The Regional Balance of Power Reshuffled: Who is Realigning Regionally and Internationally?

It will be now crucial to see how Turkey will play its cards in Syria after it secured the grand prize of the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime at the hands of its allies, who now control Damascus and other Syrian cities. Yet Turkey – and Israel's – emergence as dominant regional players does not negate the relevance of Arab influence. Indeed, the key Arab states still possess crucial tools to position themselves strategically within this shifting balance of power.

Globally, power dynamics have also shifted. Russian influence in the Middle East and Africa has waned, driven by its diminished foothold in the Mediterranean and the collapse of the regional and potentially domestic positions of its key ally, Iran. For their part, is China bracing for the economic confrontation anticipated from newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump, while Europe trembles under the weight of its staunch support for Ukraine, fearing that cornering Russia might provoke a tactical nuclear conflict.

The year 2024 has proven disastrous for Iran’s Islamic Republic, culminating in its abrupt withdrawal from Syria as armed factions—backed and encouraged by Turkey and Israel—toppled the Assad regime. Iran fled Syria to avoid a ground war it deemed too costly, abandoning its longstanding military, political, and economic investments there, leaving left behind a legacy of mismanagement that failed to deliver for the Syrian people.

Moscow is enraged by Tehran which it had entrusted with safeguarding Assad’s regime, more than it was enraged by the victory of the armed rebels and the ‘betrayal’ of Turkish President Erdogan. Russia was blindsided by Iran's inability—or unwillingness—to protect the Assad government in Damascus, creating a rift in their partnership. Indeed, President Vladimir Putin had envisioned a strategic agreement with Iran, similar to its pact with China. However, after the events in Syria, the future of this agreement is in jeopardy. Even if relations are mended, the mutual trust underpinning their strategic partnership has been irreparably damaged.

Both sides will exchange blame, directing their frustration toward the Syrian military, which had grown disillusioned during the remarkable developments that culminated in the regime's collapse in Damascus in just 11 days. While reconciliation between them might occur later, trust between them has been deeply shaken, along with their strategic partnership.

The severe blow Turkey dealt to Russia and Iran fundamentally altered their relationship, especially since the three nations had previously considered themselves partners in determining Syria's future through the Astana process. Suddenly, Turkey pulled the rug out from under Russia and Iran, assuming pole position in shaping Syria’s destiny, as well as defining the scope and nature of Russian and Iranian influence in the Middle East.

Vladimir Putin will never forgive Recep Tayyip Erdogan for what he perceives as a significant betrayal. Indeed, Russia had played a pivotal role in securing Erdogan’s re-election, provided Turkey with discounted gas, and viewed their relationship as strategic, particularly given Turkey’s strained ties with its NATO allies.

However, Turkey had reassessed its strategic and national interests, deciding that improving relations with NATO countries presented an opportunity it could not afford to miss. Ankara found common ground with these nations in Ukraine, where Turkey has financial, economic, and military ties—particularly through the production of drones vital to Kyiv's war effort.

Erdogan postponed his meeting with Putin three times, all while planning to remove Russia and its partner Iran from Syria alongside the Assad regime. This meeting is likely to remain indefinitely postponed as Turkey's bargaining process with Russia gets going, particularly concerning the fate of Russian bases in Hmeimim and Tartus.

The two bases are critical for Russia’s presence in the Mediterranean and its access to Africa, especially via Libya. Ankara has assured Moscow that the bases will not face military threats from armed groups, while the new regime in Damascus has sent signals to Russia that it will not target the bases for now—possibly out of fear of provoking a ground battle given the bases' formidable defences.

While the serious bargaining process between Russia and Turkey has yet to begin in earnest, it is clear that Ankara holds more leverage. First, Turkey controls matters on the ground now, and second, Turkey remains a lifeline for Russia, which is grappling with the weight of Western sanctions.

