to Western?sanctions.
By all accounts, Russia’s war on Ukraine isn’t going?well.
The estimated death toll among Russian soldiers is about the same as Soviet losses for the entire 10-year Afghan war. Russian forces have failed to achieve strategic goals such as taking Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, or the major port city of Mariupol. More than two-thirds of Russia’s battalion tactical groups — its basic fighting units — have been deployed. Its forces have been plagued by major interoperability and communication?failures.
Another big item on the list of problems:?satellites?— there are too few of them, and too few with high-quality?capabilities.
According to experts and open-source information compiled by?RFE/RL, Russia has long been saddled with a small and inadequate fleet of communications and surveillance satellites that in many cases rely on either outdated technology or imported parts that are now harder to come by due to Western?sanctions.
Ukraine has no satellite fleet of its own. But it has benefited greatly not only from the unprecedented amount of weaponry and military equipment that the United States has supplied, but also from an unprecedented amount of intelligence, including real-time data on Russian troop?movements.
It’s unclear if that includes high-resolution imagery from spy?satellites.
But in any case, a proliferation of Western technological developments has resulted in an explosion of high-quality, real-time satellite imagery available not only to military intelligence but also private, commercial companies. Russia has virtually none of?that.
“In principle, Russia is already practically blind in orbit, †said Bart Hendrix, a Brussels-based analyst and expert on Soviet and Russian space?programs.
According to a database maintained by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a respected?U.S.?nongovernmental organization, Russia currently has around 100 military or dual-purpose satellites. Nineteen of them are classified as remote sensing satellites, with technology allowing either optical photography or radio signal surveillance. The others serve other?purposes.
Resolution Matters
Russia has two optical reconnaissance satellites in orbit now, called Persona, Hendrix said, but they were launched between seven and nine years ago, meaning they may be near the end of their working?life.
Adding further to the problem: The maximum resolution of the Persona satellites is believed to be 50 centimeters per pixel, Hendrix?said.
Another Problem for Russia in Ukraine: Effective Satellites Are Few and Far Between
By comparison, the best American spy satellites, called Keyhole, are estimated to have a resolution of around 5 centimeters per pixel. At that resolution, the letter “V†which is being painted on the roofs of Russian military vehicles operating in Ukraine would be easily and clearly visible from the typical altitude where a spy satellite was?orbiting.
Commercial satellite companies like Maxar and Planet typically have a?maximum resolution?of around 15?centimeters.
“The Americans have at least five Keyhole-12 satellites, the Italians, the French and the Spaniards have their own satellites, there are an order of magnitude more,†Hendrix told?RFE/RL.
Russia has also lagged behind in building and deploying remote-sensing satellites whose radars can see through cloud cover, unlike optical?satellites.
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists’ database, Russia has only one confirmed?radar satellite in operation, called Kondor. It was launched in 2014, and with an expected lifespan of five years, it may have already ceased to be?operational.
In February, Russia’s space forces?launched another satellite, dubbed Kosmos-2553 or Neutron. Little is known about its purpose or capabilities, though it was built by Mashinostroyeniye, a Moscow military research institute which specializes specifically in radar-sensing?satellites.
“If Neutron is a radar satellite, then this is the first such launch in almost 10 years,†Hendrix?said.
“In terms of radar satellites, Russia also lags behind?NATO?by an order of magnitude,†he?said.
GPS,?GLONASS
The world’s most dominant system for positioning technology is the U.S.-built platform known simply as the Global Positioning System, or?GPS.
The technology is publicly available, and widely used in everything from navigation systems to handheld smartphones. But because it is owned and operated by the?U.S.?government, Russia has long chafed at the system, and sought to build an alternative, known as?GLONASS.
But for the?GLONASS?network to be fully functional, it needs 24 satellites. Russia currently has only 23 deployed, and several of them are nearing the end of their lifespan in?orbit.
Russia has struggled to build and launch new units for the?GLONASS?network in part because of the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow for its seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in?2014.
