Region reacts to Trump triumph
Thank you for reading LatinNews' chosen article from the Latin American Weekly Report - 07 November 2024
Governments across the region received the news of Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections on 5 November with a mixture of trepidation and dread for most, and euphoria and excitement for a more select group. Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum, who is likely to face the full force of Storm Donald, gave an outward show of equanimity but in private she will be trying to batten down the hatches ahead of its impending arrival. Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro is likely to be concerned after Trump endeavoured to drive him from office in 2019, although, paradoxically, it is relations with Colombia, traditionally the closest ally of the US in the region, that could well turn sour more quickly. Argentina’s President Javier Milei shares the greatest affinity with Trump, but that is no guarantee that he will not fall foul of his transactional politics.
As Trump’s victory became apparent on 6 November, President Sheinbaum declared that “there is no cause for concern”, saying she was “convinced” that relations between the two countries would be good. While acknowledging Trump had won the election, Sheinbaum said she would wait until the final vote counts had come in before issuing an official statement. This measured, cautious approach is indicative of Sheinbaum’s style and will likely mark the way in which her government plans to handle the Trump administration which, despite her assurances, throws up some significant concerns for Mexico.
The Mexican peso fell by over 3%, reaching M$20.80/US$1 on 6 November, its lowest level since August 2022. Although since recovering some of its losses, the volatility is expected to continue in the coming weeks. In particular, the markets are concerned about the impact that a Trump presidency will have on bilateral trade. Trump has pledged to impose harsher and broader trade tariffs on Mexico. Given over 80% of Mexico’s exports go to the US, bringing in around US$475bn in 2023 alone, this would have a significant impact.
More widely, Trump has indicated he wants to renegotiate the terms of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the free trade deal that replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) during his first term, when it comes up for review in 2026. This will be a pivotal moment as Mexico will have to work hard to avoid Trump tearing up this deal too, as he did with Nafta, or agreeing to unfavourable terms. The appointment to lead the economy ministry of Marcelo Ebrard, who worked with the previous Trump administration as foreign minister (2018-2023), was widely seen as having the USMCA review in mind.
Trump is also using the threat of tariffs as a bargaining chip in another major bilateral challenge: migration management. He has pledged to impose tariffs of 25% on all Mexican imports if the government does not curb the flow of migration to the US border, saying he would raise this to 100% if needed. He has promised to step up the anti-migration policies of his first presidency, pledging to enact mass deportations, militarise the border, and reinstate the so-called ‘Remain in Mexico’ programme. These measures will likely increase the already high numbers of migrants in Mexico, especially in its ill-equipped and often dangerous northern border towns.
Security cooperation will also present a major challenge. Trump has proposed firing missiles into Mexico to destroy clandestine drug laboratories and sending in ‘kill teams’ to take out drug kingpins. While likely a rhetorical threat, there is no doubt that Trump will place immense pressure on Sheinbaum’s government to crack down on the power of drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) and curb the flow of fentanyl into the US. This will strain bilateral relations given that Sheinbaum, like her predecessor, is a staunch advocate for the inviolability of Mexican sovereignty and her government is already bristling at the reluctance of the US to hand over information regarding its involvement in the arrest of Sinaloa DTO co-founder Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada García in July.
At a personal level, Sheinbaum will not have the easy rapport that characterised relations between Trump and her predecessor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Despite their ideological differences, they shared much in common as charismatic, loquacious, nationalist anti-establishment populists. Trump apparently referred to López Obrador privately as “Juan Trump” in a sign of his recognition of a kindred spirit who knew how to play his game. The more earnest and conventional Sheinbaum will face a stiffer challenge, although relations could well be more strained with the closest ally of the US in the region rather than its closest neighbour.
Colombia faces rocky relations
Colombia’s President Petro gave a muted response to Trump’s victory and this has the potential to be a combustible relationship. Beyond a shared suspicion of the deep state, and a natural volubility, they have little in common: Petro is the most strident critic of Israel in the region, Trump a staunch supporter; Petro is a passionate defender of the environment, opponent of fossil fuels, and climate crusader (who in his inaugural address at the COP16 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity hosted by Colombia on 21 October said that “We are beginning the era of human extinction”), Trump has shown scant concern for the environment, wants to ramp up oil production, and espouses climate denialism.