Turkey's offer will likely be to secure a relatively peaceful and dignified withdrawal for Russia from the two bases, but this would come at a significant cost—one that Moscow might find impossible to pay. Reports suggest Turkey has hinted at allowing Russia to keep the bases in exchange for an annual fee of $100–150 million—an impractical sum for Moscow under current circumstances. As a result, Ankara’s actual proposal amounts to a quiet, de facto expulsion of Russia from Hmeimim and Tartus. This has only fuelled Moscow's growing frustration.

Ultimately the future of these Russian bases depends on decisions made by the United States and Turkey, not the new Damascus regime. Washington may find its interests are best served by shutting down the bases or converting them into NATO—or even American—bases, to eliminate Russia’s influence in the Mediterranean.

For Turkey, the key goal is consolidating its control over Syria while dismantling Kurdish aspirations for statehood. This is the focus of its negotiations with the United States. In return, Turkey is offering to rein in armed factions and prevent the spread of terrorism or militant Islamist extremism in Syria. However, these are pledges, not guarantees. Still, Turkey’s offerings align with the goals of the U.S. and European nations, whose main aim is to remove Russia from the Mediterranean and consolidate NATO's dominance in the region. And Turkey is ready to support NATO's ambitions, particularly through its control of Syria and Libya, by spreading its pragmatic Islamist ideologies.

Israel, for its part, has positioned itself well within the shifting regional power dynamics. Its achievements include inflicting significant blows on Iran within its borders, undermining Iran’s regional influence strategy by hitting its proxies led by Hezbollah, and neutralizing the "Persian Crescent" project, a key pillar of Tehran’s regional ambitions. Israel also systematically dismantled Syria’s military infrastructure, accelerating Iran's retreat from Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

As Turkey presents itself to NATO as a strategic partner with a unique role in the Middle East, Israel likewise positions itself as a strong ally to the U.S., instrumental in shaping the emerging Middle East. While Israel is exuding a sense of triumphalism stemming from its military successes in Lebanon and Syria, Israeli leaders are acutely aware that these victories were achieved with direct U.S. support—manifested in substantial military aid and logistical backing from the U.S. Central Command in the Middle East.

In light of Turkey's ambition to cement its place in global and regional power dynamics, Israel's firm positioning, and Iran's diminishing influence, where do Arab states stand? Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, are clearly at the forefront of Arab leadership during this historical phase. So, what are the options and the roadmap for Arab countries to position themselves in the regional and global balance of power?

The vision and capabilities exist. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, encapsulates national and regional ambitions that are developmental, pragmatic, and visionary. It envisions a Middle East resembling Europe—a secures Arab region that looks into the future with peace and prosperity.

What is required is meaningful engagement with sectors marginalized by despotism in key states like Syria. If Arab nations are serious about preventing Syria from falling under Turkish or Israeli influence—or succumbing to Sunni and Shia extremism—they must engage with Syrian Arab tribes and the elites sidelined by the Assad regime. The objective of this engagement is not merely to appoint individuals to sovereign ministries but to ensure their active participation in civil infrastructure sectors, such as the economy, industry, and transportation. Strengthening Arab tribes also serves to hinder extremism, a looming threat to Syria's future.

Reconstruction projects will inevitably counter the projects of destruction that have suffocated Syria. Gulf Arab states hold the keys to Syria’s reconstruction—not Turkey, Israel, or Iran, which has swiftly abandoned their investments in the country.

Turkey lacks the financial resources to secure its control over Syria’s future, while Israel is unlikely to be accepted as a player in broader reconstruction efforts. Only Gulf Arab states possess the necessary resources to rescue Syria from darkness, ensuring it remains a secular Arab state in the truest sense, rather than falling victim to Israeli or Turkish agendas—particularly those tied to the Muslim Brotherhood or Israeli expansionist ambitions.

As for the roadmap for Arab positioning in regional power dynamics, this remains an ongoing discussion worth tackling in the future.