Experts said up to 90 percent of the electronics — which need to be resistant to space radiation that can quickly destroy sensitive equipment — used in the next generation?GLONASS?K-1 satellites are imported. Russia has tried to design and manufacture homegrown replacement parts, but the result was a satellite that was twice as heavy as the previous models and it has yet to be launched into?orbit.
“Half of the?GLONASS?satellites can fall out [of orbit] at any moment. In principle, the failure of the first three or four will only affect the accuracy in a certain area. But for normal coverage of the territory of Russia, about 18 units are needed,†said one expert who worked in Russian and European aerospace industry and asked to remain anonymous to discuss sensitive industry?matters.
“If the launch trend is not fundamentally changed, the?GLONASS?system will fall apart over the next few years,†he?said.
Further complicating matters: Russia’s next generation of military launch rockets — the heavy-lift Angara 5 — has been plagued by problems. It has been used in only three launches since?2014.
Data Overload
Another problem is data processing, according to Pavel Podvig, an expert on Russian armed forces and a senior fellow at the?UN?Institute for Disarmament Research in?Geneva.
“It’s one thing to have satellites, it’s another thing to be able to use them. You need a system that will allow you to quickly transfer information from satellites to the right people who will process it and transfer it to people responsible, for example, for target designation,†he?said.
领英推è
“The fact that Russia has some satellites still flying does not mean that such a system exists, and if it exists, in the case of Russia it is difficult to say how good or bad it is,†Podvig?added.
“Even the Americans aren’t able to cope with this task,†he said. “I don’t see any evidence that Russia is successfully solving this task in the war with?Ukraine.â€
Written by Mike Eckel based on reporting by Mark Krutov and Sergei Dobrynin of?RFE/RL’s Russian Service. Mike Eckel is a senior correspondent reporting on political and economic developments in Russia, Ukraine, and around the former Soviet Union. Mark Krutov is a correspondent for?RFE/RL’s Russian Service. Sergei Dobrynin is one of the leading investigative journalists in Russia.This?article?is reprinted with permission of?Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty?(RFE/RL).
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THE RUSSIA CONNECTION
A Headache for Germany: Russian Nickel, Palladium, Chromium Exports
By Arthur Sullivan - Published 12 April 2022
Russian gas and oil are by far the most significant exports Moscow sells to Germany. Yet other important raw materials are also under the spotlight because of the war in?Ukraine.
Almost all the debate surrounding Germany’s economic ties with Russia?since the invasion of Ukraine has focused on gas and oil. With good reason — Germany buys more Russian oil and gas than any other European country, making energy Russia’s most lucrative import to Germany by?far.
However, many German companies rely on a steady supply of other Russian exports, particularly raw materials such as nickel, palladium, copper and?chromium.
Nickel is used in stainless steelmaking but is also an important component for lithium-ion batteries which are needed to power electric cars. Palladium is also vital for carmakers, as it is a critical component in the production of catalytic converters, which clean exhaust fumes in petrol and hybrid?vehicles.
In 2020, Russia was Germany’s biggest provider of raw nickel, accounting for 39% of the country’s supply according to the?MIT?Observatory of Economic Complexity, a trade?tracker.
It also provided around 25% of German imports of palladium, and between 15% and 20% of the heavy metals chromium and cadmium, which have a range of industrial uses. Russia also accounted for 11% of Germany’s refined copper imports in 2020, 10.9% of its platinum and 8.5% of its iron?ore.
Nickel and Daimler
A recent study by the German Economic Institute (IW), a Cologne-based think-tank, identified several raw materials imported from Russia which would be difficult to replace for Germany. “New trade relations with alternative export nations for these raw materials are essential,†the institute said in a?statement.
Nickel is particularly important to consider. Germany’s second-biggest import partner for raw nickel in 2020 was the Netherlands at?29%. But Russia is the market leader, supplying around 20% of the world’s purest form of the metal, known as class 1?nickel.
High grade nickel has been in increasingly short supply for a few years now. The boom in electric vehicle production around the world —?which needs high-grade nickel for batteries —?has seen demand?surge.