The biggest bone of contention between Petro and Trump, however, is likely to be drugs. Colombia’s coca cultivation increased by 10% in 2023 to 253,000 hectares compared with the previous year, according to a report released by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on 18 October, while potential cocaine production, soared, climbing 53% on 2022 figures to 2,664 tonnes. Trump threatened to decertify Colombia as a partner in the war against drugs when it was being governed by Iván Duque (2018-2022), an ally who shared his party’s political persuasion, despite describing him as “a really good guy”, because he had failed to deliver on his promise “to stop drugs” and “has done nothing for us”. Trump is likely to have far less patience with Petro.
What now for Venezuela?
President Maduro, notably, gave a much more welcoming response than Petro, congratulating Trump on his victory, highlighting the “historic links between the peoples of both countries” and hailing “a new start” for bilateral relations. Trump recognised opposition politician Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela in 2019 as part of a failed attempt to remove Maduro from power. He reportedly respects Maduro’s resilience but might seek to turn the screw again, especially if there is a further surge in immigration after Maduro’s scheduled inauguration on 10 January. According to Panamanian authorities, Venezuelans made up more than 80% of the 25,111 migrants trying to cross the Darién Gap in September.
Cuba tensions
Venezuela’s main ally, Cuba did not even reference the US election, let alone the victory of Trump, who reversed the rapprochement with Havana overseen under his predecessor Barack Obama (2009-2017). This culminated in the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism on 11 January 2021, nine days before the end of Trump’s first term. The designation subjects Cuba to sanctions that penalise persons and countries engaging in certain trade with Cuba, restricts US foreign assistance, bans defence exports and sales, and imposes certain controls on exports of dual use items.
Hopes for improved Cuba-US relations under President Joe Biden ultimately failed to materialise: while the current US administration has relaxed some restrictions on flights, migration, and remittances, and there has been a resumption of bilateral discussions on topics such as migration and law enforcement, other restrictions remain in place – notably the US’s continued designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, which is a major complaint of the Cuban government. But the return of Trump will test the mettle of President Miguel Díaz-Canel as his government wrestles with an acute economic crisis, with sanctions only likely to be tightened and Biden’s parole program, which permits tens of thousands of Cubans with US sponsors to enter the country legally, eliminated.
Central America and immigration
Trump’s threat of large-scale deportations is likely to significantly affect Central America which, under his administration, saw US funding reduced and hardline measures rolled out to address migration. This was in contrast to the outgoing administration’s attempts to tackle the root causes of migration from Central America such as lack of economic opportunity, insecurity, corruption, and climate change, through schemes such as the Partnership for Central America (PCA), a public-private partnership focused on economic development in Central America’s Northern Triangle (comprising El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).
Examples of the hardline measures rolled out under Trump’s first term include Asylum Cooperative Agreements (ACAs) with the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which were likened to ‘safe third country’ agreements that stipulate that asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the first safe country they enter. On 6 February 2021 President Biden announced they had been terminated [WR-21-07 ]. Trump also ended Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for countries, including El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua [WR-18-18 ] which was blocked in the courts and reversed under the current administration. TPS is a benefit granted to nationals from countries experiencing “ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or extraordinary and temporary conditions” that “prevent its nationals from returning safely”.
One of the first presidents to congratulate Trump following the 5 November election was El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele. The two share an ideological affinity, as well as a disinclination to accept the constraints imposed by democratic institutions. Bukele was a featured speaker in February at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the US state of Maryland, which was attended by prominent right-wing figures including Trump, while Trump’s son, Donald Trump Jr, attended Bukele’s second inauguration as president in June this year, which circumvented constitutional restrictions. With human rights or democracy unlikely to feature high on the Trump administration’s agenda, US-El Salvador relations look set to improve.