Tesla?CEO?Elon Musk has frequently tweeted about the lack of nickel. “Nickel is the biggest challenge for high-volume, long-range batteries!†he wrote in July 2020. “Australia?&?Canada are doing pretty well.?US?nickel production is objectively very lame. Indonesia is?great!â€
?Class 1 nickel prices had already doubled over the last two years but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted fears that Moscow could impose an export ban.??A trading frenzy in early March saw prices hit record highs, with the London Metal Exchange even suspending trading for a period, the first time it had taken such action in 37 years. Nickel prices have gone up 400% in 2022?alone.
Volkswagen —?which has effectively staked its future on rapidly becoming an?EV?power?— recently announced that it had struck an agreement with the Chinese companies Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan Group for a joint venture to secure raw cobalt and nickel supply in Indonesia, one of the world’s biggest?producers.
Export Bans, Import Bans
However, uncertainty over Russian raw materials will continue to stalk the market. Some analysts have predicted that the nickel crisis alone will add at least $1,000 (€919)?to the costs of a new electric car for?consumers.
The?VDA, the trade body for German carmakers,?says the war in Ukraine will lead to further disruption of vehicle production in Germany.?“In the long term, the car industry is facing shortages and higher prices of raw materials,†it said in a?statement.
Not only carmakers are affected. In 2018, German chemicals giant?BASF?joined forces with Russia’s Norilsk Nickel, the world’s largest producer of refined nickel, for a deal which would see the Russian company supply?BASF’s new battery materials production facility in Finland with nickel and cobalt. Such deals are now being heavily?scrutinized.
Although Moscow did not put materials such as nickel on the export ban list it released in March, there remains a?chance that sanctions either from Moscow or Brussels will end the flow of such raw materials to?Europe.
On Friday, the?EU?announced import bans on several Russian products including coal, caviar, wood, rubber, cement and vodka. However, nickel and other commodities exported in high volume to countries such as Germany were left off the?list.
Small Potatoes Compared to Energy
Even if the sale of Russian nickel to Europe is not legally prohibited, the overwhelming pressure on German companies to cut business ties with Russia continues to mount in practically every?sector.
Yet while myriad economic and business links between Germany and Russia die away and will continue to do so in the face of the outrage over what is happening in Ukraine, almost every scenario is dwarfed in significance by the possible consequences of an embargo on Russian oil and?gas.
Many experts and business leaders have argued?that Germany’s economic prosperity of recent decades has largely been built on the cheap supply of Russian?energy.
BASF?head Martin Brudermüller told the?Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung?that a sudden ban on Russian oil or gas?could lead to an economic crisis?as bad as any in Germany since World War?II, and that his company would have to stop production if natural gas supplies fell to less than half the current?usage.
Some disagree with such strong assessments.?A study by the German National Academy of Sciences, Leopoldina, said ending supply immediately would be?“manageable.â€
The fact that something as stringent as an outright ban on Russian energy is being seriously debated does make one thing clear for any German business with ties to Russia, regardless of their nature: Nothing is off limits, regardless of how economically “critical�it may?be.
Arthur Sullivan is business reporter at?DW.?This?article?was edited by Hardy Graupner, and is published courtesy of?Deutsche Welle (DW).
?Ukraine, Russia, crisis, Germany, Russian metal exports, German Economy | Homeland Security Newswire
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ENERGY SECURITY
Can Nuclear Generation Help Reduce European Reliance on Russian Gas?
By Anne-Sophie Corbeau - Published 7 April 2022
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the International Energy Agency and the European Commission have come up with plans to rapidly reduce the European Union’s imports of Russian natural gas. While the International Energy Agency anticipates that?EU?nuclear generation could increase by 20 terawatt hours (TWh) (or 2.7 percent) in 2022, the European Commission only mentions nuclear as a potential source of?hydrogen.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the?International Energy Agency?and the?European Commission?have come up with plans to rapidly reduce the European Union’s imports of Russian natural gas. While the International Energy Agency anticipates that?EU?nuclear generation could increase by 20 terawatt hours (TWh) (or 2.7 percent) in 2022, the European Commission only mentions nuclear as a potential source of?hydrogen.
Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a global research scholar with the Center on Global Energy Policy, answers questions from?State of the Planetabout how nuclear power can help reduce the?EU’s gas?demand.
State of the Planet: Can nuclear generation help reduce gas demand in Europe in the near term?
Anne-Sophie Corbeau: Nuclear represents about?25 percent?of the?EU’s electricity generation. In 2020, nuclear generation amounted to 688 TWh and is estimated to have recovered to around 735 TWh in 2021. However, nuclear generation is expected to drop by an estimated 90 TWh in 2022, and by another 20 TWh in 2023. Lower supplies of electricity from nuclear generation are generally made up for with higher consumption of natural?gas.
Falling nuclear production in Europe can be attributed to two factors. The first is that French is down from 360 TWh in 2021; electric utility?EDF?expects French nuclear generation to range between 295 and 315 TWh in 2022, and between 300 and 330 TWh in 2023. Taking the average of these assessments, this will reduce French generation by about 60 TWh in 2022 and 50 TWh in 2023 against 2021 levels. The lower generation forecasts take into account that a number of French nuclear reactors will be closed for their 10-year inspection or for controls due to suspicions of?corrosion.
The second reason is the retirement of around 4?GW?of nuclear capacity in Germany in the wake of a decision made after the Fukushima Daiichi accident of 2011. These plants generated about 30 TWh in 2020. Another 6?GW?is due to be decommissioned by early 2023. The effects will be mostly felt from 2023 onward. The start of nuclear power plants in Finland, France, and Slovakia over 2022–23 will only partly counterbalance this?decline.
It is uncertain that more nuclear generation can come from other operating plants. Most plants outside of France (around 39?GW) operate at high rates (>90 percent), including 25?GW?operating at above 96 percent. In contrast, the load factors in France have been low (about 70?percent).
SP: Are there actions that policy makers could take to increase nuclear power and reduce Europe’s dependence on gas?
Corbeau: There are two actions that policy makers could take for nuclear to help reduce gas?consumption:
·?Postpone the decommissioning of the 6?GW?of nuclear capacity in Germany and Belgium due to be retired by early 2023. This may be challenging, as these plants will need fuel and a qualified workforce to operate the plants, but given that they are still operating, it could be possible to reverse the process if the decision is made soon enough. This action would not significantly change the situation in 2022 but will have an impact on next winter and add close to 50 TWh in 2023, mostly from Germany and?Belgium.
·?Restart the 4?GW?recently decommissioned in Germany. This can be technically challenging and costly, and could face local opposition. To the extent regulatory and political barriers are removed, action needs to be taken quickly. As time passes, it becomes harder to restart plants, as they will need a workforce and fuel, which has to be ordered well in advance specifically for each reactor. However, such a process could add another 30 TWh by 2023. How much can be added in 2022 depends on the speed of the?process.
French nuclear generation could prove the most important factor for adding to?EU?nuclear power in the near and long term. If?EDF?were able to increase its power generation back to 2021 levels quickly, that could add 10 TWh in 2022 (the upper range of?EDF’s forecasts) and 50 TWh in 2023. Given that France has typically low load factors, there is an upside to going back to above 400 TWh—the levels reached in the mid-2010s—but this may be limited by the number of 10-year inspections happening over the coming?years.
If these three options are achieved, Europe’s nuclear generation would reach almost 660 TWh in 2022 and 760 TWh in 2023, compared to 735 TWh in 2021. Looking at 2030, an additional 14?GW?out of the 100?GW?operating in 2021 are expected to be retired. A reassessment of nuclear power plants could be done to determine which plants could safely be operated longer. Additionally, European countries willing to build nuclear capacity could accelerate their plans, as these plants typically take a decade to build.?If approved by the European Council and the Parliament, the new?EU?taxonomy, which includes nuclear as a sustainable energy activity, could help to support?financing.
?This post,?originally published?by Columbia Climate School’s Center on Global Energy Policy, is?published courtesy of?Earth Institute, Columbia?University.?
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