Leaders bent on strengthening democracy and rooting out corruption, for instance, Guatemala’s Bernardo Arévalo, will swiftly discover, if they are not already aware, that these are not priorities for Trump. Expressing his “congratulations” to Trump on social media, Arévalo has been clear previously about the crucial role played by the Biden administration in ensuring that transition of power went ahead in January this year, amid efforts by the so-called ‘pacto de corruptos’ network of institutional corruption in Guatemala to derail his August 2023 victory.
Brazil’s polarised response
In his congratulatory message to Trump on social media, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva focused on the need to respect democracy and the importance of dialogue. Just five days earlier, Lula had said in an interview that a Harris victory would be better for democracy, adding that “we saw what the end of Trump’s term [was like], that is, that attack on the Capitol”, which was emulated by supporters of far-right former president Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023), a Trump acolyte, in Brasília, in January 2023. Bolsonaro hailed Trump’s victory as a triumph for conservatives around the world. His eldest son, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, even claimed on 6 November that what Trump has achieved could be replicated by his father in the 2026 presidential race in Brazil, even though last year the superior electoral court (TSE) barred the former president from running for office for eight years.?
Despite the clear preference of the left-of-centre Lula administration for a Democrat in the White House, Lula has demonstrated an ability to elevate pragmatism over ideology before and display a cooperative stance with world leaders of different political stripes, except for some far-right leaders, such as Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Brazil and the US have a long history of close diplomatic ties, so regardless of the personal relationship between Lula and Trump, Brazil’s foreign ministry is expected to try to keep relations as smooth as possible with the US State Department.
However, relations are unlikely to be harmonious. The new US administration is likely to cut its support for Lula’s foreign policy priorities, such as international funding for measures to protect the Amazon rainforest. A possible lack of US backing for Brazil’s initiatives for multilateral cooperation might push Brazil to deepen its ties with other allies, such as China, Russia, and members in the Brics group of developing countries, or with other members of the G7 group of advanced economies. Some national press reports have highlighted that during Trump’s previous presidency, protectionist policies in the US pushed Brazilian agribusiness companies to boost exports to China and other partners.
Argentina: high hopes
It is across the border in Argentina where expectations will be highest for what a Trump victory could betoken. President Javier Milei gave the most effusive response to Trump’s triumph. An anti-system populist strongman, Milei will hope that his shared style and values can help secure US support for a new debt restructuring accord with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), on whose executive board the US has the largest voting weight, and an influx of investment.
In a televised interview with his partner, Amalia ‘Yuyito’ González, on 4 November, Milei justified firing his foreign minister, Diana Mondino, after Argentina voted in favour of lifting the US economic embargo on Cuba at the United Nations on 30 October. “I made clear my alignment with the US and Israel…for this reason the unpardonable mistake made by Mondino cost her her job in 30 minutes”. The diplomatic corps overnight became part of the enemy ‘caste’. In a ceremony on 4 November, Milei replaced Mondino with the country’s ambassador to the US, Gerardo Werthein, who he instructed to conduct a purge to root out “traitors” in the foreign ministry, all those supporting “enemy agendas opposed to liberty”, and “make them pay”.
Vehicle tariffs
Donald Trump has also threatened to impose 100% tariffs - or even 200% - on vehicles imported from Mexico. That could deal a major blow to an industry that accounts for around 5% of Mexico’s GDP and mainly exports to the US. Such threats have already led to a stymieing of foreign investment in Mexico, prompting US electric vehicle maker Tesla to put plans for a massive factory in Mexico on ice. The tariffs would be a bid to prevent the triangulation of Chinese vehicles through Mexico into the US, in just one sign of how an intensification of the US-China trade war under Trump may impact Mexico.
Argentine alignment
Gerardo Werthein fired all of the secretaries and undersecretaries in the foreign ministry after his appointment. A wealthy Jewish businessman with no diplomatic experience prior to his ambassadorial assignment in Washington, Werthein took his oath of office on the Torah. Werthein’s priority will be strengthening ties with the US and Israel. President Milei shares much in common with Donald Trump, notably unqualified support for Israel and climate change denialism, but they do have some differences, particularly over Ukraine. Trump’s trade protectionism could also pose problems for Argentina and conflicts with Milei’s libertarianism.
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